Young v. Orleans Parish Criminal District Court et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL ALEXANDER YOUNG 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1751
ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL
DISTRICT COURT, ET AL.
SECTION “A”(1)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Michael Alexander Young, a former Louisiana state inmate, filed this pro se and
in forma pauperis civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Young sued the Orleans Parish
Criminal District Court, Section J Judge Daryl Derbigny, and Court Deputy Taylor.2 In his original
complaint, Young stated his claim, without corrections to grammar or spelling, as follows:
Section J Judge Daryl Derbigny has allowed me to be set back, to the point I
haven’t been to court since my arringment on 10-2-24. My lawyer has waived
my presence, every court date I had. I’ve been in jail 13 ½ months because of
this. He’s allowed the D.A. to not prosecute my case, when I should have been
set for trail 6 months after I was Indicted, on a simple robbery charge. Which is
a non violent crime. Because of his failure to Judge things according to the law
of Louisiana, I’ve been mistreated by OPSO, sitting in jail 13 ½ months, with
no signs of getting out. Hostage situation3
Court Deputy Taylor – she has been calling the transportation deputies, telling
them not to bring me to court, that I’m not needed. How am I not needed, when
I have to go to court, to fight my charge? When I went to court on 6-26-25 she
told me the Judge is not here, I told her I haven’t seen my lawyer, are been to
court, since I’ve been in jail, she said if the lawyer waive my presence, then I’m
not needed, the courtroom is not a meeting place to see my lawyer. And I’m not
needed now. And told them to take me back.4
1 At the time Young filed this action, he was a pretrial detainee at the Orleans Justice Center. He has since been
extradited to Phoenix, Arizona, where he is awaiting charges. See Rec. Docs. 3 and 6.
2 Rec. Doc. 8.
3 Young filed a separate lawsuit against numerous defendants alleging various constitutional violations relating to his
treatment while incarcerated in Orleans Parish Justice Center. Young v. Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, et al., 25-cv-
1327 “M”(2). That litigation is currently being screened by United States Magistrate Judge Donna Phillips Currault.
4 Rec. Doc. 8 at 5–6.
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Young seeks monetary damages.5
Shortly after filing this case, Young advised that he was “finished with Orleans Parish,”
and that “[t]hey dropped the charges, and gave me credit for time served on 8-19-25.”6 In actuality,
Young pled guilty to the lesser offense of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $5,000, and
was sentenced to a deferred sentence of less than 14 months at hard labor under La. Code Crim. P.
art. 893.7
Federal law requires that this matter be screened. For example, with respect to actions, such
as this one, which are filed in forma pauperis, federal law mandates:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action …
(i) 	is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) 	fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) 	seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In addition, because Young is incarcerated, screening is also required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. That statute mandates that federal courts “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”8 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, the statute similarly provides:
On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or
any portion of the complaint, if the complaint –
5 Id. at 7.
6 Rec. Doc. 3 at 1, 3.
7 See Orleans Parish District Court’s Docket Master in Case No. 563067”J” (Docket Entry 8/18/25), accessed through
the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office Official website at https://www.opso.us.
8 “As used in this section, the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused
of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions
of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c).
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(1) 	is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2) 	seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d
174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). When making that determination, the Court has “not only the authority
to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to
pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Macias v. Raul
A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the plaintiff does
not “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnote, citation, and quotation marks omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has held:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Young filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In pertinent part, that statute provides:
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
For the following reasons, even when Young’s complaint is liberally construed,9 his federal
civil rights claims are frivolous, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and/or seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
I. 	Orleans Parish Criminal District Court
Young sued the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court (“OPCDC”) under § 1983. His
claim against the OPCDC is improper for two reasons.
First, OPCDC lacks capacity to sue or be sued under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. An entity's capacity to be sued is determined by reference to the law of the state
in which the district court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). To possess such a capacity under Louisiana
law, an entity must qualify as a “juridical person.” The Fifth Circuit has held that state district
courts are not juridical entities capable of being sued. McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th
411, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2023) (applying Louisiana law); see also Tooke v. White, No. 23-428, 2023
WL 6205925, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 22, 2023) (“OPCDC is not a juridical entity that is capable of
being sued under Louisiana law.”) (citing McLin, 79 F.4th at 416–17).
9 The Court must liberally construe a pro se civil rights complaint. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th
Cir. 1994).
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Second, amendment would be futile because OPCDC is subject to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See McLin, 79 F.4th at 417 n.23 (concluding that the Twenty-First Judicial District
“lacks the capacity to be sued” and that amendment would be futile because of Eleventh
Amendment immunity). Thus, Young’s claim against OPCDC should be dismissed with prejudice.
II. 	Section J Judge Daryl Derbigny
Young also sued the Hon. Daryl Derbigny under § 1983. Young’s claims against Judge
Derbigny fail as a matter of law.
The Eleventh Amendment bars any claims against Judge Derbigny in his official capacity.
See Will v. Mich. Dept. of St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Warnock v. Pecos Cty., Tex., 88
F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Doris v. Van Davis, No. 08-4138, 2009 WL 382653, at *2
(E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2009).
Likewise, absolute judicial immunity bars any claim against Judge Derbigny in his
individual capacity. Judges have “complete protection” from lawsuits based on judicial functions.
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29 (1991) (quotation omitted). Absolute immunity applies
regardless of whether the judge’s actions were allegedly erroneous, malicious, or in excess of his
authority. See Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1996). “A judge’s immunity is
overcome only for actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity or for action taken in complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994)). Young’s
claims against Judge Derbigny involve only actions taken in his judicial capacity and within his
jurisdiction. Thus, the claims against Judge Derbigny in his individual and official capacities
should be dismissed.
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III. 	Court Deputy Taylor
Similarly, Young’s claim against Court Deputy Taylor is barred by immunity. Absolute
immunity extends to non-judicial officers who perform judicial functions in accordance with a
court directive or instruction, including court clerks. See Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that court clerks “have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising
from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion”). This
rule exists because “court personnel should not serve as a lightening [sic] rod for harassing
litigation.” In re Foust, 310 F.3d 849, 855 (5th Cir. 2002). Court clerks have absolute immunity
from actions for damages arising for actions they are specifically required to perform by court
order or discretionary action, and qualified immunity for routine duties not explicitly commanded
by court decree or judicial instruction. Id. Court staff also is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity for damages “when they perform tasks integral to the judicial process.” Evans v. Suter,
260 F. App’x 726, 727 (5th Cir. 2007)
Young’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish any sort of collusion or
wrongdoing by Taylor. Rather, the allegations in Young’s complaint challenge Taylor’s actions
taken while performing routine duties that are an integral part of the judicial process. Further,
Court Clerk Taylor “is entitled to absolute immunity as [Young] has not alleged that any of
[Taylor’s] actions were not taken under court order or at a judge’s discretion.” Small v. Dallas
Cty., Tex., 170 F. App’x 943, 944 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Ricks v. Ellender, No. 3:17-CV-27,
2017 WL 3048648, at *3 (W.D. La. June 12, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 3044657 (W.D. La. July
18, 2017). Thus, Court Deputy Taylor is immune from Young’s claim for damages.
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RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Michael Alexander Young’s federal civil rights
claims against defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after
being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on
appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district
court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from
a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of October, 2025.
__________________________________________
JANIS VAN MEERVELD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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