In Re: Stewart Barge Number Twelve, L.L.C. as Owner of the SC 740 Barge, Petitioning for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE: STEWART BARGE NUMBER
TWELVE, LLC, AS OWNER OF THE
SC 740 BARGE
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-1300
SECTION: "M" (1)
JUDGE BARRY W. ASHE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JANIS VAN MEERVELD
ORDER AND REASONS
This is a maritime limitation action with a single personal injury claimant. The vessel
owner is seeking to join the vessel operator/employer as a defendant to the personal injury
claimant’s claim against the vessel owner via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. But the personal
injury claimant insists he is entitled to pursue the vessel owner/employer in state court. Because
there is no risk that the existing parties could be subjected to multiple or inconsistent obligations
without the proposed joinder, mandatory joinder is not appropriate and the Motion for Joinder
(Rec. Doc. 8) must be DENIED.
Background
This lawsuit was initiated by Stewart Barge Number Twelve, L.L.C., as owner of the SC
740 Barge, its equipment, gear, furniture, appurtenances, etc., petitioning for exoneration from or
limitation of liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30529. The precipitating incident occurred on or
about January 3, 2025, while the SC 740 Barge was chartered by Stewart Construction, LLC,1 for
a mooring and breasting dolphin replacement project. While working on the project, Angel
Guevara—an employee of Stewart Construction—sustained injuries to his right foot when it
1 Stewart Barge and Stewart Construction are parties to a Barge Bareboat Charter Party.
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 1 of 14

2
became entrapped in a winch aboard the ringer crane on the SC 740 Barge. Mr. Guevara underwent
medical treatment and his right foot has been partially amputated.
The District Court issued an order enjoining all suits, actions, or proceedings of any nature
against Stewart Barge or the SC 740 Barge to recover damages related to the January 3, 2025,
incident. The monition date for asserting claims was set for July 31, 2025.
Mr. Guevara filed an Answer and Claim for Damages asserting causes of action against
Stewart Barge under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b),2 for unseaworthiness of the SC 740, under General
Maritime tort law, under the Jones Act,3 for vicarious liability, for negligence under Louisiana law,
and for punitive damages under state law. Mr. Guevara alleges that he was employed by Stewart
Construction and that he was instructed by employees of Stewart Construction and Stewart Barge
to stand atop the winding spool of the winch while the crane was being lowered for further
navigation of the vessel. He alleges this exposed him to an unguarded, unprotected section of the
cable spool on the winch. His foot then became trapped in the spool of the winch during the
operation of lowering the crane. Mr. Guevara alleges that employees of Stewart Construction and
Stewart Barge had previously modified the winch, causing it to become unreasonably dangerous.
Mr. Guevara also alleges that the managers, members, and employees of Stewart Barge and
Stewart Construction are the same and that they are considered a single business enterprise due to
the lack of formalities separating them.
Stewart Construction and Signal Mutual Indemnity also filed an Answer and Claim seeking
to recover from Stewart Barge for the compensation, medical expenses, and attorneys’ fees they
2 This cause of action under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act concerns injury caused by
negligence of a vessel.
3 Although Mr. Guevara does not explicitly allege that Stewart Barge is his employer, he alleges that he “spent more
than 30% of his work time aboard vessels working for Stewart Construction, LLC and/or Petitioner [Stewart Barge].”
Rec. Doc. 6, at 15.
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 2 of 14

3
have paid to Mr. Guevara under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Stewart
Construction alleges that it employed Mr. Guevara at the time of the incident and denies it caused
or contributed to Mr. Guevara’s injuries.
After this, Mr. Guevara filed a lawsuit in Louisiana state court against Stewart Construction
asserting claims under the Jones Act,4 for unseaworthiness, under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), under
General Maritime Law, for negligence under Louisiana law, and for punitive damages under
General Maritime Law. As in his federal lawsuit, he alleges that he was employed by Stewart
Construction and that he was instructed to stand atop the winding spool of the winch. But he does
not allege who issued the instructions. He alleges that individuals had previously modified the
winch and that Stewart Construction knew or should have known of the alterations.
Then Stewart Barge filed the present Motion for Joinder of Necessary Party, arguing that
Stewart Construction must be joined to this federal action as an indispensable party to Mr.
Guevara’s claims. It argues that proceeding without Stewart Construction would expose Stewart
Barge to potentially inconsistent results and could lead to double recovery by Mr. Guevara in
separate lawsuits. It argues that because Mr. Guevara has alleged that both Stewart Barge and
Stewart Construction were responsible for the condition of the winch at the time of the incident, it
will be necessary to interpret the Barge Bareboat Charter Party between Stewart Barge and Stewart
Construction. Further, it argues that it will not be possible for the Court to accord complete relief
among the existing parties because Mr. Guevara has alleged the fault of both Stewart Barge and
Stewart Construction in this action and has asserted a Jones Act claim in this federal case even
though such claims only arise against the employer. Additionally, it argues that the issue of whether
4 In his state court petition, he alleges that he “spent more than 30% of his work time aboard vessels working for
Stewart Construction.” Rec. Doc. 8-3, at 4. Unlike in his federal claim, he does not mention Stewart Barge. At oral
argument, counsel for Mr. Guevara explained that the elimination of any mention of Stewart Barge from the state court
petition was likely due to their attempt to avoid violating this Court’s stay order.
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 3 of 14

4
the crane qualifies as an appurtenance of SC 740 and which entity was responsible for operating
the crane will arise in both this litigation and in Mr. Guevara’s state court lawsuit against Stewart
Construction.
Mr. Guevara opposes. He insists that his Jones Act claim against Stewart Construction is
separate and distinct from this limitation action. He points out that Stewart Construction is already
a party to this action and submits that Stewart Barge is attempting to force him to pursue his claims
against Stewart Construction in this court. He insists the savings to suitors clause, the Anti-
Injunction Act, and the limited scope of the limitation action all preclude the relief sought by
Stewart Barge. He submits that no court has held that claims against third parties arising out of the
same incident are required by Rule 19 to be joined to the shipowner’s limitation proceeding. He
argues that this is because the nature of a limitation proceeding is such that the claims against third
parties are not essential to the determination of a shipowner’s right to seek limitation. He points
out that the Limitation of Liability Act applies only to shipowners, the saving to suitors clause
preserves common law remedies, and there is no diversity jurisdiction in this case (or as to his
claims against Stewart Construction).
In reply, Stewart Barge argues that Mr. Guevara’s claims against it and Stewart
Construction are not separate and distinct. Instead, it argues that Mr. Guevara is pursuing the same
claim and same causes of action in two different fora. It submits that Mr. Guevara alleges that both
Stewart Barge and Stewart Construction are his Jones Act employers. By doing so, it argues, Mr.
Guevara has made Stewart Construction an indispensable party to the Jones Act claim.
Additionally, it says that although Stewart Construction is a claimant, its presence in this action is
only in its capacity as Mr. Guevara’s longshore employer. It explains that it seeks to join Stewart
Construction in a different capacity.
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 4 of 14

5
Stewart Construction has not filed a memorandum in opposition to or in support of Stewart
Barge’s motion. According to Stewart Barge’s Complaint, the companies are unaffiliated. Rec.
Doc. 1, at 2. As noted above, Mr. Guevara alleges Stewart Barge and Stewart Construction are a
single business enterprise. In opposition to the present motion, he claims that Stewart Construction
and Stewart Barge share legal counsel. Rec. Doc. 9, at 4. Although the two parties do not share
counsel in this case, at oral argument, counsel for Stewart Barge in this case confirmed that her
firm also represents Stewart Construction in the state court litigation.
Of note, Stewart Construction has filed a Peremptory Exception of Nonjoinder in the state
court litigation. Stewart Barge contends that if that motion is granted, then Mr. Guevara will have
to dismiss his state court lawsuit because joining Stewart Barge as a defendant to the state court
suit would violate the District Court’s injunction.
Law and Analysis
1. 	Limitation Actions
“The statutory right of limitation of liability enables a shipowner to limit liability for
damage claims arising out of a voyage of the vessel to the post-casualty value of that vessel and
pending freight provided that the damage that occasioned the claims was incurred without the
privity or knowledge of the owner.” § 15:2. Policy of limitation, 2 The Law of Maritime Personal
Injuries § 15:2 (5th ed.). “The statutes in a broad and popular sense manifest an intent to encourage
investment by exempting investors in ships from loss in excess of their investment.” Id. Under the
Act, “[t]he term ‘owner’ includes a charterer that mans, supplies, and navigates a vessel at the
charterer's own expense or by the charterer's own procurement.” 46 U.S.C.A. § 30501(2); see Trail
Marine LLC v. Tex. Petro. Inv. Co, No. 6:22-CV-02050, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212015, at *8
(W.D. La. Oct. 28, 2022) (“In cases involving a bareboat charter agreement, the charterer assumes
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 5 of 14

6
complete and exclusive possession, command, and navigation of the vessel, such that the charterer
is considered an owner pro hac vice entitled to seek limitation of liability.”).
The procedure, as explained by the Fifth Circuit, is as follows:
When a shipowner files a federal limitation action, the limitation court stays all
related claims against the shipowner pending in any forum, and requires all
claimants to timely assert their claims in the limitation court. The court takes
jurisdiction to entertain those claims without a jury, and ensures that the shipowner
who is entitled to limitation is not held to liability in excess of the amount ultimately
fixed in the limitation suit (the limitation fund). The court's primary concern is to
protect the shipowner's absolute right to claim the Act's liability cap, and to reserve
the adjudication of that right in the federal forum.
Magnolia Marine Transp. Co. v. Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted). As Mr. Guevara points out here, often federal courts will bifurcate the issues
for trial and rule on the limitation issues first, and then if the petitioner is not entitled to limitation
or exoneration, “allow claimants to return to state court if they so desire.” In re Mississippi
Limestone Corp., No. 4:09-CV-00036-SA-DAS, 2010 WL 4174631, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 7,
2010) (quoting In re Athena Const., LLC, No. CIV A 06-2004, 2007 WL 1668753, at *6 (W.D. La.
June 6, 2007)). This procedure is prompted by the tension between the vessel owner’s right to seek
limitation in federal court and the saving to suitors clause, which preserves suitors’ choice of
common law remedies. Matter of Graham Offshore Tugs LLC, 752 F. Supp. 3d 619, 623 (E.D.
Tex. 2024); see Fecht v. Makowski, 406 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1969) (“The reason for enjoining
state court suits is to distribute effectively a limited fund in a single proceeding, not to ‘transform
the (Limitations) Act from a protective instrument to an offensive weapon by which the shipowner
could deprive suitors of their common-law rights . . . .”’ (quoting Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn,
354 U.S. 147, 152 (1957))).
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 6 of 14

7
2. 	Rule 19 Mandatory Joinder
Limitation Petitioner Stewart Barge argues that joinder is mandatory under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 19. This rule provides:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief
among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to
protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of
the interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). “Rule 19 provides for the joinder of all parties whose presence in a lawsuit
is required for the fair and complete resolution of the dispute at issue.” HS Res., Inc. v. Wingate,
327 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 2003). “While the party advocating joinder has the initial burden of
demonstrating that a missing party is necessary, after ‘an initial appraisal of the facts indicates that
a possibly necessary party is absent, the burden of disputing this initial appraisal falls on the party
who opposes joinder.’” Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 570 F.3d 625, 628
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties under Rule 19. See Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498
U.S. 5, 7 (1990); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee comments to the Amended Rule (“It
should be noted particularly, however, that the description is not at variance with the settled
authorities holding that a tortfeasor with the usual ‘joint-and-several’ liability is merely a
permissive party to an action against another with like liability.”). Thus, a plaintiff cannot typically
“be forced to sue a joint tortfeasor on the theory that an absent joint tortfeasor automatically
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 7 of 14

8
subjects the other defendants to a risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations.” Payan v. Cont'l Tire
N. Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 587, 589 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
Courts have held that “[w]here interpretation of a contract is at issue, the parties to the
contract are necessary parties” under Rule 19. In re Apple iPhone 3G & 3GS MMS Mktg. & Sales
Pracs. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456 (E.D. La. 2012); Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc. v. Jefferson
Par., No. CIV.A. 03-2272, 2004 WL 1837386, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2004) (“Federal courts
consistently hold that a party to an agreement in dispute is an indispensable party under F. Rule
Civ. P. 19(a) in a suit seeking to rescind, annul, or interpret that agreement.”). For example, in
Apple iPhone, plaintiffs had purchased iPhone 3G or 3GS cellular telephones that, for the first
time, came equipped with Multimedia Messaging Service (“MMS”) that would allow a user to
send pictures and videos without an internet connection via a wireless connection (previously, text-
only messages could be sent this way). 864 F. Supp. 2d at 453. As a result of an exclusivity
agreement between AT&T and Apple requiring the iPhone could only be used on AT&T’s
network, plaintiffs had to enter into a Wireless Services Agreement (“WSA”) with AT&T to access
its wireless service network and use the MMS feature. Id. at 454. But plaintiffs alleged that when
AT&T realized sending pictures and videos would overload its network, it barred iPhone users
from having MMS but charged them for the service anyway. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that Apple never
disclosed that they would have to pay for the MMS feature but not be able to use it and that Apple
advertised the MMS feature with videos of people texting pictures but only provided small, fine
print disclosures about “when the service was available” that were “intentionally designed so that
consumers would not see or understand them.” Id. 	Plaintiffs sued Apple and AT&T but then
voluntarily dismissed AT&T. Id. at 453. Later, Apple sought to join AT&T under Rule 19 and to
compel arbitration pursuant to the WSA between AT&T and plaintiffs. Id. at 453-54. The court
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 8 of 14

9
found that plaintiffs’ claims against Apple “were ultimately based on AT&T’s alleged contractual
obligation under the WSA to provide MMS, as well as the bills Plaintiffs paid under the WSA that
allegedly included charges for MMS.” Id. at 461. Thus, the court found that AT&T was a necessary
party under Rule 19(a). Id. at 456.
But no party has been able to cite a case where Rule 19 has successfully been used to join
a third party to a limitation action. In In re Diamond B Marine Services, Inc., the court rejected the
attempt.5 No. CIV.A. 99-951, 2000 WL 1262979, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 5, 2000). In that case, one
of the limitation petitioners sought to join the crew members of its vessel who had been sued
separately in state court by the passenger claimants, arguing that the court would not be able to
afford complete relief to the claimants without these defendants and that their joinder would ensure
that the petitioners were not found responsible for the fault of the crew members. Id. at *1. But the
court explained that
[T]he purpose of a federal limitation proceeding is to ascertain whether the ship
owner is entitled to the Act's protection and, if so, to determine how the limitation
fund should be distributed. The purpose of the proceeding is not to provide
complete relief to all parties, as evidenced by the fact that the Act precludes state
court suits against ship owners, but allows such suits against all other parties.
Id. The court found the crew members were not necessary parties. Id. The court also denied the
crew members’ motion to intervene, noting that although their “defenses share common questions
of law and fact with the limitation proceeding, it would be awkward to make [the crew members]
‘defendants’ in that proceeding, since the passenger claimants are not actually ‘plaintiffs.’” Id. at
*2.
5 In so doing, the court similarly observed that the parties had not cited “any case in which a court has granted a Rule
19(a) motion in a limitation of liability proceeding.” In re Diamond B Marine Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-951, 2000
WL 1262979, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 5, 2000).
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 9 of 14

10
3. 	Rule 20 Permissive Joinder
Under Rule 20, a person may be joined as a defendant if “(A) any right to relief is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id. R. 20(a)(2). Even if this test is satisfied,
“district courts have the discretion to refuse joinder in the interest of avoiding prejudice and delay,
ensuring judicial economy, or safeguarding principles of fundamental fairness.” Acevedo v.
Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “The
purpose of Rule 20(a) is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of
disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.” Guedry v. Marino, 164 F.R.D. 181, 184 (E.D. La.
1995). Thus, “joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” Id. (quoting Mosley
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974)). Nonetheless and critically relevant in
this case, permissive joinder under Rule 20 is at the option of the plaintiffs.6 See Applewhite v.
Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Field v. Volkswagenwerk
AG, 626 F.2d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Under Rule 20, moreover, joinder of plaintiffs “is at the
option of the plaintiffs;” it cannot be demanded as a matter of right by the defendant.”)
4. 	Analysis
First, the Court addresses Mr. Guevara’s argument that because Stewart Construction is
already a party to this action (albeit in a different capacity), the motion should be denied outright.
But Mr. Guevara recognizes that Stewart Barge seeks to join his claim against Stewart
6 As explained in Moore’s Federal Practice: “Although universal employment of the permissive party joinder rule, by
joining all interested parties, would virtually eliminate duplicative litigation, the plaintiff is not required to join all
potential litigants. Moreover, the defendant has no right to insist that the plaintiff join all persons who satisfy the
permissive party joinder standard.” 4 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 20.02 (2025).
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 10 of 14

11
Construction. That is the issue before the Court: whether Stewart Construction must be joined as
a defendant to Mr. Guevara’s claims under Rule 19.
There are two ways to satisfy Rule 19(a). Although the parties do not distinguish between
them, the Court finds it helpful to do so.
a. 	Rule 19(a)(1)(A) - Can the Court accord complete relief among the existing
parties?
Stewart Barge argues that the Court cannot afford complete relief among the existing
parties without the presence of Stewart Barge as a defendant to Mr. Guevara’s claims. Although it
is not binding on this Court, the Diamond B court rejected this argument, finding that the limitation
action was not intended to provide complete relief to all parties but merely to protect the
petitioner’s right to limit liability. Just as in Diamond B, the presence of Mr. Guevara’s claims
against Stewart Construction is not necessary to protect Stewart Barge’s alleged right to limitation.
Stewart Barge admits as much.7 Rec. Doc. 11, at 3. The Court finds that joinder is not necessary
to afford complete relief under Rule 19(a)(1)(A).
b. 	Rule 19(a)(1)(B) - Does Stewart Construction have an interest in the action that
would be practically impaired or subject Stewart Barge to a substantial risk of
multiple or inconsistent obligations?
Stewart Barge argues that Stewart Construction must be joined as a defendant to Mr.
Guevara’s claims to prevent inconsistent results. Its focus on the term “results” reveals the
problem. Rule 19 is concerned with a risk of inconsistent obligations. But Stewart Barge is not a
party to the state court litigation and as long as this Court’s stay order is in effect, it never could
be. There is no chance Stewart Barge would be subject to inconsistent results.
7 Stewart Barge distinguishes the Diamond B case because no Jones Act claim had been asserted against the vessel
owner. It argues that because Mr. Guevara asserts a Jones Act claim against both Stewart Barge and Stewart
Construction, both must be present here in order to avoid inconsistent results. The Court considers this argument under
subsection (B).
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 11 of 14

12
Stewart Barge argues that because Mr. Guevara asserts a Jones Act claim against Stewart
Barge here and a Jones Act claim against Stewart Construction in state court, there is a risk that
one court will find Mr. Guevara to be a seaman subject to the Jones Act and the other court will
not. It argues there is a risk that this court could find that Stewart Barge is the Jones Act employer
while the state court could find that Stewart Construction is the Jones Act employer. This would
be inconsistent, it says, because Mr. Guevara can only have one Jones Act employer.8 And it argues
that one court might find the crane at issue is an appurtenance of the vessel while the other might
find the crane is not an appurtenance of the vessel. While these hypothetical rulings might be
inconsistent with each other, they could not result in Stewart Barge being subjected to inconsistent
obligations. It could not be made a party to the state court litigation and cannot not incur any
obligations there at all. Consistent with the well settled rule that joint tortfeasors are not necessary
parties under Rule 19, Temple, 498 U.S. at 7, the Court does not find a risk of multiple or
inconsistent obligations to existing parties present here.
This is also consistent with the ruling in Diamond B, where the court held that Rule 19
could not be used to join crew members as third party defendants to the claims of the passenger
claimants against the vessel owner. 2000 WL 1262979, at *1. As the Dimond B court observed,
the purpose of a limitation action “is not to provide complete relief to all parties.” Id. Stewart Barge
attempts to distinguish Diamond B because it involved crew members and not an alleged employer,
8 It is not entirely clear that there could never be two Jones Act employers. The case cited by Stewart Barge for its
“one Jones Act employer” statement seems to contemplate more than one by saying “[a]t trial, Plaintiff will bear the
burden of proving all elements of his Jones Act claims, including that he is a Jones Act seaman and, if so, that Pioneer
is one of his Jones Act employers.” Delozier v. S2 Energy Operating, LLC, 491 F. Supp. 3d 149, 156 (E.D. La. 2020)
(emphasis added). Elsewhere in Stewart Barge’s brief, it states that “it may be possible for a seaman to have more
than one Jones Act employer.” Sanchez v. Aries Marine Corp., No. CIV.A. 02-1455, 2003 WL 203102, at *1 (E.D.
La. Jan. 28, 2003).
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 12 of 14

13
but the Court finds no reason why this factual distinction would impact the conclusion. In both
cases, the facts and legal issues overlap but the claims are separate. 9
Stewart Barge also argues that Stewart Construction must be joined because the Court will
be required to interpret the Charter Party to which Stewart Construction is a party. It says this is
so because the Charter Party addresses the two companies’ responsibilities and obligations with
respect to SC 740. But Stewart Barge does not explain why the interpretation of the contract here
would make Stewart Construction a necessary party. There is no claim seeking to rescind or annul
the Charter Party. There does not seem to be any finding in this case that could bind or impact
Stewart Construction. In the Apple iPhone case that Stewart Barge cites, the court found AT&T
was a necessary party because the plaintiffs’ claims against existing defendant Apple were
ultimately based on Apple’s exclusivity contract with AT&T, which resulted in plaintiffs entering
into a contract with AT&T that they alleged improperly charged them for a service they were not
receiving. But here, the Charter Party did not result in a direct impact to Mr. Guevara. And to the
extent this Court considers the Charter Party in determining Stewart Barge’s obligations as to the
operation and maintenance of the SC 740, this will not result in any rulings as to the contract itself
(such as requiring Stewart Barge to undertake obligations thereunder, holding that Stewart
Construction is relieved from obligations thereunder, nullifying the contract, or similar. Further,
to the extent Stewart Construction has rights against Stewart Barge under the Charter Party, it has
not chosen to pursue them here. The Court finds that the Charter Party does not make Stewart
Construction a necessary party under Rule 19.
9 Stewart Barge noted that fact discovery would require cooperation and coordination with Stewart Construction.
While discovery may be required from Stewart Construction, this alone is not enough to find it a necessary party.
Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide methods for obtaining discovery from non-parties, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 45. Moreover, since counsel for Stewart Barge in this action represents Stewart Construction with regard to
Mr. Guevara’s claims in the state action, the Court is hopeful that Stewart Construction will cooperate with any such
discovery.
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 13 of 14

14
c. 	Permissive Joinder
The situation is different when considering Rule 20, which applies specifically to joint
tortfeasors. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (providing that persons may be joined where “(A) any right to
relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”). There seems to be no dispute
that Mr. Guevara’s claim against Stewart Construction arises out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of occurrences and that the action will raise common questions of law and
fact. But Rule 20 provides for permissive joinder, not compelled joinder. It might be available if
Mr. Guevara voluntarily sought to join his claim against Stewart Construction. He has not chosen
to do so.
Conclusion
The requirements of Rule 19 have not been satisfied and Rule 20 is not available by the
circumstances presented. Accordingly, Stewart Barge’s Motion for Joinder of Necessary Party
(Rec. Doc. 8) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of November, 2025.
Janis van Meerveld
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 2:25-cv-01300-BWA-JVM Document 15 Filed 11/04/25 Page 14 of 14