Combel v. Great International Supply Chain Management Co, Ltd. et al

2:25-cv-01252Laed2 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JENNA COMBEL 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1252
GREAT INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY
CHAIN MANAGEMENT CO., LTD,
ET AL
SECTION “R” (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff Jenna Combel moves to dismiss without prejudice all class
action claims and allegations she asserted in her complaint under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 1 For the following reasons, the Court denies the motion.
As the class action had not yet been certified or proposed to be certified
for the purposes of settlement, Court approval of the dismissal of the class
action claims and allegations is not required by rule. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)
(requiring court approval of the voluntary dismissal of the claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class or a class proposed to be certified for the
purposes of settlement); 	see also Adams v. USAA Casualty Insurance
Company, 863 F.3d 1069, 1081-82 (noting that several courts have held that
settlements or voluntary dismissals that occur before class certifications are
outside the scope of Rule 23 and collecting cases).
1 	R. Doc. 40.
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Combel’s motion instead falls under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). 	Rule 41(a)
allows plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss “an action.” Williams v. Seidenbach,
958 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2020). 	Under binding Fifth Circuit precedent,
Rule 	41 	does 	not 	allow 	a 	plaintiff 	to 	dismiss 	individual 	claims. 	Id.
(distinguishing between impermissible Rule 41(a) dismissals of individual
claims and permissible Rule 41(a) dismissals of individuals defendants); see
also Exxon Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 599 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1979).
Other courts take a different view. Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S.
Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding “no reason to
make a distinction” between dismissals under Rule 15(a) and those under
Rule 41(a)); see also Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32, 39 (8th Cir. 1966);
Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); Dirauf v. Berger,
506 F. Supp. 3d 254, 263 (D.N.J. 2020); Guzman-Fonalledas v. Hosp.
Expanol Auxilio Mutuo, 289 F. Supp. 3d 331, 333 (D.P.R. 2018).
Here, Combel purports to dismiss her class action claims under Fed. R.
Civ. 	P. 	41(a)(2) 	while 	leaving 	her 	individual 	claims 	intact. 	This 	is
impermissible under the Fifth Circuit’s Rule 41(a) precedent. The Judiciary
has proposed an amendment to Rule 41(a) to allow voluntary dismissal of
one or more of a plaintiff’s claims, but that proposal is not ripe for adoption.
Jud. Conf. Comm. Rules of Practice & Proc., Proposed Amendments to the
Case 2:25-cv-01252-SSV-EJD Document 49 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 3
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Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Evidence (Aug. 2025). The rationale for the proposed
amendment is a persuasive one: permitting dismissal of one or more claims
in a multi-claim case is consistent with the general policy favoring narrowing
issues through pretrial proceedings, simplifying proceedings, and facilitating
settlements. See id.
Regardless, this Court is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent. The Court
therefore DENIES plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without prejudice all class
action claims.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of February, 2026.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-01252-SSV-EJD Document 49 Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 3

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