United States of America v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-805
SADE WILLIAMS 	SECTION: D (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment of Default and Incorporated
Memorandum in Support filed by the Plaintiff, the United States of America.1 The
Government seeks a default judgment against Defendant Sade Williams. The Motion
is unopposed. After careful consideration of Plaintiff’s memorandum, the record, and
the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff the United States of America (“the Government” or “Plaintiff”) filed
suit in this Court against Defendant Sade Williams (“Williams”) seeking damages for
unjust enrichment/payment by mistake and penalties under the False Claims Act
(“FCA”) 	and 	Financial 	Institutions 	Reform, 	Recovery, 	and 	Enforcement 	Act
(“FIRREA”).2 The Government alleges that Williams misrepresented information on
her application for a loan under the Payroll Protection Plan (“PPP”) pursuant to the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) and used the loans
for unauthorized purposes.3
1 R. Doc. 12.
2 See R. Doc. 1.
3 Id.
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The Government alleges the following facts in its Complaint. On March 16,
2021, Williams received a PPP loan under the CARES Act in the amount of
$20,832.00. The loan issued was “based upon false and fraudulent records and
statements in a claim for payment submitted to Capital Plus Financial, LLC.”4 In her
application, the Government asserts that Williams “misrepresented his annual
income and payroll costs, which were used in calculating his eligible loan amount.”5
The Government specifies Williams’s misrepresentations:
Williams or persons acting in conspiracy with her, falsely claimed in an
application for a PPP loan that Williams was the sole proprietor of a hair
company that was founded in 2018 and in operation on March 20, 2021,
when in fact Williams was not an eligible self-employed individual or
employer in that line of business…
Williams, or persons acting in conspiracy with her, falsely claimed that
she had earned $101,305 in gross income as an owner of a hair company
from 2018 as reported on IRS Form 1040, Schedule C, Line 7, when in
fact she did not earn or report income in that amount…
Williams, or persons acting in conspiracy with her, submitted a false
and fraudulent Form 1040, Schedule C showing $101,305 in gross
income, when in fact she did not earn that amount, nor filed the Form
1040 with the IRS…
Williams, or persons acting in conspiracy with her, submitted a false
and fraudulent bank statement purporting to be from “JRMartin Choice
Bank” 	for 	“Natural 	Hair 	Afro, 	LLC” 	and 	authorized 	user 	“Sade
Williams,” when in fact no such bank, bank account, or business
existed…
Williams, or persons acting in conspiracy with her, further falsely
claimed 	that 	the 	PPP 	loan 	funds 	would 	be 	used 	for 	authorized
expenditures under PPP rules (such as payroll, mortgage interest, rent,
utilities, and covered supplier costs), when in fact Williams actually
used the funds for unauthorized expenditures…
Williams, or persons acting in conspiracy with her, certified that the
information provided in his application and supporting documentation
4 Id. at ¶ 8.
5 Id. The Court notes that the Government interchangeably uses the words “his” and “her” in the
Complaint when referencing Defendant Sade Williams. See references to “his” in ¶¶ 8, 10, 13, and
20(f), (h), and (i) and references to “her” in ¶¶ 20 (a), (b), (c), (d), €, (f), (g), (h), and (i). These
typographical errors do not impact the Court’s analysis.
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was true and correct in all material respects, when in fact it was false
and fraudulent in the above-stated material respects, among others to
be shown at trial.6
Furthermore, Williams “knowingly used the PPP loan funds for unauthorized
purposes” and “knowingly misrepresented his use of the funds on the forgiveness
application submitted for the PPP loans.”7 The Government specifies that, when
applying for forgiveness of the loan, Williams
falsely claimed that she spent $20,832 of the loan proceeds on payroll,
when in fact she used the entirety of the PPP loan for other purposes…
Williams, or persons acting in conspiracy with her, falsely certified in
his PPP loan forgiveness application that she had complied with all
requirements of the PPP Rules and guidance related to eligible uses of
PPP loan proceeds, when in fact she had not complied, but rather had
spent the PPP loan proceeds on ineligible personal uses…
Williams, or persons acting in conspiracy with her, falsely certified that
the information provided in his PPP loan-forgiveness application was
true and correct in all material respects, when in fact the PPP loan
forgiveness application had false, material information the SBA relied
upon to forgive Williams’s PPP loan.8
Based upon Williams’s false representations, the Small Business Administration
(“SBA”) “forgave Williams’s PPP loan of $20,832.00 and accrued interest of $117.47”
and “paid $2,500.00 in processing fees to Capital Plus Financial, LLC for the PPP
loan disbursed to Williams.”9
On April 24, 2025, the Government filed the Complaint seeking damages for
unjust enrichment/payment by mistake and penalties under the FCA and FIRREA.10
6 Id. at ¶ 20.
7 Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
8 Id. at ¶ 20.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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Defendant Williams was personally served on August 8, 2025;11 however, she has
failed 	to 	answer 	or 	otherwise 	plead 	in 	response 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint. 	On
September 16, 2025, the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana entered default against Williams pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a).12
The Government filed the instant Motion for Judgment of Default against
Williams pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1), seeking relief in the
form of a money judgment in a sum certain by computation.13 The Government
contends that a default judgment is proper because, as its attached declaration from
Special Agent Chris Reyes demonstrates and in light of Williams’s default, “Williams
is indebted to the United States in the amount of $23,419.96, plus post-judgment
interest accruing on that amount at the legal rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961.”14 As a
result, the Government argues that it is entitled to a default judgment for that sum
certain. The Government further requests the Court to dismiss Counts III and IV of
the Complaint.15
In response to the Motion, the Court issued a Show Cause Order in which
Defendant Sade Williams was ordered to appear in person at the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on February 26, 2026, at 1:00
p.m., and show cause as to why default judgment should not be entered against her.16
11 R. Doc. 8.
12 See R. Doc. 11.
13 R. Doc. 12.
14 Id. at ¶ 7; see also R. Doc. 12-1, Declaration of Special Agent Chris Reyes.
15 Id. at ¶ 8.
16 R. Doc. 13.
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The Order was sent to Williams via email, U.S. mail, and certified mail to both
addresses noted on the executed summons.17 While the Court received a return the
certified mail as undeliverable at the 140 Gonzales Court address, the Court did not
receive a return from the United States Postal Service at the 205 Jackson Street
address.18 The order was sent additionally via regular mail and by email. The Court
has been advised that there was no “bounce back” notice or other indication that the
email containing the Order was not received. Despite this Order, Williams did not
appear.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the process in which a
party may seek judgment due to the default of an opposing party. “[D]efault
judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by
courts only in extreme situations.”19 “A party is not entitled to a default judgment as
a matter of right, even where the defendant is technically in default.”20 Accordingly,
a default judgment is appropriate only when “the adversary process has been halted
because of an essentially unresponsive party.”21
A plaintiff seeking default judgment must proceed through two steps: (1) the
plaintiff must petition the clerk of court for an entry of default and (2) if the plaintiff’s
17 See R. Doc. 13-1. The Order was sent via first class and certified mail to 140 Gonzales Court, Houma,
Louisiana 70364-4803 as well as to 205 Jackson Street, Houma, Louisiana 70363.
18 See id. and R. Doc. 14.
19 Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead
and Savings Ass’n., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989)).
20 Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir.
1977)).
21 Sun Bank, 874 F.2d at 276 (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432
F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
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claim is not for a sum certain, then the plaintiff “must apply to the court for a default
judgment.”22 	In order for the clerk of court to enter a default against a defendant
pursuant to Rule 55(a), the plaintiff must show “by affidavit or otherwise” that the
defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.”23 	Beyond that requirement,
however, the entry of default is largely mechanical. Upon the clerk’s entry of default,
the defendant is deemed to have admitted the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations.24
Next, after the entry of default, “the Court may enter a default judgment
against a party when it fails to plead or otherwise respond to the plaintiff's complaint
within the required time period.”25 A court may enter a default judgment only if the
plaintiff has stated a cognizable legal claim supported by well-pleaded factual
allegations, which the court accepts as true.26
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Jurisdiction
Before entering judgment, a district court must “look into its jurisdiction both
over the subject matter and the parties.”27 	“Judgment entered in the absence of
jurisdiction is void, and the Court must therefore refrain from entering judgment if
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
24 Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).
25 Granite State Ins. Co. v. Delta Marine Env’t, LLC, No. CV 18-3571, 2018 WL 6067552, at *1 (E.D.
La. Nov. 20, 2018) (Africk, J.) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)) (emphasis added).
26 See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206 (“There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment
entered.”); Lewis, 236 F.3d at 767.
27 Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V VIKTOR KURNATOVSKIY, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001).
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its jurisdiction is uncertain.”28 	Here, subject matter jurisdiction is based upon a
federal question and upon the fact that the United States has brought the action.29
The jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1335 are satisfied because
the United States is proceeding in its sovereign capacity and because the suit arises
under the False Claims Act.30 Furthermore, it appears that the Court has personal
jurisdiction over Williams because she is a citizen of Louisiana.31
B. 	Whether Default Judgment is Appropriate in this Matter
The Court first considers whether the initial entry of default by the clerk of
court was appropriate. Plaintiff has shown by affidavit that the Defendant, Williams,
was personally served on August 8, 2025.32 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, Williams
had twenty-one days to file responsive pleadings to Plaintiff’s complaint after having
been served.33 Williams did not make any appearance in this Court; the record clearly
demonstrates that Williams has “failed to plead or otherwise defend.”34 The United
States moved for Entry of Default against Williams which the Clerk of Court properly
entered on December 28, 2022.35 Therefore, the Court finds that the entry of default
against Williams was warranted.
The Court next considers whether Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment.
The Plaintiff Government is seeking a sum certain, and the Motion for Default
28 RSDC Holdings, LLC v. Steinberg, No. CV 16-9381, 2017 WL 117314, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2017)
(Vance, J.).
29 See R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 3.
30 See R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 19-22; 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B).
31 See R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
32 See R. Doc. 8; R. Doc. 15-2.
33 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
35 R. Docs. 10-11.
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Judgment is properly before this Court.36 	The Court must now determine whether
the Plaintiff has adequately stated a valid cause of action entitling it to relief. A court
may only enter a default judgment if the factual allegations in the pleadings, which
the court accepts as true, provide a “sufficient basis” for a default judgment.37
Here the Plaintiff Government argues that it is entitled to damages based on
unjust 	enrichment 	and 	payment 	by 	mistake. 	Regarding 	the 	claim 	of 	unjust
enrichment, because the suit relates to the Government’s rights under a nationwide
federal program, the PPP in this case, the Court finds that federal law applies.38
Under federal common law, to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff
“must show (1) [it] had a reasonable expectation of payment, (2) the defendant should
reasonably have expected to pay, or (3) society’s reasonable expectations of person
and property would be defeated by nonpayment.”39 Defendant received substantial
funds from the PPP, totaling $20,832.00, based on her misrepresentations on her
application for the loan.40 The Plaintiff Government has shown (1) that Williams
understood the terms and conditions of the loan that would require repayment to the
Government, (2) that the loan would not be issued or forgiven if certain conditions
were not met, and (3) that the interests of society, as reflected by the purpose of the
CARES Act and the PPP, would be defeated should Williams not be required to pay
36 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
37 See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.
38 United States v. Vernon Home Health, Inc., 21 F.3d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[F]ederal law governs
cases involving the rights of the United States arising under a nationwide federal program.”).
39 Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 993–94 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing C. Kaufman,
Corbin on Contracts § 19A, at 50 (Supp.1989)); see also U.S. ex rel. Roberts v. Aging Care Home Health,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 810, 820 (W.D. La. 2007).
40 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 10.
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for the loans obtained via misrepresentations. The Court finds that the Government
has validly stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment.
The Government additionally argues that it is entitled to damages based on
payment by mistake. Regarding this claim, “[t]he Government by appropriate action
can recover funds which its agents have wrongfully, erroneously, or illegally paid.”41
“No statute is necessary to authorize the United States to sue in such a case. The
right to sue is independent of statute.”42 For a claim related to a false claim, the
Government must show that “(1) payments were made (2) under belief that they were
properly owed; (3) that belief being erroneously formed; and (4) the mistaken belief
was material to the decision to pay.”43 The Government, however, need not “show
that the defendant[ ] knew the payments were mistaken.”44 Based on the factual
allegations in the Government’s Complaint—which Williams is deemed to have
admitted by his default—the Court finds that the Government is entitled to relief for
payment by mistake. 	The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated that
Williams obtained funds from the United States to which she was not entitled and
that the Government approved a loan for Williams to which she was not entitled.45
Furthermore, the Court finds that the Government has shown that it forgave the loan
made to Williams based on her material misrepresentations.
41 United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415, 58 S. Ct. 637, 638, 82 L. Ed. 932 (1938); see also United
States v. Medica–Rents Co., 285 F.Supp.2d 742, 776 (N.D.Tex. 2003).
42 Id.
43 U.S. ex rel Trim v. McKean, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (W.D. Okla. 1998) (citing United States v.
Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 124 (9th Cir.1970)).
44 Medica-Rents Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
45 See R. Doc. 1.
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Before entering a default judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, however, the Court
must consider whether the six factors listed in Lindsey v. Prive Corp.46 weigh in favor
of entering a default judgment in this case. These factors include:
[1] whether material issues of fact are at issue, [2] whether
there 	has 	been 	substantial 	prejudice, 	[3] 	whether the
grounds for default are clearly established, [4] whether the
default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable
neglect, [5] the harshness of a default judgment, and [6]
whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside the
default on the defendant’s motion.47
Regarding the first factor, the Court finds that there are no material facts in
dispute because Williams failed to file responsive pleadings to the Complaint;
Williams’s default is an admission of the Government’s well-pleaded allegations.48
Therefore, there is no factual dispute because all material facts have already been
deemed admitted by Williams.
Second, in regard to substantial prejudice, the Court is aware of the burden
that delay can impose on litigants.49 However, courts “can deal with obstinate and
dilatory parties in a variety of ways, and judgment by default should not be the first
resort.”50 Further, the Fifth Circuit has noted that default judgments are generally
disfavored, as there is a strong policy in favor of decisions on the merits.51 But when
a defendant’s complete failure to appear brings the adversary process to a halt, this
prejudices the plaintiff’s interests. 	Here, Williams has completely failed to appear
46 Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 1998).
47 Id. at 893 (citing 10 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2685 (2d
ed. 1983)).
48 See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.
49 See Sun Bank, 874 F.2d at 277.
50 Id.
51 See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893.
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whatsoever, prejudicing the Government’s interest in recouping the fraudulently
obtained funds. Until judgment is rendered, the Government continues to suffer an
uncompensated injury. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, the Court finds this
second factor to weigh in favor of the Government.
Third, the grounds for default are clearly established, making this factor weigh
in favor of the Government. 	Williams was served more than five months ago, has
made no appearance at all in this matter, and has not responded to the Court’s
Orders. 	Fourth, the record does not indicate any reason or excuse on the part of
Williams for her failure to appear. 	Next, the Court finds that the fifth factor
regarding the harshness of a default judgment weighs in favor of the Government as
well. The Government is seeking damages based on Counts I and II of its Complaint
in a sum certain of $23,419.96. 	The Court does not find this requested relief to be
overly harsh given that the Government is also requesting that the Court dismiss
Counts III and IV of its Complaint, which include claims for harsher civil penalties.52
Additionally, Williams has been given ample time to respond to the Government’s
Complaint which mitigates the harshness of a default judgment.53 Thus, this factor
weighs in favor of Plaintiff.
52 R. Doc. 1 at p. 9; R. Doc. 12 at p. 2.
53 See United States v. Fincanon, No. 7:08-CV-61-O, 2009 WL 301988, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009)
(citing Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893). Importantly, the Court further notes that the Plaintiff Government
was in email contact with the Defendant after filing the Complaint but before seeking an Entry of
Default. See R. Doc. 7-1. Those emails reflect communication between the Defendant and the Assistant
United States Attorney (“AUSA”) for over one month in which the AUSA sent the Defendant a copy of
the Complaint on at least two occasions. 	In one email, the AUSA advises the Defendant that the
amount of debt is $23,419.96 and further advises, “Please review and, if you are willing, I can draft a
consent judgment whereby you agree to pay this amount back to the government.” The Defendant
responds in an email that, “Yes, I’ll do monthly payments.” The Court used that same email address
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Lastly, the Court finds that the sixth factor—whether the Court would think
itself obligated to set aside the default judgment on the defendant’s motion—weighs
in favor of the Government. Given that the Motion for Default Judgment is unopposed
and no response has been filed to date notwithstanding Defendant’s awareness of the
lawsuit and that the Defendant failed to respond to the Court’s Show Cause Order,54
the Court is unaware of any facts that would lead it to set aside the default judgment
if challenged by the Defendant. 	Williams has not presented the Court with any
argument indicating that the Court would reach a different outcome with respect to
a motion to set aside a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Moreover, based
on the evidence in the record, the Court does not believe that Williams would be able
to produce a “meritorious defense.”55
Because the Court finds that the Government is entitled to judgment on
Counts I and II based on a sum certain by computation, and because the Court finds
that the Lindsey factors weigh in favor of granting the default judgment, the Court
determines that a default judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, the United States, is
appropriate in this case.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
to send the Orders to Show Cause to the Defendant. The Court further notes that this is the exact
amount, the “sum certain” of $23,419.96 that the Government now seeks in a default judgment.
54 R. Doc. 13.
55 Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000) (“To determine whether . . . to set aside a
default . . . we . . . consider three factors . . . whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside
would prejudice the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is presented.”).
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion For Default Judgment56
is GRANTED. A separate judgment shall issue.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 10, 2026.
______________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
56 R. Doc. 12.
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