Gamboa v. Marriot International, Inc. et al

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ORDER AND REASONS
The Court has before it Defendants Blue Ocean Hospitality, LLC and Blue Sky
Hospitality Solutions LLC’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. R.
Doc. 23. Plaintiff Paula Gamboa opposes the Motion, R. Doc. 40, and Defendants have filed a
reply memorandum in its support, R. Doc. 41. Having considered the briefing, in light of the
applicable law and record facts, the Court will DENY the Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND INSTANT MOTION
This dispute arises from injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiff after a slip-and-fall
accident. The parties agree that, on January 23, 2024, Plaintiff was visiting the Marriot Lakeway
Hotel, which is managed by Defendants, with her employee, Stacey Necaise. R. Doc. 23-6, 40-3.
While walking past the hotel’s main elevator banks, Necaise’s foot caught the edge of a large
rug. Id. This caused the edge of the rug to lift from the floor. Id. Plaintiff tripped on the upturned
edge of the rug and fell, landing on her knees and allegedly causing injury. Id. Plaintiff
subsequently filed the instant suit, asserting her injuries were caused by Defendants’ negligence
and seeking damages. See R. Doc. 7. Defendants now ask this Court to enter summary judgment
in their favor and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, arguing Plaintiff cannot prove essential elements
of her claims. R. Doc. 23.
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II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). However, “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting
forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or
defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216
(5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)). Initially, the movant bears the burden of presenting the basis
for the motion; that is, the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact or facts. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to come
forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). A fact is
“material” if its resolution in favor of one party may affect the outcome of the case. Saketkoo v.
Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 997 (5th Cir. 2022). “A dispute about a material fact
is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims arise under Louisiana’s Merchant Liability Statute, LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6.
That statute provides, in pertinent part, that, “in a negligence claim brought against a merchant
by a person lawfully on the merchant's premises for damages as a result of an injury, death, or
loss sustained because of a fall due to a condition existing in or on a merchant's premises, the
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claimant shall have the burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of his cause of action,
all of the following:
(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant and that
risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.
(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the
condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.
(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In determining reasonable
care, the absence of a written or verbal uniform cleanup or safety procedure is
insufficient, alone, to prove failure to exercise reasonable care.
La. R.S. 9:2800.6. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot prove any of these three essential
elements of her claim. R. Doc. 23-1 at 4.
Defendants’ arguments focus on the first prong of the inquiry; whether Plaintiff has
shown that any condition existed that presented an unreasonable risk of harm. Defendants argue
that the elevation of the rug on which Plaintiff tripped, only 9/16 of an inch, cannot constitute an
unreasonably dangerous condition, citing to several cases in which other courts have held that
small deviations in elevation are not unreasonably dangerous. See R. Doc. 41 at 1–2. However,
those cases are distinguishable. As Plaintiff asserts, she has presented expert evidence showing
that the rug in question had uneven, fraying edges and was situated atop a reflective, polished
stone or marble floor. See R. Doc. 40-2 at 2–3. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has created a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the rug’s condition constituted an unreasonably
dangerous condition.
Having so held, 	the Court easily concludes that Plaintiff, at least at the summary
judgment stage, can meet her burden to satisfy the other required elements of her cause of action.
Defendant admits that the rug had been in situ where Plaintiff tripped for over ten years. See R.
Doc. 41 at 3. Accordingly, it can be inferred that Defendant had knowledge of the allegedly
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unreasonably 	dangerous 	condition 	and 	failed 	to 	use 	reasonable 	care 	in 	addressing 	it.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims raise material factual disputes and require resolution by a jury.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, R. Doc. 23, is
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of February, 2026.
United States District Judge
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