Seacor Marine LLC v. GOL, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SEACOR MARINE LLC 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-2409
GOL, LLC 	SECTION “R” (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff SEACOR Marine LLC’s (“SEACOR”) 59(e)
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 1 	Defendant GOL, LLC (“GOL”)
opposes the motion. 2 	For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the
motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
SEACOR sued GOL for breach of contractual and fiduciary duties.3
GOL moved for summary judgment, asserting that GOL did not breach the
contract it had with SEACOR and that SEACOR lacked any rights to receive
funds paid to GOL under an agreement between Cox and GOL. 	SEACOR
opposed the motion, arguing that GOL failed to take appropriate steps to
obtain payment from Cox and by failing to remit money to SEACOR after
1 	R. Doc. 67.
2 	R. Doc. 68.
3 	R. Doc. 1. For a full recitation of the facts in this case, see R. Doc. 65.
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GOL obtained payment from Cox in Cox’s bankruptcy proceeding. 	The
Court, after review of the summary judgment record, granted GOL’s motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	and 	denied 	SEACOR’s 	request 	for 	summary
judgment in its favor.
SEACOR now moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the
judgment.4
The Court considers the motion below.
II. 	LAW AND DISCUSSION
A district court has considerable discretion to grant or deny a motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). 	See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v.
Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). 	The Court must “strike the
proper balance between two competing imperatives: (1) finality, and (2) the
need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts.” 	Id. 	But
reconsideration 	“‘is 	an 	extraordinary 	remedy 	that 	should 	be 	used
sparingly.’” 	Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 396 (5th Cir.
2021) (quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir.
2004)).
4 	R. Doc. 67.
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The Fifth Circuit requires that the moving party show that the motion
is necessary based on at least one of the following criteria: “(1) where there
has been an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) where the movant
presents newly discovered evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3)
to correct a manifest error of law or fact.” 	Jennings v. Towers Watson, 11
F.4th 335, 345 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not demonstrate any of the requirements for Rule 59(e)
relief. There has been no change in the controlling law, plaintiff submits no
newly discovered evidence, and the Court has committed no manifest error
of law or fact.
SEACOR argues that the Court erred in granting summary judgment
because it “adopted a different analysis than either party advanced” in their
briefs. 	SEACOR does not dispute that it was necessary for the Court to
interpret the Trade Agreement, to which the Court notes SEACOR was not a
party. Moreover, the Court did not strike out on its own in the way SEACOR
avers. GOL specifically argued that it could not pay SEACOR out of the funds
it received from Cox because SEACOR did not agree to provide post-petition
services to Cox as an essential vendor. 	This Court held first that GOL had
not been “paid” SEACOR’s invoices by Cox, and second that SEACOR was
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not entitled to any portion of the Cox payment because it did not agree to
serve as an essential vendor.
In making this second determination, the Court reviewed the Trade
Agreement, the Bankruptcy Order, and the Bankruptcy Motion underlying
the Order. 	The parties were on notice that the Court would review such
Orders. 	Indeed, SEACOR discussed the Trade Agreement, the Bankruptcy
Proceedings, and the role of essential vendor status in its Response in
Opposition to GOL’s motion for summary judgment. 5 SEACOR also attached
the Trade Agreement to that Response. And GOL discussed the Bankruptcy
Court Order, bankruptcy code, and the role of essential vendor status in its
motion for summary judgment, and it attached the Bankruptcy Order, which
is clearly based on the underlying Bankruptcy Motion, to its summary
judgment motion. 6 Because the parties were well aware that the Court would
review these papers, and evaluate the role of essential vendor status in
determining whether SEACOR was entitled to a portion of the payment GOL
received from Cox, it is disingenuous for SEACOR to now assert that the
Court’s decision was based on an analysis not advanced by the parties.
5 	See R. Doc. 46.
6 	See R. Doc. 36; Id. Exhibit F.
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SEACOR 	also 	urges 	that 	the 	interpretation 	of 	the 	underlying
agreements leads to an “inequitable” result. But the “inequitable” result that
SEACOR complains of is completely hypothetical. It would require GOL to
receive its full prepetition claim from Cox, a party now in Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and then for GOL to not disburse to SEACOR the portion of
GOL’s prepetition claim attributable to SEACOR’s invoices. 	Such events
have not happened. 	SEACOR’s musings about what may happen in the
future do not provide a basis for challenging a decision made based upon
what has actually happened. To allow hypotheticals to distract from reality
would be inequitable. The Court rejects SEACOR’s argument that 59(e) relief
is warranted based on allegedly “inequitable” potential consequences.
Finally, the Court addresses SEACOR’s arguments regarding GOL’s
alleged “self-dealing.” To the extent that GOL may have behaved contrary to
the Court’s interpretation of the Trade Agreement to SEACOR’s detriment,
this does not invalidate this Court’s interpretation. As this Court pointed out
in its summary judgment order, if GOL did improperly allocate funds, that is
something that the debtor (Cox) and now the Chapter 7 trustee can complain
about. Moreover, as stated in the summary judgment order, the redress for
improper allocations would be for Cox’s payment to GOL to be deemed as
applying to post-petition services that GOL has since provided to Cox or
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treated as a voidable preference; the redress would not be for SEACOR to
receive the money.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to alter
or amend the judgment.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ____ day of December, 2025.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15th
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