Lucas v. City Of Thibodaux et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STEPHEN LUCAS 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-1943
CITY OF THIBODAUX, ET AL. 	SECTION “O”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court in this now-federalized dispute among neighbors is a Rule
12(b)(6) motion1 to dismiss for failure to state a claim by Defendants Lafourche Parish
Sheriff Craig Webre and Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office Deputies Lafate Day,2
Zachary Sciortino, and Stephen Waldrop (collectively, the “LPSO Defendants”).
Plaintiff Stephen Lucas opposes3 the motion, and the LPSO Defendants filed a reply. 4
For the following reasons, the LPSO Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights lawsuit is the latest installment in a
decadelong feud among Stephen Lucas and Jeremy Landry, neighbors in the Sugar
Ridge West Estates Subdivision in Thibodaux, Louisiana. To hear Lucas tell it—as
the Court must at this stage of the litigation—Lucas has been persistently victimized
by Landry’s aggressive conduct. Landry’s alleged harassment campaign against
Lucas started in early 2016 after Lucas, who alleges he simply wanted to improve the
neighborhood drainage system, brought to light that Landry and his contracting
1 ECF No. 20.
2 Deputy Lafate Day was incorrectly named as Elliot Day in the Complaint. See id.
3 ECF No. 21.
4 ECF No. 25.
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company lost the public bid to perform the subdivision’s drainage work; work that
Lucas says was necessitated by Landry’s company’s poor workmanship in initially
installing the drainage system when Sugar Ridge West Estates was first developed.
Since the drainage project was finished by a different contractor in early 2016,
Lucas says Landry has retaliated, that Landry would repeatedly drive past Lucas’s
house, rev his engine, screech the breaks, and violate traffic laws by speeding and
disregarding stop signs; on occasion, Landry nearly hit Lucas with his vehicle and,
other times, Landry keyed or otherwise damaged Lucas’s (and Mrs. Lucas’s) cars.
When Lucas attempted to confront him, Landry attacked and pistol-whipped Lucas,
leading to Landry’s arrest. But Landry was “undercharged” with second degree
battery. When Lucas obtained a protective order, Landry reciprocated, obtaining a
protective order allegedly in retaliation based on misrepresentations about Lucas.
Still Landry persisted. Landry continued to harass Lucas, tailgated him, even
following Lucas to the grocery store only to key Lucas’s car while he shopped. Another
time, when Lucas was returning from grocery shopping, Landry threw a sizable rock
at Lucas’s car, shattering the windshield. Another time, Landry followed Mrs. Lucas
and keyed her car while she was inside a restaurant.
Lucas 	often 	called 	the 	police—either 	the 	LPSO 	or 	Thibodeaux 	Police
Department (“TPD”)—to report these incidents. Sometimes a warning or a citation
issued to Landry. For some incidents, Lucas requested that criminal charges be filed
against Landry, but Lucas felt that the police “avoided charging” Landry.
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Fed up, Lucas now seeks a federal forum to redress his grievances against his
neighbor, Landry, as well as the City of Thibodaux and local law enforcement officers
from TPD and LPSO.5 Lucas’s federal complaint consists of a narrative recitation of
facts, organized by “incidents,” followed by a series of legal claims (including four
federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five state law claims against various
defendants). At this, the pleadings, stage, the Court “accept[s] all well-pleaded facts
as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to” Lucas. Anderson v.
Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 589 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). What
follows is a summary of the alleged facts contextualizing the instant motion to
dismiss.
The Neighbors and the Genesis of their Neighborhood Feud
Lucas is an Army veteran.6 Landry is a contractor who owns his own company,
LA Contracting Enterprise, L.L.C. 7 Landry is “also a reserve deputy at Assumption
Parish Sheriff’s Office.”8
Lucas (and his wife) and Landry (and his wife and family) live “.1 miles apart”
on Sugarfield Drive in the Sugar Ridge West Estates Subdivision in Thibodaux,
located in Lafourche Parish.9 As Lucas sees it, the genesis of the neighbors’ feud
began in late 2015 when Lucas “brought to light” that a “reputable” contracting
5 Lucas sues Landry as “a natural person”; the City of Thibodaux; and names specific law
enforcement officers from TPD and LPSO, some sued in their individual capacities, others in their
official capacities, and others in both their individual and official capacities.
6 ECF No. 1 ¶ 2. Mrs. Lucas is “employed in the parish government.” Id. ¶ 3.
7 Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 10.
8 Id. ¶¶ 15, 175.
9 Id. ¶¶ 4, 23. Lucas and his wife purchased their house on June 6, 2013. Id.
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company—not Landry’s—won the public bid for their Subdivision’s drainage project;
a project that was necessary allegedly due to Landry’s company’s “fail[ure] to properly
. . . install drainage during the [Subdivision’s] development[.]”10 Landry, “holding on
to a perceived slight,” then allegedly “coordinated a pattern of a series of intentional
actions of harassment, physical harm, often involving law enforcement as well as the
legal process to harm Stephen Lucas, spanning over the past decade.”11
When the Subdivision’s drainage project was completed, around February
2016, Lucas alleges that Landry “began to repeatedly pass in front of the Lucas
Residence specifically at times when Mr. Lucas [was] outside [and Landry] would
intentionally and repeatedly revved-up (sic) his vehicle’s engine, screech the brakes,
and sped through the stop-sign at the intersection of Meadow View Court and
Sugarfield Drive.”12 Lucas seeks relief for “Landry’s ongoing behavior” which has
allegedly “escalated in addition to becoming more aggressive and hostile against Mr.
Lucas.” 13
Lucas recounts, incident-by-incident (pages 8 through 52 of his Complaint),
interactions 	with 	Landry, 	law 	enforcement 	responses, 	and 	protective-order
proceedings in state court. First, the background incidents (pages 8-33 of the
Complaint). Lucas alleges that the inaugural—May 7, 2016—incident unfolded as
follows: while driving, Landry “purposefully swerved” and “nearly hit” Lucas, who
10 Id. ¶¶ 5-12.
11 Id. ¶ 12.
12 Id. ¶ 25. Of the three routes in which Landry may enter or exit the Subdivision to reach or
leave his own house at the end of the cul-de-sac, one requires traveling past Lucas’s house. Id. ¶ 24.
13 Id. ¶ 26.
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called 	LPSO; 	Lucas 	then 	went 	to 	Landry’s 	house 	“to 	calmly 	discuss 	their
differences.”14 When Landry did not answer Lucas’s knock on the door, Lucas was
“walking away when he was viciously attacked by Defendant Landry who was armed
with a pistol.”15 Lucas alleges that, as a result of being “pistol-whipped,” he suffered
four broken bones and was later “granted a protective order.” But Lucas nevertheless
was miffed that Landry was “undercharged with 14:34.1 Second Degree Battery” and
that the LPSO report of the incident failed to note that Landry “was armed with a
pistol, refused to relinquish his pistol, [and was] intoxicated[.]”16 Lucas also alleges
that Landry “retaliated” against him by “fil[ing] a false Protective Order alleging that
Mr. Lucas tried to break into his residence,” and that Landry made false statements
to a local reporter who published a piece about the alleged break-in.17
In a second (May 11, 2016) incident, Lucas alleges that Landry violated the
protective order by “deliberately” driving in front of Lucas’s house while he was
cutting grass, and that LPSO’s report failed to acknowledge that Landry had two
alternative routes to drive in which he could avoid driving by Lucas’s house.18
Incident three (July 26, 2016), which Lucas reported to LPSO, involved Lucas’s
allegations that Landry “aggressively followed and then tailgated [and] attempt[ed]
to run Lucas off the road, then later . . . [Lucas’s] vehicle was keyed” while he was
getting groceries and Landry “spit[] on Lucas[ ’s] driveway.”19
14 Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
15 Id. ¶ 29.
16 Id. ¶ 30-32, 137.
17 Id. ¶¶ 32-34.
18 Id. ¶¶ 35-37.
19 Id. ¶¶ 38-39, 41.
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In yet another incident, on August 8, 2016, Lucas alleges that Landry “followed
him and staked out . . . Lucas[,] waiting for him to return from Rouses [and then
Landry] threw a sizable rock at Mr. Lucas’ face from a moving vehicle, which resulted
in shattering his Jeep windshield.”20 Lucas filed a complaint with the Thibodeaux
Police Department (“TPD”), which interviewed Landry.21 After Mrs. Lucas met with
TPD and was told that no charges were pursued because there was no “video
evidence,” Landry allegedly followed Mrs. Lucas and keyed her car.22 TPD responded
to the complaint for this incident six on November 15, 2016. 23 On December 13, 2016,
Lucas alleges that the Louisiana Attorney General suddenly and without notice
“dropped the criminal charges against Defendant Landry.”24
Several months later on May 24, 2017, Lucas alleges that Landry—while
driving by Lucas’s house where Lucas was outside mowing the lawn—spontaneously
“confessed” to Lucas that he (Landry) had: lied to law enforcement, “retaliate[ed]”
against Lucas “every time [Lucas] flipped [Landry] off,” damaged the Lucas’s cars,
and stated that he (Landry) would pay $300 for the Jeep damage and $900 for the
damage to Mrs. Lucas’s car.25
Lucas alleges several other perceived transgressions (not labeled “incidents”):
(i) Lucas called LPSO “in reference to [Landry’s] black Porche vehicle speeding down
20 Id. ¶ 42.
21 Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
22 Id. ¶¶ 45-46.
23 Id. ¶ 47. In the meantime, Lucas alleges that Landry harassed Lucas on November 11 and
“bragged about keying Mrs. Lucas’ car.” Id. ¶ 49. Mrs. Lucas reported Landry’s alleged confession to
TPD seven years later on November 20, 2023. Id.
24 Id. ¶ 50.
25 Id. ¶ 51.
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the street” but LPSO declined to act because LPSO did not observe the alleged traffic
violation; (ii) the “unconcerned” response of law enforcement when presented with
Landry’s recorded “confession”; (iii) Landry allegedly filed a false report with LPSO
“after approaching Mr. Lucas while he walked back from a neighbor’s residence[, after
which] Landry lied about the entire encounter[, then LPSO failed to note] that
Defendant Landry had his door ajar and pistol in his hand.”26
Lucas next alleges that Landry victimized him twice in January 2019. First,
on January 9, 2019, Lucas alleges that “Landry drove a four-wheeler into the
backyard of the Lucas Residence with a pistol in his lap, while Mr. Lucas was cutting
grass[],” and then Landry returned, stopped in front of Lucas’s house, and “became
angry and pulled a pistol on Mr. Lucas” when Lucas ignored him.27 When LPSO
responded to Lucas’s complaint, deputies reviewed Lucas’s surveillance video and
then contacted Landry to advise that Landry would be issued a warning for the traffic
violation, disregarding a stop sign. 28 In a second January 2019 incident, Lucas alleges
that Landry “again trespasse[d]” on his property while driving a four-wheeler, acted
aggressively, and “tore up the Lucas’ servitude in a fit of rage.”29 Lucas alleges that
his complaint to LPSO “led to Mr. Landry being cited for reckless operation of an off
road vehicle” but that Landry was not cited for trespassing due to the property
markers undermining support for such a claim.30 “In retaliation” for Lucas’s report,
26 Id. ¶¶ 53-.58.
27 Id. ¶¶ 59-60.
28 Id. ¶¶ 61-62.
29 Id. ¶ 63.
30 Id. ¶ 64.
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Landry and his wife allegedly “filed a false police report . . . that Mr. Lucas nearly
caused [Mrs. Landry] to wreck when he pulled out in front of her on his lawn
mower.”31
Lucas alleges that Landry continued to harass him. For example, Landry
allegedly approached Lucas on July 29, 2020 while Lucas was cutting grass and yelled
at him, attempting to “bait [him] into a fight in the public street.”32 Two months later,
Landry allegedly followed Lucas to the grocery store, where Lucas “witnessed
Defendant Landry keyed his vehicle in the Rouses parking lot.”33 Lucas reported the
incident to TPD, which interviewed Landry.34 The day after this alleged car-keying
incident, Lucas alleges that his name and address “were posted to neighborhood
Facebook page encouraging the community to give him a hard time and harass him
indiscriminately.”35
By this time, Lucas alleges, “there had been approximately seventy-one (71)
documented incidents of harassment and intentional actions by Defendant Landry”
which allegedly culminated on September 26, 2020 “in Mr. Lucas shooting a firearm
into the ground of the Lucas Residence when a drunken mob led by Defendant Landry
approached Mr. Lucas threatening him and his wife.”36 Lucas alleges that LPSO
31 Id. ¶ 65.
32 Id. ¶ 67. According to Lucas, the LPSO report indicates that Lucas requested that Landry
be criminally charged.
33 Id. ¶¶ 69-70.
34 Id.
35 Id. ¶ 73.
36 Id. ¶¶ 74-75.
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“overcharged Mr. Lucas with aggravated assault with a firearm.”37 Lucas alleges that
the Landrys then obtained a protective order based on Landry’s false testimony. 38
The “drunken mob incident” which Lucas alleges provoked him to shoot his
firearm into the floor of his own home did not end the feud. Rather, Lucas alleges that
Landry “was increasingly and repeatedly showing up at the Lucas Residence . . . to
bait Mr. Lucas into a violent confrontation” and Lucas believes Landry was armed
with a pistol when he did so. 39 On April 30, 2021, Lucas alleges that Landry filed a
false police report with LPSO in which “Landry instigated a scenario screaming from
the street . . . that Mr. Lucas and his wife were not welcomed here[;]” when LPSO
interviewed Landry, he indicated he “would like to make a report to try to get the
protective order reinstated.”40 And, Lucas alleges, Landry “filed another protective
order on the same day based on these false allegations.”41
For nearly one year, Lucas does not allege any incidents in the feud with
Landry. But then on March 25, 2022, while both he and Landry were driving their
respective vehicles, Lucas alleges that Landry “purposely got in front of Mr. Lucas,
then stopped short to try to cause him to rear end him,” but that the TPD did not
follow up “[b]ecause the video [taken by Lucas on his phone] did not show the incident
that caused Mr. Lucas’s reaction because [the camera] was faced toward Mr.
Lucas[.]”42
37 Id. ¶ 76.
38 Id. ¶¶ 77-80.
39 Id. ¶¶ 81-83.
40 Id. ¶¶ 81-83.
41 Id. ¶ 85.
42 Id. ¶¶ 86-88.
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On January 7, 2023, Lucas alleges that, while he and his wife were walking on
the roadway in the subdivision, Landry stalked them, drove behind them, and then
“drove past them at a high rate of speed [almost] hitting Mr. Lucas when he passed
them.”43 Though Lucas alleges that LPSO advised the Lucases that Landry did not
violate any laws in passing them as they walked on the roadway, and that Landry’s
speed could not be determined, Lucas claims that LPSO declined to investigate
Landry for stalking and that when the Lucases met with Lafourche Parish Sheriff
Webre, he “did not care” about the Lucases and “would not even admit that stalking
is a crime” in Louisiana.44
Another alleged near-miss incident occurred on February 24, 2023. That day,
Lucas was walking on his street when Landry, driving his white truck, “made a hand
gesture toward [Lucas] slapping his face,” then almost hit Lucas with his truck before
Landry sped out of the subdivision.45 LPSO was advised of the incident but “would
not consider any further action.”46 A few weeks later on March 10, 2023, Landry
“passed seven times in five minutes honking, gesturing, yelling at Mr. Lucas while
he was fertilizing the front yard[.]”47 LPSO told Mrs. Lucas it would document the
incident.48 When Landry found out that the Lucases called LPSO, Landry allegedly
43 Id. ¶ 89.
44 Id. ¶¶ 90-91.
45 Id. ¶ 92.
46 Id. ¶¶ 93-94.
47 Id. ¶ 95.
48 Id. ¶¶ 96-97. The LPSO Report indicates that Mrs. Lucas discussed the drainage project as
the impetus for Landry’s alleged harassment of Lucas. Id.
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“retaliate[ed]” by making a false report to LPSO that it was Lucas who yelled
obscenities and flipped him off as he was driving by the Lucas’s house.49
The “Current Allegations”
Next up, the “current allegations” or incidents forming the basis of the claims
alleged in the instant lawsuit (pages 34-52 of the Complaint). Lucas alleges that—
since September 26, 2020—Landry “would concoct a legal issue to further place Mr.
Lucas in the legal system.”50 On August 4, 2023, when Lucas appeared in court for
the pretrial conference related to the September 26, 2020 incident, Landry showed
up and “shoulder checked” Lucas’s friend in the courthouse stairwell, twice screamed
“suck my d—ck”, and “taunt[ed]” Lucas and his friends by saying “we’ll see ya.”51
While Lucas and his friends waited at LPSO to report this incident against Landry,
Landry also showed up at LPSO—except, it was not LPSO officers, but TPD Officer
John Lirette who “responded” and TPD Officer Prejean who “took over the narrative
in a clearly biased manner.” 52 TPD proceeded to “investigate” by interviewing first
the Lucas group and then Landry, but (Lucas alleges) Landry “proceeded to continue
his false narrative” with Officer Prejean allegedly acquiescing, notwithstanding
alleged video footage undermining Landry’s narrative. 53 Ultimately, Lucas alleges
that the outcome of his complaint regarding Landry’s courthouse conduct coupled
with Landry’s false statements (which TPD acquiesced in its allegedly biased
49 Id. ¶¶ 98-99.
50 Id. ¶ 114.
51 Id. ¶¶ 115-17.
52 Id. ¶¶ 118-24.
53 Id. ¶¶ 124-30.
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investigation) was that Lucas and his friends were charged with disturbing the
peace—without justification—whereas Landry was not charged.54
Three days after the courthouse stairwell incident—on August 7, 2023—
Landry filed in state court against Lucas a petition seeking a protective order,
allegedly 	replete 	with 	“patently 	false 	and 	misleading 	allegations 	against 	Mr.
Lucas.” 55 During the hearing on the petition for the protective order, Lucas alleges
that Landry testified that he was and is a “commissioned [police] officer” and, further,
that Landry committed perjury in recounting the courthouse stairwell incident as
well as the May 7, 2016 and September 26, 2020 incidents.56 Landry’s protective order
“[c]ase was dismissed with prejudice in favor of Mr. Lucas.”57
Alleged LPSO Misconduct Predicating Lucas’s Claims
Two months later in October 2023, Lucas alleges that Mrs. Landry made a
false complaint to LPSO that Lucas—several days earlier—had “held up his middle
finger” to her juvenile daughters driving home from school.58 LPSO Lieutenant Gabe
Leblanc drafted the narrative for the LPSO Report #J-14030-23 documenting Mrs.
54 Id. ¶¶ 131-41. Lucas alleges that the charge was baseless because he never even spoke to
Landry at the courthouse. Id. ¶ 140. The disturbing the peace charges were eventually dropped. Id.
55 Id. ¶¶ 148-57.
56 Id. ¶¶ 158-61. Before and after this allegation that Landry is a commissioned officer, Lucas
alleges that Landry is a reserve deputy in the Assumption Parish Sheriff’s Office. Id. ¶¶ 15, 175. In
the motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that any allegation by Plaintiff that Landry is a “reserve
deputy” with Assumption Parish Sheriff’s Office is insufficient standing alone to render his bystander
liability claim plausible. ECF No. 20-1 at 16. Lucas repeats this allegation regarding Landry’s
“reserve” status with Assumption Parish in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 21 at 12.
57 ECF No. 1 ¶ 163.
58 Id. ¶¶ 164-65. This October 9, 2023 incident is one which Lucas argues involves the LPSO
Defendants. See ECF No. 21 at 12.
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Landry’s allegations on behalf of her daughters regarding Lucas allegedly standing
in his yard while gesturing to them with his middle finger. 59
On November 30, 2023, Landry disregarded traffic signs while driving his
black truck, sped around the corner from his house, stopped at the Lucas’s house,
“jumped out of the running truck,” and crossed into the Lucas’s driveway, where he
“proceeded to scream death threats at Mr. and Mrs. Lucas[.]”60 LPSO Deputy Stephen
Waldrop appeared on scene before the Lucases called authorities.61 Lucas alleges that
the LPSO report of the incident (which nowhere suggests that a loaded firearm was
retrieved from Landry’s truck) conflicts in several respects with the dashboard
camera footage (which shows that Officer Waldrop retrieved Landry’s pistol from a
neighbor, who had cleared and retrieved the pistol from Landry’s unlocked truck
during the incident).62 Landry, who claimed that the incident was his reaction to his
minor daughter’s allegation that Lucas had tail-gated her and tried to run her off the
road—allegations which Lucas claims are refuted by video recordings collected from
Lucas and other neighbors—was briefly handcuffed but ultimately not cited or
charged for the November 30 incident.63
59 ECF No. 1 ¶ 165.
60 Id. ¶ 167.
61 Id. ¶ 168. Lucas alleges that Waldrop spoke to Major Elliot (Lafate) Day who was also
enroute, having been called by Landry, and who advised Waldrop of the history between Landry and
Lucas. Id. ¶ 169.
62 Id. ¶¶ 131-41. According to Lucas, the dash cam footage also captured the following, which
was not reflected in the LPSO report: Landry “resisting Defendant Stephen Waldrop and Deputy Sergi
Savoie”; Waldrop and Savoie took Landry to his house, not to the precinct; three unnamed officers
from Assumption Parish Sheriff’s Office arrived at Landry’s residence; Waldrop told Landry that he
“put people at risk” speeding and running stop signs; discussion among Waldrop, Sciortino, and Day
in which the officers “villainiz[e] Lucas” while justifying Landry’s actions. Id. ¶¶ 174-79.
63 Id. ¶¶ 179-82.
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The next day, December 1, 2023, Mrs. Lucas filed a petition against Landry
seeking a protective order, which was consolidated with the one Mrs. Landry had
filed on her behalf and on behalf of her children against Lucas; the court issued
mutual protective orders.64
The Instant Lawsuit
This civil rights lawsuit followed on August 5, 2024. Lucas asserts nine causes
of action and names nine defendants: Jeremy Landry as “a natural person,” the City
of Thibodeaux, as well as various law enforcement personnel in the Thibodaux Police
Department (Bryan Zeringue, in his individual and official capacity as Chief of the
TPD; Beau Prejean, in his official capacity as detective in the TPD; John Lirette, in
his official capacity as an officer in the TPD), as well as law enforcement personnel of
the Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office (Craig Webre, in his individual and official
capacity as the Sheriff of LPSO; Lafate Day, 65 in his official capacity as an officer of
the LPSO; Stephen Waldrop, in his official capacity as an officer of the LPSO; and
Zachary Sciortino, in his individual and official capacity as an officer of the LPSO).
In Counts 1 and 2, Lucas alleges that Defendants Prejean, Lirette, the TPD,
and the City of Thibodaux violated his First Amendment and Fourth Amendment
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pertinent to the instant motion, Lucas alleges in Count
3 that certain LPSO Defendants (Waldrop, Sciortino, Day, and the LPSO) failed to
intervene “when Defendant Landry was violating Mr. Lucas’ constitutional rights” in
64 Id. ¶¶ 184-85. Lucas alleges that the Landry’s daughter ultimately testified that she did not
see clearly whether Lucas ever flipped her off. Id. ¶ 186.
65 LPSO Defendants contend that Deputy Lafate Day was incorrectly named as Elliot Day in
the Complaint. ECF No. 20 at 1.
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violation of Lucas’s Fourth Amendment rights under § 1983. In Count 4, Lucas
asserts a Monell claim against Lafourche Parish Sheriff Webre (as well as Police
Chief Zeringue and the Thibodaux Police Department, LPSO, and City of Thibodaux).
In Counts 5, 6, and 9, Lucas alleges various state-law claims against Landry,
including defamation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution (related to the civil
orders of protection). Finally, as to “all defendants,” Lucas alleges in Counts 7 and 8
state-law claims for abuse of right and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The City of Thibodaux and Chief Zeringue, along with officers Prejean and
Lirette, filed an answer.66 As did Landry. 67 The LPSO Defendants now move to
dismiss Lucas’s claims against them for failure to state a claim, citing a litany of
grounds: Lucas’s claims are prescribed; Lucas fails to state a plausible bystander
liability claim; Lucas fails to allege any constitutional violation being perpetrated by
a fellow officer which the LPSO Defendants should have intervened to protect
against; 	Lucas, 	a 	private 	citizen, 	has 	no 	judicially 	cognizable 	interest 	in 	the
prosecution (or non-prosecution) of another; the LPSO Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity for those claims advanced against them in their individual
capacities; Lucas’s Monell claim against Sheriff Webre is insufficiently pled; and
Lucas fails to plead any state-law claim against the LPSO Defendants and/or the
LPSO deputy defendants are entitled to Louisiana’s discretionary immunity statute
for law enforcement officers.
66 ECF No. 13.
67 ECF No. 14.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Procedural: Rule 12(b)(1) and (6)
“Rule 12(b)(1) motions challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court.” McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2023). “[A] claim
is ‘properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate’ the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer
Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)
(quotation omitted). Courts are to consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional argument
before addressing any other arguments on the merits. Id. (citing Ramming v. United
States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). Even in the absence of a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, sua sponte dismissal is mandatory when the Court determines that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2021)
(citations omitted).
When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, or when jurisdiction is
examined sua sponte, “the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in establishing that
jurisdiction does in fact exist.” See Porretto v. City of Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113
F.4th 469, 481 (5th Cir. 2024). To carry his burden at the pleading stage, the plaintiff
generally must “allege a plausible set of facts establishing jurisdiction.” Physician
Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012). Where the jurisdictional
question is confined to the pleadings, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard applies: “[a]ll well-
pleaded facts are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiff.” Shemwell v. City of McKinney, 63 F.4th 480, 483 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint that does not meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. F E D . R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” F E D . R. C I V . P. 8(a)(2).
“[T]he 	pleading 	standard 	Rule 	8 	announces 	does 	not 	require 	‘detailed 	factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although courts “accept all well-pled facts as true,
construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to
the 	plaintiff, 	conclusory 	allegations, 	unwarranted 	factual 	inferences, 	or 	legal
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conclusions are not accepted as true.’” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)
(cleaned up).
These same pleading standards apply to civil rights claims like Lucas’s.
Specific applications of the ordinary pleading standards to civil rights lawsuits are
relevant here. For example, resort to group pleading—faulting defendants “as a group
without factual material suggesting that any particular defendant” violated the
plaintiff’s civil rights—is insufficient to state a plausible claim against a particular
individual defendant. See Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2023).
This is so because “a § 1983 plaintiff ‘must plead that each Government-official
defendant, 	through 	the 	official’s 	own 	individual 	actions, 	has 	violated 	the
Constitution.’” Id. at 275. Furthermore, “‘a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified
immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a
qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.’” See Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d
262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Santander v. Salazar, 133 F.4th
471, 478 (5th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).
B. Substance: Federal Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Enacted 	pursuant 	to 	Congress’s 	authority 	to 	enforce 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action against state actors who
violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarski v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380
(2012). It provides:
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
... person … to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To establish § 1983 liability, the plaintiff must satisfy three elements: “(1) a
deprivation of a right secured by federal law (2) that occurred under color of state
law, and (3) was caused by a state actor.” Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482
(5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Loera v. Kingsville Ind. Sch. Dist., 151 F.4th
813, 	818 	(5th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citations 	omitted) 	(combining 	latter 	two 	elements,
articulating two elements: a violation of a right secured by federal law and that “the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law”).
Satisfaction of the first element implements the principle that “Section 1983 imposes
liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of
duties of care arising out of tort law.” Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 482 (citations omitted).
And, “[t]he traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the
defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Cornish v. Corr.
Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (modified citation) (“Mere private
conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is excluded from § 1983’s reach.”).
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Capacities and Immunities
A § 1983 plaintiff may pursue remedies against state actors in their official or
individual capacities. As to the LPSO Defendants, Lucas purports to sue Sheriff
Webre and Deputy Sciortino in both their individual and official capacities, whereas
he purports to sue Deputies Day and Waldrop solely in their official capacities.
“The performance of official duties creates two potential liabilities, individual-
capacity liability for the person and official-capacity liability for the municipality.”
Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 484 (5th Cir.
2000). The substantive law distinguishes between federal civil rights claims pursued
against an official in his official capacity and those against an official in his
individual (or personal) capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)
(explaining the doctrinal and practical differences between the two capacities).
Official capacity suits “‘generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Id. (quoting Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Because the entity is
the real party in interest, “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,
to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. at 166. “Because the real party in
interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named
official,” liability is premised upon “the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ [which] must have
played a part in the violation of federal law.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)
(citation omitted).
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Thus, a person may sue a municipality that violates his or her constitutional
rights “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. A plaintiff pursuing a municipal Monell liability claim must
show “the deprivation of a federally protected right caused by action taken pursuant
to an official municipal policy.” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Texas, 994 F.3d 477, 482
(5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Specifically, “[a] plaintiff must identify ‘(1) an
official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose moving force is that
policy (or custom).’” Id. (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir.
2002) (cleaned up)). Critically, “[m]unicipalities are not liable ‘on the theory of
respondeat superior’ and are ‘almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act
on the part of an employee.’” Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838,
847 (5th Cir. 2009)).
In contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose individual liability upon
a government officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25
(citation omitted). Thus, “[o]n the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983
action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused
the deprivation of a federal right.” Id. (plaintiff pursuing individual capacity claim
need not establish a connection to governmental “policy or custom”). Another
distinction of consequence: “officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those
sued in their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as
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objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Burge
v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Qualified or “good faith” immunity is available for officials sued in their
individual capacities for executory or investigatory functions. “[G]overnment officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 807-08 (1982) (citations omitted); accord Rivas-Villegas
v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (citation omitted). Because such immunity is an
immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability, “it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)
(denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable; a defendant’s entitlement
to qualified immunity should be determined at the earliest possible stage of the
litigation).
Assertion of qualified immunity “adds a wrinkle to § 1983 pleadings.” Arnold
v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266-67, 269 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Ordinarily, after determining
that a plaintiff had plausibly alleged constitutional violations, we would turn to the
qualified-immunity analysis.”). Unlike the actor claiming absolute immunity (who
bears the burden of establishing he enjoys absolute immunity), when a defendant
invokes a qualified immunity defense in a motion to dismiss, “[t]he plaintiff [bears]
the burden of demonstrating that qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Green v.
Thomas, 129 F.4th 877, 883 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). In the face of a qualified
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immunity defense, “the plaintiff must plead specific facts that both allow the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm alleged and
that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Nevarez v. Dorris,
135 F.4th 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[t]o defeat a
qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must [allege facts which] show ‘(1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id. With respect to the second
prong, which encompasses the objective reasonableness of the defendant-official’s
conduct, “[a] [g]overnment official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at
the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’
that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates
that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “The reasonableness of the official’s conduct and
the degree to which the particular right in question was clearly established are thus
merged into one issue for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis.” Ramirez v.
Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133-34 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The reviewing court
may tackle these questions in whatever order it deems expeditious. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The LPSO Defendants move to dismiss each of Lucas’s claims asserted against
them. The parties’ contentions frame the Court’s resolution of the motion, which the
Court finds should be granted.
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A. Plaintiff’s Concessions Narrow the Scope of Contested Issues.
The LPSO Defendants (Sheriff Craig Webre, Lafate Day, Zachary Sciortino,
and Stephen Waldrop) move to dismiss all claims alleged against them asserting
various grounds: (1) the LPSO is not a proper party; (2) any claims predicated on
conduct occurring prior to August 4, 2023 are prescribed; (3) Plaintiff fails to plead a
failure to intervene claim; (4) Plaintiff has no legally cognizable interest in Landry’s
arrest or prosecution; (5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for individual
capacity claims; (6) Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible Monell claim; (7) Plaintiff fails
to plead plausible state law claims for abuse of right and intentional infliction of
emotional distress and Defendants are immune from such liability.68
For his part, Lucas clarifies that “the basis for . . . claim[s against the LPSO
Defendants] starts on paragraph 114 [of the Complaint;]” in particular, Lucas argues
that his claims against the LPSO Defendants “involve the incidents on October 9,
2023 and November 30, 2023.” 69 Contending that “all other incidents highlight the
pattern of violations of Mr. Lucas’ civil liberties[,]”70 Lucas thus concedes ground (2),
i.e., that any claims predicated on conduct occurring before August 4, 2023 are time-
barred or prescribed. As for ground (1), Lucas contends that LPSO is not listed as a
party and thus dismissal is not warranted. 71 As for (3), Lucas contends that he pled
a plausible bystander liability claim insofar as the LPSO Defendants “were well
aware that . . . Landry utilized his reserve credentials to contact three unnamed
68 ECF No. 20-1 at 14- 27.
69 ECF No. 21 at 2, 12.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 11.
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officers from Assumption Parish Sheriff’s Office to be present [after the November 30,
2023 incident]” but that, regardless, bystander liability is not reserved for police
officers and the fact that Lucas has sued Landry solely for state law tort claims has
no bearing on whether the LPSO Defendants may be liable for failure to intervene in
Landry’s “excessive force.”72
Addressing ground (4), Lucas contends that he “certainly has not pled that
recovery is based upon Lafourche Deputies’ failure to arrest or charge Landry, but
rather in their disregard of the Equal Protection Clause.”73 Lucas then responds to
grounds (5) and (6) by: suggesting that “Defendants have conceded that the causes of
actions against Defendants were sufficiently alleged under its official capacities”;
asserting that Lucas has alleged that the LPSO Defendants made misrepresentations
in police reports in violation of state law; and citing to a local media report
purportedly quoting Sheriff Webre’s December 2020 comments on intervention
training for deputies as well as a White Paper published by Georgetown Law School
ostensibly in support of the bystander liability and/or Monell claims.74 Finally, as to
(7), Lucas contends that his allegations that the LPSO Defendants “assisted Landry”
72 Id. at 12-18. Lucas also argues—in a fashion that is at best inconsistent with the allegations
in his complaint, where he names Landry as a defendant in his private civilian capacity only and
nowhere alleges facts indicating that Landry acted as a state officer in harassing Lucas, just that he
happened to be a commissioned officer with a different sheriff’s office—that “the Complaint alleges
that his constitution (sic) rights have (sic) violated by Defendant Landry when he entered on to the
Lucas’ Residence in a rage of fit (sic) threatening death with a loaded gun at the console ready,
detaining Mr. Lucas[]” when Landry knew that Lucas could not have a firearm due to the October 12,
2020 protective order issued against Lucas. Id. at 17.
73 Id. at 18-19.
74 Id. at 19-22. Lucas suggests that he has alleged all elements of a Monell claim, particularly
given his history with Landry: “by this time, Mr. Lucas rarely contacted [LPSO] or [TPD] due to the
double standards and repeated decisions of failing to charge Defendant Landry.”
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suffice to allege causes of action against them for Landry’s alleged abuse of rights and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.75
In reply, the LPSO Defendants first contend that Lucas’s bystander liability
theory fails as a matter of law because the Complaint contains no factual allegations
plausibly indicating that Landry acted under color of state law in his conduct
targeting Lucas such that Lucas has not alleged facts supporting element one of
bystander liability, i.e., that any of the LPSO officers knew that a fellow officer acting
under color of state law was violating an individual’s constitutional rights.76 Second,
they contend that Lucas’s reliance on state public records laws to suggest that his
claims are predicated on a “falsified police report” makes no sense/is implausible
where Lucas asserts no claim that he was subject to false arrest or malicious
prosecution but, rather, instead his claims stem from his dissatisfaction that Landry
was not arrested or charged for his conduct victimizing Lucas.77 Third and finally,
the LPSO Defendants contend that Lucas cannot advance an Equal Protection claim
when such a claim is nowhere alleged in his Complaint and, even if it is, Lucas still
fails to allege that he is a member of a protected class or how he has been treated
differently. 78
Considering that Lucas concedes that the LPSO is not a proper party and that
any cause of action predicated on conduct occurring before August 2023 would be
75 Id. at 23-24. In addition to citing the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims, Lucas also sets forth the duty-risk analysis that he contends would be applicable to a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress though no such claim appears in his Complaint.
76 ECF No. 25 at 1-4.
77 Id. at 4.
78 Id. at 5.
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time-barred, this obviates Court resolution or analysis of these issues. Accordingly,
(i) LPSO is not a proper juridical party and insofar as Plaintiff named the LPSO as a
separate entity, any claims against LPSO as a standalone entity will be dismissed;
and (ii) insofar as any claims against the LPSO Defendants are based on conduct or
incidents occurring prior to August 2023, such claims are time-barred and therefore
dismissed.79
Having conceded the lion’s share of factual allegations are time-barred, Lucas
features two incidents—October 9 and November 30, 2023—as the predicates to
Section 1983 liability for the LPSO Defendants. But, like Lucas and the defendants,
the Court focuses on the second of those two, considering that the first appears to
involve an LPSO officer that is not named as a defendant in this proceeding.
Moreover, it is unclear how the first incident could predicate Section 1983 (or any)
liability for any LPSO Defendant.80 And Lucas does not attempt to explain it.81
Additionally, 	because 	Lucas’s 	official 	capacity 	claims 	advanced 	against
Sciortino, Day, and Waldrop are merely redundant of the official capacity claim
79 Section 1983 does not provide a limitations period. So courts borrow from state law: “[t]he
statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations
governing personal injuries in the forum state.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). In Louisiana, before July 1, 2024, that period is one-year. See La. Civ.
Code art. 3492, repealed on July 1, 2024 and replaced by La. Civ. Code art. 3493.1. Effective July 1,
2024, Louisiana’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims changed from one to two years. La.
Civ. Code art. 3493.1.
80 Lucas alleges that, in October 2023, Mrs. Landry made a false complaint to LPSO that
Lucas—several days earlier—had “held up his middle finger” to her juvenile daughters driving home
from school. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 164-65. LPSO Lieutenant Gabe Leblanc drafted the narrative for the LPSO
Report #J-14030-23 documenting Mrs. Landry’s allegations on behalf of her daughters. Id. ¶ 165. The
plaintiff does not mention Leblanc anywhere else in the complaint, nor does the plaintiff explain why
Leblanc was not named as a defendant, or how drafting the narrative of a report made to the LPSO
by Landry’s wife renders an LPSO officer or sheriff liable to Lucas.
81 See ECF No. 21 at 12.
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against Sheriff Webre (and because Lucas fails to allege that any LPSO officer or
deputy 	had 	any 	policymaking 	authority), 	the 	official 	capacity 	claims 	against
Sciortino, Day, and Waldrop must be dismissed. See Garza v. Escobar, 972 F.3d 721,
734 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
As addressed below, the Court agrees with the LPSO Defendants that Lucas’s
claims against them must be dismissed for several overlapping and independent
reasons: Lucas lacks standing to challenge their failure to investigate or arrest
Landry; Lucas fails to allege any plausible Section 1983 claim against the LPSO
Defendants in their individual or official capacities because he fails to allege a
constitutional violation by an official clothed with state authority; and Lucas fails to
allege facts supporting either state law claim advanced against them.
A. 	Standing: Lucas, the Victim, Lacks Article III Standing to Sue
Officials for Failure to Investigate His Perpetrator, Landry.
Because it implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Court first
takes up the LPSO Defendants’ contention that Lucas’s Section 1983 claims are
subject to dismissal because, as a private citizen, Lucas lacks a cognizable interest in
the prosecution or non-prosecution of another private citizen, Landry. The Court
agrees; any claim predicated on the theory that the LPSO Defendants inadequately
investigated or failed to investigate, charge, or prosecute Landry must be dismissed
without prejudice for lack of standing.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, courts are duty-
bound to examine the basis of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Lane v.
Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 565 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Nat’l
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Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 874 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir.
2017) (The Court must “examine [its] own subject-matter jurisdiction ‘whenever [it]
appears fairly in doubt.’”). Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or
forfeited, Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012), “and the district court ‘shall
dismiss the action’ whenever ‘it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.’” Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 53 F.3d
690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)).
As 	for 	constitutional 	limits 	on 	federal 	jurisdiction, 	Article 	III 	of 	the
Constitution extends “[t]he judicial Power,” only to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “[I]f a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts
have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.” Murthy
v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (citation omitted).
The justiciability doctrine of standing implements this constitutional limit on
federal jurisdiction and ensures fidelity to separation of powers and the prohibition
against rendering advisory opinions on abstract disputes. For example, “a case or
controversy can exist only if a plaintiff has standing to sue.” United States v. Texas,
599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023). “Article III grants federal courts the power to redress harms
that defendants cause plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants
accountable for legal infractions.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 427
(2021) (citation omitted). To establish standing to sue, “a plaintiff must demonstrate
(i) that []he has suffered or likely will suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely
was caused or will be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would
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be redressed by the requested judicial relief.” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for
Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380 (2024) (citations omitted). “[S]tanding is not
dispensed in gross” so “‘plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they
press’ against each defendant, ‘and for each form of relief that they seek.’” Murthy,
603 U.S. at 61 (quoting TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 431).
Though not framed by the LPSO Defendants as a feature of subject matter
jurisdiction, the case law invoked for this dismissal ground confirms that a crime
victim has no Article III standing to sue a government official for failure to investigate
or for inadequate investigation of his perpetrator. See Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th
650, 655, 654 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (holding “it is not the province of the
judiciary to dictate prosecutorial or investigative decisions to [an] executive branch”);
see also Robertson v. U.S. ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 278 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted) (“Our entire
criminal justice system is premised on the notion that a criminal prosecution pits the
government against the governed, not one private citizen against another.”). This is
simply a specific application of the standing doctrine: a complaint must concern a
plaintiff’s own treatment, not the treatment of others. See Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 654,
658 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) and noting that
“longstanding Supreme Court precedent confirms that a crime victim lacks standing
to sue . . . for failing to investigate . . . her perpetrator, due to lack of causation and
redressability”).
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Here, Lucas seeks to hold the LPSO Defendants accountable for injuries he
allegedly suffered as a result of harassment perpetrated by his neighbor, Landry, the
singular alleged assailant. As Lucas tells it in his Complaint, there is one victim and
one perpetrator in the decadelong conflict between neighbors. Jeremy Landry—“a
person within the neighborhood, and a contractor, whose company failed to properly
. . . install the drainage during the development of Sugar Ridge West Estates
Subdivision”—persistently harassed, assaulted, and victimized Lucas in a variety of
forms (threats, intimidation, filing frivolous protective orders, violated traffic laws
and intimidated Lucas with his car). Per Lucas, Landry was motivated by Lucas
“bringing . . . to light” that Landry’s contracting business had lost the public bid in
favor of a “reputable company” to correct the earlier work poorly performed by Landry
and his company.
It is not alleged that any of the LPSO Defendants independently perpetrated
any harassment, intimidation, property damage, or traffic violations against Lucas.
Nor are there allegations that the LPSO Defendants conspired with Landry in
carrying out Landry’s revenge or acted in furtherance of Landry’s personal vendetta
against Lucas. Instead, Lucas’s allegations concerning the LPSO Defendants are
derivative of his allegations against his alleged neighbor-nemesis, Landry. That is,
Lucas challenges the LPSO’s failure to investigate (or investigative shortcomings) or
its failure to charge (or undercharging) Landry despite Lucas’s numerous claims of
victimization. But Lucas lacks standing to sue on this basis: no cognizable claim
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exists against law enforcement officers on grounds that the plaintiff is dissatisfied
with law enforcement’s investigation into his putative rival.
Lucas resists this characterization of his grievances. But it is drawn directly
from his own allegations. Lucas’s complaint is replete with references to responding
police officers’ failures to charge Landry, or Lucas’s desire that Landry be charged for
the alleged harm Lucas suffered at Landry’s hands:
 	ECF No. 1 ¶ 31 (alleging that Landry was “undercharged”);
 	¶ 39 (alleging that Lucas indicated he would contact TPD if he obtained video
surveillance “to pursue charges” against Landry for keying Lucas’s car);
 	¶ 50 (referencing that on December 13, 2016 the Attorney General “suddenly
dropped 	the 	criminal 	charges 	against 	Defendant 	Landry 	without 	victim
notification and against wishes of [the] Assistant Attorney General”; and
further referencing that Lucas “followed up” with the AG’s office five times);
 	¶ 68 (referencing LPSO case narrative from July 29, 2020 incident reflecting
that “Mr. Lucas has requested criminal charges be filed against Mr. Landry for
disturbing the peace and for harassment for this incident [and] Mr. Lucas has
also requested that criminal charges be filed against Mr. Landry for all the
past reported incidents to the Sheriff’s Office to include criminal trespassing
since the statute of limitations has not expired yet”);
 	¶ 72 (alleging that the TPD “failed to obtain video [from Rouses parking lot] in
order to avoid charging Defendant Landry” for September 24, 2020 incident);
 	¶ 74 (alleging that by September 25, 2020 when Landry posted Lucas’s name
and address to the neighborhood Facebook page encouraging the neighbors to
harass Lucas, “Mr. Lucas rarely contacted [LPSO] or [TPD] due to the double
standards and repeated decisions of failing to charge Defendant Landry”);
 	¶ 76 (alleging that LPSO “overcharged Mr. Lucas” and failed to report that
Lucas first called 911 that night and that LPSO “did not attempt to get a
statement, did not question Defendant Landry”);
 	¶ 90 (alleging that the narrative for the LPSO case report reflected that Lucas
was “advised . . . that Mr. Landry’s speed could not be determined to pursue
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any type of charges [which upset the Lucases who] eventually understood why
no charges were pursued”);
 	¶ 91 (alleging that Lucas was informed that LPSO “higher-ups would not allow
[LPSO] to seek out additional videos, and request for stalking investigation
[was] denied”);
 	¶¶ 92-94 (alleging that LPSO “would not consider any further action” against
Landry after Lucas reported on February 24, 2023 that Landry nearly hit
Lucas with his vehicle);
 	¶¶ 131-47 (alleging that Lucas was cited for disturbing the peace but, due to a
biased investigation by TPD, Landry was not charged);
 	¶¶ 169-73 (alleging that the LPSO report failed to reflect what the dashboard
camera videos show, which was that Landry “resisted” Defendant Waldrop;
and “to avoid charging Landry for these threats of harm and his actions against
Mr. Lucas” LPSO failed to include in its report that Landry had a loaded
firearm in his truck);
 	¶ 177 (alleging that police officers were “actively trying to find ways to charge
Mr. Lucas without investigation and evidence, despite witnessing Defendant
Landry’s actions firsthand”);
 	¶¶ 178-79 (alleging that the police officers “seem well aware of Defendant
Landry’s violent tendencies” but that they “attempted to justify Defendant
Landry’s actions” and “at least two of the deputies hav[e] an on-going personal
relationship with Defendant Landry, with no interest in having an unbiased
investigation” such that “[u]ltimately, . . . Defendant Stephen Waldrop decided
not to issue any citations on Defendant Landry”);
 	¶¶180-81 (alleging that video evidence corroborates that Lucas was victimized
by Landry and refutes Landry’s allegations that Lucas victimized Landry’s
daughter);
 	¶ 213 (alleging that “[n]ot only was (sic) Defendants deliberately indifferent to
Defendant 	Landry’s 	attacks 	on 	Mr. 	Lucas, 	they 	were 	biased 	in 	their
investigations and follow through, repeatedly excusing [Landry’s] violent
behavior and actions committed . . . against Plaintiff”).
Simply put, Lucas alleges LPSO officers fell short in their investigation of
Landry’s repeated harassment of Lucas. Insofar as Lucas seeks to recover from the
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LPSO Defendants due to their failure to investigate or charge Landry, such claims
are simply not cognizable because “victims do not have standing based on whether
other 	people—including 	their 	perpetrators—are 	investigated 	or 	prosecuted.”
Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 652 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-19
(1973)). “[T]hough a crime victim has certainly been injured by the criminal, that
injury is usually neither traceable to executive-branch inaction nor redressable by a
judgment against an executive branch official.” Cano v. Garcia, No. 21-50742, 2022
WL 1548671, at *1-2 (5th Cir. May 16, 2022) (unpublished) (quoting Lefebure, 15
F.4th at 654 and citing Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618). Lucas thus has no constitutional
right to have the LPSO Defendants investigate, charge, or prosecute Landry.
Accordingly, 	Lucas 	fails 	to 	allege 	facts 	indicating 	that 	the 	LPSO 	Defendants’
nonenforcement (or inadequate enforcement) of state criminal (or traffic) laws caused
Lucas harm redressable by the LPSO Defendants.
In the face of this clear application of well-established law to the facts alleged
in his Complaint, Lucas pivots and attempts to recast his cause of action, arguing
that he “has not pled that recovery is based upon Lafourche Deputies’ failure to arrest
or charge Landry, but rather in their disregard of the Equal Protection Clause.”82 But
Lucas nowhere alleges an Equal Protection claim in his complaint, either in form or
substance.83 Regardless, this repackaging attempt fails to save his doomed claims
82 ECF No. 21 at 18.
83 Even indulging (as Plaintiff suggests) that “a plaintiff could allege” an equal protection claim
based on a defendant’s intentional discrimination against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s
membership in a protected class or based on a facially neutral policy that has adverse effects and was
motivated by discriminatory animus, ECF No. 21 at 18, Plaintiff does not allege facts supportive of an
equal protection theory here. So, too, could a plaintiff attempt to allege a class of one equal protection
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predicated on the LPSO Defendants’ failure to investigate, charge, or prosecute
Landry. See, e.g., Pratt v. Helms, 73 F.4th 592, 595 (8th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted)
(agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s disposition in Lefebure and expressly finding that
“a victim has no constitutional right to an investigation of a crime against him—at
least where, as here, the victim brings a class-of-one equal-protection claim”).
Moreover, even indulging Lucas’s assertion that he intended to frame his §
1983 cause of action against the LPSO Defendants as anchored to the Equal
Protection Clause, a crime victim’s failure-to-investigate claim is a standing problem,
not a pleading problem that could be remedied by amendment. See Lefebure v. Boeker,
No. 17-1791, 2023 WL 3069125, at *2-3 (M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2023) (Jackson, J.) (citing
Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 662) (concluding that the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning applies to
prosecutors and law enforcement with equal force and denying leave to amend as
futile, reasoning that the plaintiff’s contention that the sheriff’s discriminatory
failure to investigate led to her injury fails for lack of standing), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Lefebure v. Daniel, No. 23-30260, 2023 WL 7180621 (5th Cir. June 9, 2023).
Furthermore, in the very opposition papers in which Lucas purports to
repackage his cause of action under the Equal Protection clause, Lucas continues to
frame his grievance against the LPSO Defendants as a failure to investigate Landry.
Just like the Complaint, Lucas in his opposition features the LPSO Defendants’
alleged failure to accurately report and investigate, and failure to arrest, Landry for
violation or a failure to protect theory if warranted by alleged facts, but Lucas does not press facts
supporting such theories here. And principles of forfeiture and party presentation prevent the Court
from advancing substantive arguments on behalf of parties. The Court thus declines to address facts
and theories neither alleged nor briefed.
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his conduct on November 30, 2023. 84 For example, Lucas contends in his opposition
that the dashboard camera videos “depicted a gross departure of the written LPSO
Report” in several ways, including in the report’s failure to mention what the video
shows: “Defendant Landry resisting Defendant Stephen Waldrop and Deputy Sergi
Savoie[.]”85 	Lucas 	argues 	that 	the 	LPSO 	Defendants 	“intentionally 	hid 	this
information [that a loaded firearm was in Landry’s vehicle on November 30, 2023] in
order to avoid charging Defendant Landry for these threats of harm and his actions
against 	Mr. 	Lucas.”86 	Lucas 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	dash 	camera 	shows 	that
“Defendant Stephen Waldrop and Deputy Sergi Savoie bring Defendant Landry to
his residence, and not to the precinct[.]”87 Additionally, Lucas takes issue with the
LPSO report failing to “mention . . . three unnamed officers from Assumption Parish
Sheriff’s Office, where Defendant Landry is a reserve Deputy[.]”88
Lucas argues that the LPSO Defendants were aware of Defendant Landry’s
allegedly violent disposition and the LPSO Defendants had “no interest in having an
unbiased investigation.” 89 Again, Lucas is focused on the LPSO Defendants’ decision
“not to issue any citations to Defendant Landry.”90 In sum, the thrust of Lucas’s
grievance with the LPSO Defendants is their alleged “acquiesce[nce] in the alleged
84 In his opposition papers, Lucas expressly concedes that most of his allegations are time-
barred and therefore contends that “the basis for [the] claims” predicating his lawsuit “start[ ] on
paragraph 114” and the allegations “pertaining to the Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office involve the
incidents on October 9, 2023 and November 30, 2023.” ECF No. 21, p. 2.
85 ECF No. 21 at 3 (citing ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 170-71).
86 Id. at 5 (citing ECF No. 1, ¶ 172) (emphasis added).
87 Id. (citing ECF No. 1 ¶ 174) (emphasis added).
88 Id. (citing ECF No. 1 at ¶ 175).
89 Id. at 7, 6 (“Defendant Stephen Waldrop, Defendant Zachary Sciortino, and Defendant Major
Elliot Day seem well aware of Defendant Landry’s violent tendencies.”).
90 Id. at 7.
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constitutional violation by failing to report the matter accurately by not conducting
an unbiased investigation, failing to name all parties present, failing to report the
gun, by failing to preserve the evidence on (sic) which the gun was loaded and placed
on the console of his truck.”91
Insofar as Lucas’s claims against the LPSO Defendants rest on Lucas’s
disappointment 	or 	unmet 	expectations 	concerning 	investigatory 	and 	charging
shortcomings, dismissal without prejudice for lack of standing is compelled by
binding precedent. No matter how frustrated and outraged Lucas has become over
Landry’s allegedly incessant harassment, Lucas lacks standing to sue the LPSO
Defendants for their failure to investigate or charge Landry. See Lefebure, 15 F.4th
at 651-52 (describing allegations as “sickening” and observing “[i]f anyone deserves
to have her day in court, it is Priscilla Lefebure,” but nonetheless reversing and
remanding with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction as to the prosecutor); see also Lefebure, No. 17-1791, 2023 WL 3069125,
at *1-2 (granting sheriff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing without
prejudice for lack of standing plaintiff’s “horrifying” claims that an assistant warden
at a state penitentiary repeatedly raped the plaintiff, and that the district attorney
and sheriff conspired to ensure that the assailant would not be prosecuted for his
crimes).
In addition to dismissal of Lucas’s Section 1983 claims against the LPSO
Defendants in their individual capacities, insofar as Lucas’s Monell claim against
91 Id. at 19 (citing ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 164-82).
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Sheriff Webre in his official capacity is predicated on this failure to investigate or
charge theory/narrative, the same result obtains. Cf. Piotrowski v. City of Houston,
237 F.3d 567, 572-73, 584-85 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[a] city cannot be liable to
a member of the public for failing to prosecute a known wrongdoer if no individual
City employee could be liable for the same neglect”).92 Insofar as Lucas in his
Complaint casts himself as the victim of a singular alleged assailant, Landry, and
claims that the LPSO failed to investigate Landry’s victimization of Lucas, any such
claim is nonjusticiable, for “a victim has no constitutional right to an investigation of
a crime committed against him[.]” Pratt v. Helms, 73 F.4th 592, 595 (8th Cir. 2023).
Accordingly, any Section 1983 claim against the LPSO Defendants predicated on
their failure to investigate (or inadequate investigation of) Landry must be dismissed
without prejudice.
As set forth below, Lucas’s Section 1983 claims against the LPSO Defendants
fail for other independent reasons. Lucas fails to allege facts indicating that any
LPSO Defendant engaged in conduct that violated Lucas’s constitutional rights. And
by alleging facts indicating that Landry was not acting under the pretense of official
authority in his capacity as an Assumption Parish reserve deputy but, instead, as a
private citizen pursuing a personal vendetta against his neighbor, Lucas fails to
allege any facts that would support the essential elements of a Section 1983 claim
92 In Piotrowski, “what makes this domestic dispute especially unusual is that [the plaintiff’s
ex-boyfriend, Richard Minns] used the services of at least two members of the [Houston Police
Department] as well as one member of the Houston Fire Department to harass Piotrowski.”
Nevertheless, the city was not liable under Section 1983 for alleged constitutional violations arising
from its failure to prevent the plaintiff’s boyfriend from trying to kill her. Id.
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against the LPSO Defendants: a constitutional deprivation or violation perpetrated
by a person acting under-color-of-state-law. These interrelated defects likewise doom
Lucas’s Monell claim against Sheriff Webre.
B. 	Section 1983’s Essential Elements: Lucas Fails to Allege Facts
Plausibly Indicating that Landry Acted Under Color of State
Law and Lucas Fails to Allege Any Constitutional Violation
Perpetrated by the LPSO Defendants.
The Court next takes up the LPSO Defendants’ contention that Lucas’s Section
1983-based claims against them must be dismissed because Lucas has failed to allege
the requisite elements of a Section 1983 claim: constitutional violation under color of
state law.93 Specifically, the LPSO Defendants contend that Lucas fails to allege
against them a plausible Section 1983 claim predicated on a Fourth Amendment
bystander liability theory because Lucas fails to allege facts indicating that Landry
was acting under color of state law in harassing Lucas or using “excessive force”
against Lucas such that none of the LPSO Defendants plausibly could have stood by
while a fellow officer was violating Lucas’s constitutional rights.
The Court agrees. To state a claim under § 1983, Lucas must—yet he fails to—
allege both a constitutional deprivation and that “the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” See Loera v. Kingsville Ind.
Sch. Dist., 151 F.4th 813, 818 (5th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).
Context is critical to framing this dismissal ground. Lucas does not allege that
any LPSO Defendant directly violated or deprived him of his constitutional rights;
93 ECF No. 20-1 at 16-17; ECF No. 25 at 1-4.
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rather, his Section 1983 theory is that the LPSO Defendants stood by in disregard of
a duty to intervene while Landry harassed Lucas and used “excessive force” against
Lucas 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment. 	But 	Lucas 	fails 	to 	allege 	any
constitutional injury. Notably absent from Lucas’s Complaint are: (i) any factual
allegations plausibly indicating that Landry was acting under color of state law when
he allegedly harassed and/or assaulted Lucas; (ii) any factual allegations supporting
any claim for a federal constitutional violation against Landry; (iii) any factual
allegations or legal causes of action against the LPSO Defendants for constitutional
violations independent of Landry’s alleged harassment or “excessive force” against
Lucas.
Lucas fails to allege facts permitting the Court to plausibly infer that Landry
acted under color of state law in harassing Lucas. It follows that Lucas has not alleged
a constitutional violation by the LPSO Defendants. Furthermore, absent an alleged
constitutional violation perpetrated by state actors, Lucas fails to allege a Monell
claim against the LPSO sheriff.
1. 	Under Color of State Law
Section 1983’s text “protects against acts attributable to a State, not those of a
private person.” Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024). “‘[S]tate action exists only
when’ 	the 	constitutional 	deprivation 	‘ha[s] 	its 	source 	in 	state 	authority.’” 	See
Hernandez v. Causey, 124 F.4th 325, 336 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Lindke, 601 U.S. at
198). Simply put, Lucas’s allegations that Landry’s decadelong harassment campaign
had its source in a purely personal/private vendetta against Lucas and that he was
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repeatedly victimized by his neighbor in his neighborhood fail to implicate any
manifestations of the under-color-of-state-law element. By failing to allege facts
indicating that Landry acted under the color of state law, Lucas thereby fails to allege
any § 1983 claim against the LPSO Defendants who allegedly stood by while Landry
in his personal and private capacity harassed/assaulted Lucas.
The state action and under-color-of-state-law doctrines 94 track the general rule
that constitutional rights generally restrict “state action” but not “private conduct.”
Lindke, 601 U.S. at 195 (generally observing that “ordinarily” § 1983 applies to
actions of police officers but “absent some very unusual facts, no one would credit . . .
a plaintiff’s complaint [regarding his] neighbor”). Though the Supreme Court’s state-
action precedents largely “have grappled with variations of . . . whether a nominally
private person has engaged in state action for purposes of 1983[,]” Lindke confronted
“whether a state official engaged in state action or functioned as a private citizen.”
Id. at 195 (citations omitted).95 The Court observed that “the state-action requirement
exclude[s] from liability ‘acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits,’
[thereby] ‘protect[ing] a robust sphere of individual liberty for those who serve as
public officials or employees[.]’” Id. at 196 (citations omitted). Ultimately, a Section
1983 plaintiff “cannot hang his hat on [the public official’s] status as a state employee”
94 “In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the same thing
as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 928-29 (1982) (citation omitted).
95 In Lindke v. Freed, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state official engaged in state
action or functioned as a private citizen. Freed, the city manager of Port Huron, Michigan, maintained
a Facebook page, where he posted both personal updates and information relating to his government
job. Id. at 191–93. After a constituent, Lindke, posted negative comments, Freed deleted the negative
comments and blocked Lindke from commenting on Freed’s Facebook page. Id. at 190–91, 193. Lindke
sued, alleging Freed violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 193.
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because 	“[t]he 	distinction 	between 	private 	conduct 	and 	state 	action 	turns 	on
substance, not labels[.]” Id. at 197.
Lindke elucidates a framework for categorizing conduct. See Mackey v. Rising,
106 F.4th 552, 559 (6th Cir. 2024) (observing that “[s]tate employees do not work for
the State every hour of the day[; t]hey also undertake all sorts of private activities on
their own time” and further that Lindke “tailored [Griffin v. Maryland’s] general test
to the specific social-media context”). First, there is a “bedrock requirement that ‘the
conduct 	allegedly 	causing 	the 	deprivation 	of 	a 	federal 	right 	[must] 	be 	fairly
attributable to the State[,]’ [i.e.,] traceable to the State’s power or authority.” Lindke,
601 U.S. at 198 (citations omitted). To be sure, determining the scope of an official’s
actual authority anchored in state law is a critical threshold issue: “the state-action
doctrine requires that the State have granted an official the type of authority that he
used to violate rights—e.g., the power to arrest—it [thus] encompasses cases where
his ‘particular action’—e.g., an arrest made with excessive force—violated state or
federal law.” Id. at 200 (citations omitted). Second, to qualify as state action, the
plaintiff must allege or show that “the official is purporting to exercise state
authority.” Id. 	at 201-03 (illustrating by hypothetical that context matters in
determining whether an official invoked his official authority, e.g., where a school
board president announces at a school board meeting that the board lifted pandemic
restrictions on public schools, versus when one is merely engaged in private action in
a “personal capacity as a friend and neighbor,” e.g., the next evening the same school
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board 	president 	at 	a 	barbeque 	with 	friends 	shares 	that 	the 	board 	lifted 	the
restrictions).
“[W]hen the challenged conduct ‘entail[s] functions and obligations in no way
dependent on state authority,’ state action does not exist.” Id. at 198–200 (citations
omitted) (“[T]he ‘[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law,’ constitutes state
action”; but “[t]o misuse power, . . . one must possess it in the first place[.]”). Indeed,
the Supreme Court’s more recent pronouncement is simply a gloss on the well-
established principles frequently applied by the Fifth Circuit. Informing whether a
plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to plead that an officer misused official power,
the Fifth Circuit has elaborated on the scope of the essential color-of-state-law
prerequisite to § 1983 liability:
Under “color” of law means under “pretense” of law. Generally, if an
officer 	is 	performing 	their 	official 	duties, 	their acts 	“are 	included
whether they hew to the line of their official authority or overstep it,”
though “acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly
excluded.” That said, even if an officer acts for purely personal reasons,
he or she may still act under color of law if they are “acting by virtue of
state authority.”
Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted)
(observing that “whether a police officer is acting under color of law does not depend
on duty status at the time of the alleged violation”).
Assessing the under-color-of-law element thus compels consideration of “(1)
whether the officer ‘misuse[d] or abuse[d] his official power,’ and (2) if ‘there is a nexus
between the victim, the improper conduct, and [the officer’s] performance of official
duties.’” Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
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Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir.2002) (emphasis added)). Thus, “[i]f an
officer pursues personal objectives without using his official power as a means to
achieve his private aim, he has not acted under color of state law.” Id. (citing
Townsend, 291 F.3d at 861).
Substance—context—is key, as illustrated by cases where courts find that the
under-color-of-state-law prerequisite was satisfied. See, e.g., Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th
508 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding support in the summary judgment record of a nexus
between the alleged sexual assault misconduct and the deputy’s abuse of official
authority where deputy’s alleged relationship with the victim grew out of legitimate
police activity—the victim’s husband’s request for a welfare check on his wife; deputy
then used the authority of his office to determine victim’s address, whether she would
be alone there, and whether there were security cameras; deputy relied on the
pretense of the legitimate wellness check to entice Tyson to a more secluded part of
her 	home; 	and 	deputy 	interwove 	sexual 	advances 	with 	his 	law 	enforcement
authority); Gomez, 18 F.4th at 776 (the district court erred in finding that bar patron
victim of police officer beating failed to allege that the plain-clothed off-duty officers
did not act under color of state law, considering the following “add[ed] to the air of
official authority that pervaded the assault”: officers’ tone of voice and direct orders
to stop, use of a police hold in forcing the plaintiff’s hands behind his back, calling for
backup and identifying themselves to law enforcement dispatch as police officers);
United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 386 (5th Cir. 2008) (assistant city attorney
acted under color of law when he sexually assaulted two women in his office,
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reasoning that he took advantage of his position to become acquainted with the
victims; he ensured the women were alone and secluded in his office; he indirectly
referenced his power and made implicit threats that could have left victims with the
impression he could have one victim’s son re-arrested); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578,
589 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that sheriff acted under color of law when he questioned
suspect of criminal investigation on the porch of her home then returned later to
sexually assault her); United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1991)
(finding requirement under color of state law met where off-duty deputy sheriff
assaulted wife’s alleged ex-lover in a private vendetta but identified self as police
officer, used service weapon, and suggested that he could use police authority to get
away with the paramour’s murder).
With the above authorities indicating what suffices for one to act under color
of state law, Bustos is instructive in illustrating what falls short. Bustos alleged that
he was physically assaulted and battered by off-duty police officers who were out
drinking at a night club with female companions. 599 F.3d at 465. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of the assaulting officers’, bystanding officers’, and
City’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, determining that Bustos
failed to plead that the officers who assaulted him acted under color of state law. Id.
at 465-66 and 469. 96 In so doing, the Fifth Circuit distinguished cases “concerning
96 Notably, as discussed further below, Bustos’s failure to allege that the assaulting officers
acted under color of state law likewise doomed his failure to intervene theory predicating claims
against other, bystanding officers. Id. at 466-67. Bustos failed to state a claim against bystander
officers because he failed to allege that the bystander officers had a constitutional duty to prevent an
alleged assault or harm by private individuals (who merely happened to be police officers). Id. And,
finally, because Bustos alleged no constitutional injury attributable to police officers, Bustos failed to
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police officers pursuing violent private aims” but yet where the under-color-of-law
element nevertheless was satisfied because in each of those cases, “the officer [had]
used his official power to facilitate his actions.” Id. at 465. 97
That Bustos failed to “allege facts to suggest that the officers who assaulted
him misused or abused their official power” doomed his ability to state a plausible
Section 1983 claim against the off-duty officers who allegedly assaulted him. 599 F.3d
at 465. Bustos’s factual allegations lacked the hallmarks of a Section 1983 claim
where police officers are clothed with state authority. Absent from his complaint were
any allegations that the officers were in uniform or that the officer that assaulted him
used an official service weapon or threatened him by asserting his authority as a
police officer. Id. Thus, “no ‘air of authority’ pervaded this barroom altercation.” Id.
So too here. Lucas like Bustos fails to allege facts to suggest that Landry—the
only perpetrator of harassment or assault—misused or abused his official power,
much less that the “air of official authority . . . pervaded the assault” and harassment.
First, 	the 	Court 	considers 	whether 	the 	conduct 	allegedly 	causing 	the
constitutional violation is fairly attributable to the State, i.e., whether the State
state a Monell claim against the city because he did not allege that a municipal policy was the moving
force behind a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 467 (additionally affirming dismissal of
Bustos state law tort claims against the City due to Texas common law immunity).
97 For example, the Fifth Circuit examined Tarpley, in which “[t]he presence of police and the
air of official authority pervaded the entire incident” where a deputy sheriff—who lured his wife’s
former lover to his home and assaulted him—used his service weapon, identified himself as a police
officer, summoned another officer who identified himself as a fellow officer, and the two ran the victim
out of town in their squad car. The panel then examined United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 415-
16 (5th Cir. 1999) in which the police officer defendant’s status as a police officer “put him in the unique
position” to offer protection to his co-conspirators and cover up the murder of an individual who had
filed a complaint with internal affairs, and other evidence sufficed for a jury to conclude that the officer
acted under color of state law, including that the defendant met with co-conspirators in the police
station, drove them in his police car to areas the victim frequented, and had discussions with them
during his shift.
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granted Landry as a commissioned officer in Assumption Parish the type of authority
he used to violate Lucas’s rights. Lucas’s allegations stumble on this threshold
element: he alleges no facts indicating that the State conferred on Landry any
authority to harass, assault, or show up at Lucas’s house and menace or threaten
him. Notably, Lucas does not allege that Landry purported to use any arrest,
detention, or official search or interrogation powers in any of their interactions.
Instead, the facts alleged underscore the personal quality of the neighbor-on-neighbor
harassment. Lucas alleges no facts indicating that Landry’s vendetta/pursuit was
officially authorized or had its origin in Landry’s duties as a reserve deputy. At best,
the facts alleged indicate that Landy was acting not under the pretense of any official
authority vested in him but, rather, as a father retaliating after (he was told, however
falsely) a neighbor allegedly made an obscene hand gesture toward his daughter, or
as a private contractor still bitter that his neighbor criticized his private contracting
company’s workmanship.
Second, the Court considers whether Lucas alleges that Landry purported to
exercise his official authority—any nexus between the victim, the improper conduct,
and the officer’s performance of his official duties. Here, too, Lucas’s allegations
falter: there are no allegations that Landry purported to use official authority to
facilitate his harassment or alleged assault of Landry. Again, the challenged conduct
in November 2023—driving a few blocks to Lucas’s house, jumping out of a running
black GMS Sierra, crossing by foot onto Lucas’s driveway, and “screaming death
threats at Mr. Lucas and his wife”—are in no way alleged to be dependent on Landry’s
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authority as an Assumption Parish commissioned officer or reserve deputy. Lucas
alleges no facts that would indicate that Landry was acting under the pretense of law.
Lucas and Landry are acquainted with one another because they are neighbors living
close by in the same subdivision, where Landry’s private company allegedly installed
a poor drainage system and Lucas thereafter publicly outed Landry as the system’s
builder. That is how and where their conflict originated and proliferated. Other than
a domestic or familial dispute, it’s hard to imagine a more personal pursuit than the
one alleged by Lucas, replete with a grudge held from a perceived professional slight,
road rage, car-keying, lewd hand gestures—a neighbor-on-neighbor feud culminating
more than once with mutual protective orders involving spouses and children.
According to Lucas’s allegations, Landry displayed none of the hallmarks of a
law enforcement official. Lucas’s affirmative pleading deficiencies are amplified by
facts not pled: no allegations in the 66-page complaint suggest that Landry ever wore
a police uniform;98 flashed his badge; detained or purported to arrest Lucas; ordered
Lucas to do anything under the pretense of his official authority; drove a marked
vehicle99 	in 	perpetrating 	the 	traffic 	violations, 	disregarding 	traffic 	signs, 	and
harassing drive-by incidents; used his service weapon; or “otherwise acted like [a]
police officer or demonstrated an air of authority[.]” Compare Larpenter v. Vera, No.
22-30572, 2023 WL 5554679, at *2-3 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2023) (citations omitted,
98 Landry’s civilian dress—dark blue jeans, bright yellow shirt with company logo, tan dress
shoes—is mentioned once. ECF No. 1 ¶ 70.
99 Lucas alleges that Landry perpetrated his campaign of harassment while driving a black
Porche Cayenne, a white truck, a white Chevy Tahoe, a black Chevrolet Silverado, a black GMC Sierra,
and a four-wheeler. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 36, 39, 53, 59, 70, 86, 92.
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cleaned up) (sua sponte addressing under-color-of-law element and determining that
defendant, who—in his capacity as an off-duty private security guard—violently
removed a Mardi Gras ball attendee from the event space, was acting under color of
state law because defendant “displayed all the hallmarks of a law enforcement
official” including that he was wearing his official uniform, gave “lawful” commands,
and employed a maneuver learned in police training) with Townsend v. Moya, 291
F.3d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that prison guard did not act under color of law
when he stabbed inmate during game of horseplay unrelated to guard’s official
duties); Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir. Unit A. Jan. 1981)
(holding that on-duty chief of police did not act under color of law when he assaulted
his sister-in-law at police station because assault arose from purely private family
dispute and defendant did not threaten to arrest plaintiff).
Critically, Lucas sues Landry as a private individual—a civilian neighbor who
owns his own contracting business—not as an officer or state actor.100 Though Lucas
mentions that Landry is “a reserve deputy” with Assumption Parish Sheriff’s Office101
and that Landry testified that he is a “commissioned officer,”102 these are mere labels
whereas the under-color-of-state-law element “turns on substance.” Lindke, 601 U.S.
at 197.103 As for substance, Lucas alleges facts uniformly indicating a prevailing
100 ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10, 17A.
101 Id. ¶¶ 15, 175
102 Id. ¶ 159.
103 In his opposition, Lucas argues that the LPSO Defendants knew that “Defendant Landry
utilized his reserve credentials to contact three unnamed officers from Assumption Parish Sheriff’s
Office to be present” at Landry’s house, after Landry was intercepted by the LPSO, after Landry
showed up at Lucas’s house on November 30. ECF No. 21 at 13. But the Court considers only the well-
pleaded facts in the complaint; it cannot consider newly minted allegations made beyond the
complaint. Blankenship v. Buenger, 653 F. App’x 330, 337 n.22 (5th Cir. 2016); Dorsey v. Portfolio
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personal quality to the rivalry between Lucas and Landry. Ultimately, Landry’s
alleged conduct is mere private conduct excluded from Section 1983’s reach. This
dooms Lucas’s attempt to impose Section 1983 liability on the LPSO Defendants.
It follows, as set forth below, that Lucas fails to state a bystander liability claim
against the LPSO Defendants and any Monell claim against the sheriff.
2. 	No Constitutional Violation Perpetrated by State Actor
Lucas’s Section 1983 claims against the LPSO Defendants fail as a matter of
law because Lucas does not allege that any of the LPSO Defendants violated his
constitutional 	rights. 	Instead, 	he 	purports 	to 	allege 	that 	Landy 	inflicted 	a
constitutional injury while the LPSO Defendants failed to intervene. However, by
failing to allege facts indicating that Landry acted under color of state law, Lucas’s
bystander liability theory fails to implicate any constitutional violation perpetrated
by a state actor. Thus, Lucas fails to state a failure to intervene claim and, ultimately,
fails to allege that any LPSO Defendant violated Lucas’s constitutional rights—
warranting dismissal of all Section 1983 claims against them.
In the LPSO Defendants’ dismissal motion, they argue that Lucas fails to plead
an underlying constitutional violation perpetrated by an officer acting under color of
state law. In Count 3, Lucas claims that Defendants Stephen Waldrop, Zachary
Sciortino, Elliot Day, and the LPSO “had a duty to intervene when Defendant Landry
Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). Even if the Court considered this argument as an
allegation, it amounts to nothing more than another stray suggestion that Landry happens to be a law
enforcement officer with reserve credentials. Lucas fails to suggest how this would support a finding
that he alleged Landry acted under color of state law or inflicted a constitutional injury in allegedly
harassing Lucas.
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was violating Mr. Lucas’ constitutional rights, which resulted in the infliction of
excessive force/violations upon Mr. Lucas.”104 In Count 4, Lucas purports to allege a
Monell claim against Sheriff Webre based on LPSO officers’ violations of Lucas’s
Fourth Amendment rights in standing by while Landry allegedly utilized excessive
force.105
Lucas fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest that the LPSO Defendants
stood by while a state actor violated his constitutional right to be free from excessive
force, much less to allege facts that would overcome the LPSO Defendants’ assertion
of qualified immunity. Considering that the mine-run bystander liability or failure to
intervene cases in the Fifth Circuit concern circumstances in which the officers are
literally standing by at the scene where constitutional excessive force violations are
unfolding, Lucas’s conclusory allegations that the LPSO Defendants were complicit
in constitutional violations perpetrated against him by failing to intervene in
Landry’s harassment of Lucas do not fit the mold.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure . . .
against unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “[T]here is no ‘generic
right to be free from excessive force.’” Kennedy v. City of Arlington, 165 F.4th 937,
943 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989)). In plain
terms, “[a]n excessive force claim is a claim that a law enforcement officer carried out
an unreasonable seizure through a use of force that was not justified under the
relevant circumstances.” County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428 (2017).
104 ECF No. 1 ¶ 210.
105 Id. ¶¶ 224-233.
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Thus, “[t]o state a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show
two things: (1) a seizure occurred; and (2) the force used was unreasonable.” Estate of
Parker v. Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety, 140 F.4th 226, 238 (5th Cir. 2025)
(citation 	omitted). 	“[A] 	Fourth 	Amendment 	seizure 	occurs 	‘when 	there 	is 	a
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied.’” Id.; Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 134 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted) (“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from being subjected to
excessive force when they are physically apprehended or subdued by agents of the
government.”).106 	“An 	officer’s 	use 	of 	force 	is 	unreasonable 	under 	the 	Fourth
Amendment if the plaintiff shows: ‘(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only
from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was
clearly unreasonable.’” Estate of Parker, 140 F.4th at 239.
“Both bystander liability and municipal liability require [the plaintiff] to plead
an underlying constitutional violation.” Id. at 245. And, “[m]ere allegations of verbal
abuse do not present actional claims under § 1983.” See Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d
271, 274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993); see also McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.
106 But see Tyson, 42 F.4th at 515 (observing that all claims that officers used excessive force
during an arrest, stop, or seizure should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment but when “neither
a search nor seizure took place, the claim falls outside the Fourth Amendment and comes instead
within the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Here, Lucas alleges
mere labels and conclusions invoking “the Fourth Amendment” and “excessive force” at Landry’s
hands. Because he fails to allege facts supporting this or any other ostensible theory for any alleged
constitutional injury, it is unclear whether Lucas alleges that Landry purported to effect a seizure
when he showed up on Lucas’s driveway in November 2023 (before law enforcement intervened and
briefly handcuffed Landry). But because Lucas likewise fails to allege any facts supporting excessive
force or any constitutional injury effected by a state actor, the Court declines to grapple with under
which theory Lucas purports to proceed.
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1983) (“[A]s a general rule, ‘mere threatening language and gestures . . . do not, even
if true, amount to a constitutional violation.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 998 (1983).
Notably, after the panel in Bustos determined that the plaintiff failed to allege
that the assaulting officers acted under color of state law, Bustos also affirmed
dismissal of Section 1983 claims against bystander officers and dismissal of the
Monell claim for failure to allege that any officer had violated plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. The same result obtains here.
Because the Fourth Amendment binds only the government, Lucas’s Section
1983 	claims 	against 	the 	LPSO 	Defendants 	based 	on 	Landry’s 	purported
unconstitutional conduct is a nonstarter because Landry allegedly harassed Lucas in
Landry’s capacity as a private citizen. Absent from the complaint are any factual
allegations suggesting that Landry acted under color of state law, effected a seizure
of Lucas, or utilized force in the process, much less that any force used was
unreasonably excessive and that the LPSO Defendants failed to intervene. Further
illustrating 	Lucas’s 	failure to 	allege 	facts 	plausibly 	indicating 	that 	the 	LPSO
Defendants could be liable to Lucas under a theory that they failed to intervene in
Landry’s perpetration of excessive force against Lucas, the elements of the bystander
liability cause of action are framed in terms of police officer liability at the scene of
another fellow officer violating an individual’s constitutional rights:
A failure to intervene claim against a police officer requires that the
officer 	(1) 	knows 	that 	a 	fellow 	officer 	is 	violating 	an 	individual’s
constitutional rights; (2) is present at the scene of the constitutional
violation; (3) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (4)
chooses not to act.
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Armstrong v. Asheley, 60 F.4th 262, 280 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Whitley v. Hanna, 726
F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981
F.3d 319, 342 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Bystander liability requires more than mere presence
in the vicinity of the violation; ‘we also consider whether an officer acquiesced in the
alleged constitutional violation.’”); Norman v. Ingle, 151 F.4th 707, 713-14 (5th Cir.
2025) (where police officer “did not actively participate in the challenged conduct” and
plaintiff offered no analogous case law that a reasonable officer would know of his
duty to intervene in the circumstances presented, plaintiff failed to meet his burden
of demonstrating that his claim was not barred by qualified immunity).
Lucas fails to allege facts which support these elements. The LPSO Defendants
contend that, as pled, Lucas has not and cannot state a bystander liability claim
against 	Day, 	Sciortino, 	or 	Waldrop. 	That 	is 	because, 	according 	to 	the 	LSPO
Defendants, the facts do not support Lucas’s contention that Landry used “excessive
force,” much less committed some other constitutional violation, when certain LPSO
Defendants indeed were present during the November 30, 2023 incident as Landry
sped down the street in his truck; when Landry was placed in handcuffs; and when
Landry orally threatened Lucas but did not physically touch or brandish a gun toward
Lucas. In other words, according to the LSPO Defendants, Lucas fails to make out a
Fourth Amendment violation and any bystander liability theory. The Court agrees.
Lucas fails to allege factual material plausibly indicating that Landry was
acting under color of law in effecting a violent seizure of Lucas, much less any factual
allegations implicating the LPSO Defendants as bystanders present at the scene
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choosing not to act while another officer acting under color of state law violated
Lucas’s Fourth Amendment rights. Absent allegations that Landry acted under color
of state law, that a state officer acting under color of state law used excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the LPSO Defendants failed to
intervene in the use of excessive force, Lucas’s factual allegations do not fit this
Section 1983 theory of derivative liability whatsoever. See Kennedy, 165 F.4th at 946.
His Section 1983 failure to intervene claims against the LPSO Defendants must be
dismissed.
Because Lucas fails to allege that he suffered a constitutional injury at the
hands of the LPSO Defendants, Lucas’s other derivative claim based on Monell is
likewise doomed. See id. at 946-47; see also Bustos, 599 F.3d at 467 (“Because Bustos
has alleged no constitutional injury attributable to the Officers, Bustos has failed to
state a claim that a City policy was the moving force behind a violation of his
constitutional rights.”).
Accordingly, as pled, any Section 1983 claims against the LPSO Defendants—
including a Monell claim against the sheriff—fail as a matter of law.
C. 	State Law Claims and Immunity
Finally, Lucas purports to sue “all defendants” for “assisting” Landry in
abusing Lucas’s rights (Count 7) and inflicting emotional distress upon Lucas (Count
8). The LPSO Defendants move to dismiss both claims for failure to state a claim and
because Louisiana confers immunity on them where it is alleged that the LPSO
Defendants have merely exercised discretion in the course and scope of their law
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enforcement duties. The Court agrees that dismissal of Lucas’s state law claims is
warranted.
As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether Louisiana recognizes a cause of
action for “assisted” abuse of rights or “assisted” infliction of emotional distress.
Lucas does not purport to allege that the LPSO Defendants themselves abused
Lucas’s rights or inflicted emotional distress upon him. Nor does Lucas allege that
the LPSO Defendants conspired with Landry to abuse Lucas’s rights or inflict
emotional distress upon him. No factual allegations are advanced that would
plausibly support that the LPSO Defendants acted pursuant to an agreement with
Landry to harass Lucas. Accordingly, insofar as Lucas purports to allege an assisted
or attempted abuse of rights or assisted or attempted infliction of emotional distress,
any such claim fails as a matter of law. Lucas likewise fails to allege facts that would
overcome discretionary immunity, or any facts that would plausibly indicate that the
LPSO Defendants are liable to Lucas for abuse of rights or intentional (or negligent)
infliction of emotional distress.
1. 	La.R.S. 9:2793.11 Officer Immunity for Discretionary Functions
“A civil claim for damages against a peace officer or public entity that employs
or appoints a peace officer shall be prohibited [where] (1) The conduct or actions of
the peace officer arise out of the performance of any discretionary function within the
course 	and 	scope 	of 	the 	peace 	officer’s 	law 	enforcement 	duties.” 	La.R.S. 	§
9:2793.11(B)(1). “[C]riminal, fraudulent, or intentional misconduct,” however, is
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excepted from this general rule such that peace officers are ineligible for immunity if
engaged in the same. Id. (C)(1).
Viewing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Lucas, he alleges no
facts indicating criminal, fraudulent, or intentional misconduct on the part of the
LPSO Defendants. Though he labels his infliction of emotional distress claim as
sounding in “intentional” conduct, Lucas retreats from this label in his briefing,
suggesting “[a] claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical
injury is viable under La. Civ. Code art. 2315(A)[.]”107 In any event, the Court does
not take as true mere labels or conclusions, only well-pled facts. At best, Lucas alleges
that the LPSO Defendants acted negligently in failing to investigate, undertaking
inadequate investigations of Landry’s allegedly intentional conduct, or in careless
record keeping or inadequate follow-up. Assuming such conduct is legally actionable
under any state-law theory, because the only facts alleged by Lucas concerning LPSO
conduct concern those officers and the sheriff performing discretionary functions
within the course and scope of their law enforcement duties, La.R.S. § 9:279311 bars
his state law claims against them. For this reason alone, Lucas’s abuse of right and
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims must be dismissed as
to the LPSO Defendants.108
107 ECF No. 21 at 23.
108 The alleged facts giving rise to this lawsuit predate the effective date of the statute, April
29, 2024. Lucas resists the statute’s application not on grounds of La.R.S. § 9:2793’s non-retroactivity,
but, rather, by arguing that he alleges that Landry committed intentional misconduct which should
(somehow) defeat the statute’s application to the LPSO Defendants who he alleges “assisted” Landry.
Any later assertion by Lucas that the statute does not apply retroactively is likely forfeited. See Matter
of Green, 968 F.3d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”)). Regardless,
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2. 	Abuse of Right
Lucas fails to state an abuse of right claim against the LPSO Defendants.
“[I]nvoked sparingly[, t]he abuse of rights doctrine is a civilian concept which is
applied only in limited circumstances because its application renders unenforceable
one’s otherwise judicially protected rights.” Steier v. Heller, 31,733 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/5/99), 732 So.2d 787, 790 (citations omitted). The doctrine applies only if the
plaintiff alleges that one of the following conditions is met:
(1) the predominant motive for exercise of the right is to cause harm;
(2) there is no serious or legitimate motive for exercise of the right;
(3) 	the 	exercise 	of 	the 	right 	violates 	moral 	rules, 	good 	faith, 	or
elementary fairness; or
(4) the exercise of the right is for a purpose other than that for which it
was granted.
Id. at 791.
Merely articulating these conditions illustrates how this cause of action is a
poor fit for Lucas’s allegations against the LPSO Defendants. Indeed, the doctrine
seems to apply in circumstances such as in the exercise of a contractual right. See id.;
see also Sartisky v. Louisiana Endowment for the Humanities, No. 14-1125, 2014 WL
5040817, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2014) (Engelhardt, J.). Here, Lucas’s alleged facts
villainize Landry—not the LPSO Defendants. Lucas alleges no facts regarding any of
the LPSO Defendants that would satisfy any of these conditions. Lucas does not
allege that any LPSO Defendant was motivated to cause harm, much less that any
LPSO Defendant exercised any “right” that violated good faith, lacked a legitimate
the Court considers the LPSO Defendants’ alternative grounds for dismissal of Lucas’s state law
claims and finds that each independently has merit and warrants dismissal of Lucas’s state law claims.
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motive, or was “for a purpose other than that for which it was granted.” Again, at
best, Lucas alleges that the LPSO Defendants failed to adequately investigate
Lucas’s complaints against Landry and he otherwise concludes that they “assisted”
Landry in abusing his rights. Lucas fails to state an abuse of right claim against the
LPSO Defendants.
3. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff
must allege facts indicating that “(1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme
and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe;
and (3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that
severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his
conduct.” White v. Monsanto, 585 So.2d 1205, 1209 (La.1991). To satisfy the first
element, the challenged conduct “must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. “[M]ere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” do not satisfy
the first element, considering that “[p]ersons must necessarily be expected to be
hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind.” Id. The conduct must be calculated to cause
severe emotional distress, not merely fright, humiliation, or embarrassment. Id. at
1210.
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The LPSO Defendants contend that Lucas has failed to allege facts meeting
this high threshold because he alleges no facts indicating that any of them acted in
an outrageous manner or desired to inflict severe distress upon him. The Court
agrees. In his complaint, Lucas focuses on Landry’s alleged conduct which he
characterizes 	as 	extreme 	and 	outrageous, 	but 	he 	alleges 	that 	all 	defendants
collectively “named and unnamed” “knowingly and willingly assisted Defendant
Landry.”109 Lucas’s allegations that the LPSO Defendants performed inadequate
investigations or that their reports of various incidents left something to be desired—
or otherwise fell short in the performance of their discretionary functions—fall well
short of outrageous or “intolerable in a civilized community.” In his opposition papers,
Lucas appears to concede that it is Landry whom he alleges had the desire to inflict
emotional distress and that the other defendants collectively “should have known”
that Landry’s conduct caused him stress. 110 Lucas’s allegations fall well short of the
high threshold on conduct sufficient to state an emotional distress claim. Lucas has
failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the LPSO
Defendants.
D. 	Amendment Would be Futile.
In the concluding paragraph of his opposition, Lucas requests the opportunity
to amend his complaint if the Court “disagrees” that he has sufficiently pled any cause
109 ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 259-62.
110 ECF No. 21 at 24 (“Defendants had knowledge that Plaintiff was a Veteran, further
Defendants all witnesses (sic) to the immense effects of the emotional distress that cumulated since
2016 [and] Defendants should have known that his was likely to cause severe emotional distress, which
was compounded by his mental health history and the circumstances of having (sic) of 2016 and
2020.”).
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of action. But a plaintiff’s “bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—
without any indication of the particular grounds on which amendment is sought—
does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).” Smith v.
CommonSpirit Health, 37 F.4th 1160, 1170 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted); cf.
Porretto v. City of Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113 F.4th 469, 491 (5th Cir. 2024)
(affirming denial of “bare bones” request in motion-to-dismiss opposition for “an
opportunity 	to 	amend 	the 	[c]omplaint 	if 	the 	Court 	deems 	additional 	factual
allegations are necessary” because such a request “remains futile when it fails to
apprise the district court of the facts that the plaintiff would plead in an amended
complaint” (cleaned up)).
Lucas offers no indication that or how he could plead facts sufficient to allege
a plausible claim against the LPSO Defendants. The crux of his claims against the
LPSO Defendants is that they failed to investigate or charge Landry, but he has no
Article III standing to pursue such claims. Lucas’s allegations sounding in a failure
to investigate is a standing problem, not a pleading problem that could be remedied
by amendment. See Lefebure v. Boeker, No. 17-1791, 2023 WL 3069125, at *2-3 (M.D.
La. Mar. 31, 2023) (Jackson, J.) (citing Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 662). Moreover, Lucas
concedes that most of his factual allegations occurred so long ago that any cause of
action based upon those would be time-barred. Furthermore, Lucas fails to allege
facts indicating that Landry acted under color of state law (and, all well-pled facts
plausibly indicate the contrary: that Landry pursued a wholly personal vendetta
against his neighbor, Lucas). This dooms his Section 1983 claims against the LPSO
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Defendants which are predicated on derivative theories of bystander liability and
Monell. Because he alleges no standalone constitutional violation by the LPSO
Defendants, his derivative claims are fatally defective. Lucas fails to suggest how he
might remedy the fundamental defects in his Section 1983 claims against the LPSO
Defendants. Nor has he alleged any facts that would overcome these defendants’
immunity for his state law claims, much less how he could allege facts that support
the elements of those claims. Given Lucas’s failure to offer any indication that he
could 	revamp 	his 	66-page 	complaint 	to 	plead 	facts 	sufficient 	to 	address 	the
fundamental defects in his claims against the LPSO Defendants, the Court finds that
leave to amend would be futile.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion111 to dismiss by the LPSO Defendants is
GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of March, 2026.
BRANDON S. LONG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
111 ECF No. 20.
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