USA v. Payton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 19-214
ANDREW PAYTON 	SECTION: “D”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for a Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), filed by the Defendant Andrew Payton (“Payton”).1 The United States
of 	America 	opposes 	the 	Motion.2 	After 	careful 	consideration 	of 	the 	parties’
memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Andrew Payton (“Payton”) was convicted in this Court after he pled
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) on March 29, 2022.3 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the other
four counts of the five-count Indictment were dismissed by the Government at the
time of sentencing.4
On June 28, 2022, the Court held a Sentencing Hearing in this matter.5 Prior
to the hearing, counsel for Payton filed three objections to the Presentence Report
1 R. Doc. 124
2 R. Doc. 126.
3 R. Doc. 54; R. Doc. 56.
4 R. Doc. 1; R. Doc. 70.
5 R. Doc. 71 at p. 1.
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(“PSR”), which the Court addressed during the hearing.6 	Specifically, Payton’s
counsel objected to “The Offense Conduct” in the PSR, which mentions that additional
controlled substances and a firearm were found during the search of a residence, on
the grounds that the allegations were not contained in the Factual Basis filed by the
Government and agreed to by Payton, and because the allegations will prevent
Payton from participating in a rehabilitation program.7 	Payton’s counsel also
objected to the PSR’s statement that Payton is ineligible for the safety valve,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), based upon his possession
of that firearm.8 	Finally, Payton’s counsel objected to the two-point enhancement
applied pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based upon Payton’s possession of the
firearm.9
After hearing from counsel during the sentencing hearing, the Court overruled
all three of the objections.10 	In determining Payton’s sentence, the Court applied
U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(c)(7) to calculate Payton’s base offense level of 26.11 From there, the
Court applied a two level enhancement for possessing a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§2D1.1(b), bringing Payton’s offense level to 28.12 Subsequently, the Court applied a
career offender enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(a) based upon Payton’s
two prior felony drug offenses.13 	Specifically, Payton was convicted in 2006 of
6 See R. Doc. 63; R. Doc. 98 at pp. 6–13.
7 R. Doc. 63 at p. 1.
8 Id.
9 Id. at p. 2.
10 R. Doc. 70; R. Doc. 98 at pp. 6–13.
11 R. Doc. 98 at p. 18.
12 Id.
13 Id. at pp. 18–20.
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possession with intent to distribute marijuana under Louisiana law and he was
convicted in 2007 of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine under Louisiana
law.14 	Thus, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(b), the Court calculated Payton’s offense
level to be 34.15 Lastly, the Court determined that a three-level reduction was
warranted pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and 1.1(b), giving Payton a total offense
level of 31.16 The Court accordingly calculated the advisory guideline range as being
188 to 235 months based on an offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of
VI.17 	The Court then granted Payton’s request for a downward variance and
sentenced Payton to 168 months.18
Payton appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.19 	On appeal, Payton argued that this Court erred in concluding that
he is a career offender because his state convictions cannot be used to support the
career offender enhancement.20 Payton specifically asserted that his prior marijuana
conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense because marijuana has been
removed from the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).21 	On February 13,
2023, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal because Payton had waived his right to
appeal in his Plea Agreement.22 Payton filed a Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme
14 Id. at pp. 17–19.
15 Id. at p. 18.
16 Id. at p. 19.
17 Id. at pp. 17–20 & 24–25; R. Doc. 70.
18 R. Doc. 98 at pp. 26–47.
19 R. Doc. 75.
20 Id.
21 Id. at p. 2.
22 R. Doc. 106. See R. Doc. 108 at p. 2; R. Doc. 56 at pp. 2–3; R. Doc. 112 at p. 1, n.1 & p. 2.
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Court, which was denied on June 12, 2023.23 On March 25, 2024, Payton timely filed
a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a
Person in Federal Custody.24 The Court denied such Motion.25
On May 19, 2025, Payton filed this instant Motion for a Reduction of Sentence
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).26 Payton first contends that he has exhausted
all his administrative remedies as required by § 3582(c)(1)(A), thereby making his
Motion 	properly 	before 	this 	Court.27 	Next, 	Payton 	asserts 	that, 	pursuant 	to
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	circumstances 	as 	defined 	under 	United 	States
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13, he is entitled to a reduction of his
sentence.28 He specifically points to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Minor29 to claim that, if sentenced today, he would not be a “career offender” pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because his prior 2006 possession with intent to distribute
marijuana under Louisiana law and his 2007 conviction of possession with the intent
to distribute cocaine under Louisiana law no longer constitute predicate offenses for
the career offender designation under the Armed Career Criminal Act.30
Moreover, Payton asserts that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh
in favor of a sentence reduction.31 He specifically maintains that his participation and
completion of various Evidence Based Recidivism Reduction programs demonstrate
23 R. Doc. 107.
24 R. Doc. 108.
25 R. Doc. 121.
26 R. Doc. 124.
27 Id. at p. 5.
28 Id. at pp. 5–7.
29 121 F.4th 1089 (5th Cir. 2024).
30 R. Doc. 124 at pp. 7–12.
31 Id. at p. 12.
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his eligibility for sentence reduction.32 Payton highlights that he currently serves as
an “orderly at the Education Department[,]” where he has completed programs such
as “ACT work keys” and earned a technical diploma in business technology.33 He also
notes that he is participating in the “Seven Habits” program, a program only for
dependable, responsible, and trustworthy inmates, according to Payton.34 And as a
final point, Payton invokes the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United
States35 to demonstrate why the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence
reduction.36
The Government opposes the Motion.37 While the Government acknowledges
that Payton has exhausted his administrative remedies, it argues that a sentence
reduction is unwarranted because Payton has not presented any extraordinary or
compelling reasons to qualify for a sentence reduction.38 The Government does not
dispute that Payton’s 2006 conviction and 2007 conviction would no longer qualify as
predicate offenses under United States v. Minor.39 Instead, the Government asserts
that the Fifth Circuit has determined that non-retroactive changes in the law do not
constitute compelling or extraordinary circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A).40
The 	Government 	also 	asserts 	that 	even 	if 	Payton 	could 	demonstrate
extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the § 3553(a) factors weigh against a
32 Id. at p. 13.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 597 U.S. 481 (2022).
36 R. Doc. 124 at p. 14.
37 R. Doc. 126.
38 Id. at pp. 1–2.
39 Id. at p. 4.
40 Id.
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sentence reduction.41 The Government specifically highlights Payton’s criminal
history, namely his convictions for distribution of illegal drugs and manslaughter.42
The 	Government 	also 	believes 	that 	Payton’s 	criminal 	conduct 	has 	increased
throughout the years and that the instant conviction demonstrates that Payton has
further immersed himself in criminal activity.43 Accordingly, the Government claims
that “the § 3553(a) factors—most notably, the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the need for the sentence imposed to provide just punishment for the offense,
the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,
and the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant—weigh 	against 	a 	sentence 	reduction.”44 	Thus, 	according 	to 	the
Government, Payton’s motion should be denied.45
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A judgment of conviction imposing an imprisonment sentence “‘constitutes a
final judgment’ and may not be modified by a district court except in limited
circumstances.”46 	Section 	3582(c)(1)(A) 	demonstrates 	one 	of 	these 	limited
circumstances47 and provides, in pertinent part:
The court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to
bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at p. 5.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)).
47 United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023)(noting that § 3582(c)(1)(A) is often
referred to as a “compassionate release” because courts typically use it for prisoners with severe
medical issues or conditions).
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receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility,
whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may
impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without
conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term
of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to 	the 	extent 	that 	they 	are 	applicable, 	if 	it 	finds 	that
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.48
Additionally, a sentencing reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”49 “Section 3582 does not define
extraordinary and compelling reasons. Congress left that task to the Sentencing
Commission, though Congress did insist that rehabilitation of the prisoner alone
cannot justify a reduced sentence.”50 The Sentencing Commission, after the passage
of the First Step Act in 2018, amended the Guidelines by extending the applicability
of the policy statement provided in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).51 Effective November 1,
2023, § 1B1.13(b) provides six categories of circumstances that may constitute
“extraordinary and compelling reasons[,]” which are (1) the medical circumstances of
the defendant; (2) the age of the defendant; (3) the family circumstances of the
defendant; (4) whether the defendant was a victim of abuse while in custody; (5) other
reasons similar in gravity to those previously described; and (6) an unusually long
sentence.52
Accordingly, to successfully bring a compassionate release motion, a prisoner
must clear four hurdles by showing that (1) he exhausted his administrative
48 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(a)(i).
49 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(a)(ii).
50 United States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 2022)(citation modified).
51 United States Sentencing Commission, Amendment 814 to the Sentencing Guidelines (2023),
https://perma.cc/HG4Y-HLHV.
52 Id.; U.S. SENT ’ G G UIDELINES MANUAL , §§ 1B1.3(b)(1)-(6) (U.S. SENT ’ G C OMM’ N 2023).
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remedies; (2) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify a sentence reduction; (3)
a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements promulgated by the
Commission; and (4) the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence reduction.53
III. 	ANALYSIS
Payton argues that he is entitled to a compassionate release pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).54 The Court takes each element in turn.
1. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Although 	the 	parties 	do 	not 	dispute 	that 	Payton 	has 	exhausted 	his
administrative remedies,55 the Court must assure itself of its jurisdiction to hear this
matter. Pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A), a prisoner must first exhaust his administrative
remedies before he files a motion for compassionate release. “Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s
text states plainly that a prisoner has the option to file his motion in the district court
upon the expiration of one of two events: (1) once he ‘has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal . . . or’ (2) after ‘the lapse of 30 days from the receipt
of such a request by the warden.’”56 As pertinent here, a prisoner’s first step is to
request that the Bureau of Prisons bring a motion on behalf of the prisoner.57 Next,
if the Bureau of Prisons denies a prisoner’s motion, he may file a motion with a
district court.58
53 See Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1089.
54 R. Doc. 124.
55 Id. at p. 5; R. Doc. 126 at p. 1.
56 	United 	States 	v. 	Garrett, 	15 	F.4th 	335, 	338 	(5th 	Cir. 	2021)(quoting 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(emphasis removed)).
57 United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020)
58 Garrett, 15 F.4th at 338.
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Here, as the parties stipulate, the Court finds that Payton has exhausted all
his administrative remedies to prior to bringing the instant Motion.59 On February
18, 2025, Payton filed an “Inmate Request to Staff” asking the warden to file a
compassionate release motion on his behalf.60 The warden denied Payton’s request
on February 24, 2025,61 and Payton filed the instant Motion on May 19, 2025.62
Finding that Payton has exhausted all his administrative remedies, the Court
determines that it has jurisdiction to hear this matter and thus continues its analysis.
2. 	Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Payton asserts that pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Minor, he would not be classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 if
sentenced today.63 Therefore, according to Payton, the Fifth Circuit’s change in the
law constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason.64 The Government, in
opposition, contends that although Payton would not be a career offender if he was
sentenced today, 	the change in the law is non-retroactive and therefore does not
qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A).65
Under § 3582(c)(1), “prisoners have extraordinary and compelling reasons for
relief only when they face some extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the
59 R. Doc. 124 at p. 5; R. Doc. 126 at p. 1.
60 R. Doc. 124-1 at p. 2.
61 Id. at p. 3.
62 R. Doc. 124.
63 Id. at p. 7.
64 Id. at p. 12.
65 R. Doc. 126 at p. 4.
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time of sentencing, and unique to the life of the prisoner.”66 As further explained by
the Fifth Circuit:
A non-retroactive change in the law affects every prisoner previously
sentenced under that provision in the exact same way. And by its terms,
a nonretroactive change in the law has zero effect on defendants already
in prison. Thus, a non-retroactive change in law is, by definition, neither
an 	extraordinarily 	severe 	exigency 	nor 	unique 	to 	the 	life 	of 	the
prisoner.67
Thus, it is clear that “‘[a] prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in
criminal law to support a compassionate release motion, because such changes are
neither extraordinary nor compelling.’”68 Usually, the Court’s analysis would turn to
whether the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Minor is a non-retroactive
change in the law. Because, however, the Court finds that the § 3553(a) factors do not
support a compassionate release, the Court need not address such issue nor any other
element of a successful compassionate release motion.69
3. 	Section 3553(a) Factors
Even 	assuming 	Payton 	has 	demonstrated 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling
circumstances 	warranting 	sentence 	reduction, 	he 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	relief
66 United States v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2025)(internal quotation marks omitted).
67 Id. (citation modified).
68 Id. (quoting United States v. McMaryion, No. 21-50450, 2023 WL 4118015, at *2 (5th Cir. June 22,
2023) (per curiam)).
69 See United States v. Ladner, CRIMINAL ACTION No. 22-180, 2025 WL 932773, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar.
27, 2025)(Africk, J.)(“A district court has the authority to deny compassionate release based on the
§ 3553(a) factors alone.”). Nonetheless, regarding the third element of a successful compassionate
release motion, whether a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements promulgated
by the Commission, the Court finds that Payton has not shown any extraordinary and compelling
reasons exists under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Payton has not raised any medical, age, family, abusive, or
length of sentence circumstances warranting sentence reduction. See R. Doc. 124. The Court disagrees
that Payton’s completed rehabilitation programs constitute other compelling and extraordinary
circumstances under U.S.S.G.§ 1B1.13(b)(5). Regardless, “[t]his policy statement does not bind courts,
but serves to inform its analysis for determining sufficient circumstances to merit compassionate
release.” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021).
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under § 	3582 because the § 3553(a) factors weigh against his release.70 Section
3553(a) provides courts with numerous factors to consider when imposing a sentence,
including:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to 	provide 	the 	defendant 	with 	needed 	educational 	or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner[.]71
As an initial matter, the Court determines that the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant weigh heavily against
granting compassionate release. As explained by the Government:
In considering his motion for a reduction in sentence this Court should
also consider the fact that Payton’s involvement in criminal conduct has
increased over the years, not decreased. This present case involved three
kilograms of cocaine, which is approximately $75,000 - $90,000 worth of
drugs, wholesale, with a much higher street value. He also possessed a
firearm. (See PSR, ¶¶ 25, 26). This most recent crime is much more
serious than his two previous distribution convictions, which shows that
he has not decided to remove himself from the criminal element. In fact,
he has further immersed himself in it.72
70 United States v. Wells, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 13-151, 2023 WL 3976188, at *2 (E.D. La. June
13, 2023)(Fallon, J.)(“A district court may deny relief based on the applicable 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors without reaching whether a defendant has extraordinary and compelling reasons for
release.”); see also United States v. Samak, CRIMINAL DOCKET NO. 91-189, 2020 WL 4050365, at
*4 (E.D. La. July 20, 2020)(Morgan, J.)(“Even if Samak had demonstrated ‘extraordinary and
compelling’ circumstances warranted a reduction in his sentence, he would nevertheless not be entitled
to relief under § 3582 because the § 3553(a) factors weigh heavily against his release.”).
71 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
72 R. Doc. 126 at p. 5.
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The Court, too, agrees that Payton’s involvement in criminal conduct has seemingly
escalated in magnitude. Further, while recognizing—and commending—Payton for
completing various rehabilitation programs to better himself, the Court notes that
Payton has committed a serious drug crime and that he has already received a
downward variance at his sentencing hearing.73
Second, the Court finds that the need for the sentence imposed to promote
respect for the law also weighs heavily in its decision in denying compassionate
release. In 2007, Payton pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine in
the 22nd Judicial District Court in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana.74 Yet, the
conviction as issue here is for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
of cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).75 Payton
has not only repeated the same criminal conduct, but he has also escalated the
magnitude his criminal conduct.76
Third, the Court finds that the need for the sentence imposed to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant likewise impacts its decision. As outlined
in the Presentence Investigation Report, Payton has a long and serious history of
criminal activity, including but not limited to an adult criminal conviction for
manslaughter and operating a vehicle while intoxicated.77 Moreover, while on parole
73 R. Doc. 70. The Court has reviewed the numerous achievements Mr. Payton has reached while
incarcerated and finds it very commendable that Mr. Payton has taken numerous steps to better
himself and prepare himself for success upon his release. See R. Doc. 124-1.
74 R. Doc. 61 at p. 10.
75 R. Doc. 1; R. Doc. 54.
76 R. Doc. 126 at p. 5.
77 R. Doc. 61 at pp. 9–13.
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related to his manslaughter conviction, Payton apparently “absconded supervision[,]”
thereby warranting a revocation of his parole.78
Accordingly, the Court finds the § 3553(a) factors counsel against reduction,
specifically the nature of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law, and the
need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes. The Fifth
Circuit is clear that “‘[t]he district court has discretion to deny compassionate release
if the Section 3553(a) factors counsel against a reduction.’”79 Having found so, the
Court denies compassionate release in this matter at this time.80
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s
Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person
in Federal Custody81 is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, February 3, 2026.
______________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
78 Id.
79 Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1089 (quoting Ward v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2021)); see also
United States v. Samak, 832 Fed. Appx. 330, 331 (5th Cir. 2020)(finding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when the district court, without addressing whether defendant had established
extraordinary and compelling circumstances, denied compassionate release based solely on the
§ 3553(a) factors).
80 The Court also points out that its previous sentence was a downward variance from the guideline
range of 188-235 months. See R. Doc. 98 at p. 25, p. 44, and p. 47.
81 R. Doc. 124.
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