Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ZURY SARAHI CASTRO, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-3054-JWL
)
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General; )
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION )
REVIEW; )
Secretary of Homeland Security; )
SAMUEL OLSON, ICE Field Office Director; )
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; and )
JACOB WELSH, Warden, Chase County Detention )
Center, )
)
Respondents. )
)
____________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, by which she challenges her detention by immigration officials without a bond
hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the petition in part.
Respondents are ordered to release petitioner on bond, subject to the same terms previously
set by an immigration judge, on or before April 6, 2026, and they are further ordered to
provide notice to this Court when such relief has been given. The Court denies any request
by petitioner for other relief.
Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States as a baby in approximately
1991 without authorization, and she has resided in the United States since then. On January
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17, 2026, petitioner was detained by immigration officials, and removal proceedings were
subsequently initiated. Petitioner requested release on bond, but on February 3, 2026, an
immigration judge denied the request, on the ground that the immigration court lacked
jurisdiction to consider release on bond because petitioner was being detained pursuant 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention. On February 18, 2026, the governing
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision (Hurtado) was vacated by a federal district
court in California; and on February 26, 2026, the immigration judge held another bond
hearing for petitioner, considered the merits of the issue, and granted the request, ordering
petitioner’s release from custody under a bond of $5,000. The following day, the
Government filed a form to invoke an automatic stay of the release order, and the
Government subsequently filed an appeal of that order to the BIA. On March 6, 2026, the
immigration judge, acting sua sponte, reconsidered the release order and again denied the
bond request for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the immigration court remained bound by
the BIA precedent in light of the Ninth Circuit’s stay of the California court’s order to the
extent applied outside that district.
Petitioner, who remains in custody in this judicial district, filed the instant habeas
action on March 17, 2026. Respondents have filed an answer and, at the Court’s request,
a supplemental answer; petitioner has filed a traverse; and the matter is therefore ripe for
ruling.
To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory and
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constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003). Respondents have not argued
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claim.
Petitioner was not recently detained as an alien newly arriving in the United States;
rather she had been present in the United States for many years when she was detained.
Petitioner argues that, for that reason, her detention does not fall within the scope of 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention pending removal proceedings, and
under which the Government purports to detain petitioner; but instead is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary release on bond. Petitioner thus claims
that her detention without any consideration of her release on bond violates these statutes.1
In a recent case involving the same issue, this Court rejected the Government’s
interpretation of these statutes in favor of the interpretation adopted by the overwhelming
majority of courts that have addressed the issue, and the Court ordered relief in the form of
a bond hearing under Section 1226(a). See Galdamez Orellana v. Welsh, 2026 WL 710121
(D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.). Respondents concede that the relevant facts of
the present case are not materially distinguishable from those in Galdamez Orellana, and
they therefore acknowledge that the Court’s prior reasoning would also apply here. Thus,
for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s opinion in Galdamez Orellana, see id. at *1-
3, the Court concludes in this case that the Government may not detain petitioner under
1 Petitioner also claims that her detention without consideration of release on bond
violates due process. In light of the Court’s conclusion that petitioner is entitled to bond
consideration under the statues, it need not reach that issue. Nor need it address petitioner’s
other claims by which she seeks the same relief.
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Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and that it may therefore detain petitioner pending a final removal
decision only under Section 1226(a), which allows for release on bond; and that the
Government has therefore violated these statutes by refusing to allow for consideration of
petitioner’s release on bond under Section 1226(a).2
The Court then turns to the issue of the appropriate relief to be accorded petitioner
for this violation. In its previous similar cases, the Court has ordered the Government to
provide a bond hearing on the merits, while denying the petitioner’s requests for release,
for a bond hearing conducted by the Court itself, for an order imposing a particular burden
of proof in the bond hearing, or for an order prohibiting invocation by the Government of
the automatic stay provision in an appeal from the bond determination. See, e.g., id. at *3.
The Court concludes in its discretion, however, that in this case such relief would not be
appropriate in light of the February 23 order by which the immigration judge determined
that petitioner should be released on bond based on the merits of the issue. Requiring the
same outcome – petitioner’s release on $5,000 bond – provides petitioner the most efficient
relief. In light of the recency of that decision and the absence of changed circumstances
relevant to that decision, it would be superfluous to order another bond hearing.
2 The Court declines respondents’ request to reconsider its prior ruling in light of
the Eighth Circuit’s recent contrary decision in Avila v. Bondi, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL
819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). The Court agrees with the reasoning of the dissent in that
case, see id. at *6-8 (Erickson, J., dissenting), just as in Galdamez Orellana it agreed with
the reasoning of the dissent in a similar case decided by the Fifth Circuit. See Galdamez
Orellana, 2026 WL 710121, at *3 (citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 508-
21 (5th Cir. 2026) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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The parties agree that, because the Government had already appealed from the
February 23 order granting release on bond, the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction to
reconsider that ruling on March 6.3 Respondents then argue that the February 23 order
cannot be “reinstated” as requested in the petition because it is still technically in force
(although stayed and on appeal), and they further argue that, in light of that procedural
difficulty, the Court should simply order a new bond hearing in the immigration court.
Other than to make that semantic argument, however, respondents have not provided any
reason why the Court should not order that the February 23 determination be given effect,
obviating the need for a new hearing. Respondents do not dispute petitioner’s evidence
that, at the February 23 hearing, the Government did not offer evidence or in any way
oppose the request for release on bond on the merits (including whether petitioner would
be a flight risk or pose a danger to the public upon release), but instead opposed release
solely on the jurisdictional basis under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Moreover, in appealing that
determination to the BIA, the Government again did not question the merits of the
determination and relied solely on the jurisdictional argument. Thus, the Government has
demonstrated that it lacks a factual basis to oppose release on bond for petitioner. The
Court therefore concludes that ordering a new bond hearing would not serve any legitimate
purpose, and thus would not serve the interests of justice; accordingly, it orders that
3 Although an Article III trial court is generally divested of jurisdiction to address
an issue once an appeal on that issue has been filed, the parties have not cited any authority
to support the claim that the same rule applies in this context of an immigration court.
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petitioner be released, subject to the same terms set by the immigration judge on February
23, 2026 (i.e., bond of $5,000).4
The Court also orders that that bond decision be given effect forthwith, without any
stay akin the one invoked by the Government in appealing the February 23 order to the
BIA. The Government invoked the stay in this case solely to appeal the bond determination
on jurisdictional grounds, but the Court has ruled that the BIA precedent on which the
Government relies (Hurtado) was wrongly decided. Because the Government has no
lawful basis to challenge the immigration judge’s bond decision (having foregone any
merits-based arguments), a stay of this Court’s order would serve only to thwart the Court’s
remedy for the statutory violation.5 The Court therefore orders that petitioner’s release on
bond be effected on or before April 6, 2026.
Finally, the Court notes that petitioner has requested an award of attorney fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act. Any such request should be made by future motion, after
consultation with Government counsel, in accordance with applicable rules.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted in part. Respondents are ordered
to release petitioner on bond, subject to the same terms previously set by an immigration
4 In her traverse, petitioner requests as the appropriate remedy her release without
bond, on recognizance, but the Court denies that request, as it does not believe that it would
be proper make a fact-based bond determination in the first instance. An immigration judge
has set appropriate terms for petitioner’s release on bond, and the most appropriate relief
in this Court is for those terms to be given effect.
5 The Court need not address in this case the constitutionality of the stay provision.
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judge, on or before April 6, 2026, and they are further ordered to provide notice to this
Court when such relief has been given. The Court denies any request by petitioner for
other relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 1st day of April, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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