Sunflower State Industrial Railway v. US Surface Transportation Board

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SUNFLOWER STATE INDUSTRIAL
RAILWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
US SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD,
Defendant.
Case No. 5:25-CV-04056-JAR-RES
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant US Surface Transportation Board’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 10) and Plaintiff Sunflower State Industrial Railway’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
13). Although Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se,1 moves the Court to order dismissal, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) permits Plaintiff to dismiss this case as a matter of right before
Defendant serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Here, Defendant has
served neither. Therefore, Plaintiff may dismiss this action as a matter of right. The Court thus
liberally construes Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss as a notice of dismissal under Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i). And as explained below, because Plaintiff dismissed this case when it filed its
motion, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot.
1 Magistrate Judge Schwartz previously addressed whether Plaintiff could proceed without counsel because
business entities generally may not appear pro se. See Doc 7; Harrison v. Wahatoyas, L.L.C., 253 F.3d 552, 556
(10th Cir. 2001) (“As a general matter, a corporation or other business entity can only appear in court through an
attorney and not through a non-attorney corporate officer appearing pro se.”). Plaintiff represented that it is a sole
proprietorship, and the Court therefore did not require Plaintiff to obtain counsel at that time. Accordingly, because
Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes its filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th
Cir. 1991). However, under this standard, the Court does not assume the role of Plaintiff’s advocate. Garrett v.
Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
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I. Procedural History
On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant,2 alleging that
Defendant has unlawfully allowed trail managers of railbanked rights-of-way to obstruct rail
carriers’ efforts to reactivate rail service and that nothing in the railbanking provision of the
National Trails System Act authorizes trail managers to participate in Defendant’s decision-
making on rail reactivation requests.
On September 2, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).3 Defendant asserts that, to the extent Plaintiff challenges a
rule, regulation, or final order issued by Defendant, then exclusive jurisdiction lies in the federal
courts of appeals. Alternatively, Defendant contends that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief
beyond review of a specific board action taken by Defendant, Plaintiff has not identified any
applicable waiver of sovereign immunity that would permit suit in this Court.
On September 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed its own motion to dismiss, stating that it “takes
notice” of Defendant’s motion and intends to refile this matter in the United States Court of
Appeals.4
II. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) instructs that “the plaintiff may dismiss an
action without a court order by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves
2 Doc. 1.
3 Doc. 10.
4 Doc. 13.
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either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”5 A plaintiff’s notice of dismissal need not
invoke Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) explicitly.6
Plaintiff asks the Court to dismiss this action and states that it intends to refile in the
United States Court of Appeals. Defendant has served neither an answer nor a motion for
summary judgment. Under these circumstances, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows Plaintiff to dismiss
this action as a matter of right by filing a notice of dismissal. It does not matter that Defendant
has filed a motion to dismiss.7
While Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss does not invoke Rule 41(a) by name, it is apparent
that Plaintiff wants the Court to dismiss this case. Plaintiff titled its filing a “Motion to
Dismiss,” took note of Defendant’s jurisdictional argument that only the federal courts of appeals
may hear challenges to rules, regulations, or final orders issued by Defendant, and indicated its
intent to refile this matter in the United States Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court construes
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss as a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
“The effect of the filing of a notice of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is to
leave the parties as though no action had been brought.”8 Once the notice is filed, “the district
court loses jurisdiction over the dismissed claims and may not address the merits of such claims
or issue further orders pertaining to them.”9 A notice of dismissal is “self-executing . . . [and] is
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
6 See Janssen v. Harris, 321 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a pro se plaintiff’s letter
requesting dismissal could be construed as a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal despite not expressly invoking
Rule 41(a)); Hirsh v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 20-1134-DDC-KGG, 2020 WL 5986292, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 8,
2020) (construing a pro se plaintiff’s motion to dismiss as a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)).
7 Lundahl v. Halabi, 600 F. App’x 596, 603 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The motions to dismiss filed by . . .
Defendants did not preclude [plaintiff’s] unilateral dismissal of the case.”).
8 Janssen, 321 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1049
(9th Cir. 2001)).
9 Id. (quoting Davis, 267 F.3d at 1049).
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effective at the moment the notice is filed with the clerk and no judicial approval is required.”10
Accordingly, this action was dismissed when Plaintiff filed its motion on September 17, 2025.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that the Clerk is directed to treat
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) as a notice of dismissal and close the case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is denied
as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 18, 2025
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10 Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 1993).
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