Archer v. Tapia et al

1
In the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
_____________
Case No. 25-cv-04034-TC
_____________
PATRICK DAVID ARCHER,
Plaintiff
v.
ANDREA TAPIA, ET AL.,
Defendants
_____________
ORDER
Patrick Archer, proceeding pro se, sued Andrea Tapia, the Kansas
Department for Children and Families, and the Kansas City Board of
Public Utilities, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights.
Doc. 1. All of the defendants separately moved to dismiss. Docs. 13,
23, & 24. For the following reasons, the defendants’ motions to dis-
miss are granted. As a result, the remaining motions are denied as
moot. Docs. 48, 51, 52, 53, 69, & 74.
I
A
Each ground on which the defendants seek dismissal has a differ-
ent standard that governs its resolution. And Archer’s pleadings are
subject to certain standards that apply only to pro se plaintiffs. The
following describes each applicable standard.
1. The KDCF and Tapia assert that there is no subject-matter ju-
risdiction over Archer’s claims. Docs. 23 & 25. A party may move to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). There
are, generally speaking, two ways to challenge subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, one being facial and the other being factual. Laufer v. Looper, 22
F.4th 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2022). A facial challenge accepts the facts in
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the complaint as true but argues they fail to state a basis for jurisdiction,
while a factual attack contests the validity of jurisdictional facts. Id. Ei-
ther way, “[t]he objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter ju-
risdiction . . . may be raised . . . at any stage in the litigation.” Arbaugh
v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
and 12(h)(3)). An objection to a plaintiff’s standing is an objection that
a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Baker v. USD 229
Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 868 (10th Cir. 2020).
2. All of the defendants move to dismiss. The rules of civil proce-
dure permit dismissal if it appears the complaint fails “to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Doc.
23 at 2; Doc. 25 at 7.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the com-
plaint need only contain “a short and plain statement . . . showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief” from each named defendant. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Two
“working principles” underlie this standard. Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v.
Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). First, a court ignores legal conclusions,
labels, and any formulaic recitation of the elements. Penn Gaming, 656
F.3d at 1214. Second, a court accepts as true all remaining allegations
and logical inferences and asks whether the claimant has alleged facts
that make his or her claim plausible. Id.
A claim need not be probable to be considered plausible. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. But the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
claimant, must move the claim from conceivable to plausible. Id. at
678–80. The “mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could
prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient;
the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff
has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these
claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177
(10th Cir. 2007).
Plausibility is context specific. The requisite showing depends on
the claims alleged, and the inquiry usually starts with determining what
the plaintiff must prove at trial. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of African
Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 332 (2020). In other words, the nature
and complexity of the claim(s) define what plaintiffs must plead. Cf.
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248–49 (10th Cir. 2008)
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(comparing the factual allegations required to show a plausible per-
sonal injury claim versus a plausible constitutional violation).
3. These rules do not operate in a vacuum. When a plaintiff, such
as Archer, proceeds pro se, a court must construe his or her pleadings
generously. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir.
2009). That generosity means a court should overlook the failure to
properly cite legal authority, confusion of various legal theories, and
apparent unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Id. But it does not
permit a court to construct legal theories on the plaintiff’s behalf or
assume facts not plead. See id.; Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,
425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
B
Plaintiff, Patrick Archer, brought this civil rights action against An-
dea Tapia, who is alleged to be the Executive Director of the Kansas
Housing Authority, the Kansas Department for Children and Families,
and the Kansas City Board of Public Utilities. Doc. 1 at 1-2.1 It con-
cerns charges for stormwater in his state-owned housing. The follow-
ing attempts to describe the factual history that can be deduced from
the handwritten Complaint and accompanying affidavit. Docs. 1 & 1-
1.
Archer moved into Welborn Villa, a property he alleges is owned
by the KHA. Doc. 1-1 at 1.2 When he moved in, he received a yellow
card from a KHA staff member that provided his costs for rent, de-
posit, and electric. Id. The card did not include dollar amounts for wa-
ter, waste management, and stormwater. Id.
The basis of this suit is Archer contends he was charged a fee for
stormwater drainage in contravention of this yellow card. Doc. 1-1 at
1–2. Archer asserts that he should not have received the stormwater
charge because the yellow card did not provide dollar amounts for
stormwater, or alternatively, because he receives federal utility assis-
tance funding that should have covered the expense. See id. at 1–3.
1 All references to the parties’ briefs are to the page numbers assigned by
CM/ECF.
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Archer alleges that he receives federal utility assistance funding
through the Low Income Energy Assistance Program. Doc. 1-1 at 2–
3. He asserts that all of the defendants are responsible for ensuring that
his federal utility assistance is applied properly. See id. at 1–3. In partic-
ular, he alleges that Tapia failed to register his information with the
BPU. Id. at 2. He then alleges that the BPU “is taking advantage” of
Tapia’s failure by continuing to charge him and other “elderly and dis-
abled person(s)” for stormwater, which has caused overdue accounts,
resulting in evictions. Id. at 3. Finally, he alleges that he told the KDCF
that Tapia failed to register his information with the BPU and that it
did nothing to help. See Doc. 1 at ¶ III.
Based on these events, Archer brought this suit against the defend-
ants seeking money damages. Doc. 1. The defendants separately
moved to dismiss Archer’s claims, making various arguments as to why
Archer’s claims should be dismissed. See generally Docs. 13, 23, & 24.
II
Archer, though he has standing, fails to state a claim.3 As to the
BPU, it is not an entity capable of being sued. With regard to his con-
stitutional claims, the allegations fail to assert a viable cause of action
against any of the remaining defendants. And finally, there is no plau-
sible violation of Title II of the Americans with Disability Act against
the defendants. As a result, Archer’s case against all defendants is dis-
missed.
A
Archer’s claim against the BPU fails because it is not an entity that
is capable of suing or being sued under Kansas law. Under Kansas law,
“[s]ubordinate government agencies, in the absence of statutory
2 Tapia and the KDCF separately move to dismiss under 12(b)(1), arguing
Archer lacks standing to bring a claim and/or failed to comply with the notice
obligations of K.S.A. § 12-105b. Doc. 23 at 3; Doc. 25 at 8. That claim must
be considered before the merits. Griffith v. El Paso Cnty., 129 F.4th 790, 835
(10th Cir. 2025) (citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure Civ. § 1350 (4th ed. 2024)). Those claims fail because
Archer’s subsequent briefing disclaimed any state law claim for which notice
would be required and Archer’s Complaint has sufficiently alleged injury in
fact insofar as he brings his own claims against the defendants. Contra Doc.
23 at 4; see Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).
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authorization, ordinarily do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.”
Mashaney v. Bd. of Indigents’ Def. Servs., 355 P.3d 667, 672 (Kan. 2015)
(citing Hopkins v. State, 702 P.2d 311, 316 (Kan. 1985)). And the statute
creating the BPU, K.S.A. § 13-1223, requires that all claims against it
must be made “only in the name of and on behalf of the city.” As a
result, Archer’s claim—which only names the BPU—must be dis-
missed. Kerr v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kan. City, Kan., No. 21-
2135, 2021 WL 4806391, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2021) (dismissing
case pled against BPU after canvassing multiple decisions reaching the
same result); accord Cross v. City of Kan. City, 638 P.2d 933, 937 (Kan.
1982) (recognizing the BPU is not an entity capable of suing or being
sued); see also Mayfield v. Harvey Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 732 F. App’x 685,
688 (10th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of sheriff’s department be-
cause it was not an entity capable of suing or being sued).
B
Archer asserts Tapia, BPU, and KDCF violated his constitutional
rights. He proceeds under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 See Doc. 45 at 2. Section
1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of [state law,]
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It creates
no substantive rights but merely provides a mechanism for enforcing
a right conferred by the Constitution or a federal statute. Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002); see also Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion
Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 174–75 (2023).
3 Archer attempts to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to allege various constitu-
tional violations against the defendants in places other than in the Complaint.
See Doc. 2 (civil cover sheet); see also Doc. 45 (response brief). Those efforts
are precluded. Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th 1251, 1263 (10th Cir. 2025).
But, out of an abundance of caution and in deference to Archer’s status as a
pro se litigant, the following attempts to consider contentions Archer makes
outside of his Complaint. Cf. Avant v. Doke, 104 F.4th 203, 210 (10th Cir.
2024) (invoking its discretion to consider new case citations provided during
supplemental briefing on an issue); Hayes v. Whitman, 264 F.3d 1017, 1025
(10th Cir. 2001) (considering additional facts or legal theories asserted in re-
sponse brief that were consistent with the facts and theories advanced in the
complaint).
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1
Archer asserts several individual-capacity claims against Tapia and
she, in turn, asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 25
at 4–6. Qualified immunity attempts to balance competing interests.
Suits against government actors allow those wronged by government
misconduct a method of redress. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
638 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)). But
non-meritorious suits exact a high cost from society and government
officials by unduly interfering with the discharge of official duties. See
id.; see also Horstkoetter v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1277 (10th
Cir. 1998). So government officials performing discretionary duties are
immune from suit when their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable official
would have been aware. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009); see also Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (recogniz-
ing municipalities may not rely on their officers’ entitlement to quali-
fied immunity). Whether an official is immune turns on the objective
reasonableness of the official’s actions, considering the laws clearly es-
tablished at the time the official acted. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565
U.S. 535, 546 (2012). Objective reasonableness is not an exacting
standard; qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law. See White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73,
79 (2017); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
The analytical framework for the invocation of qualified immunity
at the Rule 12 stage is settled. See, e.g., City of Tahlequah, Okla. v. Bond,
595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S.
1, 5 (2021) (per curiam). First, the complaint must allege conduct that,
assuming the allegations are true, violates the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Second,
the law must have been clearly established at the time of the alleged
conduct such that the defendant had fair notice that his or her conduct
was unlawful. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). If
both inquiries are answered in the affirmative, the motion to dismiss
must be denied. But, if the answer to either is no, the defendant is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hemry v. Ross, 62 F.4th 1248,
1253 (10th Cir. 2023).5
Archer’s claims against Tapia assert that she violated his Four-
teenth Amendment rights. See Doc. 45 at 2; see also Doc. 74 at 4. But
he has not plausibly alleged that Tapia’s conduct violated the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States. As a result, Tapia’s motion to dis-
miss is granted.
a. Archer first alleges a procedural due process claim, that Tapia
deprived him of his funds without due process in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Doc. 74 at 2. Specifically, he alleges that Tapia
“violated [his] rights set forth in the ‘lease agreement’ with regards to
responsibility of charges [he] was to be responsible for while living at
[Welborn Villa].” Id. He further alleges that Tapia “did in fact commit
an overt act by not including the utility charge of ‘stormwater’ as part
of the lease agreement, which controls an aspect of his physical rent
charge monthly.” Id. In Archer’s affidavit, he also suggests that he re-
ceives utility assistance from the Low Income Energy Assistance Pro-
gram that should have been used to pay the stormwater charge. See
Doc. 1-1 at 2–3. Construed generously, Archer alleges that he was de-
prived of the property interest created by either his lease agreement or
the Low Income Energy Assistance Program without due process
when the BPU charged him for stormwater. Id.
To state a due process claim, the plaintiff must possess a protected
liberty or property interest that triggers due process protections and, if
the individual is deprived of that interest, he or she must be afforded
the appropriate level of process. Roberts v. Winder, 16 F.4th 1367, 1377
(10th Cir. 2021). The Tenth Circuit provides that “the procedural due
process analysis is not a technical conception with a fixed content un-
related to time, place and circumstances, but rather is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”
4 Courts have discretion to address the inquiries in any order, as courts must
“think carefully before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve diffi-
cult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will
‘have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,
103–04 (2018).
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M.A.K. Inv. Grp., LLC v. City of Glendale, 897 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir.
2018) (citation omitted).
Assuming that Archer has been deprived of a protected property
interest, he has not plausibly alleged that he was denied the appropriate
level of process.6 Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 196
(2001) (assuming without deciding that there was a property interest in
order to reach the second element of a due process claim—the ade-
quacy of process). Archer alleges that KHA breached its lease agree-
ment with him by causing him to incur a fee that was not outlined in
the agreement. See Doc. 1-1 at 1–2. That is a contract-based depriva-
tion and, as a result, the only process Archer is due lies in a state court
remedy for breach of contract damages. Lujan, 532 U.S. at 197 (con-
cluding that if a state “makes ordinary judicial process available to [a
private party] for resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due
process”). Archer makes no argument to the contrary. Accordingly,
Archer’s property interest arising out of his lease agreement “can be
fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit.” Id. at 196.
b. Archer also alleges that Tapia violated his Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to equal protection. Doc. 74 at 2. “The Equal Protection
clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike.” Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127,
1146 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To
state a Section 1983 equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must allege the
existence of purposeful discrimination against [himself], as a class of
one or with respect to a group, causing an adverse effect.” Id. (citation
omitted). The party alleging an equal protection violation bears the
5 It is not clear from Archer’s pleadings whether he is suing Tapia because
one of her subordinates violated his constitutional rights or simply because
she is a supervisor for the KHA. To the extent he seeks to impose supervi-
sory liability on Tapia, the claim fails because he would need to allege that
one of Tapia’s subordinates violated his rights and then establish she personal
participated in a violation that caused his deprivation with the appropriate
state of mind. Wise v. Caffey, 72 F.4th 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2023). Archer’s
Complaint, affidavit, and other papers are devoid of allegations that anyone
Tapia supervises violated his rights and, as a result, his claims fail. Rowell v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 978 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Supervisors can-
not be liable under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 where there is no underlying violation
of a constitutional right by a supervisee.”); Est. of George v. City of Rifle, 85 F.4th
1300, 1321 (10th Cir. 2023) (“[W]ithout an underlying constitutional viola-
tion, a claim of supervisory liability is fatally infirm.”) (citations omitted).
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burden of “proving the existence of purposeful discrimination causing
an adverse effect.” Ashaheed v. Currington, 7 F.4th 1236, 1250 (10th Cir.
2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted). After a plaintiff
shows discriminatory intent and an adverse effect, the court applies the
appropriate level of scrutiny to the government action. Id. Archer al-
leges that he is disabled, which “trigger[s] rational-basis review.” Marks
v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 976 F.3d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)). But “[c]onclu-
sory allegations without facts that refer to a particular person or per-
sons treated differently are insufficient to state a claim.” Lucas, 58
F.4th at 1146.
Archer’s allegations fail to allege a plausible equal protection claim.
Besides referencing that he has a disability, Archer fails to allege any
facts related to his equal protection claim. See Doc. 74 at 1–2 (refer-
encing his disability and then alleging that Tapia violated his equal pro-
tection rights based solely on the fact that he was charged for storm-
water even though that expense was not listed in the lease agreement).
Nor does he point to any similarly situated individual who was treated
differently. That will not do. See Lucas, 58 F.4th at 1146 (affirming dis-
trict court’s denial of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim because the al-
legations were “general and without any facts suggesting differential
treatment”).
c. Archer also alleges that Tapia conspired with several individuals
and entities that are not parties to this suit to violate his constitutional
rights. Doc. 1-1 at 6. But there is no free-standing conspiracy claim
under Section 1983. See Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 n.6
(10th Cir. 1990). Instead, conspiracy in the context of Section 1983 is
a means by which multiple actors can be liable for the same underlying
constitutional violation. Id. Because Archer did not plausibly allege an
underlying constitutional violation, he has not stated a claim for relief
based on conspiracy liability. See Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1231 (10th Cir. 2020) (affirming the dismissal
of a Section 1983 claim that defendants conspired to make a false arrest
because the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the underlying constitu-
tional violation of a false arrest).
2
Archer seeks to impose liability on Tapia in her official capacity.
See Doc. 1-1 at 1–3. But an official-capacity claim is really a claim
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against her employer, the KHA. See Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th
1251, 1263 (10th Cir. 2025).
That claim fails. For one thing, the Complaint fails to assert a plau-
sible claim that Tapia violated Archer’s constitutional rights. See Frey v.
Town of Jackson, 41 F.4th 1223, 1239 (10th Cir. 2022) (dismissing a mu-
nicipal liability claim because the plaintiff did not allege an underlying
constitutional violation and therefore could not “recover simply be-
cause some municipal policy might have authorized an officer to vio-
late the Constitution”); Crowson v. Wash. Cnty. Utah, 983 F.3d 1166,
1187 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting that failure-to-train liability requires an
underlying constitutional violation by one of the municipality’s em-
ployees). For another, there are no allegations that the KHA could be
held responsible for the acts of Tapia under Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Whitson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of the
Cnty. of Sedgwick, 106 F.4th 1063, 1072 (10th Cir. 2024) (“[A] munici-
pality would not be liable simply because of misconduct by employees
acting within the scope of their employment. Rather, the conduct must
be fairly attributable to the municipality.”) (internal quotations and ci-
tation omitted). As a result, Archer’s claims against Tapia in her official
capacity fail.
3
Finally, Archer brings a Section 1983 claim against the KDCF.
Doc. 1 at 2. Archer asserts that the KDCF was aware that Tapia failed
to register his information with the BPU and, as a result, the BPU was
pocketing money that should have been applied to his account to pay
for stormwater. See Doc. 45 at 3. Construed generously, Archer seems
to allege that the KDCF’s liability stems from its position as the entity
that is responsible for administering the Low Income Energy Assis-
tance Program, the funds Archer alleges should have been applied to
his utility account to pay for stormwater. See id.
That claim fails for a variety of reasons. For example, Archer has
failed to allege Tapia (or her employer) violated his constitutional
rights. In addition, even if Tapia or her employer had violated Archer’s
rights, there is no indication that a state agency, the KDCF, could be
held responsible for Tapia’s conduct. Murphy v. City of Tulsa, 950 F.3d
641, 644 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the individual’s conduct did
not trigger municipal liability because there was no evidence of a mu-
nicipal custom or policy permitting the conduct). And finally, the
KDCF is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Couser v. Gay,
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959 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Eleventh Amendment immun-
ity applies not only to a state but to an entity that is an arm of the
state.”); see also McCollum v. Kansas, No. 14-1049, 2014 WL 3341139, at
*6 (D. Kan. July 8, 2024), aff’d, 599 F. App’x 841 (10th Cir. 2015) (find-
ing DCF is an arm of the state).
C
Archer also asserts that the defendants violated Title II of the
Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., based
on Tapia’s alleged failure to register his information with the BPU and
the BPU’s and KDCF’s unwillingness to intercede. See Doc. 1-1 at 6;
see also Doc. 74 at 1. Title II of the ADA “makes it illegal for a ‘public
entity’ to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability in
the provision of government programs, activities, and services.” Brooks
v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 12 F.4th 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12131). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff
must show that he or she is a “qualified individual with a disability,”
was “excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of services,
programs, or activities,” and “such exclusion, denial of benefits, or dis-
crimination was by reason of his [or her] disability.” Est. of Beauford v.
Mesa Cnty., Colo., 35 F.4th 1248, 1276 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12132).
Archer fails to allege a plausible Title II claim. First, Tapia is not
amenable to suit under Title II in her individual capacity. Cf. CSMN
Invs., LLC v. Cordillera Metro. Dist., 956 F.3d 1276, 1281 n.6 (10th Cir.
2020 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1), which defines “public entity” to in-
clude “any . . . special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a
State or States or local government,” to conclude individuals were not
amenable to a Title II suit). Second, Archer fails to allege he was denied
benefits by anyone because of his alleged disability. See Crane v. Utah
Dep’t of Corr., 15 F.4th 1296, 1313 (10th Cir. 2021) (concluding that the
ADA claim failed because the Amended Complaint failed to allege that
the individual’s disability was a but-for cause of the alleged discrimina-
tion). As a result, his Title II claim fails.
III
For the foregoing reasons, the BPU’s, Tapia’s, and KDCF’s mo-
tions, Doc. 13, 23, & 24, are GRANTED. As a result, the remaining
motions, Docs. 48, 51, 52, 53, 69, & 74, are DENIED as MOOT.
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It is so ordered.
Date: January 30, 2026 s/ Toby Crouse
Toby Crouse
United States District Judge
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