Wright v. Easter et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
AARON B. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CASE NO. 25-3251-JWL
JEFF EASTER, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Aaron B. Wright is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the
undersigned, why this matter should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that are discussed herein. 	Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file an amended
complaint to cure the deficiencies.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in custody
at the Douglas County Correctional Facility in Lawrence, Kansas. 	The Court granted Plaintiff
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff alleges that on December 15, 2019, he was arrested for a municipal misdemeanor
offense and the State of Kansas seized the opportunity to amend to felony charges. (Doc. 1, at 2.)
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	the 	municipal 	court 	dismissed 	its 	charges, 	warranting 	grounds 	for
exclusionary rule violations. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was offered a plea deal in his state court
criminal case, and if he would have accepted it his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination would have been violated. Id.
As Count I, Plaintiff alleges an abuse of process violating his Fourth Amendment rights
based on disregard for the exclusionary rule pursuant to K.A.R. 44-9-105, et. seq. Id. at 3. Plaintiff
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alleges that he had been on parole since 2013, and the charges were prohibited by either ex post
facto laws or the exclusionary rule. Id.
As Count II, Plaintiff alleges an abuse of process “to Plaintiff’s property” in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants claimed jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s
personal estate, pursuant to the preliminary hearing for parole violations per K.A.R. 44-9-105 et.
seq.” Id. (cleaned up).
As Count III, Plaintiff alleges an abuse of discretion by Defendants, by requesting to
compel Plaintiff to be a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 	Id. at 5.
Plaintiff alleges that this was done when the State sought to have Plaintiff accept a driving under
the influence charge for the weapons charge.
Plaintiff names as defendants Jeff Easter, the Sedgwick County Sheriff, and Jeff Zmuda,
the Secretary of Corrections for the Kansas Department of Corrections. 	Plaintiff alleges that
Sheriff Easter abused his discretion following the municipal court’s dismissal of misdemeanor
charges “in violation of Exclusionary Rule constitution violation of Plaintiff’s 4th Amendment
Constitution.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Secretary Zmuda is responsible for an abuse of process
in violation of K.A.R. 44-9-105 et. Seq. 	Id. at 2. 	For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and
punitive damages, and an expungement injunction order to the Kansas Driver’s License Bureau.
Id. at 6.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are
legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
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seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). 	A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. 	Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 	The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163
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(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. 	See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims and allegations in his Complaint are hard to decipher. Plaintiff will be
given the opportunity to file an amended complaint to clarify his claims. 	In filing an amended
complaint, Plaintiff must comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8’s pleading standards. Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “It is sufficient, and indeed all that is permissible, if the
complaint concisely states facts upon which relief can be granted upon any legally sustainable
basis. Only a generalized statement of the facts from which the defendant may form a responsive
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pleading is necessary or permissible.” Frazier v. Ortiz, No. 06-1286, 2007 WL 10765, at *2 (10th
Cir. Jan. 3, 2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting New Home Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Thompson, 250
F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1957)).
Plaintiff names the Sedgwick County Sheriff and the Secretary of the Kansas Department
of Corrections as defendants. 	Plaintiff has failed to allege how the Defendants personally
participated in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. An essential element of a civil rights
claim against an individual is that person’s direct personal participation in the acts or inactions
upon which the complaint is based. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985); Henry v.
Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) ( “But § 1983 imposes liability for a defendant’s own
actions—personal participation in the specific constitutional violation complained of is essential.”)
(citing Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423–24 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under
§ 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”) (citation
omitted)); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In order for liability to
arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation . . .
must 	be 	established.”) 	(emphasis 	added) 	(citation 	omitted)). 	Conclusory 	allegations 	of
involvement are not sufficient. 	See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because
vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
As a result, a plaintiff is required to name each defendant not only in the caption of the complaint,
but again in the body of the complaint and to include in the body a description of the acts taken by
each defendant that violated plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights.
Mere supervisory status is insufficient to create personal liability. Duffield v. Jackson, 545
F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008) (supervisor status is not sufficient to create § 1983 liability). An
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official’s liability may not be predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior. 	Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1476 FN4 (10th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995). A plaintiff alleging supervisory liability must show “(1) the
defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued
operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the
state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson,
614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 960 (2011). “[T]he factors necessary
to establish a [supervisor’s] § 1983 violation depend upon the constitutional provision at issue,
including the state of mind required to establish a violation of that provision.” Id. at 1204 (citing
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
Plaintiff’s claims appear to relate to his state court criminal proceedings in 2019. Plaintiff
alleges a violation of K.A.R. 44-9-105 et seq. 	The regulation deals with parole under the
Department of Corrections. The allegation that a state regulation has been violated does not state
a constitutional violation. Violations of state law or regulations do not provide a cause of action
under § 1983. Plaintiff must state a federal constitutional violation. State statutes do not provide
a basis for liability under § 1983 which only protects rights secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States. D.L. v. United Sch. Dist. No. 497, 596 F.3d 768, 776 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding
that “Plaintiffs’ citations to Kansas case law to support their claim . . . is unavailing, as § 1983
affords a remedy for violations of federal law and does not ‘provide a basis for redressing
violations of state law.’”) (citation omitted).
To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that the offer of a plea deal violates his right to be free
from self-incrimination, such a claim is without merit. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, . . ..” U.S.
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Const. amend. V. 	“The Supreme Court has concisely stated that ‘[t]o qualify for the Fifth
Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.’”
United States v. Morgan, 294 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1224–25 (D. N.M. 2018) (citing Hiibel, 542 U.S.
at 189, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–38, 120 S.Ct. 2037, 147
L.Ed.2d 24 (2000)) ). Nothing suggests that the offer of a plea deal compelled Plaintiff to
communicate in an incriminating and testimonial manner. See id. at 1224 (stating that “the Court
will not infer that obtaining factual information from a defendant about the terms of a plea
agreement invades a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent because the Court
foresees ‘no reasonable danger of incrimination’”) (citation omitted).
To the extent Plaintiff challenges the validity of his sentence in his state criminal case, his
federal claim must be presented in habeas corpus. 	“[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a
state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not
to the fact or length of his custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (emphasis
added). When the legality of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release or
a speedier release, the case must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994); see also Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866
(10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion of state court remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus
relief); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring exhaustion of available state court remedies).
“Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his
remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity
to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006);
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Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982). Therefore, any claim challenging his state sentence
is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.
Likewise, before Plaintiff may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages
based upon an invalid conviction or sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has
been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question. 	Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). 	If Plaintiff has been convicted and a judgment on Plaintiff’s claim in this case would
necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction, the claim may be barred by Heck. In Heck v.
Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a
§ 1983 action, the district court must consider the following:
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Id. at 487. 	In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 damages claim that necessarily
implicates the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until
the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a collateral proceeding, or by
executive order. Id. at 486–87. Plaintiff has not alleged that the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated.
Plaintiff mentions expungement in his request for relief. 	Plaintiff’s request that his
criminal record be expunged is not the sort of injunctive relief available in this § 1983 action.
Expungement of Kansas arrest records is governed by K.S.A. 22-2410, which places expungement
decisions within the purview of the state district courts.
Any property claim that Plaintiff is asserting would be subject to dismissal. Deprivations
of property do not deny due process as long as there is an adequate post-deprivation remedy. A
due process claim will arise only if there is no such procedure or it is inadequate. See Hudson v.
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Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Smith v. Colorado Dept. of Corr., 23 F.3d 339, 340
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees pertaining to property are
satisfied when an adequate, state postdeprivation remedy exists for deprivations occasioned by
state employees.”).
Kansas prisoners have an adequate state post-deprivation remedy. See generally, Sawyer
v. Green, 316 F. App’x 715, 717, 2008 WL 2470915, at *2 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding Kansas county
prisoner could seek relief in state courts to redress alleged deprivation of property). Plaintiff has
failed to allege that an adequate post-deprivation remedy was unavailable.
Plaintiff’s allegations relate to charges and his criminal case initiated in 2019. The statute
of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is determined from looking at the appropriate state
statute of limitations and tolling principles. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). “The
forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under
both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. . . . In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 60–513(a).” Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Sch., 465 F.3d 1184, 1188
(10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
While state law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues, “the accrual
date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388
(2007). Under federal law, the claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause
of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1983 action
accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” 	Fogle v.
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
cert. denied 549 U.S. 1059 (2006). A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by an indigent
plaintiff if it is patently clear from the allegations as tendered that the action is barred by the statute
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of limitations. 	Id. at 1258–59; see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Hawkins v.
Lemons, No. 09-3116-SAC, 2009 WL 2475130, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2009). Plaintiff filed his
Complaint on November 14, 2025. Therefore, any claims accruing more than two years prior to
the filing of this action would be barred by the statute of limitations.
IV. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why Plaintiff’s claims should not be dismissed for
the reasons stated herein. 	Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper
amended complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein. To
add claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete
amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum
to the original complaint, and instead completely supersedes it. 	Therefore, any claims or
allegations not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that
a plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all
allegations and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained
from the original complaint.
Plaintiff must write the number of this case (25-3251-JWL) at the top of the first page of
the amended complaint and must name every defendant in the caption of the amended complaint.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the body of the
amended complaint, where Plaintiff must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts taken by
each defendant including dates, locations, and circumstances. 	Plaintiff must allege sufficient
additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation. Plaintiff is given time to file a complete
and proper amended complaint in which Plaintiff (1) raises only properly joined claims and
defendants; (2) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation and
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show a cause of action in federal court; and (3) alleges sufficient facts to show personal
participation by each named defendant. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the
prescribed time that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein, Plaintiff’s claims may be dismissed
without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is granted until
December 29, 2025, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s
Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until December 29, 2025, in
which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed
herein.
The Clerk is directed to send § 1983 forms and instructions to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated November 26, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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