Towers v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
CELISHA TOWERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL ABBOTT, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-4024-JAR-ADM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Celisha Towers, proceeding pro se, filed this suit against nearly 80 defendants,
alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several other federal statutes. On August 29, 2025,
the Court granted motions to dismiss 59 defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
insufficient service, and/or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1 Today, the
Court dismissed twelve more Defendants under Rule 4(m) for failure to timely serve.
Now before the Court are several motions relating to Kansas Secretary of State Scott
Schwab, one of two remaining Defendants: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 333);
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Memorandum in Opposition to Scott Schwab Motion
to Dismiss with Memorandum Filed Separately (Doc. 355); Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave for
Scott Schwab Supplemental Memo in Opposition with Supplemental Opposition Filed
Separately (Doc. 359); Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 364); and Plaintiff’s Motion Rule
60(b)(2)(3) to Vacate Scott Schwab Motion to Set Aside Order Entry of Default ECF Document
No. 344 with Declaration of New Evidence (Doc. 374). The motions are fully briefed, and the
1 Doc. 316.
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Court has considered Plaintiff’s many filings, including her proposed supplemental filings.2 For
the reasons explained below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to vacate its order setting aside
the clerk’s entry of default against Schwab. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to stay is moot. The
Court grants Schwab’s motion to dismiss.
I. Background
The Amended Complaint asserts claims against Schwab “in his professional capacity as
Secretary of State and in his individual capacity.”3 Liberally construing the Amended
Complaint, as the Court must,4 Plaintiff alleges the following claims against Schwab:
racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d); mail
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341; retaliation under 18 U.S.C. § 1513; and constitutional torts under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violations of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-
Fourth Amendments.
On September 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Application for Clerk’s Entry of Default
against Defendant Scott Schwab.5 The Court determined that Plaintiff sufficiently showed
Schwab was served with the summons and Amended Complaint and that he failed to plead or
otherwise defend within 21 days of service and, therefore, directed the Clerk to enter default
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).6 Schwab moved to set aside that entry of default and for
2 Under the Court’s local rule on briefing civil motions, “[a] party opposing a motion must filed a response,
and the moving may file a reply.” D. Kan. Rule 7.1(c) (emphasis added). Any response is to be filed within 21 days
of the motion and is subject to a 15-page limit. D. Kan. Rules 6.1(d), 7.1(d)(3). There is no provision for a
supplement or for filings after the reply. Despite these rules, Plaintiff filed two motions to supplement and one 20-
page “Supplement” to Schwab’s motion to dismiss, well after she filed her response. Although plainly not
contemplated by the rules, the Court has reviewed and considered these filings out of an abundance of caution, and
denies the Unified Government’s request to strike.
3 Doc. 26 ¶ 52.
4 See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
5 Doc. 319.
6 Doc. 322.
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additional time to answer or otherwise plead. The Court granted his motion on November 7,
2025.7 In so ruling, the Court found that Schwab’s default was not the result of his willful
conduct, there was no prejudice to Plaintiff in setting aside the default, and that Schwab presents
meritorious defenses, including many of the same grounds that the Court already found had merit
when it dismissed other Defendants.
Schwab now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims alleged against him. Plaintiff asks the
Court to vacate its November 7 Order setting aside the Clerk’s Entry of Default against Schwab.
The Court addresses Plaintiff’s motion first.
II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate November 7 Order
Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate its November 7, 2025 Order setting aside the Clerk’s
Entry of Default against Schwab under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). But the Court agrees with
Defendant that Rule 60(b), by its terms, may only be invoked for relief against a final judgment.
The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s motion as a motion to reconsider. Under D. Kan. Rule
7.3:
Except for motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60, parties
seeking reconsideration of a court order must file a motion within
14 days after the order is served unless the court extends the time.
A motion to reconsider must be based on:
(1) an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) the availability of new evidence; or
(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.
A motion to reconsider should not be used as “a second chance for the losing party to make its
strongest case or to dress up arguments that previously failed.”8 And “[i]t is not appropriate to
7 Doc. 344.
8 Ward v. Wesley Med. Ctr., LLC, No. 23-1091-HLT-BGS, 2024 WL 989880, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 7, 2024)
(quoting Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1482, 1483 (D. Kan. 1994), aff’d, 43 F.3d 1484 (10th Cir.
1994)).
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revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior
briefing.”9
First, Plaintiff’s motion must be denied as untimely. She filed her challenge to the
Court’s November 7, 2025 Order on January 13, 2026, well past the fourteen-day deadline.10
Second, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to reconsideration. Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(c), the Court may “set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Under Rule 55(c),
courts may consider “whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice
the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is presented.”11 Further, the standard is “fairly
liberal because ‘[t]he preferred disposition of any case is upon its merits and not
by default judgment.’”12 The Court correctly considered these factors in granting the motion.
Plaintiff urges that she has new evidence that supports reconsideration because it supports
her claims of election fraud. But she does not address the liberal standard that the Court was
required to apply on Defendant’s motion to set aside default. She suggests instead that the Court
erred by finding that Defendant presented a meritorious defense. The burden of showing a
meritorious defense is a light one.13 Defendant “need only plausibly suggest the existence of
facts which, if proven at trial, would constitute a cognizable defense.”14 The Court determined
that Plaintiff’s claims against this Defendant should be decided on the merits. The Court
9 Id. (quoting Paliwoda v. Showman, No. 12-2740-KGS, 2014 WL 11517806, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 30,
2014)).
10 Doc. 374.
11 Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 316 F. App’x 744, 750 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dierschke v.
O’Cheskey (In re Dierschke), 975 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1992)).
12 Crutcher v. Coleman, 205 F.R.D. 581, 584 (D. Kan. 2001) (quoting Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364,
1366 (10th Cir. 1970)).
13 Assessment Techs. Inst., L.L.C. v. Am. Allied Healthcare LLC, No. 11-2307-KHV, 2011 WL 13130838,
at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2011).
14 Id. (quoting Crutcher, 205 F.R.D. at 585).
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explained that Defendant presented many of the same defenses presented by other Defendants in
motions to dismiss that were granted. Plaintiff fails to establish error by the Court in applying
this standard. Moreover, Plaintiff’s new evidence pertains to the 2025 election; the clams in the
Amended Complaint pertain to earlier elections when she ran for Sheriff, so this new evidence
would not have changed the Court’s decision to set aside the Clerk’s Entry of Default against
Schwab. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is therefore denied.
III. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Having denied Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, the Court now considers Schwab’s
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (5), and (6).
A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
First, Schwab moves to dismiss the official-capacity claims alleged against him based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity. When a defendant raises Eleventh Amendment immunity in a
motion to dismiss, it implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, arises under
Rule 12(b)(1).15 Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue the Court addresses it
first.16 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must therefore have a statutory or
constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction.17 The party seeking to invoke federal subject
matter jurisdiction has the burden to establish that jurisdiction is proper,18 and “[m]ere
conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough.”19
15 United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 942–44 (10th Cir. 2008).
16 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
17 United States v. Hardage, 58 F.3d 569, 574 (10th Cir. 1995).
18 Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002).
19 United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its
consent.”20 States and state agencies are generally immune from suit.21 When sovereign
immunity applies, it deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby shielding the
government from suit.22 Pleading a claim against a government official, as Plaintiff does here
against Schwab, “generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent.”23 Therefore, the official-capacity claims alleged against Schwab
are another way of pleading an action against the state agency for which he is employed.
“Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it . . .
a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief sought.”24 Sovereign
immunity thus “bars suits for money damages against states, state agencies, and state officers in
their official capacities.”25 The Tenth Circuit has explained that “[t]he arm-of-the-state doctrine
bestows immunity on entities created by state governments that operate as alter egos or
instrumentalities of the states.”26 Here, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Schwab are
barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
B. Insufficient Service of Process under Rule 12(b)(5)
Next, Schwab moves to dismiss for insufficient service of process. Plaintiff must validly
serve process on a defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 before the Court can exercise personal
20 Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).
21 Id.
22 Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 438 F.3d 1074, 1080 (10th Cir. 2006).
23 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 n.55 (1978)).
24 Id. at 167 n.14 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam)).
25 Chilcoat v. San Juan County, 41 F.4th 1196, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2022).
26 Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr.,
75 F.3d 569, 574 (10th Cir. 1996)).
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jurisdiction.27 “Plaintiff bears the burden to prove valid service.”28 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(5)
motion to dismiss, “[t]he parties may submit affidavits and other documentary evidence for the
Court’s consideration, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of any factual doubt.”29 “A pro se
plaintiff still must comply with Rule 4 and Kansas law for service of process.”30
Plaintiff asserts that she validly served Schwab when (1) a process server taped the
summons and Amended Complaint to the front door of his residence in Overland Park, Kansas;31
and (2) a process server used first class UPS delivery to send the summons and Amended
Complaint to Schwab at both his residential address and his office address in Topeka, Kansas.
She submitted to the Court electronic receipts from UPS, showing it was received by “Scott
Schwab” at his residence, and by “Williams” at his office.32
The Court has dismissed any official-capacity claim against Schwab for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. As to the individual-capacity claims, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) governs. It
allows Plaintiff to either follow Kansas law or Rule 4(e)(2). Plaintiff did not follow Rule 4(e)(2)
when she had a process server tack the summons and Amended Complaint to Schwab’s front
door because she did not deliver a copy of the summons and Amended Complaint to him
personally, nor did she leave a copy at his dwelling or usual place of abode “with someone of
suitable age and discretion who resides there.”33
27 Wanjiku v. Johnson County, 173 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1223 (D. Kan. 2016) (citations omitted).
28 Id. (citing Oltremari ex rel. McDaniel v. Kan. Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1349 (D. Kan.
1994)).
29 Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1260 (D. Kan. 2008).
30 Wanjiku, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 1228 (citing Oltremari, 871 F. Supp. at 1350).
31 Doc. 226 at 11.
32 Doc. 234 at 2; Doc. 299 at 2.
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B). Assuming service to his office was appropriate, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that “Williams” was authorized to receive summons on his behalf.
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Plaintiff also has not demonstrated, as required by K.S.A. § 60-303(d)(3), that Gregory or
Trevillion were “appointed as a process server by a judge or clerk of the district court.”34
However, assuming Trevillion was authorized to serve the individual Defendants, Plaintiff has
submitted a delivery receipt showing that Schwab signed for the UPS delivery to his home on
May 6, 2025.35 In his motion to set aside default, Schwab admitted that he received this attempt
at service, provided it to the Kansas Attorney General’s Office, and believed that office was
monitoring the case on his behalf.36 Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated service
on Schwab at his residence through return receipt delivery, in compliance with K.S.A. § 60-
303(c). The Court therefore proceeds to consider Schwab’s motion for failure to state a claim.
C. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must
contain factual allegations that, assumed to be true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level”37 and include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”38 The
plausibility standard does not require a showing of probability that “a defendant has acted
unlawfully,” but requires more than “a sheer possibility.”39 “[M]ere ‘labels and conclusions,’
and ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ will not suffice; a plaintiff must
offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”40 The Court must accept the nonmoving
34 K.S.A. § 60-304(a). This provision differs from Rule 4(c)(2), which permits service by “any person who
is at least 18 years old and not a party.”
35 Doc. 234 at 2.
36 Doc. 323 at 3.
37 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
38 Id. at 570.
39 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
40 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
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party’s factual allegations as true and may not dismiss on the ground that it appears unlikely the
allegations can be proven.41 But conclusory allegations are not entitled to an assumption of
truth.42 The Court will view all well-pleaded factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.43
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must construe her filings liberally and hold
them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys.44 However,
Plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse her from complying with federal and local rules.45
1. RICO Claims
First, the Court agrees that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Schwab for
RICO violations. She alleges no specific allegations against Schwab on these claims, but instead
generally alleges that Defendants conspired to misreport the election results when she ran for
Sheriff in 2017 and 2021.46 To bring a civil RICO claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each
Defendant “(1) conducted the affairs (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity.”47 As the Court already ruled in its August 29, 2025 Order, Plaintiff fails to allege facts
41 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
42 Id. at 681.
43 Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Arapahoe, Colo., 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 (10th
Cir. 2011).
44 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
45 Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
46 In her motions for relief from judgment, her motion to amend, and her supplemental response to the
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff alleges the same misconduct occurred in the 2025 election, and purports to have
evidence to support those claims. The Court has already denied Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the Court’s order
setting aside the entry of default against Schwab, and her motion for leave to amend has been denied. The Court
will discuss in the following section whether amending her claim to include the 2025 election would be futile. Until
then, the Court must confine itself to the factual allegations included in the operative pleading—the Amended
Complaint.
47 Llacua v. W. Range Ass’n, 930 F.3d 1161, 1182 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting George v. Urb. Settlement
Servs., 833 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2016)).
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to support the second, third, and fourth elements of this claim. And because Plaintiff fails to
state a claim under § 1962(c), she cannot maintain a conspiracy claim under subsection (d).48
2. Claims Based on Criminal Statutes
Second, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under the mail fraud or retaliation statutes
as a matter of law. These criminal statutes do not provide for a private right of action.49
3. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Third, Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against Schwab alleging constitutional
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail to state plausible claims for relief. To state a claim for
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege “(1) deprivation of a federally protected right
by (2) an actor acting under color of state law.”50 And Plaintiff must allege “personal
participation in the specific constitutional violation complained of,”51 because § 1983 imposes
liability for a defendant’s “own individual actions.”52 The personal participation requirement for
§ 1983 claims “is particularly important” when the plaintiff names multiple defendants, such as
in this case.53 “When various officials have taken different actions with respect to a plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s facile, passive-voice showing that his rights ‘were violated’ will not suffice. Likewise
insufficient is a plaintiff’s more active-voice yet undifferentiated contention that ‘defendants’
48 See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006).
49 See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of claims brought
under several criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 1341); Shahin v. Darling, 606 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D. Del.)
(finding no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1513), aff’d, 350 F. App’x 605 (3d Cir. 2009).
50 VDARE Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 11 F.4th 1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Schaffer v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016)).
51 Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423–
24 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violation.”).
52 Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009)).
53 Id. (quoting Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011)).
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infringed his rights.”54 Even in the case of supervisory liability, the plaintiff must at least
“identify the specific policies over which particular defendants possessed responsibility and that
led to the alleged constitutional violation.”55
The Amended Complaint fails to identify Schwab’s personal participation in the
constitutional deprivations alleged. In her supplemental response to the motion to dismiss,
Plaintiff suggests that Schwab’s liability is based on his status as the chief election official for
the State of Kansas, which requires him to apply election laws uniformly and impartially. She
claims that Schwab violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well
as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, by reporting fraudulent numbers
of ballots were cast in the Sheriff’s race when she ran for election in 2017 and 2021. The Court
cannot accept as true factual allegations that are not contained within the pleading. But even if
these allegations appeared in the pleading itself, they are insufficient to state plausible § 1983
claims against Schwab because they are conclusory assertions that are not entitled to an
assumption of truth.56
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to link the various constitutional violations to Schwab’s conduct
and her own injury. For example, on the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendment claims, Plaintiff
argues that Schwab is responsible for investigating problems with election results, and should
have provided training and guidance on election procedures to the Wyandotte County
Defendants. But she fails to allege that Schwab caused her own right to vote under the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments to be abridged.
54 Id. at 1225–26.
55 Id. at 1226.
56 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (explaining that allegations that the Attorney General and the Director of the
FBI were instrumental in implementing policies that hurt the plaintiff were conclusory and not entitled to an
assumption of truth).
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On the Twenty-Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff argues that Schwab’s failure to
maintain correct voter rolls created a barrier for voters in Wyandotte County. Again, this
allegation is not included in the Amended Complaint, and it constitutes a conclusory allegation
that is not entitled to an assumption of truth. Moreover, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
prohibits conditioning a person’s right to vote on payment of a poll tax.57 Plaintiff does not
allege that Schwab or any other defendant demanded payment in exchange for allowing her the
right to vote. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted based
on violation of her Twenty-Fourth amendment right not to pay a poll tax in order to exercise her
right to vote.
D. Leave to Amend
In conjunction with her motion to set aside the clerk’s entry of default against Schwab,
Plaintiff sought leave to amend. Judge Mitchell denied her motion as untimely, and because this
Court’s October 2, 2025 Order to Show Cause why the remaining Defendants in this matter
should not be dismissed was still pending.
As the Court has explained in previous orders, the general rule is that pro se parties
should be allowed leave to amend, but the Court may appropriately dismiss a claim without
allowing an amendment “where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts [s]he
has alleged and it would be futile to give h[er] an opportunity to amend.”58 “[T]he district court
should allow a plaintiff an opportunity to cure technical errors or otherwise amend the complaint
when doing so would yield a meritorious claim.”59
57 U.S. Const. amend. XXIV.
58 Knight v. Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (alteration omitted) (quoting
Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010)).
59 Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001).
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As Judge Mitchell noted, Plaintiff failed to present a proposed amended pleading for the
Court’s consideration. Her motion sought leave to amend based on new evidence about 2025
polling results in Wyandotte County—photographs of the ballot screens in her voting booth
purportedly reflecting the total ballots, which she claims do not match the reported results. But
Plaintiff offers no suggested amendment that would cure the problems this Court has identified
on the claims Plaintiff alleges in the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint is based
only on elections in 2017 and 2021, and lack of proof was not the basis for the Court’s dismissal.
Thus, even considering the merits of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, the Court finds that
the amendments Plaintiff proposes would be futile.
In Plaintiff’s supplemental response, she included more factual assertions about
Schwab’s personal participation in the claims at issue. As the Court has explained, even taking
these allegations into account would not yield a meritorious result. Thus, because Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that she could amend her pleading to yield a meritorious result, the Court
grants Schwab’s motion to dismiss.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Supplement Memorandum in Opposition to Scott Schwab Motion to Dismiss with
Memorandum Filed Separately (Doc. 355); and Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave for Scott Schwab
Supplemental Memo in Opposition with Supplemental Opposition Filed Separately (Doc. 359)
are granted. The Court has considered these filings, as well as Plaintiff’s supplemental response
(Doc. 360).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion Rule
60(b)(2)(3) to Vacate Scott Schwab Motion to Set Aside Order Entry of Default ECF Document
No. 344 with Declaration of New Evidence (Doc. 374) is denied.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 364)
is moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant Schwab’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 333) is granted. The Clerk is directed to terminate Mr. Schwab as a party to this
action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 22, 2026
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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