Murray v. Westlake Portfolio Management, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
TIMOTHY MURRAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
WESTLAKE PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:25-CV-02443-JAR-BGS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Timothy Murray brings this action against Defendant Westlake Portfolio
Management, LLC for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). This
matter is now before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. 7). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. For the
reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
I. Background
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and the documents attached to it and
are accepted as true for purposes of deciding Defendant’s motion.1
On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas. In his petition, Plaintiff listed, among other debts,
an auto-loan debt owed to Mechanics Bank Auto Finance (“MBAF”). On June 28, 2024, the
bankruptcy court sent notice of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy to MBAF. Nonetheless, in May 2025,
1 Doc. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
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Defendant—acting as a debt collector for the MBAF debt—sent Plaintiff a collection letter
demanding payment of the debt.
Plaintiff then brought this action against Defendant, alleging violations of the FDCPA
based on that collection letter. Defendant now moves to dismiss Count II of the Complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Count II alleges that Defendant failed to cease communications and
collection efforts in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c).
II. Legal Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain factual allegations that, assumed to be true, “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level”2 and include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”3 The plausibility standard does not require a showing of probability that “a defendant has
acted unlawfully,” but requires more than “a sheer possibility.”4 “[M]ere ‘labels and
conclusions,’ and ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ will not suffice; a
plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”5 The Court must accept
the nonmoving party’s factual allegations as true and may not dismiss on the ground that it
appears unlikely the allegations can be proven.6 The Court will view all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.7
2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
3 Id. at 570.
4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
5 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
7 Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Arapahoe, Colo., 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 (10th
Cir. 2011).
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III. Discussion
In Count II of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §
1692c(c), which provides that “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the
consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further
communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the
consumer with respect to such debt,” subject to certain exceptions that are not at issue here.8
Plaintiff alleges that the bankruptcy notice sent by the bankruptcy court on June 28, 2024
provided the required written notice to cease communications. Plaintiff therefore contends that
when Defendant sent the May 2025 collection letter, it violated § 1692c(c). Defendant responds
that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because the bankruptcy notice was generated and transmitted
by the bankruptcy court, not by Plaintiff or any other “consumer” as defined by § 1692c(d), and
therefore cannot satisfy § 1692c(c)’s written-notice requirement.
The Court agrees with Defendant. The plain language of § 1692c(c) requires that a
“consumer” notify the debt collector in writing. The FDCPA defines “consumer” to include the
“consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.”9
Plaintiff does not allege that he, or anyone falling within that definition, ever sent Defendant
written notice refusing to pay the debt or requesting that Defendant cease further
communications. Instead, Plaintiff makes two arguments for why the bankruptcy notice sent by
the bankruptcy court should satisfy the written-notice requirement under § 1692c(c).
First, Plaintiff argues that “by filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, [Plaintiff] set
in motion an automatic process that resulted in notice of his refusal to pay the MBAF debt.”10
8 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (emphasis added).
9 Id. § 1692c(d).
10 Doc. 14 at 5.
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Plaintiff also contends that the bankruptcy court qualifies as his “administrator” under §
1692c(d) and thus falls within the FDCPA’s definition of “consumer” for purposes of §
1692c(c). Critically, Plaintiff cites no authority—and the Court has found none—supporting the
proposition that a bankruptcy notice generated and transmitted by the bankruptcy court satisfies
§ 1692c(c)’s written-notice requirement on either theory. To the contrary, courts considering
this issue have rejected Plaintiff’s position and held that bankruptcy notices sent by bankruptcy
courts are insufficient to provide the written notice required under § 1692c(c).11
Second, Plaintiff relies on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Stecklein & Rapp Chartered v.
Experian Information Solutions, Inc.,12 to argue that the bankruptcy notice transmitted by the
bankruptcy court in this case “is good enough” because the bankruptcy court was essentially
acting as Plaintiff’s agent.13 But Stecklein is inapposite. There, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the
Fair Credit Reporting Act’s notice requirement in the context of an attorney-client relationship,
holding that a dispute letter sent by a consumer’s attorney could still qualify as notice “directly”
to the credit reporting agency, and explaining that “[u]nder basic agency law, a letter from a
lawyer is good enough.”14 That reasoning does not translate here. This case involves the
FDCPA, specifically § 1692c(c), not the Fair Credit Reporting Act. And the notice Plaintiff
relies on is not a letter from his attorney, but a notice generated and transmitted by the
11 See, e.g., Lawson v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 3:18-CV-00083-AKK, 2018 WL 4052179, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Aug.
24, 2018) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “filing for bankruptcy ‘set the necessary events in motion, such that his
creditors were notified that he was refusing to pay and directing further communication to cease’”); Henderson v.
Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-8194, 2015 WL 2375258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2015) (“Contrary to
Plaintiff’s argument, the plain language of [§ 1692c(c)] therefore provides no indication that notice of bankruptcy is
also sufficient to trigger a duty to cease communications.”); Shelley v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-
506-RLY-DKL, 2013 WL 4584649, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Plaintiffs do not allege that they or anyone
within this definition ever sent written notice to [defendant]. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on a notice issued by a
bankruptcy court, which, by the plain language of [§ 1692c(c)], is not sufficient to provide notice.”).
12 113 F.4th 858 (8th Cir. 2024).
13 Doc. 14 at 8.
14 Stecklein, 113 F.4th at 862.
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bankruptcy court. Unlike an attorney, “[a] court is not a party’s agent. It is a neutral decision
maker that adjudicates disputes between parties.”15
Accordingly, because Plaintiff does not allege that he or any qualifying representative
notified Defendant in writing that he refused to pay the MBAF debt or wanted Defendant to
cease further communications, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1692c(c). The Court
therefore grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count II.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 7) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2026
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15 Henderson, 2015 WL 2375258, at *2 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “the bankruptcy court acted as
Plaintiff’s agent” for purposes of § 1692c(c)’s notice requirement).
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