USA v. Arambula, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOSE ARAMBULA,
Defendant/Petitioner.
Case No. 2:21-cr-20019-JAR
Case No. 2:25-cv-2413-JAR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jose Arambula’s pro se Motion Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to Alter or Amend Judgment Denying Arambula’s Motion
to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 246). Having carefully
reviewed Petitioner’s motion, the Court is now prepared to rule. For the reasons explained
below, the Court denies the motion.
I. Procedural Background
In October 2023, Petitioner Jose Arambula pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to three
charges: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of
methamphetamine; (2) possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute; and (3) use of a
telecommunication device to facilitate drug trafficking.1 The United States Probation Office
thereafter prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that produced an advisory
guideline recommendation of life imprisonment.2 But before sentencing, Petitioner and the
1 Docs. 137, 138.
2 Doc. 178. The PSR resulted in a base offense level of 38, which increased to a total offense level of 45
after four enhancements and one reduction were applied. Petitioner objected to three of the offense-level
enhancements: the firearm enhancement, the maintaining-a-drug-involved premises enhancement, and the
aggravating-role enhancement.
Case 2:21-cr-20019-JAR Document 247 Filed 10/13/26 Page 1 of 6

2
Government entered into a post-conviction sentencing agreement jointly recommending that the
Court calculate the advisory guideline range as 262 to 327 months, and sentence Petitioner to
222 months’ imprisonment.3 On July 24, 2024, the Court imposed the jointly-recommended
222-month sentence,4 which Petitioner never directly appealed.
On July 28, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion challenging his conviction and sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.5 He asserted that his attorney, Norman Robb Edmonds, rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel on three grounds: (1) failing to investigate the facts of his case and the
factual basis for the guideline enchantments reflected in the PSR (“Ground One”); (2) failing to
investigate the law governing his eligibility for First Step Act time credits before advising him to
enter into the post-conviction sentencing agreement (“Ground Two”); and (3) misadvising him
that the agreement would preserve his eligibility to earn those credits (“Ground Three”). The
Court denied Petitioner’s § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing,6 finding that the motion
and the filings and records of the case conclusively showed that Petitioner had failed to establish
that Mr. Edmonds’ deficient performance prejudiced him on any ground, as required under
Strickland v. Washington.7 On June 1, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant motion seeking to alter
or amend this Court’s order denying his § 2255 motion.8
II. Legal Standard
3 Doc. 179.
4 Doc. 183.
5 Doc. 229.
6 Doc. 245.
7 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Because the Court held that Petitioner could not demonstrate prejudice, it
concluded that analysis of Mr. Edmonds’ performance under Strickland was unnecessary.
8 Doc. 246.
Case 2:21-cr-20019-JAR Document 247 Filed 10/13/26 Page 2 of 6

3
Petitioner timely brings his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “A Rule 59(e)
motion . . . does not count as a second or successive habeas application” that requires prior
authorization under § 2253(c) because the Rule “derives from a common-law court’s plenary
power to revise its judgment during a single short term of court, before anyone could appeal.”9
In other words, Rule 59(e) “gives a district court the chance ‘to rectify its own mistakes in the
period immediately following’ its decision.”10
Grounds warranting a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e) include “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the
need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Thus, a motion for reconsideration is
appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling
law.”11 However, “[i]t is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance
arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.”12
III. Discussion
Petitioner seeks relief from the Court’s denial of his § 2255 motion for three reasons: (1)
the Court misapprehended the factual allegations of Ground One and erred by denying an
evidentiary hearing to investigate those allegations; (2) the Court applied the wrong legal
standard when dismissing Grounds Two and Three; and (3) the Court erred by denying a
certificate of appealability. The Court will address each argument in turn.
First, Petitioner argues that the Court failed to credit or engage with the sixty-paragraph
narrative in his § 2255 motion that supports Ground One. And he claims that the Court
9 Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 518, 521 (2020).
10 Id. at 508 (quoting White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)).
11 Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
12 Id.
Case 2:21-cr-20019-JAR Document 247 Filed 10/13/26 Page 3 of 6

4
improperly denied Ground One without a hearing under § 2255(b).13 The Court disagrees. The
Court did not misapprehend or fail to credit Petitioner’s extensive narrative; instead, the Court
found that the record conclusively demonstrated that those allegations were insufficient to
demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. The prejudice prong of “Strickland asks whether it is
‘reasonably likely’ the result would have been different [without the ineffective assistance of
counsel] . . . . The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”14
According to Petitioner’s § 2255 motion, had Mr. Edmonds investigated the facts
contained in his sixty-paragraph narrative, Petitioner would not have entered into the post-
conviction sentencing agreement, he would have negotiated a more favorable agreement or
successfully contested the PSR at sentencing, he would have received a lower sentence, and then
he would have qualified for First Step Act time credits.15 As the Court held, this argument rests
on a potential series of events that is conceivable, but not reasonably likely. And Petitioner fails
to acknowledge that he would not have been facing 222 months’ imprisonment at a hypothetical
sentencing hearing; he would likely have been facing a recommended sentence of life
imprisonment. The Court therefore finds that it did not clearly err by finding that the record
conclusively demonstrated that Petitioner failed to prove prejudice under Strickland.
Second, Petitioner claims that the Court’s reasoning for denying Grounds Two and Three
rest on errors of governing law. For Ground Two, he contends that proving prejudice under
Strickland in the plea agreement context only requires a defendant to show that he would have
13 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (“Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney,
grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto.”).
14 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111–12 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696
(1984)).
15 Doc. 229 ¶¶ 197–207.
Case 2:21-cr-20019-JAR Document 247 Filed 10/13/26 Page 4 of 6

5
rejected the plea agreement he entered. For Ground Three, he contends that the Court
improperly required him to prove that he would have been guaranteed First Step Act time credits.
The Court applied the proper governing law.
In the plea agreement context, the applicable standard for proving prejudice under
Strickland requires a defendant to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for [his]
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”16
Because “a defendant’s say-so is not enough,”17 this inquiry is objective and considers the
factual circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s plea, such as “his age, the length of the
sentence he faced under the terms of the plea deal, the prospect of minimizing exposure to other
charged counts, and so on.”18 The Court applied this standard to the sentencing agreement
context of this case. Under this objective inquiry, the Court denied Grounds Two and Three
because it was not reasonably likely that Petitioner would have rejected the sentencing
agreement for several reasons.19 First, a more favorable agreement was not available. Second,
the alternative to the sentencing agreement was an advisory guideline range of life
imprisonment; Petitioner could not show a reasonable probability that the Court would have
sustained his objection to the managerial-role enhancement. And third, it was speculative to
assume that Petitioner would earn First Step Act time credits but for the sentencing agreement.
Thus, the Court applied the proper governing law.
Finally, Petitioner argues that the Court erred by denying a certificate of appealability.
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2255 proceedings directs the Court to issue or deny a
16 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
17 United States v. Dominguez, 998 F.3d 1094, 1111 (10th Cir. 2021).
18 Heard v. Addison, 728 F.3d 1170, 1183 (10th Cir. 2013).
19 See United States v. Arambula, No. 2:21-cr-20019-JAR, 2026 WL 1162699, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Apr. 29,
2026).
Case 2:21-cr-20019-JAR Document 247 Filed 10/13/26 Page 5 of 6

6
certificate of appealability upon issuing a final adverse order. The Court may issue a certificate
of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”20 To satisfy this standard, the movant must demonstrate that “reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.”21 Because the Court finds that its analysis was correct on the aforementioned issues, the
Court also finds that its denial of a certificate of appealability was proper.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Petitioner Jose Arambula’s
Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to Alter or Amend Judgment Denying
Arambula’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 246) is
denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
21 Saiz v. Ortiz, 392 F.3d 1166, 1171 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004)).
Case 2:21-cr-20019-JAR Document 247 Filed 10/13/26 Page 6 of 6