USA v. Mayo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRINE MAYO,
Defendant.
Case No. 18-20072-JAR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Corrine Mayo’s Pro Se Motion for
Reconsideration of Memorandum and Order (Docket #73) Relating to Motion to Construe
Motion for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) Under Amendment 833 as a
Motion for Compassionate Release Due to Non-Retroactivity of Amendment 833 (Docket # 70)
(Doc. 74), and Motion for Supplemental Support in the Form of Letters in Support of Motion for
Compassionate Release (Doc. 77). The motion to reconsider is fully briefed, and the Court is
prepared to rule. As explained more fully below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to
reconsider her previously denied compassionate-release motion in light of her new evidence of
exhaustion. On reconsideration, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for compassionate release.
The Court also denies Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record with letters of support.
I. Background
On September 28, 2020, Defendant Corrine Mayo entered a guilty plea to Count One of
the seven-count Superseding Indictment, charging a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for
possession with the intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine.1 The
1 Doc. 49.
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Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated Defendant’s total offense level as 39. With
a Criminal History Category of I, the resulting Guidelines range was 262–327 months. On
January 6, 2021, the Court imposed a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to account for the
extent of programming and coursework the defendant has completed in custody since her arrest,
demonstrating rehabilitative efforts,” and sentenced Defendant to a term of 222 months’
imprisonment.2 Defendant’s scheduled release date is July 18, 2033.3
On December 30, 2025, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction based on Amendment
833 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which expanded the mitigating-role adjustment
in drug cases under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.4 Defendant argued that the amendment, which became
effective on November 1, 2025, would decrease her offense level to 37. Before the Court could
rule on her motion for sentence reduction, Defendant filed another motion, acknowledging that
Amendment 833 is not retroactive,5 and asking this Court to construe her December 30, 2025
motion as a motion for compassionate release.
On May 11, 2026, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to construe her earlier motion as
one for compassionate release.6 The Court then dismissed Plaintiff’s motion for compassionate
release without prejudice for failure to demonstrate that she exhausted her administrative
remedies, a prerequisite to filing.7
2 Doc. 60 at 3. Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A).
3 See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Find an Inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc//index.jsp.
4 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(e).
5 See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)&(d) (“In a case in which a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and
the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the
Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (d) below, the court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment as
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).”). Amendment 833 is not listed under subsection (d).
6 Doc. 73.
7 Id.
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II. Motion to Reconsider
Defendant now seeks reconsideration of the Court’s May 11, 2026 Order dismissing her
compassionate-release motion without prejudice. She attaches proof of exhaustion to the motion
to reconsider, and asks that the Court reopen her motion for compassionate release and rule on
the merits. The Government does not oppose reopening the motion in light of Defendant’s
exhaustion, but argues that the motion for compassionate release should be denied on the merits.
Under D. Kan. Rule 7.3, “[a] motion to reconsider must be based on: (1) an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.”8 Here, Defendant submits new evidence of exhaustion, and
the Government does not oppose reopening the motion for compassionate release to consider the
merits. The Court therefore grants Defendant’s unopposed motion to reconsider the merits of
Defendant’s motion for compassionate release in light of her exhaustion. The Court reopens the
motion for compassionate release and considers it on the merits below.
III. Compassionate Release Standards
“Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment once
it has been imposed, but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.”9 One such
exception is contained in § 3582(c)(1).”10 Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step
Act of 2018,11 permits a court to reduce a term of imprisonment “upon motion of the defendant
after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau
8 See D. Kan. Rule CR1.1 (providing that Rule 7.3 applies in criminal proceedings).
9 Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011).
10 United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Rutherford v.
United States, 608 U.S. 454 (2026).
11 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
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of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.”
Before reducing a term of imprisonment under this provision, a court must find that (1)
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a sentence reduction, (2) such a reduction “is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” and (3) the
applicable sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support such a reduction.12 The
Court may deny a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion “when any of the three prerequisites listed in §
3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do[es] not need to address the others.”13 If the Court grants the
motion, however, it must address all three steps.14
Because Plaintiff filed this motion pro se, the Court construes her pleadings liberally and
holds them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” but the Court
will not act as her advocate.15
IV. Discussion
A. Exhaustion
Exhaustion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is a mandatory claim-processing rule that the Court
must enforce when the Government invokes it.16 The Government now concedes, and the Court
is satisfied, that Defendant exhausted her administrative rights to appeal, as indicated by a letter
12 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see McGee, 992 F.3d at 1042 (setting forth three-step framework).
13 McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043 (alteration added) (quoting United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir.
2021)).
14 Id. at 1043.
15 See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
16 See United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021).
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from the Warden denying her request for compassionate release that Defendant submitted with
her motion to reconsider.17 The Court thus proceeds to the merits.
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a district court to find that “extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant” a sentence reduction before it may grant the motion. The Court has “the
authority to determine for [itself] what constitutes ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons.’”18
This “is a demanding standard.”19 Defendant argued in her original motion that Amendment 833
to the Sentencing Guidelines, although not retroactively applicable to her, warrants a finding of
extraordinary and compelling circumstances because of the sentencing disparity it creates when
applied to her. Defendant claims that if she was sentenced today, her sentence would be lower
based on Amendment 833. When combined with her post-conduct rehabilitation, Defendant
argues that the sentencing disparity constitutes extraordinary and compelling circumstances.
The Government relies on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rutherford v. United
States,20 to argue that a sentencing disparity created by a nonretroactive change in the law does
not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. The
Government further argues that rehabilitation alone cannot be an extraordinary and compelling
reason that warrants compassionate release.
1. Sentencing Disparity
In Rutherford, the Court considered whether a nonretroactive sentencing disparity created
by the First Step Act of 2018 was an extraordinary and compelling circumstance that entitled two
17 Doc. 74-2.
18 United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 832 (10th Cir. 2021).
19 Fernandez v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1292, 1302 (2026).
20 146 S. Ct. 1320 (2026).
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defendants to compassionate release.21 Both defendants in that case were convicted of using and
carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At the time, the
statute provided for a mandatory 25-year consecutive term of imprisonment for each subsequent
§ 924(c) conviction after the first offense.22 Both defendants received sentences for multiple §
924(c) violations under this provision, resulting in 32- and 57-year sentences, respectfully.23 The
First Step Act amended § 924(c) to eliminate the 25-year stacking provision for first-time
offenders.24 Under the amended statute, the defendants would receive mandatory minimum
sentences under § 924(c) for 14 and 21 years, respectfully.25
The defendants in Rutherford moved for compassionate release based on the sentencing
disparity between their imposed sentences and the sentences they would receive under the
amended statute, but the Court found no extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting
compassionate release.26 The sentencing disparity was not “extraordinary” because “a
nonretroactive penalty change necessarily creates a disparity between those who receive the
benefit and those who do not. Such a disparity is an unexceptional feature of a system in which
nonretroactivity is the default.”27 And it was not “compelling” because Congress chose not to
make the statutory change retroactive, and treating the disparity as compelling “would
undermine Congress’s choice to leave the sentence intact.”28 Finally, the Court determined that
21 Id. at 1326.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1326–27.
24 Id. at 1327 (quoting First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5222).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1330.
27 Id. (citation omitted).
28 Id. at 1331.
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granting the motion would “fall well outside the heartland of compassionate release, which has
long been defined by a prisoner’s personal circumstances,” such as medical condition, age, and
family circumstances.29
The Government argues that the reasoning in Rutherford applies equally to the
Sentencing Commission’s nonretroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, such as
Amendment 833. Defendant urges that Rutherford only prohibits courts from finding that
nonretroactive statutory amendments are extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying
compassionate release. The Court agrees with the Government.
First, Defendant fails to explain how Amendment 833 creates the kind of sentencing
disparity that is an extraordinary and compelling circumstance warranting compassionate release.
Recall that the defendants in Rutherford received sentences more than twice as long as the
sentences they would have received under the amended statute. Despite these “significant”
disparities, the Court determined that the nonretroactive statutory amendment did not qualify as
an extraordinary and compelling basis for compassionate release.30 Here, Defendant claims that
Amendment 833 would have reduced her total offense level from 39 to 37. With that lower
offense level, her resulting Guidelines range under the 2025 Sentencing Guidelines is 210–262
months. The Court’s 222-month sentence is within this adjusted Guidelines range. And
assuming the Court would impose a variance, as it did at her original sentencing, it is not clear
that it would be significant once the Court considered all of the factors under § 3553(a) in
conjunction with this revised Guidelines range.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1327.
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Second, even assuming there is a sentencing disparity, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Rutherford applies equally to the Guideline amendment at issue here. As with statutory
amendments, nonretroactive amendments under the Sentencing Guidelines are unexceptional.
Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, the Court may only reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment due to
a subsequent Guidelines range reduction if it is listed in subsection (d). Defendant acknowledges
this provision because she asked this Court to treat her original motion for a sentencing reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) under the compassionate release provision in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
instead. Just like the nonretroactive statutory amendment the Court considered in Rutherford,
the default under the Sentencing Guidelines is that amendments are nonretroactive unless listed
under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). Likewise, a sentencing disparity created by a nonretroactive
Guideline amendment is not “compelling” for the same reasons discussed in Rutherford. The
Sentencing Commission chose not to make Amendment 833 retroactive, so treating it as
compelling undermines that determination.
Third, like the statutory amendments at issue in Rutherford, granting Defendant’s motion
based on a sentencing disparity created by Amendment 833 would fall outside “the heartland of
compassionate release, which has long been defined by a prisoner’s personal circumstances.”31
In her reply, Plaintiff insists that she does not rely solely on the sentencing disparity as a basis
for compassionate release; it is part of the “individualized combination of circumstances” that
she argues warrant compassionate release in this case.32 But Defendant’s original motion for
sentence reduction that the Court agreed to construe as a compassionate release motion
exclusively relied on this sentencing disparity argument. And even though Defendant’s motion
31 Id.
32 Doc. 76 at 1.
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to reconsider states that her request is based on “individualized circumstances,” she fails to name
or discuss anything other than the Amendment 833 sentencing disparity.33 Her reply states that
these individualized circumstances are “the Commission’s later judgment that low-level drug-
trafficking functions were not adequately captured by the prior guideline structure, the resulting
disparity in Defendant’s sentence, and Defendant’s exceptional rehabilitation.”34 But those first
two items are the same thing: she asks the Court to consider the Sentencing Commission’s
nonretroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, and the resulting sentencing disparity.
In the reply, Defendant also refers to her “rehabilitation, present risk, time served,
institutional record, and release plan under § 3553(a).”35 Again, these are not extraordinary and
compelling circumstances. The Court discusses rehabilitation below, which encompasses her
present risk, time served, and institutional record. The Court must consider Defendant’s release
plan before it may grant a compassionate-release motion, but there is no authority that having a
release plan, in and of itself, is an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. And Defendant
misunderstands the role of § 3553(a) in deciding a compassionate release motion. As the Court
explained in Rutherford:
Petitioners skip a step. Before determining the extent of a
reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors, a court must first ensure
that a movant is part of the “limited class of prisoners” who are
“eligibl[e]” for such a reduction. And whether a prisoner is
eligible depends on whether he can offer “extraordinary and
compelling” reasons that “warrant” compassionate release, not on
the § 3553(a) factors. This gatekeeping requirement is not, as
petitioners seem to believe, a free-for-all. It is a distinct analytical
step that imposes independent and ascertainable limits on access to
compassionate release.36
33 See Doc. 74.
34 Doc. 76 at 1.
35 Id. at 3.
36 Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1333 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)) (citations omitted).
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Defendant argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States37
recognizes that “sentencing courts generally may consider intervening changes of law or fact
unless Congress clearly says otherwise.”38 Concepcion does not support Defendant’s motion.
As the Court explained in Rutherford, Concepcion did not consider whether a sentencing
disparity qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling basis for compassionate release.39 In
Concepcion, the Court considered a different provision of the First Step Act, and explained that
when resentencing a defendant under that provision, “a court could consider changes to the
Guidelines, as well as intervening facts.”40 Here, the Court is not called upon to resentence
Defendant. As in Rutherford, this Court must determine if Defendant is “eligible for
compassionate release in the first place. And on that score, Congress has ‘expressly cabined
district courts’ discretion,’ by prohibiting a reduction in sentence unless a court finds that
‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons warrant it.”41
In sum, the Court determines that any sentencing disparity between the sentence
Defendant received and the one that would be imposed if Amendment 833 retroactively applied
to her, is not an extraordinary and compelling circumstance that warrants compassionate release.
2. Rehabilitation
Defendant also asks the Court to consider her rehabilitation while in prison. The Court
applauds Defendant’s efforts at rehabilitation during her period of confinement. But Congress
has made clear that “[r]ehabilitation . . . alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and
37 597 U.S. 481 (2022).
38 Doc. 74 at 4.
39 Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1333.
40 Id. (discussing Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 500).
41 Id. (quoting Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 495) (citations omitted).
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compelling reason” for compassionate release.42 Because the Court has already determined that
any potential sentencing disparity created by Amendment 833 is not an extraordinary and
compelling circumstance, it cannot consider Defendant’s rehabilitation in isolation.
In sum, the Court finds that Defendant is not eligible for compassionate release because
she has not demonstrated that extraordinary and compelling reasons justify such relief.
IV. Motion to Supplement
Because the Court finds that there are no extraordinary and compelling circumstances
that warrant compassionate release in this matter, the Court need not consider the remaining
compassionate-release requirements: whether it would be consistent with the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statements and whether compassionate release is supported by the §
3553(a) factors.43 Because the Court does not reach the § 3553(a) factors, there is no reason for
it to consider the letters of support Defendant attaches to her motion to supplement. While these
letters are preserved for the record as attachments to Defendant’s motion, the Court denies the
motion to supplement since they would only be relevant to those § 3553(a) factors.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant Corrine Mayo’s
Pro Se Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum and Order (Docket #73) Relating to Motion
to Construe Motion for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) Under Amendment
833 as a Motion for Compassionate Release Due to Non-Retroactivity of Amendment 833
(Docket # 70) (Doc. 74) is granted. The Court reopens Defendant’s previously dismissed
Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. 70) and denies the motion.
42 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d).
43 See Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. at 1333.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendant’s Motion for
Supplemental Support in the Form of Letters in Support of Motion for Compassionate Release
(Doc. 77) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 14, 2026
S/ Julie A. Robinson
JULIE A. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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