Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
WINDEIMIS ALAK GONZALEZ RACHID, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:26-cv-00014-TWP-KMB
)
SAMUEL OLSON, 	)
TODD LYONS, 	)
KRISTI NOEM, 	)
PAMELA BONDI U.S. Attorney General, 	)
SCOTT MAPLES JR. Sheriff, 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter is before the Court on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner
Windeimis Alak Gonzalez Rachid ("Rachid"), a Venezuelan citizen. (Dkt. 1). Rachid is detained
at the Clark County Jail under the authority of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE"). She now petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking
release from custody or a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at 27. For the reasons
explained below, the Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than 5:00 p.m. on
February 4, 2026, Respondents must either: (1) afford Rachid an individualized bond hearing
before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release
Rachid from custody, under reasonable conditions of supervision.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Rachid entered the United States in September 2023. On September 24, 2023, she was
issued a Notice to Appear. (Dkt. 1-1). In May 2024, she filed an Application for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal. ("Asylum Application") (Dkt. 1-2). On October 20, 2025, Rachid
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voluntarily reported for an ICE Check-In at ICE-ERO in Chicago, Illinois, and she was taken into
ICE custody. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 26). She was arrested pursuant to an I-200 warrant. (Dkt. 7 at 4 n.1). Rachid
has no criminal history or prior removal order, and she is pregnant with her first child, who is due
June 12, 2026. Dkt. 1 ¶ 26. She has remained in custody since that time.
The May 2024 Notice to Appear charges Rachid with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as "an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or
who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General." (Dkt. 1-1 at 1. The "arriving alien" checkbox is unmarked. Id.
Rachid requested a custody redetermination, which an immigration judge denied on
January 9, 2026, stating that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to set a bond. (Dkt. 1-4).
II. 	DISCUSSION
Rachid claims that her current detention violates the INA (Count I) and the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count II). She also argues that she is entitled to release as a
member of the class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, No. 5:25-CV-01873-
SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) judgment entered sub nom.
Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec.
18, 2025). Dkt. 1 at 6-7. Respondents argue that Rachid's petition is premature; that she is lawfully
detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); that, in the alternative, she is
lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) because she will have the
opportunity to receive a hearing; that her detention is constitutional; and that the partial final
judgment in Bautista is neither binding nor applicable. (Dkt. 7).
The Court finds that Rachid's detention is governed by § 1226(a) and therefore it is
unlawful because she has not been afforded a bond hearing.
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A. Exhaustion
In support of their argument that Rachid's claims are premature, Respondents argue she
must, but has not pursued relief through the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") or the Seventh
Circuit. (Dkt. 7 at 6-7). Rachid argues that it is futile to attempt to exhaust her administrative
remedies because the BIA has already directly addressed the issue of her statutory qualification for
bond in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. (Dkt. 9 at 7-8).
Respondents do not cite a statute requiring Rachid to request a bond hearing before seeking
habeas relief. In the absence of a statutory mandate, the Seventh Circuit holds that "sound judicial
discretion governs" whether courts should require exhaustion. Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d
1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004). In similar circumstances, other district courts determined that the
petitioner was not required to exhaust administrative remedies by seeking a bond hearing before
an immigration judge because doing so would be futile given Matter of Yajure Hurtado's holding.
Valencia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-12829, 2025 WL 3042520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025)
("Requiring 	Petitioner 	to 	exhaust 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	would 	be 	futile 	because
Respondents' position is that he is statutorily precluded from obtaining the relief he seeks. The
Court declines to require exhaustion because [t]here is nothing to indicate the BIA would change
its position [once] the BIA has predetermined the statutory issue.") (internal quotes and citations
omitted); see also Ceballos Ortiz v. Olson, et al., 2:25-cv-00548-MPB-MJD, Dkt. 18 at 2-3, 6-9
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2025) (finding exhaustion would be futile, proceeding to merits, and ordering
that petitioner be provided a bond hearing). The Court finds the reasoning applied in these cases
persuasive and concludes that Rachid is not required to exhaust administrative remedies because
doing so would be futile.
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B. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225
As an initial matter, Rachid asserts that she is a member of the class in Bautista v.
Santacruz and is entitled to the relief issued in that case. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 10. Because claims that
"necessarily imply the invalidity of . . . confinement" are habeas claims for which "jurisdiction lies
only in one district: the district of confinement," Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025), the
Court finds that Bautista and the declaratory judgment issued in that case are not binding here, so
the Court's analysis must continue on the merits.
At issue here are 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. While "§ 1226 applies to aliens already
present in the United States," U.S. immigration law also "authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)." Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Section 1226 governs the "usual" removal process, which
involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), also
known as "full removal," by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-
M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011).
Section 1226(a) provides:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States .... [T]he Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond . . . ; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
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8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). An immigration officer makes the initial determination to either detain or
release the noncitizen. After that initial decision has been made, "[f]ederal regulations provide that
aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention." Jennings, 583
U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). At that hearing, the
noncitizen "may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he
poses no flight risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98
(2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
982 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to 'establish to the satisfaction of the
Immigration Judge . . . that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a
threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006)).
Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain
other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and provides that immigration officers shall
order certain noncitizens removed without further hearing or review unless the noncitizen indicates
an intention to apply for asylum. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged
in misrepresentation or have failed to meet document requirements under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or
1182(a)(7). Id.
Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An "applicant for admission" is "[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether
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or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). In other words, noncitizens
subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to mandatory detention
while their removal proceedings are pending.
C. Rachid Is Eligible for a Bond Hearing Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
The record reflects that Rachid is eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Rachid is subject to the broader "catchall provision" in § 1225(b)(2)
because she is an "applicant for admission" according to § 1225(a)(1), who is not covered by the
narrower provisions for "arriving aliens" in § 1225(b)(1), and who is "not clearly and beyond doubt
entitled to be admitted." Dkt. 7 at 9.
The Court has previously determined that considering § 1225 as a whole, the most natural
meaning is that it applies to "arriving" noncitizens attempting to enter the United States rather than
undocumented aliens like Rachid who have lived in the interior of the United States for years. See
Calderon v. Olson, No. 4:25-cv-254-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 2896348, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 14,
2026); Mohammed v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-2404-TWP-MKK, 2025 WL 3541819, at *4 (S.D. Ind.
Dec. 10, 2025). The Court incorporates by reference the reasoning in these previous orders. As the
Court has previously explained, Respondents' interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain
meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between §§ 1225 and 1226; (3) would
render a recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior
statutory interpretation and practice. Calderon, 2026 WL 105026, at *3-5. Respondents have cited
no binding precedent to the contrary. The Court has previously found that the few district court
decisions adopting the Respondents' interpretation of § 1225 were distinguishable or otherwise
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unpersuasive.1 Diaz v. Olson, No. 2:25-CV-00631-JRS-MKK, 2025 WL 3765960, at *3 (S.D. Ind.
Dec. 30, 2025).
The Court concludes that Rachid is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226, as such, there
is no need to reach her other arguments.
D. Opportunity for Bond Hearing
In the alternative, Respondents argue that Rachid is being lawfully detained under § 1226a
"because she will have the opportunity to receive a hearing before an Immigration Judge." (Dkt. 7
at 13). Respondents therefore argue that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter due
to § 1226(e), which states:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section
shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney
General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial
of bond or parole.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)).
There is no evidence, however, that Rachid will have a bond hearing. In fact, Respondents
contend that Rachid is ineligible for a bond hearing. Because an immigration judge has not
"denied" or "revoked" bond, § 1226(e) does not have any bearing on this petition.
Rachid has not had an opportunity to meaningfully request and receive an individualized
bond hearing. Thus, her detention pursuant to § 1226(a) is currently unlawful.
1 The government offers a passing reference to Cruz Rodriguez v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-12961, 2025 WL
3672856 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2025), withdrawn & superseded, 2026 WL 63613 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2026), which
the Court addresses specifically due to its recency and its issuance from within the Seventh Circuit. Cruz
Rodriguez offers a thorough and thoughtful analysis of §§ 1225 and 1226 and concludes that both provisions
apply to certain aliens apprehended inside the United States. See Cruz Rodriguez, 2025 WL 3672856, at *7
("Sections 1225(b)(2) and 1226 have different, but overlapping, scopes."). This Court finds that logic
problematic in this case, for reasons expressed in previous decisions and discussed further below.
Regardless, this Court joins another jurist from the Northern District of Illinois in deferring to Castañon-
Nava as highly persuasive, directly applicable authority from a superior tribunal on a pure question of law.
See Morales Perez, No. 1:25-CV-14995, 2026 WL 44777, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2026).
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III. 	Scope of Relief
Rachid is entitled to habeas relief because her continued detention without a bond hearing
violates ". . . the laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The remaining
question is the remedy, which should be "appropriate to the violation." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 50 (1984). Rachid requests immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, an
individualized bond hearing. (Dkt. 1 at 27). Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas
proceedings. See Dep't of Homeland Security v. Thursaissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020)
("Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention."); Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008) (explaining that "the quintessential habeas remedy" is release
from custody). However, the Court finds that it would not be in the interests of justice to order
Rachid's immediate release and instead orders Respondents to provide her an individualized bond
hearing as required by § 1226(a) and its regulations.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than 5:00 p.m. on February 4,
2026, Respondents must either: (1) provide Rachid with an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release Rachid from
custody, under reasonable conditions of supervision. No later than 5:00 p.m. on February 6, 2026,
Respondents must file documentation certifying that they have provided Rachid with a bond
hearing, including apprising the Court of the results of the hearing. Likewise, if Respondents
release Rachid, then they must file documentation certifying her release.
The clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 1/28/2026
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Distribution:
All Electronically Registered Counsel
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