Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
ANGELICA PERALTA CALDERON, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:25-cv-00254-TWP-KMB
)
SAM OLSON, 	)
KRISTI NOEM, 	)
PAMELA BONDI, 	)
SCOTT MAPLES JR., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Angelica Peralta Calderon's ("Calderon")
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. 1). Calderon is a Mexican citizen who entered the United
States without inspection about four years ago. On or about September 17, 2025, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Officers arrested Calderon and placed her removal proceedings
under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). She now petitions the Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, seeking release from custody or a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at 11.
For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the Petition to the extent that no later than
January 22, 2026, Respondents must either: (1) afford Calderon an individualized bond hearing
before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release her
from custody, under reasonable conditions of supervision.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Calderon entered the United States without inspection over four years ago. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 38).
On September 16, 2025, ICE agents arrested Calderon in Illinois and transferred her to the ICE
Broadview Facility in Chicago. Dkt. 8-1 at 10 (ERO Narrative). On September 17, Department of
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Homeland Security ("DHS") issued Calderon an I-200 "Warrant for Arrest of Alien," which
authorizes immigration officials "pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the [INA] . . . to serve
warrants for arrest of immigration violations." Id. at 12. On September 18, DHS served Calderon
with a "Notice to Appear," placing her in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), and
charging her with inadmissibility under § 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and (a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Id. at
1. The "arriving alien" checkbox is unmarked. Id.
At some point, Calderon was transported to the Clark County Jail in Jeffersonville, Indiana,
where she has been detained ever since. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 42). Calderon has not moved for or been given
a custody re-determination hearing. Id., ¶¶ 43–44.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Calderon argues that her current detention violates the INA (Count I) and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count II). Id., ¶¶ 45–51. Respondents argue that Calderon's
habeas petition is premature; that she is lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A); and, in the alternative, she is lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) because she will have the opportunity to receive a hearing; and that her detention is
constitutional. (Dkt. 8).
The Court finds that Calderon's detention is governed by § 1226(a) and that it is unlawful
because she has not been afforded a bond hearing. Because Calderon is entitled to habeas corpus
relief on these grounds, the Court does not address the constitutional arguments.
A. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that Calderon's claims are premature because she has not moved for a
bond hearing. Dkt. 8 at 6. Calderon argues that it is futile to attempt to exhaust her administrative
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remedies because the BIA has already directly addressed the issue of her statutory qualification for
bond in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. Dkt. 9 at 2–3.
Respondents do not cite a statute requiring Calderon to request a bond hearing before
seeking habeas relief. In the absence of a statutory mandate, the Seventh Circuit holds that "sound
judicial discretion governs" whether courts should require exhaustion. Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355
F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004). In similar circumstances, other district courts determined that the
petitioner was not required to exhaust administrative remedies by seeking a bond hearing before
an immigration judge because doing so would be futile given Matter of Yajure Hurtado's holding.
Valencia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-12829, 2025 WL 3042520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025)
("Requiring 	Petitioner 	to 	exhaust 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	would 	be 	futile 	because
Respondents' position is that he is statutorily precluded from obtaining the relief he seeks. The
Court declines to require exhaustion because [t]here is nothing to indicate the BIA would change
its position [once] the BIA has predetermined the statutory issue.") (internal quotes and citations
omitted); see also Ceballos Ortiz v. Olson, et al., 2:25-cv-00548-MPB-MJD, Dkt. 18 at 2-3, 6-9
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 19,2025) (finding exhaustion would be futile, proceeding to merits, and ordering
that petitioner be provided a bond hearing). The Court finds the reasoning applied in these cases
persuasive and concludes that Calderon was not required to exhaust administrative remedies
because doing so would be futile.
B. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225
At issue here are 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. While "§ 1226 applies to aliens already
present in the United States," U.S. immigration law also "authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)." Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Section 1226 governs the "usual" removal process, which
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involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), also
known as "full removal," by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-
M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011).
Section 1226(a) provides:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States .... [T]he Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond . . . ; or
(B) conditional parole . . ..
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). An immigration officer makes the initial determination to either detain or
release the noncitizen. After that initial decision has been made, "[f]ederal regulations provide that
aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention." Jennings, 583
U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). At that hearing, the
noncitizen "may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he
poses no flight risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98
(2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
982 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to 'establish to the satisfaction of the
Immigration Judge . . . that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a
threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra,
24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006)).
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Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain
other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and provides that immigration officers shall
order certain noncitizens removed without further hearing or review unless the noncitizen indicates
an intention to apply for asylum. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged
in misrepresentation or have failed to meet document requirements under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or
1182(a)(7). Id.
Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 1225(a)(1) defines an "applicant for
admission" as "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in
the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). In
other words, noncitizens subject to 1225(b)(2)(A) are not eligible for expedited removal but are
subject to mandatory detention while their removal proceedings are pending.
C. Petitioner Is Eligible for a Bond Hearing Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
Calderon argues that the statute's text, structure, and history make it so that she can only
be detained under § 1226(a). See Dkt. 9 at 3–4. Respondents counter that § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s text
plainly refers to people in Calderon's position—unadmitted aliens and § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies.
As many courts around the country have found, Calderon's interpretation is more convincing.
i. 	Statutory Text
As seen above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant
for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
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not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Though Calderon
claims that she does not fit into any of the three criterion, see Dkt. 9 at 8–10, the Court will focus
on the meaning and relevance of the phrase "an alien seeking admission."1 Respondents argue that
"an alien seeking admission" is synonymous with "applicant for admission." See Dkt. 8 at 9 (citing
Montoya Cabanas, 2025 WL 3171331, *5 ("[a]ttempts by Petitioner to distinguish an applicant for
admission from an alien seeking admission are unavailing.")(emphasis in original)). Thus,
according to Respondents, the fact that Calderon fits the description of an "applicant for
admission" (i.e., "an alien" who is "present in the United States" who "has not been admitted"),
subjects her to mandatory detention under this provision. In contrast, Calderon argues that the
statute clearly puts forth "three unique terms in the same provision" and Calderon does not
logically fit into all three terms. Dkt. 9 at 9–10.
As the Seventh Circuit recently explained regarding § 1225(b)(2)(A), 	"an alien seeking
admission" cannot be read as synonymous with "applicant for admission" without violating the
rule against surplusage. Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th
Cir. 2025) (citing United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) ("[E]very clause and word of a statute should have meaning.")).2 "If an interpretation of
1 Calderon's arguments that she cannot be considered "an applicant for admission" who is not "clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted" are not convincing. Section 1225(a)(1) is titled "Aliens treated as applicants for
admission" and it provides: "an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an
applicant for admission." (emphasis added). There is no dispute that Calderon is an "alien" who is "present in the
United States" who "has not been admitted." Because she was arrested by an immigration officer and served with a
Notice to Appear, it is evident that Calderon is not "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted."
2 The Court cites Castañon-Nava as persuasive precedent. Following, Morales Perez v. Walsh, 2026 WL 44777, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2026), "[a]t a minimum, Castañon-Nava carries substantial persuasive weight. It is true that
Castañon-Nava cautioned that its decision was limited to 'the current record.' — F.4th —, 2025 WL 3552514, at *8.
But the statutory-interpretation issue that the opinion resolved was one purely of law, and any adjustment to the factual
record going forward would not likely alter the legal conclusion. In any event, as explained below, the Court agrees
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one provision 'would render another provision superfluous, courts presume that interpretation is
incorrect.'" Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08, 130 (2010)). "[T]his presumption
is 'strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory
scheme,' as would be the case here." Id. (quoting Marx v. Gen. Rev. Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386
(2013)). Indeed, Respondents' interpretation posits that Congress drafted "applicant for admission"
and "an alien seeking admission" as synonyms in the same exact sentence. Furthermore, "it is
Congress's prerogative to define a term however it wishes, and it has chosen to limit the definition
of an 'applicant for admission' to 'an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted
or who arrives in the United States.' 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). It could easily have included
noncitizens who are 'seeking admission' within the definition but elected not to do so." Id. Thus,
reading § 1225(b)(2)(A) in a way that gives meaning to each word necessitates that it puts forth
three distinct criteria.
Calderon cannot be said to be "an alien seeking admission." Unlike "applicant for
admission," "an alien seeking admission" is not defined within § 1225 or elsewhere in the INA.
Therefore, the Court turns to the plain meaning of the terms. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 85 (2018) (directing courts, in the absence of a statutory definition, to be
guided by the plain meaning of the text). "Seeking admission" is written in present-tense active
language. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) ("Congress' use of a verb tense is
significant in construing statutes."). As courts in this district have explained, "'seeking' means
'asking for' or 'trying to acquire or gain' and implies some kind of affirmative action on the part of
the applicant." Alejandro v. Olson, 2025 WL 2896348, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025); see also
with Castañon-Nava's holding on the legal question, so there is no need here to definitively decide whether it is binding
precedent or something short of that."
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Beltran Barrera v. Tindall, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (rejecting the
respondents' interpretation of section 1225(b)(2) to cover all aliens who are present without being
admitted because "[t]he term 'seeking' 'implies action'" and "those who have been present in the
country for years are not actively 'seeking admission.'"); Rusu v. Noem, 2025 WL 3240911, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2025) ("Noncitizens who are just 'present' in the country—who have been here
for years and never proceeded to obtain any form of citizenship (e.g. asylum, permanent residency,
refugee status, visas, etc.)—are not 'seeking' admission.").
Calderon is plainly not "seeking admission." She already entered the United States four
years ago. Since then, she lived and worked in Illinois, hundreds of miles from the U.S.-Mexico
border. The fact that Calderon does not fit into the third criterion, "seeking admission," supports
the conclusion that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to her.
ii. 	Statutory Context and Framework
Respondents' 	statutory 	argument 	also 	fails 	because 	it 	only 	makes 	sense 	when 	§
1225(b)(2)(A) is read in complete isolation from the rest of § 1225 and the INA's statutory scheme.
"[S]tatutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme." Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989);
see also King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (Our duty, after all, is "to construe statutes, not
isolated provisions.") (internal quotation omitted); United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (rejecting bankruptcy petitioner's
interpretation of § 362(d)(1) as protecting a secured parties right to immediate foreclosure because
the language of related provisions within the statutory scheme made it clear that it did not include
this).
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Considering § 1225 as a whole, the most natural meaning is that it applies to "arriving"
aliens attempting to enter the United States at a territorial border or a designated port of entry. As
Respondents concede, § 1225 governs "inspection." Dkt. 8 at 8. Though not defined in the statute,
regulations for "Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission" characterize inspection as
occurring at or near the U.S.-Mexico or U.S. Canada border or a port of entry. See 8 C.F.R. §
235.1(f) et seq (referring to aliens seeking admission at a "port-of-entry;" inspecting aliens who
have been "brought to the United States . . . after having been interdicted in international or United
States waters;" and repeatedly referring to "land border" and "land border port-of-entry"
throughout). However, "[n]o inspection or screening takes place for a noncitizen residing in the
United States who is subsequently detained[.]" Walizada v. Trump, 2025 WL 3551972, at *11 (D.
Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (referring to detention after the expiration of humanitarian parole). This
meaning of "inspection" is supported by the fact that § 1225 repeatedly refers to "arriving" aliens
throughout. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (screenings for aliens "arriving in the United States");
id. § 1225(b)(2)(C) (aliens "arriving on land . . . from a foreign territory contiguous to the United
States" may be returned to that territory pending removal proceedings); id. § 1225(d)(1)
(immigration officers authorized to inspect "any vessel, aircraft, railway car, or other conveyance
or vehicle in which they believe aliens are being brought into the United States"). The statute
further explicitly carves out exceptions for "crewm[e]n" and "stowaway[s]" in § 1225(b)(2)(B),
reflecting that Congress envisions § 1225 to apply broadly to "arriving" noncitizens—not just §
1225(b)(1). In addition, its sister statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225a, focuses on the pre-inspection of aliens
entering the country at foreign airports.
In sum, the context of § 1225 lends support to Calderon's argument that § 1225(b)(2)(A)
only encompasses migrants seeking admission at the border or a port of entry. However, as seen
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in the record, Calderon was not detained after an examining officer inspected her upon arriving to
the United States—rather, she was detained in Illinois after living within the country for more than
four years.
Respondents' interpretation also disregards the relationship between § 1225 and § 1226
within the INA. While § 1225 focuses on "inspection" of "arriving aliens," § 1226 pertains to the
"[a]pprehension and detention of aliens." The plain language here suggests that § 1226—not §
1225—applies to Calderon because she is an "alien," who was "apprehended" and "detained" after
a warrant was issued for her arrest. Indeed, the arrest warrant explicitly references the authority to
arrest Calderon pursuant to § 1226. See Dkt. 8-1 at 12. Furthermore, the fact that "arriving aliens"
and undocumented people who have lived in the country for a while would be treated differently
makes sense within broader immigration law. As the Seventh Circuit explained, "the difference in
treatment between a noncitizen at the border and one already in the United States fits within the
broader context of our immigration law. Indeed, '[t]he distinction between an alien who has
effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout
immigration law.'" Castañon-Nava, 161 F.th at 1061 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693); see also
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958). ("[O]ur immigration laws have long made a
distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who
are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.").
Last, Respondents' interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) would make the recently enacted
amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous. Congress passed the Laken Riley Act in 2025 to amend
section 1226(c) and include more classes of aliens who are ineligible for bond under § 1226(a).
Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, sec. 236, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025). One of those new classes
of non-bondable aliens are aliens not admitted into the United States who were charged with
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specific crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) (citing id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)). Under the Respondents'
expansive interpretation of § 1225, the amendment would have no purpose. Section 1225(b)(2)
would already provide for mandatory detention of every unadmitted alien, regardless of whether
the alien falls within one of the new classes of non-bondable aliens established by the Laken Riley
Act. As seen above, courts construe statutes "so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.
303, 314 (2009). Adopting Respondents' reading would render § 1226(c) unnecessary.
iii. Statutory History
Respondents' argument also fails when considering the statute's history. After Congress
passed the current detention scheme as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") drafted
regulations explaining that, generally, people who entered the country without inspection are
subject to detention under § 1226(a). See 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite
being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled
(formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond
redetermination."). Indeed, until the recent policy shift in July of 2025, the government previously
applied section 1226(a) to unadmitted noncitizens, such as Calderon, who were arrested in the
interior of the country after already entering without inspection. See Matter of Hurtado, 29 I&N
Dec. 216 n.6. ("We acknowledge that for years Immigration Judges have conducted [section
1226(a)] bond hearings for aliens who entered the United States without inspection."). Though an
agency's interpretation of a statute is not dispositive, see Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369 (2024), taken together, the plain text of the statute, the statutory context, and the statute's
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prior usage and history demonstrate that Calderon may only be lawfully detained pursuant to §
1226(a).
D. Opportunity for Bond Hearing
In the alternative, Respondents argue that Calderon is being lawfully detained under §
1226a "because he will have the opportunity to receive a hearing before an Immigration Judge."
Dkt. 8 at 13. Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter due to § 1226(e), which
states:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section
shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney
General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial
of bond or parole.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)).
There is no evidence that Calderon will have a bond hearing. In fact, Respondents contend
that Calderon is ineligible for a bond hearing. Because an immigration judge has not "denied" or
"revoked" bond, § 1226(e) does not have any bearing on this petition.
Calderon has not had an opportunity to meaningfully request and receive an individualized
bond hearing. Thus, her detention pursuant to § 1226(a) is currently unlawful.
III. 	SCOPE OF RELIEF
Calderon is entitled to habeas relief because her continued detention without a bond hearing
violates ". . . the laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The remaining
question is the remedy, which should be "appropriate to the violation." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 50 (1984). Calderon requests immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, an
individualized bond hearing. Dkt. 1 at 11. Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas
proceedings. See Thursaissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 ("Habeas has traditionally been a means to
secure release from unlawful detention."); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008) (explaining
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that "the quintessential habeas remedy" is release from custody). However, the Court finds that it
would not be in the interests of justice to order Calderon's immediate release and instead orders
Respondents to provide her an individualized bond hearing as required by § 1226(a) and its
regulations.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than January 22, 2026, Respondents
must either: (1) provide Calderon with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release Calderon from custody, under
reasonable conditions of supervision. No later than January 24, 2026, Respondents must file
documentation certifying that they have provided Calderon with a bond hearing, including
apprising the Court of the results of the hearing. If Respondents release Calderon, then they must
file documentation certifying her release. The clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 1/14/2026
Distribution:
Alush Kola
Law Offices of Al Kola
alkolalaw@yahoo.com
R. Jeffrey Lowe
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP (New Albany)
jlowe@k-glaw.com
Shelese M. Woods
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (Indianapolis)
shelese.woods@usdoj.gov
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