TREADWELL v. BYRD et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
JOSHUA TREADWELL, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:24-cv-00329-JPH-MG
)
SAMUEL BYRD, 	)
CENTURION HEALTH, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Joshua Treadwell is a prisoner confined at all relevant times at
the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"). He brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
civil rights action, alleging that the defendants Dr. Samuel Byrd and Centurion
Health of Indiana, LLC ("Centurian") were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 	Dkt. 1. 	Defendants have
moved for summary judgment arguing that Mr. Treadwell failed to exhaust his
available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before filing this lawsuit and, in fact, received the
medical treatment he requested from defendants. 	Dkts. 19; 21. 	In response,
Mr. Treadwell 	argues 	that 	he 	completed 	the 	grievance 	process 	because 	he
received a satisfactory response to his first-level grievance. Dkt. 29. Defendants'
designated evidence shows that Mr. Treadwell did not pursue administrative
remedies as to the care Dr. Byrd provided him before he filed his grievance
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requesting an MRI, therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt.
[19], is granted in part as to Dr. Byrd and denied in part as to Centurion.
I. 	Legal Standards
A. 	Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	A "material fact" is one that "might
affect the outcome of the suit." 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). 	The moving party must inform the court "of the basis for its
motion" and specify evidence demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact." 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 	Once the
moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the
pleadings" and identify "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." Id. at 324. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only "if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 	If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party, then there is no "genuine" dispute. 	Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
In 	ruling 	on 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	the 	Court 	views 	the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor." 	Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582,
584 	(7th 	Cir. 	2009) (citation 	omitted). 	It 	cannot 	weigh 	evidence 	or 	make
credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to
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the fact-finder. See O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.
2011). The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3),
and is not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is
potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion. 	Grant v. Trustees of Ind.
Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
B. 	Exhaustion
A prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing
a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 	This "exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong." 	Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (citation
omitted).
"Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and
other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function
effectively 	without 	imposing 	some 	orderly 	structure 	on 	the 	course 	of 	its
proceedings." 	Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90−91 (2006) (footnote omitted);
see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) ("In order to properly
exhaust, a prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals 'in the place,
and at the time, the prison's administrative rules require.'") (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). 	"In 	order to exhaust
administrative 	remedies, 	a 	prisoner 	must 	take 	all 	steps 	prescribed 	by 	the
prison's grievance system." 	Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004).
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As the party asserting the exhaustion defense, the defendants bear the
burden of establishing that the administrative remedies upon which they rely
were available to the plaintiff. See Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir.
2015) ("Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the defendants must
establish that an administrative remedy was available and that [the plaintiff]
failed to pursue it."). 	"[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'available' is 'capable
of use for the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may
be obtained.'" Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (cleaned up). "[A]n inmate
is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are
capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of." 	Id. 	(cleaned
up).
II. 	Factual Background
A. 	The Complaint
Mr. Treadwell's complaint raised the following allegations:
• 	At some point before he arrived at the IDOC Reception Diagnostic
Center ("RDC") in July 2022, Mr. Treadwell suffered a left knee
injury that caused pain, swelling, and difficulty walking.
• 	While at RDC, Mr. Treadwell submitted a medical care request form
and thereafter filed a grievance complaining about difficulty walking.
• 	Mr. Treadwell filed a second medical care request on or about
September 5, 2022. At the appointment, the nurse noticed swelling
and said she would request an appointment with Dr. Byrd.
• 	On 	September 	17, 	2022, 	Mr. 	Treadwell 	submitted 	another
healthcare request form, and the nurse submitted a request for x-
rays and ordered a sleeve for his knee.
• 	A few weeks later, Dr. Byrd saw Mr. Treadwell and prescribed
meloxicam. 	Mr. Treadwell told him the treatment was ineffective.
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• 	On May 27, 2023, a nurse provided Mr. Treadwell with ice for his
knee and put him on medical lay-in. 	Dr. Byrd ordered x-rays on or
about June 16, 2023, which showed no abnormalities.
• 	Dr. Byrd again saw Mr. Treadwell and treated him with injections
that made the pain worse and caused increased swelling that lasted
for months.
• 	Mr. Treadwell requested an MRI and was told that Centurion would
not allow it because of cost.
• 	On May 10, 2024, Mr. Treadwell filed a grievance requesting an MRI,
which was returned on May 22 because it was undated. 	Mr.
Treadwell corrected the error the same day, and the grievance was
accepted.
• 	On June 18, 2024, Mr. Treadwell received the grievance response
which confirmed Dr. Byrd had referred Mr. Treadwell for an MRI.
Dkt. 1 at 2–5; dkt. 1-1 at 12.
After screening his complaint, the Court identified two Eighth Amendment
claims against Defendants: (1) a deliberate indifference to a serious medical
condition claim against Dr. Byrd and (2) a claim under the theory recognized in
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) against
Centurion based on Mr. Treadwell's allegation that Centurion denied effective
medical care due to cost. 	Dkt. 9 at 3.
B. 	The Grievance Process
At all times relevant to the complaint, Mr. Treadwell was incarcerated by
IDOC, where the IDOC's Offender Grievance Process policy was in place. Dkt. 1
at 6; dkt. 20-4 at 3; dkt. 20-2. 	The grievance process consists of three steps.
First, the individual must file a formal grievance. 	Dkt. 20-1 at 3. 	Next, if the
individual is not satisfied with the response to the formal grievance, he may
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submit an appeal to the warden. 	Id. 	Finally, the individual is not satisfied with
the response from the warden or the warden's designee, he may file an appeal to
the IDOC grievance manager. 	Id. Exhaustion of the grievance process requires
completing all three steps. Id.
If an individual files a grievance and does not receive a response within 10
business days of submitting it, the individual "shall notify the Offender Grievance
Specialist of that fact (retaining a copy of the notice) and the Offender Grievance
Specialist shall investigate the matter and respond to the offender's notification
within ten (10) business days." 	Id. at 9. 	If an individual "receives no grievance
response within twenty (20) business days of the Offender Grievance Specialist's
receipt of the grievance, the offender may appeal as though the grievance had
been denied." 	Id. at 12.
C. 	Mr. Treadwell's Use of the Grievance Process
Mr. Treadwell submitted a grievance on May 10, 2024, where he wrote "I
have a knee injury on several occasions I've complained to the doctor I've asked
for an MRI numerous times but yet to have gotten it done. My knee is causing
severe pain still." Dkt. 20-3 at 3. In the requested relief portion of the form, Mr.
Treadwell wrote "I would like an MRI to figure out what's wrong with my knee!!"
Id. 	The grievance form contained technical errors, and it was returned to him.
Id. 	On May 29, 2024, Mr. Treadwell cured the errors and resubmitted his
grievance. Dkt. 20-4 at 3 ¶ 11. The same day, Dr. Byrd was contacted regarding
the grievance, and he ordered an MRI consult. 	Id. 	Mr. Treadwell received an
MRI on October 17, 2024. 	Dkt. 30 at 21 ¶ 20. 	Mr. Treadwell accepted the
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resolution and did not file an appeal. 	Id. at 20 ¶ 17. The grievance specialist at
Wabash Valley has no record of any other medical grievances filed by Mr.
Treadwell. 	See Dkt. 20-2.
III. 	Discussion
"To exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must comply strictly with
the prison's administrative rules by filing grievances and appeals as the rules
dictate." 	Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006)). 	A "prisoner must submit inmate complaints
and appeals 'in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules
require.'" Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
"Because 	exhaustion 	is 	an 	affirmative 	defense," 	Defendants 	face 	the
burden of establishing that "an administrative remedy was available and that
[Mr. Treadwell] failed to pursue it." 	Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th
Cir. 2015). 	"[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'available' is 'capable of use for
the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may be
obtained.'" Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (internal quotation omitted).
"[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures
that are capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of." 	Id.
(internal quotation omitted).
The 	Seventh 	Circuit 	"has 	taken 	a 	strict 	compliance 	approach 	to
exhaustion." 	Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2018). 	"An inmate
must 	comply 	with 	the 	administrative 	grievance 	process 	that 	the 	State
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establishes. . . ." Id.; see also Ross, 578 U.S. at 639 (the mandatory language of
the PLRA "means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust . . .").
Both Defendants contend that Mr. Treadwell did not properly exhaust his
administrative 	grievance 	procedures 	before 	filing 	this 	suit. 	Dkt. 	21 	at 	2.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a "claim-specific inquiry." 	Jones v.
Lamb, 124 F.4th 463, 468 (7th Cir. 2024). Therefore, the Court will consider Mr.
Treadwell's claims against Defendants separately. 	Id.
A. 	Defendant Centurian
Defendant 	Centurion 	argues 	that 	Mr. 	Treadwell 	did 	not 	exhaust 	his
administrative remedies with respect to his Monell claim against it because Mr.
Treadwell did not appeal his grievance when it was resolved in a favorable
manner at step one. 	Dkt. 21 at 10. 	In response, Mr. Treadwell argues that he
has exhausted his administrative remedies because there is no requirement in
the IDOC grievance policy that requires a prisoner to appeal a favorable result of
a grievance at step one; in fact, doing so would be frivolous and repetitive, which
is in violation of the grievance procedures. 	Dkt. 29 at 4.
Mr. Treadwell is correct. "[T]he notion that [the plaintiff] should have
appealed 	to 	higher 	challenges 	after 	receiving 	the 	relief 	he 	requests 	in 	his
grievances is not only counter-intuitive, but is not required by the PLRA."
Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Once a prisoner has
won 	all 	the 	relief 	that 	is 	available 	under 	the 	institution's 	administrative
procedures, 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	are 	exhausted. 	Prisoners 	are 	not
required to file additional complaints or appeal favorable decisions in such cases.
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When there is no possibility of any further relief, the prisoner's duty to exhaust
available remedies is complete." (citing Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d
1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2004)).
After filing his grievance about obtaining an MRI, Mr. Treadwell received
his MRI consult. 	Dkt. 20-3 at 8. 	Under the IDOC's offender grievance process,
inmates are "permitted" to proceed to step two and appeal "if the offender
disagrees with the formal response at the institution level." Dkt. 20-1 at 12. Mr.
Treadwell agreed with the outcome at step one, resolving his grievance, and
obviating the need for him to proceed to step two and three. 	Therefore, Mr.
Treadwell 	exhausted 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	at 	step 	one. 	Defendant
Centurion has not met its burden of proving Mr. Treadwell did not exhaust his
administrative remedies under the PLRA, and therefore, its motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
B. 	Defendant Dr. Byrd
The undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Treadwell submitted only one
grievance related to the treatment of his knee injury. 	Dkt. 20-3 at 7. 	His
grievance stated "I have a knee injury on several occasions I've complained to the
doctor. I've asked for an MRI numerous times but yet to have gotten it done. My
knee is causing me severe pain still." And in the section entitled, "State the relief
you are seeking" he wrote, "I would like an MRI to figure out what's wrong with
my knee!!" 	Id. 	Dr. Byrd contends that this grievance did not exhaust Mr.
Treadwell's administrative remedies with respect to the deliberate indifference to
a serious medical condition claim brought against him in this case. 	Dkt. 21 at
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10. 	Specifically, Dr. Byrd argues that Mr. Treadwell's allegations relating to Dr.
Byrd's treatment with pain medication and injections are outside the scope of
the grievance, which is limited to seeking an MRI. Id. Mr. Treadwell argues that
he did not need to file a separate grievance related to the injections or pain
medication 	because 	his 	request 	for 	an 	MRI 	was 	directly 	tied 	to 	the 	prior
ineffective treatments. 	Dkt. 29 at 28.
The purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement is to "ensure[] that a
prison has received notice of, and an opportunity to correct, a problem before
being drawn into litigation." 	Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 958–59 (7th Cir.
2024). A properly grieved complaint will provide the prison notice of "the nature
of the wrong for which redress is sought." Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 900, 995
(7th Cir. 2020). Mr. Treadwell properly exhausted his claim relating to his prior
ineffective care if his grievance "provided officials a fair opportunity to address
his complaint." 	Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, Mr. Treadwell's grievance put prison officials on notice that he had
a knee injury that was still causing him pain and that he had previously asked
for an MRI but had not received one. 	See dkt. 20-3 at 7. 	This grievance gave
prison officials and Dr. Byrd an opportunity to correct his complaint about
receiving an MRI. Although the grievance references that Mr. Treadwell was still
experiencing knee pain, his grievance does not mention Dr. Byrd or the courses
of treatment that he prescribed. 	See dkt. 20-3 at 7. 	Without mentioning prior
ineffective treatment from Dr. Byrd, prison officials were not on notice and given
a fair opportunity to correct those issues. Dorsey v. Ghosh, No. 20-cv-000088,
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2024 WL 4346686, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (finding that a grievance that stated
"[t]his grievance concerns non-treatment of my right knee. For some years, I've
been having pain . . . I need an M.R.I." did not properly exhaust an inmate's
claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition); Jackson v.
Ahmed, No. 2:10-CV-00975, 2021 WL 2660067, at *5 (S.D. Ill. 2021) ("[T]his
grievance is vague and it does not name, describe, or complain about the specific
conduct attributable to Defendants in this case.").
Therefore, Mr. Treadwell's grievance about wanting an MRI does not
contain details sufficient to exhaust his claim against Dr. Byrd for the prior
ineffective injections and medications. 	Dr. Byrd has met his burden of proving
that Mr. Treadwell did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies under
the PLRA, and his motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
IV. 	Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [19], is granted in part
with 	respect 	to 	his 	deliberate 	indifference 	claims 	against 	Dr. 	Byrd. 	Mr.
Treadwell's claims against Dr. Byrd are, therefore, dismissed without prejudice
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants' motion is denied in
part with respect to Mr. Treadwell's policy and practice claim against Centurion.
These claims survive and shall proceed in this case.
The clerk is directed to remove Dr. Samuel Byrd from the docket as a
defendant in this matter. No partial final judgment shall issue.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 10/29/2025
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Distribution:
JOSHUA TREADWELL
250421
WABASH VALLEY - CF
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
6908 S. Old US Hwy 41
CARLISLE, IN 47838
All electronically registered counsel of record
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