CREDICO v. CARMEL CLAY PUBLIC LIBRARY et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
JUSTIN CREDICO, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-00582-JPH-KMB
)
CARMEL CLAY PUBLIC LIBRARY, 	)
BETH MEYERS, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Justin Credico filed this lawsuit against Carmel Clay Public Library and
Beth Meyer, alleging that they violated his First Amendment free speech rights
and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights when they
prohibited him from entering or using the library for six months. 	Dkt. 7.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. [18]. 	Because Mr. Credico
waived his claims by failing to address Defendants' arguments in response to
the motion to dismiss, that motion is GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Background
Because Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court accepts and recites "the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true."
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
On March 17, 2025, Mr. Credico was at the Carmel Clay Public Library
when he complained about harassment by library staff, and told a staff
member, "you're a piece of cop shit." 	Dkt. 7 at 2 ¶ 11 (amended complaint).
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The next day, Mr. Credico was told that Beth Meyer, the library's assistant
director, wanted to speak with him. 	Id. at ¶ 12. 	But instead of having that
conversation, the Carmel Police gave Mr. Credico a trespass order, banning him
from the library for six months. 	Id. at ¶¶ 12–13. 	The notice read:
This letter outlines several serious violations of the
Carmel Clay Public Library’s Standards of Conduct (see
attached) facilitating your library suspension.
On the evening of March 18, 2025, you were verbally
abusive 	and 	threatening 	another 	patron 	after 	a
disagreement at the computer stations. You continued
to loudly swear at staff about the incident and use
abusive language.
On September 11, 2024, you were verbally abusive to
library staff members when asked to lower the volume
of 	your 	singing 	and 	to 	refrain 	from 	using 	vulgar
language. You continued to yell vulgarity and make
threats as the staff members escorted you out. You
attempted 	to 	slam 	the 	door 	on 	staff, 	but 	the 	door
hydraulics prevented any injury.
Due 	to 	your 	ongoing 	unacceptable 	and 	potentially
violent behavior, your library visitation privileges are
suspended until September 19, 2025, and after you
have met with Library Director Bob Swanay about this
matter. 	Please 	be 	aware 	that 	your 	presence 	in 	the
library 	or 	on 	library 	grounds 	will 	be 	regarded 	as
criminal trespassing.
Dkt. 18-1 at 1 (letter form Beth Meyer).1
After receiving this notice, Mr. Credico filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging that his library suspension was First Amendment retaliation and
1 Defendants included the suspension letter with their motion to dismiss, and the
Court considers it because Mr. Credico refers to the letter in his complaint. Dkt. 7 at
4 ¶ 25; Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Documents
attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are
referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to his claim.").
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violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. 	Dkt. 1;
dkt. 7 at 4–6. 	The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss both counts under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 18.
II.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Defendants may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to
dismiss claims for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'" 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A facially plausible claim is
one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged." 	Id. 	In other words, a complaint "must
allege enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story
that holds together," Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021),
"but it need not supply the specifics required at the summary judgment stage."
Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.4th 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2021).
When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] the well-pleaded
facts in the complaint as true, but legal conclusions and conclusory allegations
merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of
truth." 	McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616. 	"It is enough to plead a plausible claim,
after which a plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the
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hypotheses are consistent with the complaint." 	Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop.,
875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017).
III.
Analysis
Defendants first argue that Mr. Credico's First Amendment retaliation
claim should be dismissed because it does not allege that he engaged in
protected speech, which is required to sustain a First Amendment retaliation
claim. 	Dkt. 19 at 7, 10 (arguing that singing and telling a library employee he
was "a piece of cop shit" were not protected speech). 	They next argue that Mr.
Credico's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim should be
dismissed because he doesn't have a liberty or property interest in library
access and, alternatively, he received all the process he was due in the letter
announcing his suspension. 	Id. at 11–13. 	In response, Mr. Credico doesn't
address or even acknowledge these arguments. 	See dkt. 20. 	Rather, he argues
that he has asserted "the hybrid Franks 4-corners test alleging material
misrepresentations and omissions of facts and circumstances (within the govt
libraries write-up,)" and that with this assertion, "he was able to surpass sua
sponte dismissal." 	Dkt. 20 at 2.
"[W]hen presented with a motion to dismiss, the non-moving party must
proffer some legal basis to support his cause of action." 	Stransky v. Cummins
Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995). 	So, when a plaintiff does not
respond to arguments in a motion to dismiss, he "effectively abandons the
litigation." 	Alito v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
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Boogaard v. Nat. Hockey League, 891 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2018) ("[Plaintiffs]
do not—and cannot—deny that a district court may hold a claim forfeited if a
plaintiff fails to respond to the substance of the defendant's motion to
dismiss.").
Here, Mr. Credico does not respond to Defendants' legal arguments why
his claims should be dismissed. See dkt. 20. 	He has therefore waived his
claims against the Defendants.2 See Alioto, 651 F.3d at 721–22 (affirming the
district court's dismissal of a complaint when the plaintiff waived his claims by
failing to address the defendant's arguments in a motion to dismiss); Bonte v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court's
dismissal after concluding that plaintiff waived claims by failing to
meaningfully respond to defendant's arguments).3
2 "Though often used interchangeably by lawyers and judges alike, the terms waiver
and forfeiture are not synonymous." Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc.
v. Church Mut. Ins., --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 574106 at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 2, 2026).
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right; forfeiture
is the mere failure to raise a timely argument." Id. Here, because Mr. Credico had
notice of Defendants' arguments and chose to respond without mentioning those
arguments, waiver is the appropriate term. See id. at *5 ("When a litigant selects
among possible arguments at summary judgment, the normal consequence is that he
waives those not advanced. Whether the choices were misguided is irrelevant. . . .
That's a textbook waiver."); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Consol. R. Corp., 965 F.3d 596, 602
(7th Cir. 2020) (applying the same rule to a 12(b)(6) motion and finding waiver because
"Canadian Pacific decided how to litigate its case, offered the district court nothing at
all on an entire theory of the defendant's case, and predictably lost.").
3 In Marcure v. Lynn, the Seventh Circuit held that courts may not grant an unopposed
Rule 12(b)(6) motion "solely because there is no response." 992 F.3d 625, 633 (7th
Cir. 2021). Here, Defendant's motion is not unopposed—Mr. Credico responded with
an argument of his choosing, thereby waiving "his right to contest dismissal" on other
grounds that Defendants raised and Mr. Credico ignored. Alioto, 651 F.3d at 722;
Bradley v. Village of Univ. Park, Ill., 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023) (reaffirming that
a party may waive arguments in the district court "by failing to offer a coherent,
supported argument").
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Instead of responding to Defendants' arguments for dismissal, Mr.
Credico contends that his claim should not be dismissed because he asserted
"the hybrid Franks 4-corners test alleging material misrepresentations and
omissions of facts and circumstances." 	Id. at 1. 	However, Mr. Credico's
reliance on Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) is misplaced.
In Franks, the Supreme Court held that when a criminal defendant
makes a substantial preliminary showing that an affiant made false statements
within a search warrant affidavit, the Fourth Amendment entitles the
defendant, at their request, to a hearing. 438 U.S. at 171–72. 	While Mr.
Credico argues that false statements and omissions within the suspension
notice were "akin to a defective warrant affidavit," dkt. 7 at 5–6, Franks
hearings are applicable in criminal proceedings for defective search warrants to
protect a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 	See Franks, 438 U.S.
154. 	This case is civil, and even if Mr. Credico's suspension notice included
misrepresentations, Franks does not apply. 	Even more, Mr. Credico's reliance
on Franks does not address Defendants' grounds for dismissal. 	He has
therefore waived his claims and the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 1999)
("An unresponsive response is no response. In effect the plaintiff was defaulted
for refusing to respond to the motion to dismiss. And rightly so.").
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IV.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
is GRANTED. 	Dkt. [18]. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. 	Final
judgment shall issue by separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
JUSTIN CREDICO
Homeless
Carmel, IN 46032
jmc31337@gmail.com
All electronically registered counsel
Date: 3/11/2026
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