Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
KATELYN P.,1 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:24-cv-2145-MJD-JRS
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Claimant Katelyn P. requests judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for Supplemental
Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner.
I. 	Background
Claimant applied for SSI in January 2021. [Dkt. 9-5 at 2.] Her application was denied
initially and upon reconsideration, [Dkt. 9-4 at 9, 17], and Claimant then requested and was
granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held before ALJ
Deanna Sokolski on February 25, 2022. [Dkt. 9-2 at 36.] 	On June 17, 2022, ALJ Sokolski
issued her determination that Claimant was not disabled. [Dkt. 9-2 at 16.] The Appeals Council
1 In an attempt to protect the privacy interest of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent
with the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to
use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial
review opinions.
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
then denied Claimant's request for review on October 29, 2022. Id. at 2. Claimant appealed that
decision; that appeal resulted in a joint motion for remand being granted and the case being
remanded for further proceedings on March 16, 2023. [Dkt. 9-10 at 42.]
On remand, on September 29, 2023, the Appeals Council remanded the case to an ALJ
for further proceedings. [Dkt. 9-10 at 49.] A second hearing was held before ALJ Kevin Walker
on April 23, 2024. [Dkt. 9-9 at 38.] ALJ Walker then entered his decision again denying
Claimant's application on August 7, 2024. [Dkt. 9-9 at 5.]
Claimant filed her Complaint on December 5, 2024, seeking judicial review of ALJ
Walker's decision. [Dkt. 1.]
II. 	Legal Standards
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must have a disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1382c. Disability is defined as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner, as represented by the
ALJ, employs a sequential, five-step analysis: (1) if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, she is not disabled; (2) if the claimant does not have a "severe" impairment, one that
significantly limits her ability to perform basic work activities, she is not disabled; (3) if the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals any impairment
appearing in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, App. 1, the claimant is
disabled; (4) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step three, and is able to perform her
past relevant work, she is not disabled; and (5) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
three, cannot perform her past relevant work, but can perform certain other available work, she is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Before continuing to step four, the ALJ must assess the
claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") by "incorporat[ing] all of the claimant's
limitations supported by the medical record." Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citing Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015)). If, at any step, the ALJ can make a
conclusive finding that the claimant either is or is not disabled, then she need not progress to the
next step of the analysis. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
The Seventh Circuit recently set forth the proper standard of review in an appeal of the
denial of disability benefits as follows:
[W]e review the ALJ's decision deferentially, affirming if its conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Deborah M. [v. Saul, 994
F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2021)]; Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 873 (7th Cir. 2000)
(ALJ's 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	determination 	"must 	be 	supported 	by
substantial evidence in the record"). 	Substantial evidence is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019),
quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83
L.Ed. 126 (1938). While we do not reweigh evidence, we conduct a critical review
because a decision "cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate
discussion of the issues." Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th
Cir. 2003). In addition, an ALJ must "build an accurate and logical bridge from
the evidence to [her] conclusion." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. That logical bridge
can assure a reviewing court that the ALJ considered the important evidence and
applied sound reasoning to it. See Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir.
1999).
Moy v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2025). This is the standard the Court will apply
in this case.
III. 	ALJ Decision
ALJ Walker first determined that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the application date of January 13, 2021. [Dkt. 9-9 at 7.] At step two, the ALJ found that
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Claimant had the following severe impairments: "migraines, asthma, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)."
Id. 	At step three, the ALJ found that Claimant's impairments did not meet or equal a listed
impairment during the relevant time period. Id. at 8. The ALJ then found that, during the
relevant time period, Claimant had the residual functional capacity ("RFC")
to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except she is able to
understand, carry out, and remember simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. She is
able to make work related decisions and sustain concentration on short, simple
tasks for two hours at a time over an eight-hour workday. She requires a position
with set routine and procedures and few changes during the workday. 	She can
tolerate occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. She
can have no exposure to concentrated wetness or humidity. 	She can tolerate
occasional exposure to pulmonary irritants including dusts, fumes, odors, and
gases. She can have no exposure to unprotected heights or hazardous machinery.
She cannot operate motor vehicles. 	With the left upper extremity, she can
frequently reach and handle. She can tolerate moderate noise exposure as defined
by the SCO and DOT. 	She cannot work at production rate pace or meet strict
quota production requirements but can meet all end-of-day goals.
Id. at 10.
At step four, the ALJ found that Claimant had no past relevant work during the relevant
time period. Id. at 15. At step five, relying on testimony from a vocational expert ("VE"), the
ALJ determined that Claimant was able to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy, such as floor waxer, laundry worker, housekeeping cleaner, routing clerk, and
hand packager. Id. at 16. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Claimant was not disabled. Id.
IV. 	Discussion
Claimant raises several issues with the ALJ's decision. First, she argues that the ALJ's
evaluation of her subjective symptoms is deficient and requires remand. The Court agrees.
When assessing a claimant's subjective symptoms, an ALJ must complete a two-step
process. First, the ALJ must "consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual's
symptoms, such as pain." SSR 16-3p (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017), 2017 WL 5180304, at *3. Here,
the ALJ found that there are such impairments. [Dkt. 9-9 at 11.] Second, "once an underlying
physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual's
symptoms is established," the ALJ will "evaluate the intensity and persistence of those symptoms
to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual's ability to perform work-
related activities." SSR 16-3p at *3. The ALJ will not evaluate an individual's symptoms based
solely on objective medical evidence unless the objective medical evidence supports a finding
that the claimant is in fact disabled. Id. at *4-5. The ALJ will consider factors including, but not
limited to, the claimant's daily activities and the effectiveness of the claimant's medication or
treatment. Id. at *7-8.
Here, the ALJ concluded that "[a]s for the claimant's statements about the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, they are inconsistent because they are not
supported by objective medical evidence or other evidence." [Dkt. 9-9 at 11.] The ALJ then
summarized the evidence of record in some detail. The ALJ then recognized that "an
individual's symptoms can sometimes suggest a greater level of severity of impairment than can
be shown by the objective medical evidence alone" and "examined the claimant’s statements
regarding the factors listed in 20 CFR 416.929(c)(3)." As to those factors, the ALJ first stated
the following:
The claimant has described fairly limited daily activities. However, at certain
points in the record, she admits to more abilities than she alleges. 	Again, the
claimant is capable of at least some cooking, cleaning, and shopping, is able to
care for her personal needs, and is able to function independently and take care of
her own basic needs. These daily activities are not as limited as one would expect
given the claimant’s complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. 	In
addition, as mentioned earlier, the record reflects work activity after the alleged
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
onset date. 	Although that work 	activity did not constitute disqualifying
substantial gainful activity, it does indicate the claimant's daily activities have, at
least at times, been somewhat greater than she has generally reported.
[Dkt. 9-9 at 13.] It appears from this statement that the ALJ believed that Claimant intentionally
minimized her description of her daily activities, presumably at the hearing. Claimant testified at
the hearing that she does some cleaning, "but usually it isn't much that I can clean" and that she
does laundry. [Dkt. 9-9 at 69.] Claimant testified that she was "afraid to do the dishes" and that
her mother did the grocery shopping, but that she liked to go with her parents when they go out
shopping or other places. Id. The ALJ does not explain, and the Court is unable to discern from
the record, how Claimant's testimony at the hearing is contradicted by other evidence in the
record regarding her ability to carry out daily activities. The ALJ does not explain what he
means by "function independently" or where in the record he found support for the finding that
Claimant is able to function independently. The ALJ also does not explain how the ability to do
"at least some cooking, cleaning, and shopping, [] care for her personal needs, and [] function
independently and take care of her own basic needs" is inconsistent with the claim that her
symptoms prevent her from performing full-time work. Finally, with regard to Claimant's work
activity, her testimony was that she had to quit working because she experienced "more and
more frequent" panic attacks when she tried to work; it is difficult to see how Claimant's failed
attempts at working part-time is evidence that her symptoms are not as severe as she alleges.
Next, the ALJ stated "I generally find the claimant's description of the location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of her symptoms unpersuasive as they are generally unfounded
elsewhere in the record." [Dkt. 9-9 at 13.] The ALJ then gave several examples of why he
believed Claimant's subjective symptoms allegations were "unfounded." First, the ALJ stated
that "[Claimant] alleges debilitating migraines. However, she has had normal neurology exams
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
and improvement with medication. On several occasions, she said she was very happy with her
medications and that they worked well (Exhibits B1F at 1-6; B17F at 103-105, 205-207)." 	Id. It
is entirely unclear how "normal neurology exams" are relevant to the question of how often
Claimant suffered from migraine headaches and how severe those headaches were. While it is
true that Claimant stated that her migraine medications were working well in two of the records
cited by the ALJ, those records were from February 2022 and February 2023. See [Dkt. 9-15 at
104] (Ex. B17F at 103); [Dkt. 9-16 at 97] (Ex. B17F at 205).2 In between the February 2023
visit and the April 2024 hearing, Claimant returned to her neurologist complaining of an
"increase in frequency and intensity of her migraine headaches." [Dkt. 9-17 at 78] (notes from
December 7, 2023). The ALJ does not acknowledge that fact or the fact that a migraine
medication might work well at first and then grow less effective over time. In other words, the
ALJ does not explain how the fact that Claimant's migraine medication was working well in
February 2022 and February 2023 renders her April 2024 testimony regarding her migraine
symptoms "unfounded," especially in light of the intervening neurology visit in which she
complained of worsening migraine symptoms.
2 The ALJ also cites to Exhibit BF1at 1-6. Those records are from March and April 2021. In
March 2021, Claimant was first prescribed medication (gabapentin) for migraines by her primary
care physician and was referred to a neurologist. [Dkt. 9-7 at 6] (Ex. B1F at 6). At a follow-up
visit the following month, Claimant's primary care physician reported that Claimant's migraine
headaches had "lessened on gabapentin" and that Claimant was waiting for an appointment with
a neurologist, which was scheduled for July 2021. [Dkt. 9-7 at 4] (Ex. B1F at 3). At that
appointment, the neurologist noted that Claimant's migraines were occurring "with increasing
frequency and intensity over the past several months" and prescribed Nurtex ODT as an abortive
medication for migraines. [Dkt. 9-7 at 188.] These notes do not suggest that Claimant was "very
happy with her medications and that they worked well," but rather that she obtained some relief
from gabapentin but needed an additional medication to help manage her migraines.
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
Next, the ALJ states: "[Claimant] also alleges asthma, though her treatment notes show it
is well controlled with medication (Exhibits B1F at 7-10; B15F at 10; B17F at 103-105, 205).
Further, she has not required any treatment for acute asthma exacerbations." [Dkt. 9-9 at 13.]
Claimant does not "allege asthma"; Claimant has asthma and has been diagnosed and treated for
asthma consistently. The only testimony at the hearing regarding Claimant's asthma is that she
uses an inhaler twice every day and that she had also used a rescue inhaler about five times in the
past month. [Dkt. 9-9 at 64.] It is unclear how that testimony, or anything else in the record
regarding Claimant's asthma, is inconsistent with the ALJ's conclusion that her asthma is "well
controlled with medication." In other words, the ALJ seems to assert that Claimant has made
allegations regarding her asthma symptoms that are inconsistent with the record as a whole, but
he does not explain what those allegations are or where Claimant made them.
Next, the ALJ states:
In addition, [Claimant] alleges many symptoms of ADHD, anxiety, depression,
and PTSD. However, her treatment notes and objective exams show many normal
findings and improvement with medication and therapy. . . . 	She also alleges
difficulty with concentration and focus. While her therapy notes do describe her
as distracted at times, it was usually because she was on her phone (Exhibits B10F
at 57, 72, 76, 93; B13F at 19). 	Notably, her behavioral health and psychiatric
exams showed good attention and concentration (Exhibits B2F at 11, 13, 15, 17,
20; B5F at 3-5; B7F at 31-32; B10F at 61-62).
[Dkt. 9-9 at 13, 14.] It goes without saying that the fact that there are "many normal findings" in
Claimant's records does not negate the fact that there are also many abnormal findings. See [Dkt.
9-10 at 50] (Appeals Council remand order noting that "showing some improvement does not
negate the claimant's significant ongoing abnormalities on mental status examinations."). With
regard to Claimant's allegations of difficulty with concentration and focus, the state agency
psychologists found that Claimant is moderately limited in her ability to maintain attention and
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
concentration for extended periods, [Dkt. 9-3 at 16], and the ALJ found that she had a moderate
limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, [Dkt. 9-9 at 9], so the ALJ apparently
agreed that she had some degree of difficulty with concentration and focus. As with asthma, the
ALJ implies that Claimant somehow exaggerated her problems with concentration and focus but
in no way explains how that is the case.
Next, the ALJ stated the following:
While [Claimant] alleges difficulty with hygiene, her treatment notes seem to
indicate this was more of an issue of routine, lack of knowledge, and lack of
resources rather than a symptom of mental health (Exhibits B10F at 28, 90, 121;
B16F at 8). Her hygiene routine improved with help from her therapist (Exhibits
B13F at 15; B16F at 13).
[Dkt. 9-9 at 13-14.] The records cited by the ALJ do not support his conclusion that Claimant's
hygiene issues were not related to her mental impairments. On the contrary, the records state
that the therapist "provided psychoeducation on the impact of [a hygiene] routine and
consistency with mental health symptoms increasing when stressors increase and not getting
[Claimant's] basic needs met." [Dkt. 9-8 at 91.] The same record indicates that claimant
understood the hygiene routine and was able to explain how to complete it, but nonetheless
Claimant "appeared disheveled upon arrival and reported that they shower daily and wear new
clothes daily, however that is not evidence in appearance." Id. And while the ALJ is correct that
the record indicates that her hygiene routine improved with therapy, those records indicated
"some improvement" toward a goal of "complet[ing] hygiene at least 4 out of 7 days a week";
they do not indicate that Claimant no longer had any issues with hygiene.
Next, the ALJ stated that "[w]ith regard to hallucinations, while [Claimant] did report
some as distressing at a few visits between February 2022 and April 2022, she said they did not
bother her on many occasions. She also denied hallucinations at times." [Dkt. 9-9 at 14]
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
(citations omitted). The import of this statement is unclear. Does the ALJ mean that Claimant
lacks credibility because she has said different things about hallucinations at different times? If
so, there is no medical evidence in the record suggesting that Claimant's reports of hallucinations
to her mental health providers were not genuine or that they were suspect because they waxed
and waned and took on different characteristics. And, as the Appeals Council noted in its
remand order, "reporting hallucinations at some visits and not at others and showing some
improvement does not negate the claimant's significant ongoing abnormalities on mental status
examinations." [Dkt. 9-10 at 50.]
Finally, with regard to the panic attacks experienced by Claimant, which she identified at
the hearing as the reason her attempts to work were unsuccessful, the ALJ stated "[Claimant]
also alleges frequent panic attacks but often denied them to her doctors and said her medication
worked well. Her therapy notes also show a decrease in anxiety/panic with use of positive
thoughts." [Dkt. 9-9 at 14] (citations omitted). This, of course, reads as if Claimant told her
doctors one thing and then told the ALJ another. But the ALJ's own summary of the medical
evidence demonstrates that Claimant's medical records show a pattern of the frequency and
severity of her panic attacks increasing and decreasing and then increasing again, necessitating
medication changes at times. See [Dkt. 9-9 at 12-13]. This pattern is consistent with serious
mental illness, which tends not to improve in a linear fashion, but instead waxes and wanes over
time due to changes in medication, therapy, environment, stress, and myriad other factors. As
the Seventh Circuit has recognized, "[a] person who has a chronic disease, whether physical or
psychiatric, and is under continuous treatment for it with heavy drugs, is likely to have better
days and worse days." Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Larson v.
Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that "symptoms that 'wax and wane' are not
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 10 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
inconsistent with a diagnosis of recurrent, major depression"). The ALJ does not explain how
variations in Claimant's reported panic attack symptoms over time conflict with her allegation
that when she tried to work—that is, do something outside of her routine—she experienced panic
attacks that made her unable to continue doing so.
The Commissioner correctly notes in his brief that
An ALJ's evaluation of a claimant's subjective claims is due special deference—
particularly where, as here, he heard the claimant testify. 	Bates v. Colvin, 736
F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013); Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir.
2008); Kelley v. Sullivan, 890 F.2d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 1989). The ALJ's findings
must be upheld unless they were "patently wrong," a standard which allows the
court to overturn a decision only when it lacked "any explanation or support."
Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
[Dkt. 14 at 4.] But it is not enough for an ALJ to give an explanation; that explanation must be
supported by the record and it must actually support the ALJ's conclusion. As set forth in detail
above, that is not the case here. Remand is thus required. To make this finding is not, as
suggested by the Commissioner, to improperly "reweigh" the evidence; it is to point out that the
ALJ failed to satisfy his obligations under the applicable law to comply with the requirements set
forth in the agency's own rulings and to "rest his denial of benefits on adequate evidence
contained in the record and [] explain why contrary evidence does not persuade.” Berger, 516
F.3d at 544.
Because remand is required based on the ALJ's unsupported subjective symptoms
analysis, the Court need not address Claimant's other arguments at length. However, the Court
notes that the ALJ's deficient analysis of the effects of Claimant's panic attacks on her ability to
work is also highly relevant to his evaluation of the "paragraph C criteria" at step three, which
Claimant also alleges was erroneous. The ALJ's entire analysis is as follows:
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 11 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
I have also considered whether the "paragraph C" criteria are satisfied. 	In this
case, the evidence fails to establish the presence of the "paragraph C" criteria. The
evidence fails to show marginal adjustment or minimal capacity to adapt to
changes in her environment or to demands that are not already part of her daily
life despite ongoing medical treatment and mental health therapy that diminishes
the symptoms and signs of her mental disorder. 	At the hearing, Dr. Heath
specifically noted the elements of the paragraph C criteria are not met.
[Dkt. 9-9 at 10.] To be frank, Dr. Heath's testimony was largely equivocal and at times
unintelligible. In addition, under questioning by Claimant's attorney, Dr. Heath stated that he
"wouldn't put up a hard argument" against the attorney's suggestion that there was, in fact,
evidence in the record that would support finding that the paragraph C criteria were satisfied.
[Dkt. 9-9 at 54.] On remand, the ALJ shall conduct a more careful analysis of whether the
paragraph C criteria are satisfied that does not rely on Dr. Heath's equivocal testimony and takes
into account the reassessment of the subjective symptoms analysis.
V. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 26 FEB 2026
Distribution:
Service will be made electronically on
all ECF-registered counsel of record via
email generated by the Court's ECF system.
Case 1:24-cv-02145-MJD-JRS Document 19 Filed 02/26/26 Page 12 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>