Simmons v. Cloud Nine Hospitality Group

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JODY SIMMONS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLOUD NINE HOSPITALITY GROUP,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:24-CV-01724-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jody Simmons brings this employment discrimination action under
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Civil Rights Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and
Title 	VII 	of 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act, 	42 	U.S.C. 	§2000e, 	et 	seq., 	alleging 	race-based
discrimination by Defendant Cloud Nine Hospitality Group (“Cloud Nine”). (Doc. 1).
Cloud Nine has not appeared to defend the case.
Having obtained an entry of default from the Clerk of Court, Simmons moved for
default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2) and for entry of an award against Cloud Nine.
(Doc. 9). On September 29, 2025, the undersigned denied Simmons’s motion for default
judgment without prejudice. (Doc. 12). The Court explained that it was “unable to
establish an award for [Simmons] with reasonable certainty,” and thus could not enter a
default judgment in his favor. (Id.). On October 29, 2025, Simmons filed an amended
motion for default judgment against Cloud Nine. (Doc. 13). The amended motion is now
ripe for disposition.
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B ACKGROUND
Simmons 	worked 	for 	Cloud 	Nine 	as 	a 	“house/maintenance 	man” 	from
March 1, 2022 until July 31, 2023. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 12, Complaint). Simmons is Black and thus
a member of a protected class. (Id. ¶ 13). In July 2023, Cloud Nine’s general manager
(identified as “Rick”) told employees in a department meeting that the hotel where
Simmons worked was changing management groups and that “all” housekeeping staff
would be replaced prior to the change in management. (Id. ¶ 14). Within a week of Rick’s
announcement, eight Black housekeepers were terminated from their positions and
replaced with Hispanic housekeepers. (Id. ¶ 15). This included Simmons, who was told
to “turn in [his] badge” on July 31, 2023. (Id. ¶ 17). The “housekeeping managers,” who
are not Black were not fired or replaced. (Id. ¶ 15).
During his employment, Simmons “met or exceeded” Cloud Nine’s expectations
of him. (Id. ¶ 21). He thus alleges that he was terminated due to his race. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23).
And as a result of Cloud Nine’s alleged conduct, Simmons suffered a “loss of income,
loss of other employment benefits and . . . mental anguish, distress, humiliation and loss
of enjoyment of life.” (Id. ¶¶ 30, 38). After he was terminated, moreover, Simmons lost
his car and apartment and became homeless. (Doc. 14-1 ¶ 13 (Simmons Affidavit in
Support of Am. Mot. for Default Judgment)). During this time, he stayed at various
homeless shelters and with friends as he was able. (Id. ¶ 14).
While he was unemployed, Simmons also tried to find new employment but was
unsuccessful for almost two years. (Id. ¶ 12). Indeed, Simmons applied to five or six jobs
per day in hopes of improving his financial and professional circumstances. 	(Id. ¶ 19).
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His unemployment lasted until May 15, 2025, when he began a new job, earning $16 per
hour. (Id. ¶ 20). Given his allegedly unlawful termination on July 31, 2023, this meant that
Simmons was unemployed for approximately 93 weeks.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 55(a) requires the clerk to enter default when a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend and that
failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise. FED. R. C IV. P. 55(a). The clerk’s entry of a
default “is merely a formal matter and does not constitute entry of a judgment.”
10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682
(3d ed. 2010). “Once default is established, and thus liability, the plaintiff still must
establish his entitlement to the relief he seeks.” VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Illinois
Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
Under Rule 55(b)(2), “the court may enter a default judgment if the amount at issue
is for a sum certain.” Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Alps Elec. Co., No. 99 C 6990,
2002 WL 484845, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2002) (citing F ED. R. C IV. P. 55(b)(2)). “Even when
a default judgment is warranted based on a party’s failure to defend, the allegations in
the complaint with respect to the amount of the damages are not deemed true.” In re Catt,
368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2004). Instead, the plaintiff must introduce evidence on the
issue of damages, and the district court must “conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Id.
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DISCUSSION
Simmons seeks to recover backpay, compensatory damages, pre- and post-
judgment interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. (Mem. in Support of Am. Mot. for
Default Judgment (Doc. 14)). The Court will examine Simmons’s entitlement to each of
these claimed damages categories.
1. 	Backpay
“An award of back pay to a successful Title VII plaintiff is ‘presumptively
appropriate.’” Ward v. Tipton Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 937 F. Supp. 791, 798 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
(quoting E.E.O.C. v. O & G Spring and Wire Forms Spec. Co., 38 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1994)).
“The claimant must establish the amount of damages, but she is presumptively entitled
to full relief.” Garcia v. Sigmatron Int’l, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1256 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
Here, Simmons requests $48,360.00 in backpay, reflecting his lost wages. This number is
based on his claimed weekly income of $520.00, multiplied by 93 weeks (the length of
time between his termination and the date on which he began a new job). (Doc. 14-1).
Although the Court agrees that Simmons is entitled to backpay, it disagrees with
his calculation of it. Simmons submitted a pay stub in support of his amended motion for
default judgment, covering a period from May 17, 2023, to May 30, 2023. (Doc. 14-4).
During this two-week period, Simmons worked 58.89 hours, earning $13 per hour. (Id.).
Based on these figures, Simmons earned a total of $765.57 over two weeks or $382.79 per
week. Multiplying this figure by 93 weeks results in $35,599.47 in lost earnings. The Court
considers this figure to represent a more appropriate lost wage amount.
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2. 	Compensatory Damages
In 	an 	employment 	discrimination 	case, 	“[t]he 	availability 	of 	compensatory
damages apart from back and front pay demonstrates Congressional recognition that
discriminatory employment practices inflict injuries beyond mere loss of a paycheck or
reduction in wages and benefits, and Congressional intent that victims of employment
discrimination should be compensated for those non-pecuniary injuries.” Williams v.
Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 791, 794 (N.D. Ind. 1996). “When assessing the
propriety of a compensatory damages award, relevant inquiries may include whether the
award is monstrously excessive, whether there is no rational connection between the
award and the evidence, and whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made
in similar cases.” Lampley v. Onyx Accept. Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Simmons seeks a compensatory damages award of $5,000.00 to compensate him
for 	the 	psychological 	and 	emotional 	injuries 	he 	sustained 	from 	his 	termination.
Considering Simmons’s allegation of targeted race-based termination by Cloud Nine, this
request appears to be within the range of reasonable alternatives. Application of the
Lampley factors confirms as much. An award of $5,000.00 is not “monstrously excessive”
in light of what happened to Simmons. He is a Black man who, along with other Black
employees, 	was 	allegedly 	terminated 	because 	of 	his 	race. 	His 	termination 	and
concomitant loss of income also led to him becoming homeless, an experience he
describes as “distressing and degrading.” Under these circumstances, $5,000.00 dollars is
not “monstrously excessive.” There is also a “rational connection” between Simmons’s
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claimed compensatory damages and Cloud Nine’s misconduct. Simmons alleges that
Cloud Nine specifically “targeted” him for termination because of his race. Then, after he
was terminated, Simmons experienced humiliation, emotional distress, a lack of self-
worth, and a loss of enjoyment of life. These types of psychological injuries are common
in wrongful termination cases, and they support the necessary “rational connection” to a
compensatory damages award. See id. at 484 (evidence of “negative effects on [plaintiff’s]
emotional state” supported rational connection to compensatory damages award).
Finally, Simmons’s claimed compensatory damages award is “roughly comparable to
awards made in similar cases”—indeed it is rather modest. See e.g., Schandelmeier-Bartels
v. Chicago Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 390-91 (7th Cir. 2011) (reducing compensatory damages
award from $200,000 to $30,000 in race-based discrimination and termination case
because plaintiff lacked “stronger evidence of long-lasting emotional harm;” collecting
cases); 	E.E.O.C. 	v. 	AutoZone, 	Inc., 	707 	F.3d 	824, 	833-34 	(7th 	Cir. 	2013) 	($100,000
compensatory damages award not excessive for failure to accommodate plaintiff’s severe
back pain; collecting comparable cases).
Accordingly, the Court awards Simmons $5,000.00 in compensatory damages.
3. 	Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest
Simmons also seeks an award of pre- and post-judgment interest. “In general,
whether and how to award prejudgment interest . . . lies in the discretion of the district
court, although there is a presumption in favor of granting such interest.” Frey v. Coleman,
903 F.3d 671, 682 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). Here, the Court is not
persuaded that pre-judgment interest is appropriate. Cloud Nine has not defended this
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case. While this is certainly not Simmons’s fault, it forces the Court to evaluate his claimed
damages without the benefit of adversarial testing. And based on the evidence Simmons
has presented, pre-judgment interest does not appear warranted. Aside from his own
affidavit, Simmons has submitted only a paystub to support his damages. The Court, in
its discretion, thus declines to award pre-judgment interest. See Musser v. Colonnade Senior
Dev., LLC, No. 3:24-CV-02045, 2025 WL 2390544, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2025) (entering
default 	judgment 	in 	employment 	discrimination 	case 	but 	denying 	pre-judgment
interest); Quidgeon v. Olsen, No. 10–cv–1168, 2011 WL 1480537, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 19,
2011) (same in trademark infringement action); N.W. Trans, Inc. v. Horn’s Poultry, Inc., No.
92–2270, 1993 WL 787510, at *3 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (same on summary judgment based on
“equitable considerations”).
Post-judgment interest, on the other hand, is appropriate here. “[R]egardless of
whether there is any reference to postjudgment interest in the pleadings, a court’s order,
or the entry of a money judgment, a prevailing plaintiff in federal court is automatically
entitled to postjudgment interest.” Miller v. Artistic Cleaners, 153 F.3d 781, 785. (7th
Cir. 1998). Post-judgment interest will accrue from the date of judgment in this case as
laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
4. 	Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Finally, Simmons seeks $7,572.00 in attorney’s fees and $510.00 in costs. In a Title
VII action, courts may, in their discretion, award reasonable attorney’s fees to the
“prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). “To determine a reasonable fee, the district
court uses the lodestar method, multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
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on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d
632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011).
Simmons’s attorneys submitted a table outlining the time they spent working on
this case. (Doc. 14-2, p. 3). The case demanded 11.5 hours of attorney time and roughly
the same amount from several paralegals and other professional staff. Considering the
involvement of these professionals and the total amount of time spent, the Court finds
counsel’s request for $7,572.00 in fees reasonable under the lodestar method. Simmons’s
request for $510.00 in costs to cover case filing and service fees is also reasonable.
Accordingly, the Court will award Simmons a total of $8,082.00 in attorney’s fees and
costs.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Amended Motion for Default Judgment filed by Plaintiff
Jody Simmons (Doc. 13) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Simmons’s requests
for compensatory damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and post-judgment interest are
GRANTED. Simmons’s request for back pay is GRANTED as modified in this Order.
His request for pre-judgment interest is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Simmons and
against Defendant Cloud Nine Senior Hospitality Group for a total award of $48,681.47.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 27, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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