USA v. Green

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTONIO K. GREEN,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:24-CR-30146-NJR-1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Defendant Antonio K. Green was charged with being a felon in possession of a
firearm after police found a gun in his car. He now moves to suppress the evidence of
this crime because the police stopped him on the basis of an anonymous 911 call, which,
in his view, was not sufficiently reliable to justify the stop. (Doc. 48). Green’s motion is
fully briefed and ripe for disposition without a hearing. 1
B ACKGROUND
On August 1, 2024, the East St. Louis Police Department received a 911 call from
an unidentified caller requesting police assistance at a Mobil gas station at 8301 State
Street in East St. Louis, Illinois. (Exh. 1 of Gov. Brief (Doc. 55), 911 Call Rec. 00:04-00:24).
1 Although Green requested an evidentiary hearing to “resolve disputed facts,” he has not identified the
disputed facts, nor explained why their resolution is necessary to resolve the motion. The factual record is
well developed. It includes the 911 call, the arresting officer’s body camera footage, which captures Green’s
encounter with police, and relevant documentary evidence. Thus, considering the lack of an identified
factual dispute and the robust evidentiary record available, the Court declines to hold an evidentiary
hearing. See United States v. Martin, 422 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Evidentiary hearings are necessary
only when the party requesting the hearing identifies a significant, disputed factual issue that must be
resolved.”); accord United States v. McGauhy, 485 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2007).
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The caller was “watching the camera” and reported “somebody walking around the
parking lot holding a pistol . . . threatening [inaudible].” (Id. 00:29-00:34, 00:41). Although
the caller could “barely see” the suspect, he described him as “African American” and
“an old man.” (Id. 00:41-00:58). He further stated that the suspect was wearing “jeans”
and a “beige shirt.” (Id. 00:45-00:48). Towards the end of the one minute and 37 second
call, the caller stated that “he’s been threatening customers. I just don’t know what’s
going on with him.” (Id. 01:23-01:26).
Officer Dennis Hill was dispatched to the Mobil gas station at approximately
7:27 p.m. (Exh. B. of Def. Brief (Doc. 48-1, p. 6), Police Report). The computer-aided
dispatch (“CAD”) notes indicated that a Black man wearing a “beige shirt” was “walking
around the lot with a handgun.” (Exh. C. of Def. Brief (Doc. 48-2, p. 1), CAD Notes). The
CAD notes also relayed that the “subject was making threats to customers.” (Id.).
Officer Hill arrived at the Mobil gas station at around 7:38 p.m. (Id.). He stepped
out of his cruiser and “observed a black male later identified as offender Antonio Green
to be entering the driver’s seat of a white in color, 2006 Cadillac CTS.” (Doc. 48-1, p. 6).
Officer Hill identified Green as the subject of the 911 call because he was wearing a beige
shirt and blue jeans, consistent with the anonymous caller’s description. (Id.).
Officer Hill’s body camera footage begins at 7:39 p.m. (Exh. A of Def. Brief
(Doc. 49), Body Camera Footage). At that time, he got back into his cruiser and pulled in
front of Green’s car to block him from leaving the parking lot. (Id. 0:00:05-25). At the same
time, Officer Barnett parked his cruiser behind Green’s car. (Id.). Officer Hill approached
the passenger side window of Green’s car with his service weapon drawn and asked
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Green if he had any weapons “on [him].” (Id. 0:00:05-25). Although the body camera
footage reveals an inaudible response from Green to this question, Officer Hill noted in
his police report that Green replied “Yes.” (Id. 0:00:28-35; Doc. 48-1, p. 6).
Officer Hill ordered Green out of the car and asked him where he kept his firearm.
(Doc. 49, 0:00:33, 0:01:20). Green told him that it was “on the seat” and admitted that he
did not have a Firearm Owner’s Identification (“FOID”) card or a Concealed Carry
Weapon (“CCW”) card. 2 (Id. 0:01:22-29). Officer Hill told Green that he was “just
detained” at this point and had another officer place him in the back of a police cruiser.
(Id. 0:01:28).
Officer Hill then went into the gas station to find the person who called 911. (Id.
0:02:23-38). He spoke to two people, but none appeared to know who made the call. (Id.).
When Officer Hill came back out into the parking lot, another officer was speaking to a
witness (K.A.) who told him that “he [presumably Green] was trying to get that girl over
there in the white.” (Id. 0:02:55-58). When he heard this, Officer Hill told his colleague
“I got probable cause now.” (Id. 0:02:58). K.A. told Officer Hill that Green had a black gun
and was “walking around with it . . . in his hand.” (Id. 0:03:10-34). K.A. also said that
Green pulled the gun on another person and “freaked out.” (Id. 0:04:11-15). After
speaking with K.A., Officer Hill searched Green’s car and found the gun near the driver’s
seat. (Id. 0:05:07-06:23).
2 Under Illinois law, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, “[n]o person may acquire or possess
any firearm, stun gun, or taser within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police.” 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1).
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On November 5, 2024, Green was indicted on one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 1). He now moves to suppress
the evidence and statements derived from his encounter with police.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Stopping someone is
generally considered a seizure for which probable cause is required.” United States v.
Olson, 41 F.4th 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2022). This general rule, however, is subject to a “limited
exception” for “brief investigatory stops” (known as “Terry stops”) where an officer has
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
“Whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified a Terry stop is a fact-
intensive, objective inquiry encompassing the totality of the circumstances known to the
officers at the moment of seizure.” Id. at 800. Although this is a lower standard than
probable cause (which is necessary for a full-blown arrest), it is not met simply because
an officer has a “hunch” that criminal activity might be afoot. United States v. Lopez, 907
F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2018). “Whether the facts were enough to support reasonable
suspicion [as opposed to a mere “hunch”] ‘is dependent upon both the content of the
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” United States v. Swinney,
28 F.4th 864, 866 (7th Cit. 2022) (quoting United States v. Adair, 925 F.3d 931, 935 (7th
Cir. 2019)).
Green argues that Officer Hill subjected him to a Terry stop without possessing a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Both parties agree that Green was seized when
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Officers Hill and Barnett parked their cruisers in front of and behind his car so that he
could not drive away. The government argues, however, that the seizure was supported
by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. And because the initial seizure was
justified, the events that followed, including Green’s admission about an unlicensed gun
in the car, justified the search that revealed the gun. But if Green is correct that Officer
Hill lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him in the first place, then any subsequent
developments (including his statements to police) are irrelevant, and the evidence is
subject to suppression. See United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 685-87 (7th Cir. 2013)
(each investigatory step must be supported by requisite level of suspicion or cause). The
dispositive question, then, is whether Officer Hill had a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity when he initiated a Terry stop by blocking Green’s car from driving away.
Officer Hill’s suspicion was based on the information he received about the
anonymous 911 call, which reported a Black man in a beige shirt “threatening” people
with a gun. Anonymous tips to police are viewed with some skepticism under the Fourth
Amendment because, by their nature, they do not identify the informant and “seldom
demonstrate[] the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 329 (1990). Anonymous tips must therefore be scrutinized for their reliability to make
sure police do not intrusively investigate innocent citizens whom an informant seeks to
falsely accuse. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000). Of course, “[t]his is not to say that
an anonymous caller could never provide the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry
stop.” White, 496 U.S. at 329. “[T]here are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably
corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to
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make the investigatory stop.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reliability thus exists on a spectrum: the more indicia of reliability a tip presents, the
more likely it is to support a Terry stop. Id.; White, 496 U.S. at 329; accord Navarette v.
California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 401 (2014).
The Seventh Circuit has identified three factors, based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Navarette v. California, “that make an anonymous tip reliable enough to create
reasonable suspicion: the tipster (1) asserts eyewitness knowledge of the reported event;
(2) reports contemporaneously with the event; and (3) uses the 911 emergency system,
which permits call tracing.” United States v. Watson, 900 F.3d 892, 895 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing
Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399-401) (the Navarette factors or framework). Moreover, the
anonymous tip must be “reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to
identify a determinate person.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
Green argues that the anonymous 911 call was not sufficiently reliable to support
reasonable suspicion because it described him in overly generic terms: a Black man with
a gun, wearing a beige shirt and jeans. 3 He is correct that these generic descriptors alone
do not support a Terry stop. It is not illegal in Illinois to possess a gun with a license, nor
is it a crime to wear a beige shirt and jeans. But Green’s argument omits critical
information about the 911 call that demonstrates its reliability and assertion of illegality.
Reliability, as noted, must be assessed under the Navarette framework. The first
Navarette factor concerns the caller’s “eyewitness knowledge” of the events in question.
3 Although the 911 caller described the suspect as wearing a beige shirt and jeans, the CAD notes only
mentioned the beige shirt.
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Eyewitness knowledge “lends significant support to the tip’s reliability” because it
necessarily implies that the caller knows that dangerous or illegal activity was or is taking
place. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399. Here, the 911 caller told police that he was “watching the
camera” and saw “somebody walking around the parking lot holding a pistol . . .
threatening” people. He thus asserted eyewitness knowledge of the events. Although he
qualified his observations by telling police he could “barely see” the suspect, he still was
able to describe him as “African American” and “an old man.” He also saw enough to
tell police that the suspect was wearing “jeans” and a “beige shirt.” It is thus apparent
that, even with limitations in what the caller could see, he asserted eyewitness knowledge
of Green’s threatening behavior. This supports the reliability of the call under the first
Navarette factor.
The second Navarette factor determines whether the caller reported information
“contemporaneously with the event.” Contemporaneous reports are viewed as reliable
because the reporting party does not have the luxury of time and deliberation to fabricate
a story. Id. at 399-400. This factor, too, weighs in favor of reliability. The caller reported
the events as they unfolded. He was “watching the camera” and relayed the information
in real time or very shortly after he saw the suspect threaten people. The contemporaneity
of this report supports its reliability.
The third Navarette factor also weighs in favor of reliability. When an anonymous
caller uses the 911 system, her report is considered reliable because the police can trace
the call back to her. Id. at 400-01. The likelihood of identification means that “a false tipster
would think twice before using such a system.” Id. at 401. Here, there is no dispute that
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the anonymous call came in through the 911 emergency system. 4 Thus, on the surface,
the 911 call bears the indicia of reliability normally attributed to such calls under the
Navarette framework.
But the analysis of the third Navarette factor cannot end there because the caller
never told police whether he was calling from a personal phone or some else’s. In Watson,
an anonymous caller borrowed another person’s phone to call 911 and reported “boys”
“playing with guns and stuff.” Watson, 900 F.3d at 893. The Seventh Circuit determined
that, under these circumstances, the call could not support reliability in the way other 911
calls do. Id. at 895. This was so because the caller had no connection to the owner of the
phone. Id. “Any phone number identified would not lead back to the caller because he
had no permanent connection to the phone, and the phone’s geographic location at the
time of the call would be useful only so long as the caller remained near the phone.” Id.
Here, the anonymous caller presumably called from inside the Mobil gas station because
he told police he was “watching the camera.” This puts him in a similar position to the
caller in Watson who relayed his observations from across the street. Id. at 893. What is
less clear is whether the caller used his own phone or someone else’s. If it is the latter, the
third Navarette factor likely undermines the tip’s reliability as it did in Watson.
But the anonymous 911 call here does not flunk the third Navarette factor, and
4 Green apparently did not receive a recording of the 911 call until after he filed his motion to suppress. He
thus argued in his motion that the call lacked reliability because it was not clear whether it was made
through the 911 system. Although the government’s delayed disclosure forced him to pivot from this
argument, he ably argued in his reply brief that the call was not reliable, regardless of the caller’s use of the
911 system. In any event, because Green does not dispute that the anonymous caller used the 911 system,
the existence of the 911 call is established.
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certainly not the broader reliability analysis, based on the possibility that the caller used
someone else’s phone. What might have happened here, definitively happened in Watson:
the police knew that that the caller was using someone else’s phone. The possibility that
this might have happened here too does not upend the reliability analysis because “the
fact that the police knew the caller had used the 911 system supports a finding of
reasonable suspicion.” Swinney, 28 F.4th at 867 n.3. Moreover, because “there is nothing
to suggest that the caller did not believe h[is] phone number would be known to police,”
the police reasonably relied on the veracity of the report. 5 Id. Accordingly, the evidence
supports a finding of reliability under third Navarette factor.
The content of the report was also clear in its “assertion of illegality.” J.L., 529 U.S.
at 272. The caller told police that the suspect was walking around the parking lot
“threatening customers” with a gun. In Illinois, a person commits an aggravated assault
when he “places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery,” and does so
with a deadly weapon. 720 ILCS 5/12-1(a) & 2(c)(1) (defining assault and aggravated
assault). A report that a person is “threatening” others with a gun, reasonably may be
construed as a report of an aggravated assault. This assertion of illegality sets this case
apart from Watson, where the report of “boys” “playing with guns and stuff,” showed
only a “mere possibility of unlawful use” of a firearm. Watson, 900 F.3d at 893, 896
(quotation marks omitted). “[T]he presence of guns did not create a reasonable suspicion
5 At one point during the encounter, the dispatcher appears to tell Officer Hill that “it was an employee”
who made the 911 call. (Exh. A of Def. Brief (Doc. 49), Body Camera Footage 0:01:55-0:02:04). The remaining
footage neither confirms nor refutes this claim. Officer Hill spoke to two people inside the gas station, but
neither appeared to know who made the call.
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of an ongoing crime, because carrying a firearm in public is permitted with a license in
Indiana.” Id. at 895. Contrast this with the report here: a person “threatening” others with
a gun. Such conduct is not permitted in Illinois, with or without a license. The clear
assertion of illegality, coupled with the satisfaction of the Navarette factors, pushes this
anonymous tip towards the reliable end of the spectrum, where tips supporting
reasonable suspicion are gathered.
Green, for his part, relies on J.L. for the proposition that “an anonymous tip about
a person with a gun, absent additional facts, cannot suffice as reasonable suspicion.”
(Def. Br., p. 9 (Doc. 48)). In J.L., an anonymous caller reported that “a young black male
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” J.L.,
529 U.S. at 268. When officers responded, they saw three Black males “just hanging out
there” Id. (alteration omitted). Although one of the three, J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt,
the officers had no reason to suspect him or the other two males of illegal conduct apart
from the anonymous tip. Id. The officers nevertheless stopped and frisked J.L. and found
a gun in his pocket. Id. The Court held that the officers acted without reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity because the anonymous tip was neither reliable nor did it allege illegal
conduct. Id. at 271-72. “All the police had to go on,” the Court explained, “was the bare
report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew
about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L.”
Id. at 271. Indeed, the report did not allege a crime at all; it merely reported a person’s
possession of a gun. Id.; Watson, 900 F.3d at 897. And because the tip “d[id] not show that
the tipster had knowledge of concealed criminal activity” (e.g., knowledge that J.L. was a
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minor and thus not permitted to carry a gun in Florida), the tip failed to offer a reliable
“assertion of illegality.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
J.L. is distinguishable for several reasons. First, as noted, the assertion of illegality
was clear in this case. The caller told police that he was watching Green “threaten” people
with a gun. The illegality in this assertion is apparent. The caller’s observations suggested
that Green was committing an aggravated assault under Illinois law. Green was not
accused of merely possessing a gun, he was accused of openly using it in an unlawful
way. Second, the basis of the caller’s knowledge of the illegality was clearly established.
He was “watching” Green on the gas station’s camera. The caller in J.L., on the other
hand, simply told police that a young Black man was carrying a gun without explaining
how he knew about this. Third, whereas the anonymous tip in J.L. did not come through
the 911 system, this one did. And while the caller could have used another person’s phone
to make the call, there is no indication that he believed the police could not trace the call
back to him. 6
Green also faults Officer Hill for failing to corroborate “key details” from the 911
call before initiating a Terry stop. (Def. Br., p. 9 (Doc. 48)). In his words, Officer Hill “never
6 J.L. may also be distinguishable for a separate reason. The Seventh Circuit has embraced a “rule requiring
a lower level of corroboration before conducting a stop on the basis of an emergency report.” United States
v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2008). This rule is “rooted in the special reliability inherent in reports of
ongoing emergencies.” Id. In such situations, J.L.’s requirement that police corroborate an anonymous tip
before stopping a suspect “does not govern.” Id. at 560. So, even if reliability was a closer call, the reliability
framework itself is malleable when an officer responds to an ongoing emergency, as Officer Hill appears
to have done here. Ultimately, whether the caller reported an ongoing emergency has no bearing on the
reliability of the report. It is thus not necessary to decide whether he conveyed an ongoing emergency that
might have removed the case from J.L.’s reach entirely. See Swinney, 28 F.4th at 869 (no need to determine
whether anonymous 911 caller reported ongoing emergency because call was reliable under Navarette
framework).
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contacted [the] tipster . . . nor corroborated any other information aside from Mr. Green
matching the clothing” attributed to him. (Id., p. 10). But such corroboration was not
necessary. The caller personally witnessed an ongoing crime and reported it by using the
911 emergency system.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Swinney is instructive and binding on this point.
There, an anonymous caller told police that a man wearing a black skullcap and a black
fur coat had pulled out a large gun and walked into a liquor store. Swinney, 28 F.4th
at 865. When police arrived, they found a man matching the caller’s description, patted
him down immediately, and found a gun in his coat pocket. Id. at 866. The court was
unconvinced by the defendant’s attempt to analogize J.L., as Green does here. The
anonymous tip, it found, “established reasonable suspicion because it reliably reported a
man carrying a gun in a liquor store, which is a crime in Illinois.” Id. at 868. “It does not
matter that the police did not see [the defendant] doing anything suspicious once they
arrived on the scene.” Id. “[W]here . . . an anonymous tip reliably reports an ongoing
crime, additional facts or circumstances are not required to justify a Terry stop.” Id. at 869.
Swinney compels the conclusion that Officer Hill had all he needed to stop Green: a
contemporaneous eyewitness report of an ongoing crime, conveyed through the 911
system. And like the officers in Swinney, Officer Hill identified Green by his clothing and
acted based on the report. The Court thus disagrees with Green’s contention that the
failure 	to 	corroborate 	more 	of 	the 	anonymous 	911 	caller’s 	information 	warrants
suppression.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Green’s motion to suppress (Doc. 48) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 7, 2026
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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