Lundy v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEVIN LUNDY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 23-cv-03809-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MCGLYNN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on various motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Kevin Lundy.
I. 	Motions for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 55, 63) – Plaintiff
Plaintiff has filed a fifth and sixth motion seeking court recruited counsel. (Docs. 55, 63;
see also Doc. 7, 8, 16, 18, 28, 30, 39, 41). There is no right to the appointment of counsel in civil
matters, but the Court “has discretion under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1) to request counsel for an
indigent litigant. Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010). When confronted with
a motion for the recruitment of pro bono counsel, the Court must consider (1) whether the indigent
plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing
so; and if so, (2) whether, given the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff appears competent to litigate
it himself. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d
319, 321–22 (7th Cir. 1993)). In conducting its analysis, the Court must also be a good steward of
the limited resources that are available because attorney resources in the Southern District of
Illinois are low relative to the hundreds of prisoner cases filed each year. See e.g., McCaa v.
Hamilton, 959 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2020) (a judge may use available information from the
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pleadings and the judge's experience to assess the importance and potential merits of a case when
considering appointed counsel). It is with these factors in mind that the Court will deny the Motions
for counsel.
Plaintiff 	discloses 	three 	unsuccessful 	efforts 	to 	contact 	attorneys 	via 	written
correspondence and provided declination letters from the three law firms. (Doc. 63, p. 3-6).
Accordingly, he appears to have made reasonable efforts to retain counsel on his own.
With respect to his ability to pursue this action pro se, Plaintiff indicates that he would
benefit from counsel because he has no legal education, he has limited knowledge of the law, he
only possesses a GED level of education, and he has a learning disability (ADHD) that makes it
difficult for him to concentrate and focus. (Doc. 55, p. 2-3). He also expresses concern about the
complexity of the case because it involves medical issues that may require expert testimony, and
he is currently in segregation with limited access to the law library. (Id.).
Despite these obstacles, the Court finds that Plaintiff is capable of proceeding pro se, and
court recruited counsel is not warranted. Plaintiff continues to be a zealous advocate for himself.
This case has not even entered merits discovery, and Plaintiff has filed over fifteen motions and
successfully defended against a motion for summary judgment on exhaustion. He consistently
communicates with the Court and seeks deadline extensions and further instructions and updates
as needed. While he may have little to no knowledge regarding the federal civil legal system and
his ADHD may impact his ability to concentrate, his numerous and detailed filings, which cite to
case law and provide relevant supporting exhibits, demonstrate that the hinderances caused by his
education level and ADHD are minimal. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff claims that as of April
2025 he is in segregation with limited law library access, the Court presumes that he will not be in
segregation indefinitely. And as Plaintiff well knows, he may request extensions of deadlines as
needed if he is unable to access the law library in a timely manner.
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Finally, although this case involves medical indifference, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
claims are not too complex for his abilities. Plaintiff alleges that he was issued a low bunk and low
gallery medical permit by a nurse practitioner at Menard Correctional Center, but that non-medical
staff failed to honor the permit for two weeks in March 2022, resulting in Plaintiff falling twice
from the top bunk injuring himself. To succeed at summary judgment regarding an Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, Plaintiff must put
forth evidence demonstrating “(1) that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition;
and (2) that the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition.” Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010). “District courts frequently assume that a plaintiff
satisfies the first element – a serious medical condition – when assessing inadequate medical care
claims based on a prisoner’s low gallery permit.” Salley v. Parker, 2022 WL 2952818, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. July 26, 2022) (collecting cases). Thus, this case will most likely focus on Defendants’
subjective state of mind, whether they knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to
Plaintiff’s health. Establishing Defendants’ state of mind will be “straightforward” and, given the
alleged facts of the case, can be done without the need of a medical expert or complex discovery.
See Olson v. Morgan, 750 F. 3d 708, 711-712 (7th Cir. 2014); Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 940
(7th Cir. 2018) (finding that a case in which the main argument was whether “prison officers
refused to respond to [the plaintiff’s] requests for medical care, not that the care he received was
substandard…is not categorically beyond the capacity of a pro se plaintiff”). It is for these reasons
that the Court finds that the case at this point still does not exceed Plaintiff capabilities, and the
Court will not expend the resources of volunteer counsel to assist. The Motions for Recruitment
of Counsel are DENIED. (Doc. 55, 63).
In light of this Order, the Motion for Status on the pending Motions for Recruitment of
Counsel is DEEMED moot. (Doc. 64).
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II. 	Motion for Extension of Time and Motion to Substitute (Docs. 56, 57) – Plaintiff
An unknown defendant remains unidentified in this case. John Doe 1 is described in the
Complaint as the “placement officer from 3/3/22-3/18/22.” (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff was originally
given the deadline of December 2, 2024, to identify John Doe 1 and file a motion to substitute.
(Doc. 27). After several extensions of the deadline (Docs. 31, 35, 41, 45), Plaintiff filed a motion
to substitute on April 11, 2025. (Doc. 53). The motion was denied because Plaintiff sought to
substitute the single John Doe Defendant with four different names. (Doc. 54). Plaintiff was then
given until May 5, 2025, to file a motion to substitute. The Court instructed Plaintiff that he must
identify the John Doe Defendant named in the Complaint and substitute that person with the name
of one individual.
On April 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking an extension of time for leave to file an
amended complaint so that he may add additional John Doe Placement Officers. (Doc. 56).
Plaintiff states that when he drafted the Complaint, he was not aware the John Doe Placement
Officer could potentially be four different people. Because he described the John Doe as the
placement officer who worked from March 3, 2022, through March 18, 2022, he states he does not
understand how the description does “not cover whoever worked those days.” (Id. at p. 1). Plaintiff
explains that he has not attached a proposed amended complaint formally substituting the John
Does because he still has not received a copy of his original Complaint following his transfer from
Menard Correctional Center to Lawrence Correctional Center to assist him in drafting a proposed
amended complaint. He asserts that if he was allowed to amend, he would only be adding the four
individuals who have been identified as “Count Officers from March 3, 2022, through March 18,
2022” as defendants (See Doc. 37, p. 2).
After filing his Motion for Extension of Time, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Substitute naming
Janell Stanely as the John Doe Defendant. (Doc. 57). The Motion to Substitute is GRANTED.
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(Doc. 57). Janell Stanely is SUBSTITUTED for John Doe 1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to SERVE Janell Stanely in accordance with the Court’s Merits Review Order (Doc. 11). Because
Plaintiff has moved to substitute the John Doe Defendant with a single individual, it appears that
the Motion for Extension of Time in order to file an amended complaint is no longer needed and
is therefore DEEMED moot. (Doc. 56).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	March 25, 2026
s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
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