Sheets v. Greenville University

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANGELA K. SHEETS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-3754-MAB
)
GREENVILLE UNIVERSITY, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Angela Sheets filed a Second Amended Complaint against Defendant
Greenville University (“Greenville”) for claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Doc. 42). Presently
before the Court is Greenville’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 43). For the reasons set forth below,
Greenville’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part (Doc. 43).
BACKGROUND
I. The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 42)
Plaintiff Angela Sheets is a female softball coach who obtained her bachelor’s
degree from Greenville in 2012 (Doc. 42 at p. 2).1 After graduating from Greenville,
Plaintiff worked as the head softball coach at Peoria Christian Junior High School and
obtained her master’s degree from Bradley University (Id. at pp. 2-3). On or around May
1 This matter is currently before the Court on a motion to dismiss and accordingly, the Court takes all well-
pleaded factual allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as true and draws all permissible
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2020).
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2020, Plaintiff received a call from Greenville’s Athletic Director, Tom Ackerman
(hereinafter, “A.D. Ackerman”) (Id. at p. 3). A.D. Ackerman informed Plaintiff that a
softball coaching position was available at Greenville and asked her to apply (Id.).
Plaintiff did and her final interview was conducted with A.D. Ackerman and Katrina
Lopez Liss, Greenville’s Chief Diversity and Culture Coordinator and Title IX
Coordinator (Id.). Thereafter, Plaintiff was hired as Greenville’s head softball coach in
July 2020 (Id.).
Plaintiff’s first season as Greenville’s head softball coach occurred in 2021 (Id.). At
that time, Plaintiff was provided with a graduate assistant named Becca Oldham to help
her manage the team (Id. at p. 4). Oldham had recently played on Greenville’s softball
team prior to graduating and was friends with many of the players on the team (Id.).
During the 2021 season, Oldham actively worked with her friends on the team to
undermine Plaintiff (Id.). This included Oldham and her friends holding meetings with
A.D. Ackerman and Hayle Gibson - Greenville’s senior woman administrator and A.D.
Ackerman’s associate head woman’s volleyball coach, wherein Oldham and her friends
would make false claims about Plaintiff (Id.). Ultimately, the softball team went 9-15 in
the 2021 season (Id.).
After the 2021 season concluded, Greenville sent out anonymous reviews for the
softball team’s players to evaluate Plaintiff (Id.). Those reviews served as the basis for
Plaintiff’s yearly review meeting with A.D. Ackerman, Gibson, and Stephen Groves -
Greenville’s Associate Athletic Director and Assistant Men’s Basketball Coach (Id.). At
that meeting, A.D. Ackerman told Plaintiff that Oldham’s friends on the team made false
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claims about Plaintiff in those reviews (Id. at pp. 4-5). However, Plaintiff was not
provided with copies of those false reviews and they were not placed in her employee
file (Id. at p. 5). A.D. Ackerman also indicated that several of the players who made false
claims had struggled with their conduct in the past (Id.). However, A.D. Ackerman did
not want to remove the problematic players and instead suggested Plaintiff draft team
rules and expectations (Id.). Meanwhile, Plaintiff held a yearly review meeting with
Oldham (Id.). At that meeting, Oldham told Plaintiff that she wanted to be Greenville’s
head softball coach and could do better than Plaintiff (Id.).
After the 2021 season, A.D. Ackerman required Plaintiff to attend weekly meetings
with Sonya Jones, a professor at Greenville who had previously played softball at
Greenville and had her office in the Athletic Department (Id. at pp. 5-6). Jones was close
friends with Liss and would convey the contents of their weekly meetings to Liss (Id. at
p. 6).
Additionally, Plaintiff followed A.D. Ackerman’s advice and created team rules
and expectations (Id.). The players complained about the rules to Jones and showed her
the rules (Id.). However, during Plaintiff’s weekly meeting with Jones, Jones told Plaintiff
she did not see an issue with the rules Plaintiff developed (Id.). Subsequently, Liss
informed Plaintiff that she and Jones are close friends, that she had knowledge of
Plaintiff’s meetings with Jones, and that she did not see an issue with the rules either (Id.).
Ultimately, each player signed the new team rules (Id.).
Oldham left her assistant position following the 2021 season and Ivan Estevez, a
close friend of A.D. Ackerman, was hired on as a part-time assistant (Id. at pp. 6-7).
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Estevez was completing his master’s degree during Plaintiff’s first year of employment
(Id. at p. 7). After being hired, A.D. Ackerman and Estevez held scheduled weekly
meetings together, which was unusual because Estevez was the only assistant coach who
had weekly meetings scheduled with A.D. Ackerman (Id.). Furthermore, Estevez
continued to work a full-time job outside of his assistant coaching position (Id.). As a
result, Estevez was often late to practice and/or unable to travel to away games, and
Plaintiff was frequently left to coach the 23 to 19 player team on her own (Id.).
This prompted Plaintiff to beg A.D. Ackerman to increase her coaching staff by
adding a full-time assistant coach (Id. at pp. 7-8). A.D. Ackerman informed Plaintiff that
she could only have a full-time assistant coach if there were over 30 players on the team’s
roster (Id. at p. 8). Consequently, Plaintiff started a junior varsity program and was able
to grow the softball team’s roster to over 30 players for the 2023 season (Id.). However,
A.D. Ackerman then backtracked and told Plaintiff that she could only look for a
graduate assistant, who would offer minimal help (Id.). At Plaintiff’s weekly meeting
with Jones, Plaintiff told Jones that she was not receiving the assistant coaching support
that other head coaches had received and expressed her frustration with A.D.
Ackerman’s backtracking (Id.). At that time, male head coaches at Greenville were each
supported by one assistant coach or more (Id. at pp. 8-9).
During the 2022 season, the main issue the softball players raised with Plaintiff
related to playing time (Id. at p. 9). Additionally, Plaintiff removed two players from the
team during the 2022 season due to their failure to communicate with Plaintiff and
Estevez (Id.). Liss attended softball games with A.D. Ackerman, Jones, and Suzanne
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Davis, the President of Greenville (Id.). A.D. Ackerman and Liss are both close friends
with Davis outside of work (Id. at pp. 9-10). Moreover, Davis’s husband is also close
friends with A.D. Ackerman (Id. at p. 9). In the end, the softball team finished the 2022
season with a record of 22-21 and made it to the conference championship game (Id.).
Several team members were awarded additional regional honors and the team led the
conference in various performance metrics (Id. at p. 10).
Meanwhile, Greenville’s Athletic Department was in the process of planning a
multimillion-dollar sports complex during the 2022 season (Id.). The planned complex
did not have any female specific locker rooms or showers, even though several men’s
teams received their own spaces (Id.). Instead, after the football season had ended, the
softball program would share the football locker room with the women’s track team (Id.).
Plaintiff consistently advocated for female athletes in opposition to the proposed plan
(Id.). Furthermore, Liss was present on more than one occasion when Plaintiff voiced her
opposition and asserted that the planned athletic complex had little, if any, benefit for
women’s sports (Id.). After Plaintiff complained about the athletic complex being devoted
to men’s sports, she was gradually excluded from all meetings about the complex (Id. at
p. 11).
Following the 2022 season, Greenville sent out anonymous reviews for the softball
players to use to evaluate Plaintiff (Id.). While the reviews were voluntary, Greenville
strongly encouraged the softball players to complete them (Id.). However, prior to
sending out the reviews, A.D. Ackerman secretly met with members of the softball team
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(Id.). Similar to the prior season, softball players once again used the reviews to make
false accusations about Plaintiff (Id.).
Those reviews then served as the basis for Plaintiff’s yearly review meeting in May
2022 (Id.). At that meeting, A.D. Ackerman told Plaintiff that she wasn’t “going to want
to read” the reviews (Id.). He then said that the situation was out of his hands and
indicated that Liss would handle the situation (Id.). However, upon examining the
reviews, Plaintiff discovered that nine reviews were negative and contained false
accusations, and nine reviews were positive (Id. at p. 12). This appeared to align with the
fact that only 9 players can play at a time in softball (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff was
deeply troubled by the false accusations in the negative reviews that alleged she was
mentally and physically abusive (Id.).
Plaintiff did not receive a call from Liss, so she contacted the Human Resources
Department (Id.). At that time, Plaintiff learned that Liss was performing an investigation
into Plaintiff because the players’ reviews had triggered a Title IX Investigation against
her (Id.). A.D. Ackerman informed Plaintiff that she could have one or two confidants
during the investigation and he told her that Estevez should be one of them (Id.).
Consequently, Plaintiff confided in Estevez who reassured her that she did nothing
wrong, the allegations were false, and the season went well (Id.). Estevez also encouraged
Plaintiff to confide in Jones.
While the investigation was ongoing, Plaintiff received a call from Roy
Mulholland, the head coach of the women’s basketball team (Id.). Mulholland told
Plaintiff that everything would work out for her if she apologized to Liss and A.D.
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Ackerman (Id.). Additionally, at some point in time, Mulholland confided in Plaintiff that
he had been subjected to some very negative reviews from his team’s players and he did
not suffer any adverse employment action (Id. at p. 19). Furthermore, Jones frequently
called Plaintiff during the pendency of the investigation and then conveyed the contents
of her conversations with Plaintiff to A.D. Ackerman and Liss (Id. at pp. 12-13). Jones told
Plaintiff that she should not be worried about losing her job as a result of the investigation
(Id. at p. 13).
Plaintiff spoke with Liss who similarly informed her that she should not be
worried about losing her job as a result of the investigation (Id.). Liss also told Plaintiff
that she could have witnesses and instructed Plaintiff to provide her with a witness list
(Id.). On or around May 14, 2022, A.D. Ackerman spoke with Plaintiff and informed her
that she should continue her usual duties as head softball coach (Id.). Two days later,
Plaintiff informed Liss that she should contact Estevez and Shelby Cash, a softball alum
who volunteered to help Plaintiff, to act as witnesses (Id.). Liss responded that she would
interview the complaining players and then schedule a time to provide Plaintiff an
opportunity to respond (Id.). Plaintiff subsequently created a list of six additional contacts
who could attest to her character and her interactions with the players (Id.).
On May 26, 2022, Plaintiff asked A.D. Ackerman and Liss if they could have a
meeting to discuss the upcoming season in light of the ongoing investigation (Id.). A
meeting was held one day later with Plaintiff, A.D. Ackerman, and Liss (Id. at p. 14). At
that meeting, Liss informed Plaintiff that she was terminated (Id.). Liss also remarked that
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Plaintiff should not have told Estevez anything (Id.). However, Liss did not provide
Plaintiff with any additional information regarding the investigation (Id.).
Just minutes after being terminated, Plaintiff received a phone call from Estevez
(Id.). Estevez told Plaintiff that he never contacted anyone regarding the investigation
(Id.). However, Estevez’s statements demonstrated that he knew more about the players’
complaints, meetings between A.D. Ackerman and Liss, and meetings between A.D.
Ackerman and the players (Id.). Plaintiff’s other witnesses said they had never been
contacted during the investigation (Id.). Liss subsequently confirmed that she had only
spoken with the players who made the false accusations against Plaintiff (Id. at p. 15).
Greenville’s Title IX resources and policies were not followed during the
investigation and Plaintiff was never provided with a written report of factual findings
(Id. at pp. 15-16). When Plaintiff asked Liss why she was terminated, Liss merely told her
that it was for a long list of reasons that Plaintiff would not agree with (Id. at p. 16). Liss
did not elaborate on those reasons or provide any of them to Plaintiff (Id.). Multiple
softball players who supposedly left negative reviews of Plaintiff later sent her text
messages stating they liked her as a coach, would miss her, and did not understand what
had happened (Id.). Relatedly, current and incoming family members of the team’s
players were upset about Plaintiff’s termination and reached out to A.D. Ackerman (Id.).
Just prior to Plaintiff’s termination, the only other female head coach at Greenville
had also been terminated following an investigation (Id. at p. 17). That female head coach
was also never provided an assistant coach (Id.). As such, Greenville did not have a single
female head coach after Plaintiff’s termination (Id. at p. 16).
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Estevez replaced Plaintiff as the head softball coach (Id. at p. 17). Immediately
thereafter, A.D. Ackerman provided Estevez with the support of two, full-time assistant
coaches (Id.). However, it appears Estevez was proceeding with just one assistant coach
at some point thereafter (Id. at p. 18). Similarly, Greenville’s other male head coaches were
all supported by one or more assistant coach (Id. at pp. 17-18). In contrast, Emily Butler,
Greenville’s head coach for men’s volleyball does not have an assistant coach and
Greenville’s only other female head coach is only provided one assistant (Id. at p. 18).
Moreover, while numerous male head coaches have been working at Greenville for
extended periods of time, only one female coach has been employed by Greenville for
more than 5 years and she has close ties to A.D. Ackerman and was promoted to be A.D.
Ackerman’s Associate Athletic Director in 2021 (Id. at pp. 18-19). Beyond that, Greenville
has been selectively concerned about coaches’ reviews (Id. at p. 19). For instance, A.D.
Ackerman has an online coach rating of 1.8/5 with his lowest rating in the area of honesty
(Id.).
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed her original Complaint with the Court on November 21, 2023 (Doc.
1). Thereafter, Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in February 2024 (Doc. 13-1). As a result, Plaintiff
filed a First Amended Complaint on March 21, 2024 (Doc. 13). Greenville filed a Motion
to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 22), which the Court granted in February
2025 (Doc. 38). Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims and
discrimination claim each failed to adequately plead causation (see generally Id.).
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However, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice, such that Plaintiff was
granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (Id. at pp. 16-17).
Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on April 14, 2025 (Doc.
42). The Second Amended Complaint raises three claims, including: (Count I) a claim of
retaliation for opposing Greenville’s discriminatory assistant coaching policy under Title
IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; (Count II) a claim that Greenville terminated her employment
because of her sex, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq.; and (Count III) a
claim of retaliation for opposing Greenville’s discriminatory sports complex in violation
of Title IX (see Id. at pp. 20-25).
In response, Greenville filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 43). Thereafter, Plaintiff
filed a Response in Opposition to Greenville’s motion (Doc. 45), and Greenville filed a
Reply in Support (Doc. 46). Furthermore, after filing its Reply, Greenville also filed a
Notice of Supplement Authority (Doc. 47), which Plaintiff responded to (Doc. 48).
LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.
2014). In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff’s pleading
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
complaint must provide enough factual information to ‘state a claim to relief that is
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plausible on its face’ and ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Camasta, 761
F.3d at 736 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff’s
pleading must state a claim that is facially plausible, meaning that “the pleaded content
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the plaintiff does
not need to provide “detailed factual allegations,” the plaintiff must plead more than
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In deciding whether the complaint sufficiently states a claim, the court takes well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all permissible inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2020).
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Title IX Retaliation Claims
a. Preemption
Greenville argues that Counts I and III should be dismissed because, among other
reasons, they are preempted by Plaintiff’s employment-discrimination claim raised in
Count II (Doc. 43 at pp. 8-12). More specifically, Greenville contends that Plaintiff’s
retaliation claims in Counts I and III allege retaliation for actions she took in relation to
discrimination in her employment, not for actions she took in relation to discrimination
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against her student athletes (Id.). In response, Plaintiff avers that her Title IX claims are
appropriate because in both circumstances, she was complaining about the university’s
discrimination against her students (Doc. 45-1 at pp. 10-12). Here, the Court separately
addresses the preemption arguments for Counts I and III because there are critical
distinctions between the actions pleaded for those two retaliation claims.
While the Court acknowledges that this is a fluid area of law,2 current Seventh
Circuit precedent provides, “[w]hen Congress creates a comprehensive statutory scheme
for protecting a right, it may impliedly express the intention that this scheme should be
exclusive.” Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1996) abrogated by
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009). Therefore, employment
discrimination claims under Title VII are found to preempt Title IX retaliation claims
when the Title IX claims “sound squarely in employment discrimination” and the
plaintiff “does not identify any remedy she seeks under Title IX that would be
unavailable under Title VII.” Agbefe v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 538 F. Supp. 3d 833,
2 Greenville argues that the standard found in Agbefe v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 538 F. Supp. 3d 833,
840 (N.D. Ill. 2021), which was mentioned in the Court’s prior Order (see Doc. 38 at p. 8, fn. 2) is incorrect
because it is narrower than the broad preemption principles cited in some other cases, including a recent
Eleventh Circuit case (Doc. 43 at pp. 10-11) (citing Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 121
F.4th 855, 869 (11th Cir. 2024)). Meanwhile, Plaintiff cited Agbefe and argued for the applicability of the
standard discussed therein (see Doc. 45-1 at pp. 10-11). Ultimately, the Court has reviewed the current
caselaw at length and believes the standards discussed herein represent the applicable law in the Seventh
Circuit under the current facts. In any event, the Court does not believe that an Eleventh Circuit opinion
“mandates dismissal” of this action filed in the Seventh Circuit (see Doc. 43 at p. 10). Waid’s holding was
not as broadly applicable as the finding in Joseph, and Greenville has not provided an on-point Seventh
Circuit case that would mandate such a conclusion under the facts presented here. Compare Waid v. Merrill
Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1996), with Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 121
F.4th 855, 864 (11th Cir. 2024).
Conversely, to the extent other cases or circuits may apply narrower standards than those stated
in Agbefe or find preclusion entirely inapplicable, Plaintiff has not pointed to any precedential cases holding
so. Rather, the Court finds Plaintiff has waived such contentions by arguing for the application of the
standard found in Agbefe (see Doc. 45-1 at pp. 10-12).
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840 (N.D. Ill. 2021). See also Brown v. Illinois Dep’t of Human Services, 717 Fed. Appx. 623,
625–26 (7th Cir. 2018) (Stating that, in order to prevail, the plaintiff “must also persuade
us to overturn our precedent that all employment-discrimination claims must be brought
under Title VII.”). Therefore, in Agbefe, the district court held:
Here, the theory behind Agbefe’s Title IX retaliation claim is that the Board
subjected her to retaliation for opposing sex-based discrimination against
herself, not against her students. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 58 (describing Agbefe’s
protected activity as “opposing the sex discrimination and harassment to
which she was subjected”) (emphasis added). In other words, the alleged
retaliation against Agbefe was due to her opposition to a discriminatory
employment practice; such a claim, unlike the ones in Cieslik, Burton, and
Jackson, is exactly what Title VII allows. And thus, under the preclusion
principle set forth in Waid, Agbefe may not bring that claim under Title IX.
538 F. Supp. 3d at 841.
Conversely, as Agbefe acknowledged, other district courts have reached a different
conclusion where “the Plaintiffs alleged their opposition to sexual harassment in an
educational setting, not in the context of an employer-employee relationship.” Cieslik v.
Bd. of Eduction of City of Chicago, 1:19-CV-05553, 2021 WL 1172575, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
2021). For instance, in Cieslik, the district court found that the plaintiffs’ Title IX retaliation
claim was not precluded by Title VII because the claim was not premised on opposition
to employment discrimination and was instead “premised on opposition to student
versus teach harassment.” Id. at *6. Put another way, Seventh Circuit precedent, as well
as district court decisions interpreting that precedent such as Agbefe and Cieslik
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distinguish between instances where discrimination3 is centered upon employment and
instances where discrimination is centered upon education. See, e.g., Agbefe, 538 F. Supp.
3d at 840.
Here, as applied to Count I, the Court finds Greenville’s preemption argument to
be persuasive. Crucially, in Count I, Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against for
opposing Greenville’s discriminatory assignment of assistant coaches on the basis of the
head coaches’ sex and advocating for additional assistant coaches for herself (Doc. 42 at
p. 21). Notably absent from Plaintiff’s pleadings, however, is any allegation that Plaintiff
opposed Greenville’s allegedly discriminatory assistant coaching policy because it
discriminated against her female student athletes (see generally Doc. 42). Instead, the
Second Amended Complaint repeatedly claims that Plaintiff was retaliated against for
opposing Greenville’s discriminatory assistant coaching policy “on the basis of the head
coach’s sex and advocating for additional assistant coaches for herself.” (Doc. 42 at p. 21)
(emphasis added). As explained in Agbefe, this distinction is crucial because the alleged
retaliation was due to her opposition to a discriminatory employment practice, not
discrimination against her female student athletes. See Agbefe, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 841.
In fact, Plaintiff’s Response even acknowledges this clear distinction, stating “[i]f
the employee alleges retaliation for opposing discrimination against her students, Title
VII does not preclude Title IX, as it constitutes alleged discrimination in education.” (Doc.
3 “[R]etaliation is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response to the nature of
the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174
(2005).
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45-1 at p. 10) (citing Agbefe, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 840). Yet, at no point does Plaintiff point to
anywhere in the Second Amended Complaint where she alleges that her opposition to
Greenville’s assistant coaching policy was due to discrimination against her female
student athletes.4 Therefore, because the Second Amended Complaint definitively
establishes that Plaintiff’s claim in Count I was brought based upon employment-
discrimination she was experiencing (i.e., her coaching and the refusal to provide her a
full time assistant coach), this claim is preempted by Plaintiff’s Title VII employment
discrimination claim raised in Count II.
In stark contrast, however, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim
raised in Count III is not preempted because that claim involves actions Plaintiff took
challenging sex-based discrimination suffered by her female student athletes. Namely,
Count III alleges that Plaintiff was retaliated against for “opposing Greenville’s plan for
a sports complex that did not provide comparable facilities for each sex.” (Doc. 42 at p.
24). Additionally, the Second Amended Complaint alleged that Plaintiff constantly
advocated “for the female sports” and objected to the complex, in the presence of Liss,
because the new complex had “little, if any, benefit for women’s sports.” (Id. at p. 10). In
other words, unlike Plaintiff’s pleadings in Count I which were related to her own
4 Furthermore, while Plaintiff’s Response argues that Plaintiff sought a full-time coach to both help her and
“to provide adequate support for her student-athletes” (Doc. 45-1 at p. 12), no similar allegation is found
in the Second Amended Complaint (see generally Doc. 38). Quite simply, Plaintiff’s failure to raise such a
critical allegation cannot be cured by doing so in her Response.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint undercuts this argument by including factual
allegations that Greenville’s discriminatory assistant coaching assignment was based on the head coach’s
sex and not the players’ sex (see Doc. 42 at p. 18) (alleging that the female head coach of the men’s volleyball
team was the only head coach who was not provided an assistant).
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employment, Count III’s allegations make it clear that her complaints were challenging
sex-based discrimination against her female student athletes. Therefore, this retaliation
claim is not preempted by Plaintiff’s Title VII claim because it does not allege retaliation
for opposing a discriminatory employment practice. See Cieslik, 2021 WL 1172575 at *5
(“In this particular case, this argument fails because the Plaintiffs alleged their opposition
to sexual harassment in an educational setting, not in the context of an employer-
employee relationship.”).
In summation, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim in Count I is
preempted by Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim in Count II. Accordingly,
Greenville’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I and that claim is DISMISSED
with prejudice. Conversely, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim in Count
III is not preempted by her Title VII discrimination claim in Count II. Therefore, the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings as to Count III will be analyzed further below.
b. Elements of Plaintiff’s Title IX Retaliation Claim
“Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 permit plaintiffs to bring causes of action for retaliation.” Burton v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (Title VII), and Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005)
(Title IX)). Under Title IX, an individual may bring a retaliation claim if he or she is
retaliated against for opposing discrimination against others. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179-180.
Specifically, to prevail on a Title IX retaliation claim, Plaintiff will need to show that: (1)
she engaged in protected activity under Title IX, (2) Greenville took a materially adverse
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action against her; and (3) there was a but-for causal connection between the two. See Doe
v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 933 F.3d 849, 857 (7th Cir. 2019); Burton, 851 F.3d at 695.
Establishing causation under Title IX requires pleading that the decisionmaker’s
adverse action was taken in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected activities. See Conviser v.
DePaul Univ., 532 F. Supp. 3d 581, 596 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (“A primary consideration for
causation at the motion to dismiss stage is whether the plaintiffs allege some “retaliatory
motive” connecting the protected activity and adverse action.”). Consequently, under
Title IX, “[k]nowledge of the protected activity is necessary to show causation for a
retaliation claim.” Lesiv v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 915 (7th Cir. 2022). This is
because “[a] supervisor simply cannot retaliate against an employee for engaging in
protected activity if the supervisor was not aware of the protected activity in the first
place.” Id. at 915-16.5
c. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim in Count III
Having found that Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim in Count III is not
preempted, the Court considers whether Count III adequately pleads the elements of a
Title IX retaliation claim. Greenville contends that the Second Amended Complaint does
not do so because it fails to adequately plead a protected activity and a causal connection
5 However, one exception to the requirement that a decisionmaker have knowledge of the protected
activities is known as a “cat’s paw” theory of liability. See Sinha v. Bradley Univ., 995 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir.
2021). “This theory is invoked in employment discrimination contexts when a biased supervisor, or a biased
subordinate, ‘who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision maker as a dupe in a deliberate
scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.’” Id. at 574 (quoting Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., 726 F.3d
910, 914 (7th Cir. 2013)). To prevail under a cat’s paw theory of liability, the plaintiff has to show that the
ultimate decisionmaker’s decision was “decisively influenced by someone who was prejudiced.” Roberts v.
Columbia Coll. Chicago, 821 F.3d 855, 865 (7th Cir. 2016). See also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 416
(2011).
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between that activity and her termination (Doc. 43 at pp. 12-17). Conversely, Plaintiff
argues that the Second Amended Complaint adequately pleads both of those elements
and nothing further is required at the pleading stage (Doc. 45-1 at pp. 12-15).
First, there is no dispute that Plaintiff’s termination constitutes a materially
adverse action taken against Plaintiff. See, e.g., Conviser v. DePaul Univ., 532 F. Supp. 3d
581, 596 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (“[A] change to the terms and conditions of ‘employment’ status
constitutes a materially adverse action under Title IX.”). The Complaint adequately
pleads that such an action was taken against Plaintiff and therefore this element has been
satisfied. See Id.
Second, taking all well-pleaded allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as
true and drawing all permissible inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a protected activity in Count III. Namely, Plaintiff
adequately alleges that she vocally opposed the athletic complex during the 2022 season
because the planned facility was devoted to men’s sports and had little, if any, benefit for
women’s sports (see Doc. 42 at p. 10). Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint alleges
that due to Plaintiff’s gender-based opposition, she was excluded from all meetings about
the complex (Id. at p. 11). Accordingly, these allegations support the reasonable inference
that her vocal opposition to the complex because of its lack of women specific facilities
occurred at those meetings. Significantly, “speaking out against sex discrimination is a
recognized protected activity under Title IX.” Conviser v. DePaul Univ., 532 F. Supp. 3d
581, 595 (N.D. Ill. 2021). See also O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir.
2011) (To demonstrate that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, “he must show
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that he took some step in opposition to a form of discrimination that the statute
prohibits.”). As such, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity.
Third, the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a but-for causal connection
between her protected activity and the materially adverse action taken against her. See
Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d, 933 F.3d 849
(7th Cir. 2019) (“Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, Doe ‘must provide some allegations
to allow the Court to infer a causal connection between his treatment and gender bias and
raise the possibility of relief under Title IX above the speculative level.’”). Notably, in the
Court’s Order ruling upon Greenville’s prior Motion to Dismiss, the Court found that the
First Amended Complaint failed to adequately plead this element because Plaintiff
alleged Liss was an independent decision maker who was responsible for her termination
and she failed to allege that Liss knew of Plaintiff’s protected activity and either
personally held an unlawful animus or was decisively influenced by someone else who
did such as A.D. Ackerman (see Doc. 38 at pp. 8-9). In contrast, Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint cures these deficiencies by alleging that: (1) Liss had knowledge of
Plaintiff’s protected activity because she was present on more than one occasion when it
occurred and also was in frequent contact with others who were aware of Plaintiff’s vocal
opposition; (2) Liss was not independently investigating Plaintiff and therefore, the
termination decision was not solely attributable to Liss; and (3) Liss, A.D. Ackerman, and
Greenville retaliated against Plaintiff because of her gender-based opposition to the
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facility that they sought to see constructed as planned (see Doc. 42 at pp. 21-23).6 See Doe
v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“A Title IX claim fails if
the plaintiff has not alleged some ‘retaliatory motive’ connecting the protected activity to
the adverse action.”).
In addition to the above allegations supporting an inference of causation, the
Second Amended Complaint contains additional circumstantial allegations supporting
an inference of causation. See Conviser, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (discussing circumstantial
evidence of retaliation including suspicious timing, comparators, and evidence of
pretext). For example, Plaintiff has alleged that Liss’s investigation and her termination
occurred in May 2022, which the Court reasonably infers was within months or weeks of
her protected activity that occurred during the 2022 season (see Doc. 42 at 10). See Bryant
v. Gardner, 587 F. Supp. 2d 951, 964-65 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“A causal link may be shown where
an adverse employment action occurred ‘closely on the heels’ of protected activity.”).
Thus, while this temporal proximity would likely be insufficient to establish causation on
its own, it does provide some additional support for the reasonable inference of a causal
connection between her protected activity (i.e., opposing the facility for gender-based
reasons) and her termination. In addition, Plaintiff has also alleged that: (1) she was
excluded from meetings about the planned complex because of her opposition (Doc. 42
at p. 11); (2) she was not provided with a fair process during the investigation because it
6 Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Liss was personally involved in the athletic
complex’s planning and opening (Doc. 42 at pp. 10-11) and was supportive of A.D. Ackerman’s plans for
the Athletic Department (Id. at p. 11).
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was pretextual (Id. at pp. 12-14); (3) she was replaced by a less qualified male coach (Id.
at p. 17); and (4) the reasons provided for her investigation and termination were not
similarly applied to a male coach (Id. at p. 19).7 Consequently, these allegations provide
further support to reasonably infer a causal connection.
Therefore, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded the existence of a but-for causal
connection between her protected activities and her termination. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has sufficiently pleaded each element of her Title IX retaliation claim found in Count III.
Greenville’s Motion to Dismiss Count III is DENIED.
II. Plaintiff’s Title VII Discrimination Claim
a. Elements of Plaintiff’s Claim Under Title VII
“Under Title VII, an employer may not discriminate based on ‘race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.’” Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)). In the context of a Title VII claim, a complaint must clear two easy
hurdles. See E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007).
“First, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant
‘fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “Second, its allegations must plausibly
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative
level’; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.” Id. In fact, the Seventh Circuit
7 Additional allegations that may support a but-for causal connection are contained within Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (see generally Doc. 42). However, the Court need not discuss those additional
examples at this time because the examples discussed above are more than adequate at this stage of
proceedings.
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“previously ha[s] stated, on numerous occasions, that a plaintiff alleging employment
discrimination under Title VII may allege these claims quite generally.” Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). “A complaint need not ‘allege all, or any,
of the facts logically entailed by the claim,’ and it certainly need not include evidence.”
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Furthermore, at the pleading stage, the Court does not need to analyze any non-
discriminatory motives for the employer’s adverse action unless the complaint alleges
“facts that establish an ‘impenetrable defense’ to her sex discrimination claim.” Id. at 1086.
Most details are more efficiently learned through the discovery process and a plaintiff
need not plead facts that are not obviously important at the pleading stage. See E.E.O.C.,
496 F.3d at 779. “[A] plaintiff might sometimes have a right to relief without knowing
every factual detail supporting its right; requiring the plaintiff to plead those unknown
details before discovery would improperly deny the plaintiff the opportunity to prove its
claim.” Id. at 780.
b. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claim in Count II
Greenville argues that Count II of the Second Amended Complaint must be
dismissed because Plaintiff failed to adequately allege that the decisionmaker who
terminated her employment did so because of her sex (Doc. 43 at p. 17). In response,
Plaintiff contends that she made a prima facie showing of sex discrimination because she
provided sufficient allegations of a similarly situated male employee who was treated
more favorably, and she included sufficient allegations that she was replaced by someone
outside of the protected class (Doc. 45-1 at pp. 16-17). Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that
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Greenville’s attempts to rebut her pleadings are improper at the pleading stage (Id. at p.
17).
The Court finds Plaintiff’s second argument to be persuasive. Again, this case is
before the Court on a motion to dismiss. As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint only needed to
describe her Title VII claim in sufficient detail to provide Greenville with fair notice and
plausibly suggest that Plaintiff has a right to relief that raises that possibility above a
speculative level. See Tamayo, 526 F.3d 1074 at 1084. Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint does both of these things and the Court declines to preemptively analyze the
additional arguments raised by the parties that are more appropriately raised at
summary judgment, after discovery is complete. See, e.g., Vega v. Chicago Park Dist., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 953 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“[The defendant] has spent a better part of its Motion
to Dismiss and Reply on this count arguing that [the plaintiff] has failed to make a
‘similarly situated’ argument (i.e., that similarly situated employees were treated more
favorably than [the plaintiff]). However, the ‘similarly situated’ argument is an
evidentiary standard applicable at the summary judgment stage; it is not a requirement
in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint.”).
Here, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contains sufficient detail to give
Greenville fair notice of her claim and the grounds it rests upon. See E.E.O.C., 496 F.3d at
776. Plaintiff pleads that she was terminated from her employment at Greenville because
of her sex. See Davis v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 11 C 9018, 2012 WL 2576356, at *7
(N.D. Ill. July 3, 2012) (“[I]n order to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff
alleging race or sex discrimination needs only to aver that her employer instituted a
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specific adverse employment action against her on the basis of race and sex.”). Plaintiff
alleges that she was a female coach who was performing her job satisfactorily, yet she
was terminated on the basis of her sex and replaced by a less qualified male coach (Doc.
42 at p. 22). See Id. In fact, the allegations related to Plaintiff’s now-dismissed claim in
Count I provide additional factual support because they allege that Plaintiff was not
provided assistant coaching support on the same basis as male head coaches due to her
sex (see Id. at p. 21).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint plausibly suggests that her Title
VII claim has a right to relief. See E.E.O.C., 496 F.3d at 776. Again, she provides sufficient,
plausible allegations supporting her claim that she was terminated on the basis of her sex.
And significantly, unlike in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the Second Amended
Complaint does not plead itself out of Court by including allegations that necessarily
thwart her claim of discrimination (see generally Doc. 38). To be specific, Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint failed in this regard because it pleaded that she was terminated by
Liss, an independent decision maker who was not part of the Athletic Department, and
that Complaint neither alleged that Liss personally held an unlawful animus against
Plaintiff nor claimed that Liss was duped into terminating Plaintiff by an individual who
held an unlawful animus such as A.D. Ackerman (see Id. at pp. 15-16). Here, in contrast,
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint adequately alleges: (1) that Liss was not
independently investigating Plaintiff and was instead frequently in contact with
members of the Athletic Department and working in conjunction with A.D. Ackerman
and others to discriminate against Plaintiff based upon her sex; and (2) that Plaintiff was
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terminated by Greenville based upon its unlawful animus towards Plaintiff’s sex (see Doc.
42 at pp. 21-23).8 Thus, the new allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint do
not succumb to the same shortcomings as her prior Complaint and are sufficient to
plausibly suggest that she has a right to relief.
For all these reasons, Greenville’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Greenville University’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part (Doc. 43). Specifically, Greenville’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as
to Count I and that claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. Conversely, Greenville’s Motion
to Dismiss is DENIED as to Counts II and III and this action will proceed on those claims.
Greenville shall file its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on or before March
20, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 6, 2026
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
8 The parties also dispute whether the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently pleaded each element of a
Title VII sex discrimination claim (see Docs. 43, 45-1, 46). They then devote significant time to discussing
other potential, nondiscriminatory motives for Greenville’s actions and whether Plaintiff needed to rebut
those nondiscriminatory reasons (see Id.). Put simply, these arguments are not appropriately raised at the
pleading stage for a Title VII claim. Instead, they are more appropriately raised at summary judgment after
the parties have conducted discovery. See, e.g., Vega, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (“However, the ‘similarly
situated’ argument is an evidentiary standard applicable at the summary judgment stage; it is not a
requirement in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint.”).
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