Attaway v. Crawford County Jail

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHEAL N.B. ATTAWAY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRED CHINN,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:23-CV-2757-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
The Court previously granted Defendant Fred Chinn’s motion for summary
judgment on the issue of exhaustion and dismissed this matter without prejudice (Docs.
95, 96). Plaintiff Micheal Attaway is now seeking to reopen the case and proceed with
discovery on the merits of his claims (Docs. 97, 98, 100, 101). For the reasons explained
below, Plaintiff’s motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Fred Chinn filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
exhaustion on April 19, 2024 (Doc. 72; see also Doc. 73). Plaintiff filed his response in
opposition just five days later (Doc. 76). In the months that followed, Plaintiff proceeded
to inundate the Court with various motions and filings related to his response in
opposition (Docs. 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 92).
The Court entered an Order on March 25, 2025, denying Plaintiff’s collateral
motions (Doc. 94), and two days after that entered an Order granting Defendant’s motion
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for summary judgment on this issue of exhaustion (Doc. 95). Judgment was entered
dismissing this action without prejudice because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing suit and this case was closed on the Court’s docket
(Doc. 96).
Four days after judgment was entered, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Change Venue
and a “Motion to Proceed with Merits Discovery and Bypass Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies” (Docs. 97, 98), seemingly unaware that judgment had been
entered. A week later, Plaintiff filed motions asking the Court to reopen this case, to allow
him to re-do his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on the issue
of exhaustion, and to issue a new ruling on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 100 (“Motion
for Reconsideration of The Court’s Memorandum and Order [at] Doc. 94”); Doc. 101
(“Motion to Vacate the Court’s March 27, 2025 Order and Clerk’s Judgment . . . .”)).
Plaintiff’s motions are currently before the Court.
DISCUSSION
The Court turns first to Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the March 27, 2025 Order and
Clerk’s Judgment (Doc. 101). In short, Plaintiff contends the summary judgment Order
should be vacated because Defendant obstructed him from receiving a complete copy of
the motion for summary judgment and exhibits thereto and then lied to the Court that he
had been given a complete copy (Doc. 101; see also Doc. 100). Plaintiff claims that he never
received a complete copy and, without it, was unable to properly respond to the motion
(Doc. 101). Plaintiff claims the Court ruled on the motion for summary judgment after
mistakenly assuming that Plaintiff had received a complete copy of the motion (Doc. 101).
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Therefore, according to Plaintiff, the exhaustion-based dismissal is legally flawed (Id. at
p. 2).
Plaintiff indicates that he is seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) (Doc.
101), which permits a court to vacate a final judgment for a variety of reasons, including
mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovery evidence, and “fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). The Court
notes certain arguments raised by Plaintiff that allege a mistake on the part of the Court
could also be evaluated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) because
the motion was filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); Blue v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012) (altering or amending
judgment under Rule 59(e) is permissible where movant clearly establishes “that the
court committed a manifest error of law or fact” or “that newly discovered evidence
precluded entry of judgment.”). See also Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51
F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) provide
overlapping relief to some degree).
While motions under both Rule 59(e) and 60(b) “see[k] to erase the finality of a
judgment and to allow further proceedings,” the Seventh Circuit has held that Rule 59(e)
generally requires a somewhat lower threshold of proof than Rule 60(b). Helm v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1995). Accord Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v.
Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 953 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th
Cir.1993) (distinguishing the “exacting standard” of Rule 60(b) from the “more liberal
standard” of Rule 59(e)); Romo v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 2001)
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(“Instead of the exceptional circumstances required to prevail under Rule 60(b), Rule
59(e) requires that the moving party clearly establish a manifest error of law or an
intervening change in the controlling law or present newly discovered evidence.”).
Ultimately, the Court need not parse the difference between the two rules because
regardless of whether Plaintiff’s motion is reviewed under Rule 60(b) or whatever lower
threshold of proof that Rule 59(e) may offer, he has failed to establish a right to relief. The
Court is wholly unpersuaded that it made a mistake, or that Defendant engaged in any
kind of misconduct, that justifies reopening this case. As the Court sees it, Plaintiff has
only his own missteps to blame for the dismissal of this case.
Indeed, it was Plaintiff who chose to respond to Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment after just five days, despite knowing full well that he had not yet reviewed
Defendant’s full brief or supporting evidence (see Doc. 94, pp. 1–2; Doc. 95, p. 6). As the
Court previously noted, Plaintiff’s choice to do so was dumbfounding (see Doc. 94, pp. 1–
2). His response brief did not directly address any of the facts asserted or arguments made
by Defendant (Doc. 95, p. 2; compare Doc. 73 with Doc. 76), and paid no heed to the rules
regarding the procedural and substantive requirements for a summary judgment
response (see Doc. 74); SDIL-LR 56.1. Plaintiff then went on to pepper the Court with more
submissions containing additional facts (which were not properly supported) and
arguments for denying summary judgment, (see Docs. 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 92), which can
only be viewed as a misguided attempt to supplement his defective response brief (see
Doc. 95, pp. 5–6, 7–9).
Plaintiff’s method of responding to the motion for summary judgment was a
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continuation of the same problematic filing tendencies he employed throughout the
course of this lawsuit. Since the inception of this case, Plaintiff routinely inundated the
Court with filings, often in rapid succession (see Docs. 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 27,
28, 35, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 53, 56, 57, 58, 65, 68, 69, 71). His filings were often redundant,
trivial, and/or completely without merit (see, e.g., Docs. 9, 29, 50, 70). From the Court’s
perspective, some of these filings were clearly submitted without reviewing—or in
complete disregard for—information the Court had provided in its previous Orders (see,
e.g., Docs. 26, 30, 54, 70). Other filings demonstrated Plaintiff’s unfamiliarity with—or
disregard for—basic procedural rules and the sequence in which civil litigation proceeds
(see, e.g., Doc. 30, 50, 54, 63, 70). There were times where he submitted his arguments or
requests for relief in a piecemeal fashion, spread out across multiple filings (see Docs. 15
and 16; Docs. 35, 42, and 44; Docs. 62 and 65), and times where he stated a position and
then abruptly reversed course (see Docs. 56, 69, 70). Plaintiff’s filings continually left the
Court with the impression that his filings were impulsive, eschewing the instructions that
he had been given. At bottom, it appears Plaintiff was in some inexplicable rush to short
circuit this litigation and get to the end result that he believed was inevitable (see, e.g.,
Doc. 68).
Importantly, Plaintiff was informed multiple times to stop his abusive filing
practices (Docs. 30, 50, 54). Yet, Plaintiff’s filing habits persisted when he chose to respond
to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion after just five
days. Against this backdrop, the Court chose not to indulge Plaintiff’s piecemeal and
faulty summary briefing and to hold him to the first response that he filed (see Doc. 95,
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pp. 5–6; see also Doc. 94, pp. 4, 5), which was not enough to survive summary judgment
(Doc. 95, pp. 11–13). The Court will likewise not indulge Plaintiff in his attempt to undo
the consequences of his careless briefing. In the end, Plaintiff’s own blunders are not
grounds for reopening the case and vacating the summary judgment order. See
Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 59(e) ‘does not
provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures’”) (citation omitted); see
also id. (“[T]rial judges are vested with discretion when determining whether . . . neglect
. . . is ‘excusable’ for purposes of Rule 60(b)(1) . . . .”); Sadowski v. Bombardier Ltd., 539 F.2d
615, 618 (7th Cir. 1976) (“Rule 60(b) is not to be invoked to give relief to a party who has
chosen a course of action which in retrospect appears unfortunate or where error or
miscalculation is traceable really to a lack of care.”). See also Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm,
541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing contempt sanctions against pro se litigant and
noting “it is . . . well established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance
with procedural rules.”) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (noting
that the Supreme Court has “never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil
litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without
counsel”); Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting in the context of
Rule 11 sanctions that “pro se filings do not serve as an impenetrable shield, for one
acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless
litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.”) (citation omitted).
Having concluded that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any basis under Federal
Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) or Rule 59(e) that warrants reopening of this matter, his motion
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(Doc. 101) is DENIED. That renders his other motions (Docs. 97, 98, and 100) MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 30, 2026
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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