USA v. Torres et al

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUSTIN ALAN CRABTREE,
Defendant.
Case No. 4:25-cr-00061-DCN-3
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is a Motion for Severance filed by Defendant Justin Crabtree. Dkt.
130. The Government filed a Response opposing the Motion (Dkt. 138), and Crabtree filed
a Reply (Dkt. 139). The matter is now ripe for the Court’s consideration.
Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds the facts and legal arguments
are adequately presented. Accordingly, the Court will decide the Motions without oral
argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B).1 Upon review, and for the reasons set forth
below, the Court DENIES the Motions.
1 Although this is a criminal case, the local civil rule applies as there is no corresponding criminal rule. See
Dist. Idaho Loc. Crim. R. 1.1(f) (explaining that “all general provisions of the Local Rules of Civil Practice
apply to criminal proceedings unless such provisions are in conflict with or are otherwise provided for by
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Local Rules of Criminal Practice”).
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II. BACKGROUND
A 	grand 	jury 	indicted 	Defendant 	Justin 	Crabtree—along 	with 	four 	co-
conspirators—for Conspiracy to Distribute and Possession with Intent to Distribute
Methamphetamine. Dkt. 2. The investigation began the summer of 2024, when law
enforcement received information that co-defendant Carlos Nicholas “Nick” Torres was
traveling out of state to purchase large quantities of methamphetamine and that Crabtree
assisted him, including collecting money.
On January 30, 2025, officers conducted a controlled purchase involving co-
defendant Michelle Wallace. During the operation, Torres contacted Wallace and later
arrived at her residence with Crabtree. Subsequent investigation revealed that on February
3–7, 2025, Torres and Crabtree traveled out of state to obtain narcotics. Geolocation data
and surveillance confirmed their movements through Nevada, Utah, and into Idaho, where
they traveled in coordination with other co-defendants.
Law enforcement later executed search warrants at a residence in Pocatello and a
related vehicle, recovering approximately fifty pounds of methamphetamine. Additional
evidence was obtained from a separate Homeland Security investigation in Nevada, where
messages between Crabtree and another individual reflected discussions about drug
transactions and distribution quantities.
This matter is currently set for trial on July 13, 2026, with a pretrial conference
scheduled for June 30, 2026. Dkt. 126.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, a prosecutor may elect to charge
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multiple counts and defendants in one trial. The primary justification for joinder is
efficiency. 1A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 142 (5th ed. 2021).
Other vital interests served through joinder include judicial economy, reliability, and
consistency. Id. Together, these interests have created “a preference in the federal system
for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.
534, 537 (1993).
Specifically, regarding joinder of defendants, Rule 8 provides that “[t]he indictment
. . . may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same
act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or
offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). It further states that, “[t]he defendants may be charged in
one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each
count.” Id. Rule 8(b) balances “the need to avoid the potential prejudice that may result
from joining multiple defendants with the need to attain trial efficiency.” United States v.
Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1978).
Rule 14 operates in close conjunction with Rule 8 and empowers courts to provide
relief from prejudicial joinder, including ordering separate trials of counts, severing the
defendants’ trial, or providing any other relief that justice requires. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).
And “once defendants are properly joined under Rule 8(b), courts routinely apply the
presumption that parties who are indicted together should be tried together.” Wright &
Miller, supra, § 224.
Consequently, if defendants were properly joined under Rule 8(b), “a district court
should grant severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would
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compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making
a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539 (citation modified).
Naturally then, “the burden is on the defendant to make a strong showing of prejudice to
obtain the relief permitted by Rule 14.” Id.; see also United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d
1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 1999), superseded on other grounds by U.S.S.G. 2S1.1 (“A criminal
defendant who seeks reversal of a trial court’s denial of a motion to sever bears a heavy
burden.”).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Joinder
The Court first addresses whether joinder of the Defendants was appropriate and,
ultimately, finds that it was.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b) permits the Government to join Defendants in
one trial, as long as the counts arise from the same series of acts or transactions constituting
an offense or offenses. Moreover, “all defendants need not be charged in each count.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 8(b). So, even though all Defendants must have somehow participated in the
series of acts from which the charges arose, Rule 8(b) does not require each Defendant to
have participated in every act or transaction in the alleged series. Wright & Miller, supra,
§ 145. Rule 8 is thus generally treated as a pleading rule, and courts determine the propriety
of joinder based on the allegations in the indictment.
Although Crabtree has only been charged in the conspiracy count, the Government
appropriately joined the Defendants together in the Indictment. Joint trials for defendants
are the standard. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537. And this is even more true for conspiracy cases.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5
Adams, 581 F.2d at 597 (a conspiracy count provides the necessary link to satisfy the
requirement of Rule 8(b)); Wright & Miller, supra, § 145 (“codefendants charged with
conspiracy should generally be tried together.”). Crabtree was charged with conspiracy to
distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and three out of the
four remaining counts against the Codefendants directly stem from the alleged conspiracy
in count one.2 So, because of the strong preference for joinder, especially in conspiracy
cases like this, the Court readily finds that joinder was proper. Having found the
Defendants properly joined, the Court turns its focus to severance.
B. Severance
While the lodestar of Rule 8 is efficiency, Rule 14’s purpose is mitigating any
prejudicial effect proper joinder might present.3 Trials involving more than one defendant
naturally create risks for the accused, such as being found guilty by association or the jury
failing to distinguish defendant-specific pieces of evidence. Wright & Miller, supra, § 224.
And “these risks become especially acute in conspiracy cases, where the presence of an
overarching agreement makes joinder proper as a matter of course.” Id. (citation modified).
Even so, any prejudicial effect joinder might have cannot overcome the preference for a
joint trial unless there is a serious risk of compromising a specific trial right or preventing
the jury from making a reliable decision. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. A defendant carries the
heavy burden of making a strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice
2 Count Five of the Indictment charges Carlos Torres and Jessica Mekosch with a separate conspiracy
charge that does not include Crabtree.
3 Still, in reviewing a claim for severance, “[s]erious consideration must be given to judicial economy.”
U.S. v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1046 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 157 (2019).
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resulting from a joint trial. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
To meet that burden, “the defendant [must] show ‘clear,’ ‘manifest,’ or ‘undue’ prejudice
from a joint trial,” United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1553–54 (9th Cir. 1986), and
must demonstrate the jury’s inability to distinguish the evidence relevant to each defendant
and even if a defendant is able to show some potential jury confusion, such confusion must
be balanced against society’s interest in speedy and efficient trials. See, e.g., United States
v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir. 1988).
Crabtree advances several arguments in support of severance. First, he contends the
jury may be unable to compartmentalize the evidence presented at trial. He asserts the
Indictment alleges only limited facts connecting him to the charged conspiracy and reflects
a comparatively minor role in the alleged scheme. As a result, he argues that, absent
severance, he will be prejudiced by the “spillover” effect of evidence introduced against
his co-defendants. Dkt. 139, at 4. Second, Crabtree argues that continuances requested by
his co-defendants have delayed the resolution of his case and thereby infringed upon his
speedy-trial interests. Finally, Crabtree again points to the limited factual allegations
concerning his involvement in the conspiracy, arguing they demonstrate his comparatively
minor role in the charged conduct. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
1. 	The Jury’s Ability to Compartmentalize/Spill-Over
“The ultimate question on whether the jury can make a reliable determination of
guilt is whether the jury was able to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate
defendants.” Wright & Miller, supra, § 224 (cleaned up). Crabtree suggests for several
reasons that, unless he is severed from the joint trial, the disparities will create a substantial
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
risk of prejudicial spillover that limiting instructions cannot cure. Dkt. 139, at 6. More
specifically he argues he should be severed because he is only charged in count one and
the quantities of drugs charged against his co-defendants in subsequent counts is massive
and should not be attributed to him. Crabtree highlights the fact that severances have been
granted when the charges brought against the defendants or the weight of the evidence
supporting each charge is wholly disparate or disproportionate to a specific defendant. Dkt.
130-1, at 4 (citing U.S. v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 846 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Court
has heard arguments such as this in prior cases and consistently held that the risk of
prejudice is light.
The Court recognizes the evidence against the various defendants may not be
identical and that some evidence may pertain more directly to certain defendants than
others. However, the Supreme Court has explained that mutually antagonistic defenses are
not prejudicial per se and do not automatically require severance. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538.
Additionally, under the conspiracy laws and jury instructions, a defendant can be liable for
the full amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy even if he only handled a small portion
of drugs.4 Under Rule 14, even when some risk of prejudice exists, severance is warranted
only if a joint trial poses a serious risk of compromising a specific trial right or preventing
the jury from making a reliable determination of guilt or innocence. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that trial courts have broad discretion to tailor relief, and that “less drastic
measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. Id.
4 See the Ninth Circuit’s jury instruction 11.6; U.S. v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Henry, 984 F.3d 1343, 1355-1356 (9th Cir. 2021).
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at 539); see also United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Where the
district court uses great diligence in instructing the jury to separate the evidence, severance
is unnecessary because the prejudicial effects of the evidence of codefendants are
neutralized.”).
At this stage, the Court is not persuaded that the anticipated evidence is so complex
or overwhelming that a properly instructed jury will be unable to evaluate the evidence
separately as to each defendant.
2. 	Speedy Trial
Crabtree also argues that continuances requested by codefendants have delayed
resolution of his case and prejudiced his speedy-trial interests. “It is well established that
an exclusion from the Speedy Trial clock for one defendant applies to all codefendants . .
. The attribution of delay to a codefendant, however, is limited by a reasonableness
requirement.” United States vs. Messer, 197 F.3d 330, 336 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation
modified). See also United States v. Beal, 536 F. Supp. 3d 743, 757 (D. Haw. 2021). Multi-
defendant cases frequently require coordinated scheduling and case management. Crabtree
has not demonstrated that the current trial schedule creates a constitutional or statutory
speedy-trial violation, nor has he shown that severance is necessary to protect any specific
speedy-trial right.5 Accordingly, the Court finds that this argument does not establish the
level of prejudice required under Rule 14.
5 The Court reviewed the record in this case. Crabtree was arraigned on September 10, 2025. The matter
was set for a jury trial on October 14, 2025. Dkts. 84, 85. On September 30, 2025, Crabtree filed a Motion
(continued)
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3. 	Limited Role
Much like his first argument, Crabtree postures he played a limited role in this
conspiracy and is only charged in Count 1. He suggests trying him together with the other
co-defendants will be prejudicial and cause “jury confusion.” The Court has already
addressed the jury issue above. While Crabtree argues that he has a limited role, the
Government alleges that he has more involvement in the conspiracy than what he proffered
in his motion. While his alleged role in the conspiracy may not be as involved as some of
the others, he is, nonetheless, part of the alleged conspiracy and should be tried with the
other co-defendants. Doing otherwise would be uneconomical and a strain on the limited
judicial resources in the District of Idaho.
V. CONCLUSION
In this instance, joinder was appropriate. Crabtree did not sufficiently bear his heavy
burden of demonstrating prejudicial joinder or persuasively explain why severance is
warranted. The Court will, therefore, not sever Crabtree under Rule 14 at this time. That
said, the Government and all Defendants should prudently prepare for trial, ensuring that
each Defendants’ constitutional rights will be upheld.
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to Continue. Dkt. 101. The jury trial was reset for all Defendants to January 20, 2026. Based on pretrial
motions filed by co-defendants Torres and Mekosch, the Court continued the jury trial to March 23, 2026.
Dkt. 121. A final motion to continue was file by co-defendant Cheri Ann Dunn (Dkt. 125) and was granted.
The Court entered an Order continuing the trial to the current trial date of July 13, 2026. By the Court’s
calculation, there has only been a roughly nine-month delay of the trial setting in this case—including a
request by Crabtree himself. That does not rise to the level of unreasonableness.
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VI. ORDER
The Court HEREBY ORDERS:
1. 	Crabtree’s Motion to Sever (Dkt. 130) is DENIED.
DATED: June 23, 2026
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
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