Allen v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. et al

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JASON HENRY ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC., EQUIFAX
INFORMATION SERVICES LLC,
TRANS UNION LLC; FORD
MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC;
M2 LAW GROUP P.C.; HOWELL &
VAIL LLP; MICHAEL J.
ARCHIBALD; and LISSETTE M.
CARRERAS,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-00404-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Ford Motor Credit Company LLC’s motion for partial
summary judgment (Dkt. 74). Ford seeks summary judgment on its counterclaims against
Jason Henry Allen for breach of contract and foreclosure of its security interest in a 2020
Ford Explorer that Allen financed through Ford. For the reasons explained below, the
Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
In July 2020, Allen purchased a 2020 Ford Explorer for $64,656.00. He financed
the purchase through Ford Motor Credit Company under a retail installment sale contract
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requiring 72 monthly payments of $898, granting Ford a security interest in the vehicle,
and allowing for repossession of the vehicle upon default. Retail Installment Contract,
Dkt. 74-4.
Allen made his monthly payments for approximately four years. In mid-2024,
rather than continuing those payments, Allen attempted to pay off the remaining balance
through a series of instruments and electronic transactions—none of which resulted in
Ford receiving any funds.
On July 15, 2024, Allen presented Ford with a paper instrument labeled “Certified
Funds” in the amount of $22,450.00. Dill Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. 74-3; Ex. B, Dkt. 74-5. The
instrument bore the address for the United States Treasury building and contained
language purporting to discharge the debt under the Uniform Commercial Code. Ford
rejected the instrument as non-negotiable because it was not linked to or drawn from a
valid existing account. Id. On August 1, 2024, Allen presented a second, nearly identical
paper instrument in the amount of $21,552.00, which Ford rejected for the same reason.
Id. ¶ 4; Ex. C, Dkt. 74-6.
After Ford rejected the two paper instruments as non-negotiable, Allen scheduled
eight electronic payments, ranging from $20,897.00 to $24,738.90, through Ford’s online
system to be paid each week starting on October 3, 2024, with the last payment scheduled
for November 21, 2024. Id. ¶ 5. Upon receiving the first electronic payment on October
3, Ford promptly sent Allen a letter stating the loan had been paid in full. Id. ¶ 6. Shortly
after, on October 18, Ford also released its lien and issued title to Allen. Id. ¶ 7.
After sending the paid-in-full letter, however, Ford discovered Allen had used his
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Social Security number as the bank account number. Id. Within days of releasing the lien
and issuing title, Ford sent Allen a letter dated October 22, 2024, informing him that his
October 18 electronic payment would be returned “as unable to locate account” because
Allen had scheduled the payment using his Social Security number. Id. ¶ 9; Ex. D, Dkt.
74-7. The letter also stated that Allen’s obligation to make his monthly payments, or pay
the balance in full, remained in effect. Id.
On December 2, 2024, Ford sent Allen another letter notifying him that his recent
payment in the amount of $22,000 had not been honored and directing him to return title
to the vehicle. In addition, it stated that the paid-in-full documents should never have
been sent and reiterated that all terms of the installment contract remained “in full force
and effect,” and Ford retained a security interest in the vehicle. Id. ¶ 10; Ex. E, Dkt. 74-7.
On December 3, 2024—the day after receiving Ford’s notice—Allen signed an
extension modifying the installment contract. Id. ¶ 11; Ex. F, Dkt. 74-8. He agreed to pay
a $25.00 extension fee in exchange for Ford extending the due dates for his October and
November 2024 payments. Id. The extension confirmed that all other terms of the
contract, including the security interest, remained in full force and effect. Id.
Ford has not received any payments from Allen since. Id. ¶ 12. Ford’s records
show an outstanding balance of $18,906.80, plus accruing interest, costs, and attorney
fees. Id. Allen continues to possess the vehicle. Id. ¶ 13.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact” and the movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(a). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The moving party bears
the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to material fact.
Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Once that burden is
met, the non-moving party must come forward with evidence sufficient to support a jury
verdict in its favor. Id. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show
“by her affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file”
that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986).
The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48. If a party
“fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact,” the Court may consider that fact to be undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(3).
ANALYSIS
A. Breach of Contract
Ford argues that Allen defaulted under the installment contract once he stopped
making his monthly payments and owes Ford $18,906.80 plus ongoing accrued interest,
late fees, costs, and attorney fees. To prevail on its breach of contract claim, Ford must
show (1) the existence of a contract, (2) a breach of the contract, (3) damages caused by
the breach, and (4) the amount of damages. McCarthy Corp. v. Stark Investment Group,
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LLC, 489 P.3d 804, 815 (Idaho 2021).
Ford has carried its burden on each element. It is undisputed that Allen entered
into the installment contract, that the contract required Allen to make 72 monthly
payments of $898.00 until the loan was paid in full, and that Allen stopped making the
payments before paying off the loan. Ford has submitted Jeremy Dill’s declaration
establishing that neither the “Certified Funds” instruments nor the electronic payments
were linked to any valid bank account; Ford never received any funds from these
purported payments; and $18,906.80 remains outstanding. The burden thus shifted to
Allen to show he satisfied his obligation to pay the outstanding balance due. He has not
met this burden. He has not produced a cancelled check, a completed wire transfer, a
bank statement, or any other evidence showing that actual funds were transmitted to
Ford.
Instead, Allen merely asserts that it is a disputed fact whether his payments were
non-negotiable. But Allen offers no evidence that his paper instruments or electronic
payments were tied to any account from which funds could be drawn. It therefore is
undisputed that the paper instruments lacked valid routing or account numbers and that
he used his Social Security number for the electronic payments. None of these is a valid
payment method. Simply stating a dispute exists does not make it so.
Allen also argues that Ford’s issuance of the paid-in-full letter and lien release
creates a disputed issue of fact. Ford, however, has submitted uncontroverted evidence
that it took these actions based on its mistaken belief that Allen had remitted a valid
electronic payment to pay off the loan. Once Ford discovered Allen had used his Social
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Security number in lieu of a valid bank account number to make the final payment, it
promptly notified Allen that the payments had not been honored and his obligations
under the contract remained in full force and effect. Again, Allen has submitted no
contrary evidence to suggest that Ford did not take those actions in error.
1. 	Equitable Estoppel and Waiver
For similar reasons, the Court rejects Allen’s argument that Ford is equitably
estopped from asserting that Allen breached the installment contract, or that Ford waived
its right to payment, by issuing the paid-in-full letter and releasing its lien. For equitable
estoppel to apply, Allen must show Ford made a false representation or concealed a
material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth, and that he reasonably
relied on the representation to his prejudice. See Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 478 P.3d
312, 321 (Idaho 2020). Allen cannot meet his burden. He has not shown Ford made any
representation knowing it was false. Nor has he shown that he reasonably relied on the
paid-in-full letter or, even if he did, that he did so to his prejudice.
As for waiver, Idaho law requires a showing of “a clear and unequivocal act
manifesting an intent to waive” and that the party asserting waiver “acted in reasonable
reliance upon the waiver and that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment.”
Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 330 P.3d 1067, 1077 (Idaho
2014). Ford’s prompt rescission of the paid-in-full letter and lien release—followed by
Allen’s own execution of the extension confirming the contract’s continued force and
effect—defeats any suggestion that Ford voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its
right to payment.
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The extension Allen signed warrants separate mention. Allen signed it the day
after Ford informed him that the paid-in-full documents had been sent in error. By
executing the extension, Allen agreed that all terms of the contract—including the
security interest—remained in full force and effect. Even if there were some question
about the effectiveness of Ford’s unilateral rescission, Allen’s own voluntary act removed
any doubt about the contract’s continuing vitality.
2. 	Overlap with Allen’s Claims Against Ford
Likewise, the Court is unpersuaded by Allen’s argument that granting summary
judgment in favor of Ford would improperly prejudge factual issues overlapping with his
claims against Ford under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Whether Allen breached the
contract by failing to make valid payments is a separate question from whether Ford
conducted a reasonable investigation upon receiving notice of a dispute from a consumer
reporting agency under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). The Court therefore finds no reason why
it cannot grant summary judgment in Ford’s favor on its breach of contract claim.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Ford has established that Allen breached the
installment contract as a matter of law and will therefore grant summary judgment in
Ford’s favor on its breach of contract claim.
B. Foreclosure of Security Interest
As the secured party, Ford is entitled to take possession of the 2020 Ford Explorer
upon Allen’s default. See I.C. § 28-9-609(a)(1). Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-9-201(a),
Ford holds a valid security interest in the vehicle under the contract, the terms of which
remain in effect and enforceable between Ford and Allen, and Allen remains obligated to
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pay the amount in full under the contract. And under Idaho Code § 28-9-202, Allen’s
obligation under the contract to pay for the vehicle remains regardless of whether Allen
has title to the vehicle. Because Allen has failed to satisfy his obligation, Ford is entitled
to repossess the vehicle. See I.C. § 8-301, et seq.
C. Rule 56(d) Request for Discovery
Finally, the Court will deny Allen’s informal request under Rule 56(d) to defer
ruling on Ford’s motion to allow further discovery. Under Rule 56(d), a court may defer
or deny considering a summary judgment motion, allow additional time to conduct
discovery, or issue any other appropriate order if the nonmoving party shows by affidavit
that it cannot present facts to justify denying the summary judgment. To prevail on a Rule
56(d) motion, “[t]he requesting party must show: (1) it has set forth in affidavit form the
specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3)
the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment.” Fam. Home & Fin.
Center, Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F. 3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008).
“Failure to comply with these requirements is proper ground for denying discovery and
proceeding to summary judgment.” Id. (citation modified).
Allen has not submitted any such affidavit or declaration. He has merely listed
discovery topics in his opposition brief. That does not satisfy the rule. Brae Transp., Inc.
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). More to the point, Allen
does not need discovery to know whether he actually paid Ford. That information is in his
hands, not Ford’s. If Allen had evidence of a valid payment, he could have produced it.
For these reasons, the Court denies Allen’s request for discovery under Rule 56(d).
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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	Ford’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 74) is GRANTED.
DATED: May 18, 2026
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge
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