Alliant, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, v. Fluid Charge, LLC et al.,

MEMORANDUM D ECISION AND O RDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
ALLIANT, LLC, a Wyoming limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN “ESTY” McCOY, an
individual; FLUID CHARGE, LLC, a
Dissolved Maryland limited liability
company; LEESBURG PIKE
PARTNERS, LLC (MARYLAND), a
Maryland limited liability company;
ZACH LAPOLE, an individual;
GAGE EVANS, an individual;
CHRISTY MILTON, an individual;
and TRACER PAYMENTS, LLC, a
Texas limited liability company,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00143-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are motions for attorneys’ fees filed by Defendants Gage
Evans, Zach Lapole, Christy Milton, and Tracer Payments, LLC. See Dkts. 65, 66,
67. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the motions.
BACKGROUND
In January 2026, this Court granted all defendants’ motions to dismiss this
case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The dismissal was without prejudice,
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however, and Alliant is free to refile its case in another jurisdiction. Indeed, in
deciding the motions to dismiss, the Court explicitly noted that it would have
preferred to transfer the action to the Eastern District of Virginia rather than
dismiss it. See Jan. 2, 2026 Order, Dkt. 63, at 2-3. But Alliant had not requested a
transfer in lieu of dismissal, so the issue hadn’t been briefed. Further, the case
involves multiple defendants located in multiple states and there is no consensus as
to where jurisdiction lies. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case without
prejudice, leaving it to the plaintiff to decide how to proceed. Having obtained this
non-merits, preliminary victory, the moving defendants ask the Court to declare
them “prevailing parties” and award attorneys’ fees under Idaho statutory law.
ANALYSIS
A. 	Authority to Resolve Post-Dismissal Fee Motions
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it has authority to resolve the
post-dismissal fee motions, notwithstanding its lack of personal jurisdiction over
the moving defendants. See generally B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d
1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Federal courts are required sua sponte to examine
jurisdictional issues ....”). Fee motions present collateral issues, and federal courts
may address such matters after dismissal. See Bautista v. Park W. Gallery, 388 F.
App’x 635, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming that district court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling on attorneys’ fees request after dismissing movant for lack of
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personal jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Legendz Entertainment, LLC v. Cam Specialty
Lending 1, Ltd., No. 2:23-cv-03097-ODW, 2024 WL 4582874, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2024). But see, e.g., Flick Mortg. Invs., Inc. v. Metropolis Promotion Invs.
& Props. (1993), Ltd., No. 04-21900-CIV, 2007 WL 9710909, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 26, 2007) (concluding that “[a] court that lacks personal jurisdiction over a
defendant lacks the power to decide any issue in favor of that defendant; a fortiori
the defendant cannot be a prevailing party with respect to that litigation”).
B. 	The Merits of the Fee Motions
Turning to the merits, movants assert that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(2) provides the procedural framework for the fee motions and that Idaho law
governs the substantive issues. Alliant hasn’t challenged that framing, other than to
drop a footnote saying that “it seems anomalous that Idaho law would control here,
when the only issues that have been litigated prior to dismissal (i.e., re: personal
jurisdiction) have been strictly procedural and based on federal law.” Response,
Dkt. 68, at 3 n.2. But after making that footnote observation, Alliant went on to
argue that even if the Court were to apply Idaho substantive law, none of the
moving defendants qualify as prevailing parties. Under these circumstances, the
Court will assume without deciding that Idaho law—as opposed to some other
state’s law—governs the substantive inquiry. See generally Alaska Rent-A-Car,
Inc. v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 738 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (“state law on
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attorney fees is substantive, so state, rather than federal, law applies in determining
prevailing party’s entitlement to attorney fee award in diversity action”).
With this framework in place, the Court turns to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(1), which guides the prevailing-party determination. That rule
provides that “[i]n determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties.” Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). In exercising this discretion, trial courts focus
on three principal factors: “(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to
the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the
parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the
claims or issues.” Nguyen v. Bui, 191 P.3d 1107, 1112 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008).
Having considered these factors, the Court easily concludes that the moving
defendants are not prevailing parties. At this point, they have obtained nothing
more than an interim procedural victory, based on Alliant’s attempt to pursue its
claims in the wrong forum. The Court has not weighed in on the substance of any
claim, and Alliant is free to pursue its claims in another forum, so the moving
defendants remain at risk. In other words, it’s not yet possible to compare the
“result obtained in relation to the relief sought” in any substantive sense.
The moving defendants cite various Idaho authorities in their effort to
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persuade the Court that they are prevailing parties, including Blimka v. My Web
Wholesaler, LLC, 152 P.3d 594 (Idaho 2007) and Charney v. Charney, 356 P.3d
355 (Idaho 2015). Both cases are distinguishable.
Beginning with Blimka, defendants cite this case for the broad proposition
that “jurisdictional victories can establish prevailing party status.” Evans Mtn.
Mem., Dkt. 65-1, at 4. But Blimka didn’t involve a pre-merits dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Rather, the trial court entered a default judgment against two
out-of-state defendants who had failed to respond to a complaint. Only after that
judgment was in place did the out-of-state defendants appear and move to vacate
the default judgment based on an asserted lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial
court denied the motion, concluding that it did have personal jurisdiction over
defendants. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
The procedural scenario in Blimka is a far cry from the one before the Court.
Here, the Court simply determined it lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendants; it has not weighed in on the merits of any of plaintiff’s claims. In
Blimka, by contrast, the trial court’s default judgment reached the merits, as it held
that “defendants committed fraud, breached the implied warranty of
merchantability, and breached an express warranty.” 152 P.3d at 597. A prevailing-
party determination in plaintiff’s favor thus made sense in Blimka. It does not here.
Charney v. Charney, 356 P.3d 355 (Idaho 2015) is also distinguishable. In
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that case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that “[a] court can determine that a
party is a prevailing party even when the proceedings against the party are
dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at 358. The court reasoned that such a dismissal
“terminates the proceedings against the party.” Id. Notably, however, the
complaining party in Charney had indicated that even though the stipulated
dismissal was without prejudice, he did not anticipate refiling. Id. Plus, the trial
court observed that the statute of limitations would have barred him from refiling
in any event. In substance, then, the controversy in Charney was over.
The controversy is not over in this case. Alliant can refile if it chooses to do
so, and there hasn’t been any substantive change in the parties’ legal relationship.
Moreover, Charney doesn’t stand for the proposition that a dismissal without
prejudice automatically confers “prevailing party” status upon defendants who
enjoy such a dismissal. Rather, trial courts still must consider the underlying facts
and procedure to determine whether any of the litigants are entitled to that status.
Here, for the reasons already noted, this Court does not find that the moving
defendants are entitled to “prevailing-party” status—and this is true regardless of
whether Alliant decides to file in another jurisdiction.
The Court also notes that the moving defendants have not cited any authority
where the facts and procedural history line up with those before the Court. Alliant,
by contrast, points to several cases holding that a defendant who successfully
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moves for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not a prevailing party because the
defendant has failed to attain a material alteration in its legal relationship with the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Wealthy, Inc. v. Cornelia, No. 2:21-CV-1173 JCM (EJY), 2024
WL 5678984, at *2 (D. Nev. July 26, 2024) (defendants who successfully moved
for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction were not prevailing parties because
“defendants have not attained a material alteration in their legal relationship with
plaintiff”); Joshco Tech., LLC v. Does 1-4, No. 2:20-cv-00521-JCM-EJY, 2020
WL 7696089, at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 28, 2020) (“[t]he instant dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction does not materially alter the legal relationship between the
parties.”). The Court finds these cases persuasive. The moving defendants have not
materially altered their legal relationship with Alliant. As such, it makes little sense
to deem them prevailing parties.
For all these reasons, the Court determines, in its discretion, that the moving
defendants are not prevailing parties. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address the
remaining arguments. The Court will note, however, that Milton and Tracer
Payments’ motion will be denied for the additional reason that it was untimely.
C. 	Alliant’s Request for Sanctions
Finally, the Court turns to Alliant’s request for sanctions. Alliant seeks
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or this Court’s inherent authority, contending
that defense counsel pursued the fee motions without supporting legal authority.
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Alliant also says movants’ efforts to obtain fees under Idaho’s fee-shifting statutes
is inconsistent with their earlier arguments that they have not purposefully availed
themselves of the “Idaho’s forum benefits.” Response, Dkt. 68, at 16.
The Court will not impose sanctions. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]ny
attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess …
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” Here, although this
Court was not convinced by the movants’ arguments, it does not find that the
motions “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplied the proceedings. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927. Nor can the Court say that any reasonably careful attorney would have
deemed the filing of the motions to be unsound. See Stradtman v. Republic Servs.,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 3d 578, 582, 585 (E.D. Va. 2015). Ultimately, defendants’
arguments did not carry the day, but they were not so bad as to warrant sanctions.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The Motions for Attorneys’ Fees filed by Defendants Gage Evans (Dkt.
65), Zach Lapole (Dkt. 66), and Christy Milton and Tracer Payments,
LLC (Dkt. 67) are DENIED.
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2. Plaintiff Alliant, LLC’s request for sanctions is DENIED.
DATED: May 1, 2026
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge
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