Seyb v. Members of the Idaho Board of Medicine, et al.

1:24-cv-00244Idd2 de jun. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
STACY SEYB, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMBERS FOR THE IDAHO BOARD
OF MEDICINE, in their official
capacities, et al.,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:24-cv-00244-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE MOTION IN LIMINE
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Stacy Seyb’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of William W. Thompson, Jr. (Dkt. 111). For the reasons described
below, the Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
The present action challenges Idaho’s abortion ban as applied to situations
where abortion is medically indicated or the woman faces a risk of death from self-
harm. Plaintiff Dr. Seyb, a maternal-fetal medicine specialist, filed suit against the
members of the Idaho Board of Medicine and the prosecuting attorneys of every
county in Idaho. Because Dr. Seyb practices in Boise and faces the risk of
prosecution exclusively in Ada County, this Court dismissed every prosecutor
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 1 of 5
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 2
except for the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney. Dkt. 54.
Trial is set to begin on June 8, 2026. Defendants intend to call William W.
Thompson, Jr., the Latah County Prosecuting Attorney, as a lay witness. Dr.
Seyb’s Motion in Limine seeks to preclude Mr. Thompson’s testimony at trial.
LEGAL STANDARD
Motions in limine are a “procedural mechanism to limit in advance
testimony or evidence in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108,
1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Like other pretrial motions, they are “useful tools to resolve
issues which would otherwise clutter up the trial.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am.
Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017). Rulings on motions in limine are
preliminary opinions that are “entirely within the discretion of the district court.”
Id.; see Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). Further, such rulings are
provisional and therefore “not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change
his mind during the course of a trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3
(2000).
ANALYSIS
The parties agree that Mr. Thompson is presented to this Court as a lay
witness. As such, Mr. Thompson may only testify based on his “personal
knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Ev. 602. His testimony must also satisfy Federal
Rule of Evidence 701, which provides that lay witness opinion testimony must be
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 2 of 5
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 3
“(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly
understanding the witness’s testimony or determining a fact in issue; and (c) not
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Dr. Seyb contends
that Mr. Thompson’s testimony is expert testimony that does not satisfy Rule 701.
He also contends that the testimony is irrelevant.
Defendants claim that Thompson’s personal knowledge and experience as an
elected county prosecutor are sufficient to provide a lay opinion on how county
prosecutors may approach the Defense of Life Act. It is true that witnesses with
professional backgrounds may testify as lay witnesses rather than as experts. See
United States v. Barragan, 871 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he line between
lay and expert opinion depends on the basis of the opinion, not its subject
matter.”). But, to do so, they cannot rely on speculation or hearsay, nor may they
rely upon their particular expertise; they must rely on their personal experience and
observations.1 Under Rule 602, personal knowledge is limited to “concrete facts;”
in other words, “knowledge produced by the direct involvement of the senses.”
United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 863-65 (9th Cir. 2014).
1 See Fed. R. Ev. 701 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules (“Limitation (a) is the
familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.”); see also Fed. R. Ev. 701
advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“Lay testimony ‘results from a process of
reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ while expert testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning
which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.’”) (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d
530, 549 (1992)).
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 3 of 5
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 4
Here, Mr. Thompson has neither prosecuted nor investigated violations of
the Act. Nor has he personally observed the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
implementing the Act. Indeed, testimony about whether “county prosecutors
generally will take a capacious and unwarranted view of the Defense of Life Act,”
Dkt. 111 at 4, necessarily speculates on the probability of future events based on
Mr. Thompson’s professional expertise as a prosecutor. See also United States v.
Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1212 (discussing how lay testimony would not “be merely
speculative” because it is “regarding firsthand observations”). Personal experience
cannot put Mr. Thompson “in possession of an accurate reproduction of the event”
when no such prosecutions have yet occurred. See Fed. R. Ev. 701 notes of
advisory committee on proposed rules.
Testimony based on the “perceptions, education, training, and experience”
of a witness that requires “specialized knowledge” is properly considered expert,
not lay, testimony. United States v. Figuroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.
1997). The testimony that Defendants wish to provide from Mr. Thompson
requires “demonstrable expertise” that is “based on training and experience” and is
therefore inadmissible as a lay opinion. Id. Parties may not “proffer[] an expert in
lay witness clothing.” Fed. R. Ev. 701 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment. As a result, the Court is unpersuaded that his testimony satisfies lay
requirements of personal knowledge.
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 4 of 5
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 5 of 5

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW
Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 1 of 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
STACY SEYB, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
V.
MEMBERS FOR THE IDAHO BOARD OF MEDICINE, in their official capacities, et al.,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:24-cv-00244-BLW MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION IN LIMINE
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Stacy Seyb's Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of William W. Thompson, Jr. (Dkt. 111). For the reasons described below, the Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
The present action challenges Idaho's abortion ban as applied to situations where abortion is medically indicated or the woman faces a risk of death from self- harm. Plaintiff Dr. Seyb, a maternal-fetal medicine specialist, filed suit against the members of the Idaho Board of Medicine and the prosecuting attorneys of every county in Idaho. Because Dr. Seyb practices in Boise and faces the risk of prosecution exclusively in Ada County, this Court dismissed every prosecutor
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 2
except for the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney. Dkt. 54.
Trial is set to begin on June 8, 2026. Defendants intend to call William W.
Thompson, Jr., the Latah County Prosecuting Attorney, as a lay witness. Dr.
Seyb’s Motion in Limine seeks to preclude Mr. Thompson’s testimony at trial.
LEGAL STANDARD
Motions in limine are a “procedural mechanism to limit in advance
testimony or evidence in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108,
1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Like other pretrial motions, they are “useful tools to resolve
issues which would otherwise clutter up the trial.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am.
Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017). Rulings on motions in limine are
preliminary opinions that are “entirely within the discretion of the district court.”
Id.; see Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). Further, such rulings are
provisional and therefore “not binding on the trial judge [who] may always change
his mind during the course of a trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3
(2000).
ANALYSIS
The parties agree that Mr. Thompson is presented to this Court as a lay
witness. As such, Mr. Thompson may only testify based on his “personal
knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Ev. 602. His testimony must also satisfy Federal
Rule of Evidence 701, which provides that lay witness opinion testimony must be
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 2 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 3
“(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly
understanding the witness’s testimony or determining a fact in issue; and (c) not
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Dr. Seyb contends
that Mr. Thompson’s testimony is expert testimony that does not satisfy Rule 701.
He also contends that the testimony is irrelevant.
Defendants claim that Thompson’s personal knowledge and experience as an
elected county prosecutor are sufficient to provide a lay opinion on how county
prosecutors may approach the Defense of Life Act. It is true that witnesses with
professional backgrounds may testify as lay witnesses rather than as experts. See
United States v. Barragan, 871 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he line between
lay and expert opinion depends on the basis of the opinion, not its subject
matter.”). But, to do so, they cannot rely on speculation or hearsay, nor may they
rely upon their particular expertise; they must rely on their personal experience and
observations.1 Under Rule 602, personal knowledge is limited to “concrete facts;”
in other words, “knowledge produced by the direct involvement of the senses.”
United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 863-65 (9th Cir. 2014).
1 See Fed. R. Ev. 701 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules (“Limitation (a) is the
familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.”); see also Fed. R. Ev. 701
advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“Lay testimony ‘results from a process of
reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ while expert testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning
which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.’”) (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d
530, 549 (1992)).
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 3 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 4
Here, Mr. Thompson has neither prosecuted nor investigated violations of
the Act. Nor has he personally observed the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
implementing the Act. Indeed, testimony about whether “county prosecutors
generally will take a capacious and unwarranted view of the Defense of Life Act,”
Dkt. 111 at 4, necessarily speculates on the probability of future events based on
Mr. Thompson’s professional expertise as a prosecutor. See also United States v.
Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1212 (discussing how lay testimony would not “be merely
speculative” because it is “regarding firsthand observations”). Personal experience
cannot put Mr. Thompson “in possession of an accurate reproduction of the event”
when no such prosecutions have yet occurred. See Fed. R. Ev. 701 notes of
advisory committee on proposed rules.
Testimony based on the “perceptions, education, training, and experience”
of a witness that requires “specialized knowledge” is properly considered expert,
not lay, testimony. United States v. Figuroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.
1997). The testimony that Defendants wish to provide from Mr. Thompson
requires “demonstrable expertise” that is “based on training and experience” and is
therefore inadmissible as a lay opinion. Id. Parties may not “proffer[] an expert in
lay witness clothing.” Fed. R. Ev. 701 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment. As a result, the Court is unpersuaded that his testimony satisfies lay
requirements of personal knowledge.
Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW Document 115 Filed 06/02/26 Page 4 of 5

Case 1:24-cv-00244-BLW
Document 115 Filed 06/02/26
Page 5 of 5
Furthermore, irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Fed. R. Ev. 402. And, evidence that is not helpful is not admissible under Rule 701(b). As this Court noted previously, Dr. Seyb exclusively provides abortions in Ada County and only faces a risk of prosecution by the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney. See Dkt. 54. Because Mr. Thompson can only speak about his personal knowledge and experience as a lay witness, he could not speculate on what the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney would do. Conversely, because the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney is a party to this suit and will have the opportunity to speak, this Court is not convinced that Mr. Thompson's testimony would "have a tendency to make a fact more or less probable." Fed. R. Ev. 401. Therefore, Mr. Thompson's personal knowledge regarding actions of the Latah County Prosecutor's Office is of little consequence to this action.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Stacy Seyb's Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of William W. Thompson, Jr. (Dkt. 107) is GRANTED.
UNITE
URTS
HO
DISTRICT OF ID
DATED: June 2, 2026 B. Jun Winmil
B. Lynn Winmill U.S. District Court Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.