Duell v. Honolulu Police Department et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
TODD ALAN DUELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
HONOLULU POLICE DEPARTMENT,
DOES 1-7,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-00518-DKW-RT
ORDER (1) ADOPTING
RECOMMENDATION TO STRIKE
AS-CONSTRUED MOTION TO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT, (2)
STRIKING VARIOUS FILINGS OF
PLAINTIFF, (3) GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND, AND (4)
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR MISCELLANEOUS RELIEF
On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff Todd Duell, proceeding without counsel,
initiated this action with the filing of a Complaint against the Honolulu Police
Department (HPD) and seven unidentified “Doe” defendants. 	According to Duell,
in November 2025, multiple HPD officers entered his home without consent or a
warrant, arrested Duell, and took him to a police station where he was questioned
by two investigators. 	Based upon this series of events, Duell appears to assert
claims under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and various
provisions of the U.S. criminal code.
HPD has moved to dismiss all claims with prejudice on various grounds,
including the failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8
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and 12(b)(6). 	Although largely nonsensical, Duell has filed a response to the
motion to dismiss, in which he appears to oppose dismissal of his claims.
Upon review, the Court finds that the Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is the operative
pleading, rather than any of the other “amended” complaints or pleadings that
Duell may have sought to file in this case. 	The Court also finds that the
Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)’s requirement for a short and plain
statement of a claim. 	In fact, the Complaint does not provide any statement of a
claim; instead, it simply contains a chart with a “Ledger of Damages” where the
claims are arguably asserted. 	Therefore, dismissal is appropriate. 	Dismissal is
with leave to amend to give Duell an opportunity to clearly delineate and state the
claims he seeks to bring in this action, consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the instructions set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges as follows. 	On November 25,
2025, five unidentified HPD officers in “regular clothes” “walked into” Duell’s
home in Waialua, O‘ahu without consent. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1. 	The officers refused
to identify themselves or produce a signed warrant. 	Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. 	The officers
informed Duell that he was under arrest, but refused to provide “articulable
probable cause” for the same. 	Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. 	After handcuffing Duell, the officers
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took him to a police station for booking and questioning. 	Id. at ¶ 8. 	Along the
way to the police station, two of the officers said to Duell: “fuck around and find
out … you’re going to prison … you’re going to lose your job.” 	Id. at ¶ 9. 	In
response, Duell stated that the officers were not “authorized to commit aggravated
identity theft of Plaintiff’s tax records for pecuniary gain….” 	Id. at ¶ 10. 	Duell
“reminded” the officers that “they have a Social Security Number” and, thus, “they
are in fact contracted with the IRS [Internal Revenue Service]….” 	Id. at ¶ 12.
According to Duell, this also means that the officers are “willful tax evaders and
willful non-tax filers” who “claim they are above the law.” 	Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.
Once at the police station, Duell was questioned by two unknown
investigators. 	Id. at ¶ 16. 	The “primary” investigator “attempted to read Plaintiff
his ‘Miranda rights’” and to “start an administrative process to gather
information”, to which Duell “immediately invoked his 5th Amendment right to
remain silent….” 	Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. 	Despite so doing, Duell then asked the
“primary” investigator a series of questions, including “if there was a warrant for
his arrest[,]” “if there was an open criminal action filed against [Duell,]” and “if
there was a CUSIP for the 1099 A filed for the court case trust securities.” 	Id. at
¶¶ 20-28. 	The “primary” investigator either refused to answer or responded “no”
to Duell’s questions. 	Id. 	Duell further informed the “primary” investigator that
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he may have committed “aggravated identity theft of Plaintiff’s tax records for
pecuniary gain….” 	Id. at ¶ 29. 	The “primary” investigator then “turned his
recorder off” and “mumbled[,] ‘this is bullshit … there was no crime … this is a
waste of my time.’” 	Id. at ¶ 30. 	Duell was “released shortly thereafter,” having
been detained for roughly three hours. 	Id. at ¶ 31. 	No charges were filed. 	Id.
The Amended Complaint then purports to provide a “Ledger of Damages”,
which is a chart containing a dollar figure in the first column, a number in the
second column, and a purported “Violation” in the third and final column. 	Id.
at 10-11. 	For example:
$250,000 	1 	4th Amendment Violation
Honolulu Police Department
In addition to over $8 million in “damages”, Duell also seeks, among other
things, orders directing HPD to identify the Doe defendants, to produce various
“bonds” and “IRS documents,” and to “[r]estrict all access to the Social Security
Number only for the use of the Plaintiff.” 	Id. at 11-14.
On December 16, 2025, Duell filed an “Affidavit in Support of First
Amended Complaint”, which appears to also serve as a proposed first amended
complaint. 	See Dkt. No. 7. 	On January 14, 2026, the assigned U.S. Magistrate
Judge recommended striking the proposed first amended complaint for failure to
comply with the Local Rules. 	Dkt. No. 16. 	No objection or other response has
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been filed, timely or otherwise, with respect to this recommendation. 	As a result,
the Court ADOPTS the recommendation, Dkt. No. 16, and directs the Clerk to
STRIKE Dkt. No. 7, which is construed as a motion to amend the Complaint.
On December 31, 2025, HPD appeared in this action with the filing of a
motion to dismiss the operative, original Complaint. 	Dkt. No. 9. 	Therein, HPD
argues for dismissal of all claims with prejudice on various grounds, including
improper service and failure to state a claim. 	On January 12, 2026, Duell filed a
response to the motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. No. 11. 	The vast majority of the
response is nonsensical, focusing upon what appears to be alleged non-compliance
with rules, policies, or provisions related to the Internal Revenue Code and/or
federal and state criminal law. 	Duell also asserts, though, that the Complaint
complies with Rules 8 and 12(b)(6).12 	On January 30, 2026, HPD filed a reply in
support of the motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. No. 20.
1 On January 12, 2026, Duell further filed a motion to “amend named parties”, in which Duell
sought to make the City & County of Honolulu, as opposed to HPD, the named defendant in this
action. 	Dkt. No. 13. 	On January 14, 2026, the assigned Magistrate Judge denied without
prejudice this second motion to amend for failure to comply with the Local and Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 	Dkt. No. 16.
2 Also on January 12, 2026, Duell filed a purported “Cross-Complaint” against the City & County
of Honolulu. 	Dkt. No. 12. 	Duell, however, is not permitted to file a Cross-Complaint against
the City & County of Honolulu, given that it is not a coparty in this action. 	See Fed.R.Civ.P.
13(g) (providing that a “pleading may state as a crossclaim any claim by one party against a
coparty…”). 	The Clerk is, therefore, instructed to STRIKE Dkt. No. 12.
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With the filing of HPD’s reply, briefing on the motion to dismiss was
complete. 	Nonetheless, on February 2, 2026, Duell filed another purported
“response” to the motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. No. 21. 	This response, apart from two
additional paragraphs concerning communications in January 2026 with counsel
for HPD and adding a request for “default against the Defendants”, id. at 8-9, 18-
19, is identical to Duell’s original response. 	In any event, because Duell was not
permitted to file a second response without leave of Court, see Local Rule 7.2 (“No
further or supplemental briefing shall be submitted without leave of court.”), the
Clerk is instructed to STRIKE Dkt. No. 21.
Not done, on February 4, 2026, Duell filed a 24-page document that purports
to accomplish various things. 	Dkt. No. 22. 	First, Duell seeks to file yet another
“response” to the motion to dismiss and/or HPD’s reply. 	Id. at 1-20. 	For the
reason stated above, this request is DENIED. 	Second, Duell moves to “strike” a
declaration submitted with HPD’s reply. 	Id. at 20-21. 	Because Duell presents no
valid reason for striking the declaration, this request is also DENIED. 	Third,
Duell moves for “entry of default against the named Defendants” because “[n]o
first-hand witness has supplied an affidavit rebutting the affidavit and complaint
filed by the Plaintiff.” 	Because HPD is clearly not in default with respect to the
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Complaint, having moved to dismiss the same, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), this request
is DENIED as well.3
The Court now turns to HPD’s motion to dismiss.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. 	Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the Court to dismiss a
complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Rule
12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). 	In addition, Rule 8(d) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be simple,
concise, and direct.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1).
Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” 	556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A court “must accept the factual allegations
of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” 	Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 886-887 (9th Cir.
3 Also on February 4, 2026, Duell filed a nonsensical “Arrest and Attachment of Bonds[] Signed
Under Good as Aval.” 	Dkt. No. 23. 	To the extent this document purports to seek affirmative
relief from the Court, see id. at 6-7, the same is DENIED.
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2018) (quotation omitted). 	However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all
of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Id. 	Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Id. (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). 	Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556).
II. 	Pro Se Status
The Court liberally construes a pro se complaint. 	Eldridge v. Block, 832
F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). 	However, the Court cannot act as counsel for a
pro se litigant or supply the essential elements of a claim. 	Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S.
225, 231 (2004); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
Cir. 1982). 	In addition, as with all litigants, pro se litigants must follow any
applicable Local Rule and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 	King v. Atiyeh, 814
F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa
Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a
pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an
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opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” 	Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66
F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). 	Justice does not require leave to amend, however,
when (1) it would prejudice an opposing party, (2) it is sought in bad faith, (3) it
would produce an undue delay in litigation, (4) it would be futile, or (5) there has
been repeated failure to cure a deficiency. 	Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp.,
545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West,
Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
Dismissal of the Complaint is appropriate because, even liberally construed,
Duell does not connect any factual allegations with the claims he purports to bring
and, thus, fails to satisfy even the basic requirements of Rule 8. 	Because
amendment may cure the Complaint’s deficiencies, leave to amend is granted.
The Complaint alleges that various events have occurred, including
unidentified HPD officers entering Duell’s home, Duell’s arrest by the same
officers, the questioning of Duell by two different and unidentified HPD officers,
tax evasion and fraud, securities fraud, and identity theft. 	Although the Complaint
does not contain a specific section for claims or causes of action, in a “Ledger of
Damages”, the Complaint lists a series of alleged “violation[s]” under the Fourth
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Amendment, Section 1983, federal criminal laws, and, liberally construed, perhaps
State law.
Assuming these “violation[s]” are meant to serve as claims, there are several
problems. 	First, the Complaint does not tie any of the preceding allegations with
any specific claim. 	The Court (and HPD) are instead required to use imagination
to draw any connections, which is both not their responsibility and unacceptable.
Second, as mentioned, Rule 8 requires a short and plain statement of a
claim. 	Here, the Complaint contains no statement of any claim beyond the
constitutional or statutory provision mentioned in the Ledger. 	This too is
unacceptable.
Third, many of the allegations—in particular, the ones involving tax,
securities, and identity fraud—do not have any clear or plain connection with HPD
or any of its officers. 	For example, although the Complaint alleges that Duell
“informed” the officers about various things related to such fraud, there are no
factual allegations in the Complaint that any fraud took place. 	In fact, other than
Duell spontaneously bringing these matters to the attention of the HPD officers,
there are no factual allegations on the subjects of tax, securities, or identification
documents at all. 	In other words, it is not remotely clear how any of these matters
are connected to the entry into Duell’s home and his arrest or to HPD and its
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officers. 	See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2)(A) (providing that multiple defendants may be
joined in one action only if, among other things, the right to relief arises “out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”).
In this light, in order for this case to proceed, Duell must amend the
Complaint. 	In any amended complaint Duell files, he must clearly state the claims
he seeks to bring and the factual allegations supporting each claim. 	Specifically,
for each individual claim, Duell must write short, plain statements describing: (1)
the constitutional or statutory right he believes was violated; (2) the name(s) of the
defendant or defendants against whom the claim is asserted; (3) exactly what each
defendant did or failed to do and when; (4) how the action or inaction of that
defendant is connected to the violation of the legal right; and (5) what specific
injury he suffered because of the defendant’s or defendants’ conduct. 	Duell must
repeat this process for each right and each person or entity named as a
defendant. 	If Duell fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each defendant with
the specific injury suffered, the pertinent claim will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim. 	In addition, Duell may not incorporate by reference any part of the
Complaint or any other matter in an amended complaint. 	An amended complaint
must be complete in and of itself. 	Further, to the extent he wishes to do so, Duell
may amend the parties as appropriate.
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Finally, although Duell is permitted leave to amend to the extent set forth
above, such leave does not extend to any claim brought for a purported violation of
federal or State criminal law. 	See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another.”); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 805-1, 806-7 (providing that only
a “prosecuting officer” can bring criminal charges). 	All such criminal law claims
are DISMISSED without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 9, is
GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND.4 	Duell may have until February 27,
2026 to file an amended complaint consistent with the terms of this Order. 	The
Court cautions Duell that failure to file an amended complaint by February
27, 2026 may result in the dismissal of this case with prejudice for the reasons
set forth herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 13, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
4 Because it is unnecessary at this time, the Court does not address any other reasons for dismissal
that may have been raised in the motion to dismiss.
___________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
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