Zemeckis v. Sloan Servicing

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
The Estate Trust known as CAROLYN
ZEMECKIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SLOAN SERVICING,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-00375 MWJS-RT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DEFERRING DECISION ON WHETHER
TO GRANT LEAVE TO AMEND
INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a dispute over student loans. The loans were originally
taken out by Carolyn Zemeckis and are currently serviced by Defendant Sloan
Servicing. Following extensive correspondence in which Zemeckis sought the
discharge of her loans, a lawsuit was filed in Hawai‘i state court by an “Estate Trust” in
Zemeckis’s name. The Trust—of which Zemeckis is Trustee—alleged that Sloan
Servicing had failed to lawfully respond to statutory notices Zemeckis had served
under various federal laws.1
1 	Since filing this action, Zemeckis has twice moved to abandon any reference to
the Plaintiff Trust or her status as Trustee. See Dkt. Nos. 25, 31. The Magistrate Judge
denied these motions, Dkt. Nos. 27, 32, and explained what procedure Zemeckis must
use to properly amend her pleading, Dkt. No. 32, and the court reminds Zemeckis that
she must abide by these decisions. But for the purposes of this motion, the court has
not taken into account Zemeckis’s trustee status or lack thereof in ruling on the motion.
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Sloan Servicing removed the action to this court and then filed a motion to
dismiss. In support of its motion, Sloan Servicing argues that Zemeckis’s complaint
fails to supply a short and plain statement for relief as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 8, and also that each count pleaded in the complaint fails to state a
claim in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).
Because the complaint fails to include sufficient factual allegations to place Sloan
Servicing on notice of the wrongs it allegedly committed, the court GRANTS Sloan
Servicing’s motion on Rule 8 grounds. The court DEFERS ruling on whether to grant
leave to amend; Zemeckis is invited to submit, by no later than January 10, 2026, a letter
explaining what facts she would allege to cure the Rule 8 deficiencies.
BACKGROUND
In December 2024, Zemeckis filed a dispute and request for information with
Sloan Servicing. Among other things, she asked the student loan servicer to provide
her with the “original promissory note” and payment history details. Dkt. No. 1-2, at
PageID.19. According to a subsequent letter from Zemeckis, she did not “receive the
full and proper documentation for [her] loan,” and she renewed her request in January
2025. Id. Over the next few months, Zemeckis reiterated her disputes and made
payments under protest. Id. at PageID.21-23. In March, she issued a “Final Notice to
Cease Collection & Discharge Alleged Debt” demanding that Sloan Servicing discharge
her debt or be subjected to formal complaints and litigation. Id. at PageID.24.
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In April, Zemeckis sent Sloan Servicing a “Lawful Tender for Full Settlement,”
which purported to settle the balance of her student loan debt in exchange for a “Trust-
Backed Promissory Note” promising to pay $65,469.34 from the “Estate Trust Known as
Carolyn Zemeckis.” Id. at PageID.27-34. In the mailing, Zemeckis asserted that if Sloan
Servicing did not accept the promissory note, its refusal would result in “full and
immediate discharge of [the] obligation” under the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at
PageID.33.
It is not clear whether Sloan Servicing ever responded to the communication
from Zemeckis.2 But in May, Zemeckis sent the company a demand for “proof of
claim,” requesting among other things “the original, wet-ink promissory note or
instrument” that created her student loan obligations. Id. at PageID.36. Sloan Servicing
evidently did not meet Zemeckis’s demands, so she mailed the company a “Certificate
of Dishonor and Final Affidavit of Administrative Judgment” asserting that the debt
was discharged and “administratively settled in full.” Id. at PageID.41.
Zemeckis initiated this lawsuit in July 2025 by filing a complaint in the Circuit
Court of the Fifth Circuit, State of Hawai‘i, entitled The Estate Trust Known as Carolyn
Zemeckis v. Sloan Servicing, Civ. No. 5CCV-25-0000067. In the complaint, Zemeckis
claims that although her student loans have allegedly been “fully discharged and
2 	The attachments to Zemeckis’s complaint only include her mailings and do not
indicate whether any responses were received.
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legally extinguished,” Sloan Servicing continues to “claim an interest” in the debt. Dkt.
No. 1-2, at PageID.10. She contends that she “tendered a negotiable instrument” to
Sloan Servicing and “served statutory notices” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g; the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et
seq.; and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Id.
Because Sloan Servicing allegedly failed to properly respond to these notices, the
complaint alleges that Zemeckis is now entitled to various forms of relief—including a
“discharge decree,” “expungement of any adverse claims” by Sloan Servicing, and a
permanent injunction against future “title interference” or collection. Id.
Sloan Servicing was served in the state court suit on August 13 and timely
removed the action to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1.
A week after removing the case, Sloan Servicing filed the instant motion to dismiss.
Dkt. No. 7. Zemeckis opposed the motion, Dkt. No. 14, and Sloan Servicing replied,
Dkt. No. 21. Zemeckis subsequently filed an additional “Renewed Opposition” on her
own motion in response. Dkt. No. 22. After briefing was complete, the court entered an
order affording Zemeckis the opportunity to respond to Sloan Servicing’s arguments
regarding the FDCPA definition of “debt collector,” Dkt. No. 26, and Zemeckis timely
responded, Dkt. No. 28.
While the motion to dismiss was pending, Zemeckis filed several motions for
summary judgment, declaratory judgment, and judicial notice. Dkt. Nos. 15-18. She
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also filed motions in an effort to proceed in her personal capacity rather than as the
named plaintiff Trust, all of which were denied by the Magistrate Judge. Dkt. Nos. 25,
27, 31-32. This order addresses only the merits of Sloan Servicing’s motion to dismiss,
and because it grants that motion, the Trust’s competing motions for summary
judgment, declaratory judgment, and judicial notice are denied as moot.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Motion to Dismiss
Sloan Servicing raises two main categories of arguments in favor of dismissal.
First, it argues that Zemeckis’s complaint fails to provide a “short and plain statement
of the claim for relief” as required by Rule 8. See Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.72-73. Second, it
argues that each cause of action in the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under
Rule 12(b)(6). See id. at PageID.71-72, 73-75. Because the court concludes that Rule 8
provides a sufficient basis to dismiss the complaint, this order addresses the Rule
12(b)(6) arguments only to the extent necessary to give Zemeckis notice of the defects
she would need to cure if granted leave to file an amended complaint.
1. 	Rule 8
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include, among other things, “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). This provision demands “more than ‘the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s],’ and ‘[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Newcomb v. Cambridge Home
Loans, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160 (D. Haw. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). Rule 8 requires that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and to
thereby “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Put slightly differently,” a
complaint will be dismissed “for failure to comply with Rule 8 where it fails to provide
the defendants fair notice of the wrongs they have allegedly committed.” Newcomb, 861
F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
Sloan Servicing argues in its motion to dismiss that the complaint offers only
“naked assertions” which fail to provide “sufficient notice of what Plaintiff . . . is
contending Defendant did wrong.” Dkt. No. 7, at PageID.73. As a result, Sloan
Servicing asserts, “the [c]omplaint does not satisfy the basic requirements of Rule 8 and
should be dismissed.” Id. The court agrees.
The factual allegations in Zemeckis’s complaint are limited to the following:
“Defendant claims an interest in under an alleged loan now fully discharged and
legally extinguished through non-judicial administrative process and lawful
tender. 	Plaintiff Trust tendered a negotiable instrument and served statutory
notices (15 U.S.C. § 1692g, TILA, RESPA), including: Debt Validation Request,
Conditional Acceptance, Tender of Discharge Instrument, Notice of Fault/Default,
Affidavit of Non-Response. 	Sloan Servicing failed to respond lawfully. 	Default
and estoppel now apply.”
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Dkt. No. 1-2, at PageID.10. The complaint also includes a request for various types of
relief (and a number of attachments, which appear to be documents Zemeckis mailed to
Sloan Servicing), but the language quoted above is the only factual matter alleged in the
complaint.
Although the complaint references several federal statutes, it offers no
explanation as to how Sloan Servicing allegedly violated those statutes beyond the
assertion that “Sloan Servicing failed to respond lawfully.” Id. But to state a claim
under Rule 8, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Jasso v.
Citizens Telecomms. of Calif., Inc., No. Civ. S-05-2649, 2007 WL 97036 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
2007) (“A mere citation to a law or regulation does not satisfy [Rule 8’s]
requirement[s].”) Moreover, the complaint offers no factual allegations whatsoever
from which the court “could draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable”
for a violation of the FDCPA, TILA, or RESPA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because the
complaint therefore fails to satisfy Rule 8’s pleading standard, the court GRANTS Sloan
Servicing’s motion to dismiss.
2. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
Having found that dismissal is justified on Rule 8 grounds, the court need not
conclusively reach the substantive arguments raised under Rule 12(b)(6) in Sloan
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Servicing’s motion. If the court were to reach these arguments, however, it would likely
find at least two of them persuasive.
First, in order to state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege facts
establishing that the defendant is a debt collector. Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720
F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013). And the FDCPA itself excludes “any person collecting
or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to
the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was
obtained by such person” from the definition of “debt collector.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)(F). Sloan Servicing argues that at the time it acquired Zemeckis’s student
loan debt, the debt was not in default, and therefore Sloan Servicing cannot be deemed
a “debt collector” for the purposes of the FDCPA. See Dkt. No. 21, at PageID.285-86.
Were the court to reach this argument, it would be inclined to agree. Without an
allegation that her loans were in default at the time Sloan Servicing acquired them,
Zemeckis cannot establish that Sloan Servicing is a covered debt collector under the
FDCPA. See Edmond v. Am. Educ. Servs., No. 10-0578, 2010 WL 4269129, at *5 (D.D.C.
Oct. 28, 2010) (explaining that “a loan servicer is not a covered debt collector under the
FDCPA absent an allegation that plaintiff’s account was in default” when the servicer
acquired it). And where a plaintiff “does not allege that [s]he was in default at the time
[Defendant] began servicing [her] loans,” she fails to state a claim for relief under the
FDCPA. Brumberger v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp., 84 F. App’x 458, 459 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Zemeckis responds that Sloan Servicing should be considered a debt collector
because “[i]t did not originate the debt; it is acting in a collection capacity; [and] it
attempted to enforce an obligation presumed to be in default.” Dkt. No. 28, at
PageID.419. But she offers no explanation as to why her loans should be “presumed to
be in default,” and there is no evident reason to apply such a presumption—especially
given that the attachments to the complaint indicate that Zemeckis was continuing to
make payments under protest “in order to avoid . . . ‘default’ status.” Dkt. No. 1-2, at
PageID.21. In any event, to the extent that Zemeckis’s complaint does not allege that
her loans were in default at the time Sloan Servicing obtained them, it fails to allege that
Sloan Servicing is a debt collector and therefore fails to state a FDCPA claim.
Second, Sloan Servicing argues that Zemeckis has failed to state a claim under
RESPA because the law does not apply to the type of loan at issue here. Dkt. No. 7-1, at
PageID.74. Specifically, Sloan Servicing contends that “RESPA does not apply to
student loans, and therefore, provides no legal basis for Plaintiff Trust’s claims or the
requested relief.” Id. Were the court to reach this argument, it likely would agree.
“Congress enacted RESPA in 1974 to protect home buyers from inflated prices in
the home purchasing process.” Schuetz v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1008
(9th Cir. 2002). In line with that purpose, “RESPA applies only to ‘federally related
mortgage loan[s].’” Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 289 F.R.D. 296, 304 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)). A loan qualifies as a “federally related mortgage loan” if
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it is “secured by a lien on residential property designed for one to four families” and
meets one of four additional criteria. Id. (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)). If a loan does
not meet these criteria, it is not covered by RESPA.
Zemeckis does not contend that her loans are federally related mortgage loans;
indeed, she does not assert that her loans are mortgages at all. She instead
acknowledges that the loans in question are an “alleged student loan debt,” see, e.g.,
Dkt. No. 15, at PageID.129, and the complaint contains no allegation that the debt was
secured by a lien on residential property. To the contrary, the attachments to her
original state court complaint similarly characterize the loan as a “student loan.” See,
e.g., Dkt. No. 1-2, at PageID.19. Without any factual allegation from which the court
could conclude that the loan in question is a federally related mortgage loan, Zemeckis
cannot show that RESPA applies to the loan. The complaint therefore likely fails to
state a claim under RESPA.
As discussed in detail below, the court may ultimately grant Zemeckis leave to
amend her complaint. If she ultimately is granted such leave and decides to continue
pursuing this lawsuit, she should consider not only whether she can plead sufficient
factual matter for each claim to satisfy Rule 8, but also whether she can allege the facts
necessary to address these specific likely defects in her complaint.3
3 	Sloan Servicing also raises a potential statute-of-limitations issue with Zemeckis’s
TILA claim in its motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 7-1, PageID.73-74. It argues that the
statute of limitations for TILA claims begins running at the time the “consumer
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B. 	Leave to Amend
When the court dismisses a complaint, it also generally grants the plaintiff leave
to amend where justice so requires. And the court “recognizes that leave to amend a
complaint should be freely given to pro se litigants.” Schwartz v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortg. Of Haw., LLC, No. 12-00257, 2012 WL 12893537, at *6 (D. Haw. Sept. 5, 2012). But
where “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment,” including
where the plaintiff “could not allege any additional facts which might cure defects in
the complaint,” leave to amend should not be granted. Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 971-72 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (cleaned up).
Because some or all of Zemeckis’s claims would appear to fail to state a claim,
even if she were to reallege them with the particularity required by Rule 8, the court
DEFERS decision on whether to grant leave to amend the complaint. Instead, the court
affords Zemeckis an opportunity to file a letter explaining how, if given leave to amend,
she would amend her complaint to sufficiently state a claim as required by Rules 8 and
becomes obligated on a credit transaction,” which Sloan Servicing alleges was over
twenty years ago in this case. Id. at PageID.74. Because Sloan Servicing supported this
argument with a supporting declaration, it likely would not have been appropriate for
the court to consider it as part of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Mansha Consulting
LLC v. Alakai, 236 F.Supp.3d 1267, 1273 (D. Haw. 2017) (declining to consider a
declaration in support of a 12(b)(6) motion where it was “not apparent on the face of the
Complaint that the statute of limitations has run”). But because the argument may
properly be made at a future point in the case—in, for example, a motion for summary
judgment—Zemeckis may nonetheless wish to consider whether she can overcome the
statute of limitations if she chooses to continue pursuing a TILA claim.
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12(b)(6). The letter must clearly set forth the facts that Zemeckis would allege in an
amended complaint, and it must do so a manner that permits the court to understand
which facts are relevant to each specific claim. In addition to setting forth the specific
facts Zemeckis believes give rise to each of her claims, the letter should also address
whether Zemeckis would allege facts showing that (1) her student loans were in default
when Sloan Servicing began servicing them, as required for a FDCPA claim, and that (2)
her student loans are “federally related mortgage loans” as required for a RESPA claim.
Zemeckis may also wish to address the statute of limitations issue described in footnote
3 above.
Zemeckis’s letter does not need to use formal or legal language, but it must at a
minimum include sufficient detail to demonstrate that she could allege the necessary
facts to state a claim if granted leave to amend. If she cannot allege the necessary facts
described above, she may say so and indicate that she would withdraw the relevant
claim in an amended filing or seek to dismiss the action altogether. Zemeckis is also
cautioned that failing to address the specific deficiencies discussed in this order—
including by making further arguments about her purported “administrative claim”
process or Sloan Servicing’s “standing”—will be considered nonresponsive and may
result in the automatic dismissal of her complaint.
If Zemeckis chooses to submit a letter seeking leave to amend, she must do so by
January 10, 2026. Zemeckis is cautioned that failure to timely file a letter, or to set forth
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sufficient facts in that letter to provide a basis for granting leave to amend, will result in
the dismissal of her lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Sloan Servicing’s motion to
dismiss, Dkt. No. 7, and DEFERS decision on the question of whether Zemeckis should
be granted leave to amend. If Zemeckis wishes to continue pursuing this action, she
must submit a letter to the court seeking leave to amend by no later than January 10,
2026. In any such letter, Zemeckis must supplement her factual allegations to address
the deficiencies that have been identified in this order. Zemeckis is cautioned that if her
letter fails to address the identified deficiencies, her action will be dismissed without
leave to amend. Moreover, if Zemeckis does not file a letter requesting leave to amend
by January 10, 2026, this case will be automatically dismissed.
In light of the dismissal, the court DENIES all other pending motions in this
matter, Dkt. Nos. 15-18, as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 10, 2025, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Civil No. 25-00375 MWJS-RT; The Estate Trust Known as Carolyn Zemeckis v. Sloan
Servicing; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DEFERRING DECISION ON WHETHER TO GRANT LEAVE TO AMEND
/s/ Micah W.J. Sm ith
Micah W.J. Smith
Un ited States District Judge
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