Naki v. County of Maui

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JULIEANN NAKI, Individually,
and as Special Administrator
of the Estate of NATHANIEL JOSHUA
NA WA‘E WA‘E MAKALA KA KAI
NAKI, RAYMOND K. NAKI, SR.,
RAYMOND K. NAKI, JR.,
ANTHONY NAKI, TERINA NAKI
and PALMER NAKI,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
COUNTY OF MAUI, MAUI POLICE
OFFICER FREDERICK WELCH;
MAUI POLICE OFFICER
NATHANAEL GANDEZA; DOE
INDIVIDUALS 1-10, DOE
PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-10, DOE
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10,
and DOE ENTITIES 1-10,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 23-00383 SASP-WRP
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
COUNTY OF MAUI, FREDERICK WELCH,
AND NATHANAEL GANDEZA’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
FILED AUGUST 22, 2025, AND
DISMISSING PENDENT STATE CLAIMS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF MAUI,
FREDERICK WELCH, AND NATHANAEL GANDEZA’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FILED AUGUST 22, 2025,
AND DISMISSING PENDENT STATE CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJUDICE
This case represents policing in moments of extreme uncertainty, where
split-second decisions can have permanent consequences. Faced with a dangerous situation that
quickly unfolded on April 30, 2023, officers tragically and fatally shot Nathaniel Joshua Na Wa‘e
Wa‘e Makala Ka Kai Naki (“Naki”). Even when a police shooting is legally justified, it still
means a life has been ended, and families are forever changed. Justification does not erase grief;
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it only explains necessity. Having reviewed the record before it, this Court concludes that the
officers’ use of deadly force was necessary under the circumstances presented to them and that
summary judgment in their favor is, therefore, proper.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
A. 	Orders for Protection
Naki’s parents both sought and were granted orders for protection against Naki.
Mother Julieann E. Naki’s (“Mother”) protective order took effect February 1, 2023, and expired
on August 1, 2023. [Exh. E, ECF No. 56-11 at PageID.442.] This order prohibited Naki “from
committing further acts of abuse or threats of abuse” and from “return[ing] to the residence
located at 11800 Kamehameha V Hwy, Kaunakakai, HI 96748.” [Id. at PageID.443.] Similarly,
Father Raymond Leimana Kaiwi Naki’s (“Father”) protective order, effective April 19, 2023,
through April 19, 2024, prohibited Naki “from committing further acts of abuse or threats of
abuse” while also prohibiting Naki “from any contact with the” Father and from “visit[ing] or
approach[ing] within 100 yards of any place where the [Father] lives or works or goes to
school.” [Id. at PageID.447–48.]
B. 	Violation of Mother’s Protective Order
On April 30, 2023, Stafford Caparida (“Caparida”), a pastor, police officer, and
cousin to Naki, was preparing for morning services at the church where Mother’s residence is
located when Naki drove “erratically” onto the property in a blue sedan. [Caparida Decl., ECF
No. 56-3 ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, 7–9.] Upon exiting his vehicle, Naki “began yelling and swearing loudly into
1 The facts summarized in this section are taken primarily from the exhibits attached to the
subject motion for summary judgment, as many of them are not in dispute. Such facts represent a
broad--rather than exhaustive--overview of the relevant background information. Other facts
pertinent to this Court’s decision may be referenced below to the extent they are applicable.
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his cell phone while pacing” on the property. [Id. ¶ 10.] Based on Naki’s statements, Caparida
believed Naki was speaking to Mother. [Id. ¶ 11.] After yelling into his phone, Naki walked
toward Caparida and Caparida’s son “while yelling, swearing, and trying to start a fight.” [Id.
¶¶ 15–16.] Concerned that Naki had directed his aggression toward Caparida and Caparida’s son,
at around 7:16 a.m., Caparida called police dispatch, requesting police assistance and reporting
that Naki “was on the property acting crazy.” [Id. ¶¶ 18–20.] Naki saw Caparida on the phone
and began yelling that Caparida “had ratted him out.” [Id. ¶ 22.] Naki returned to his vehicle,
“peeled out, and drove off headed east.” [Id. ¶ 23.]
Caparida had never seen Naki “act in such an aggressive, agitated manner as he
did on April 30, 2023.” [Caparida Decl. ¶ 13.] Caparida later described Naki’s demeanor to be
“as if he had a demon inside him.” [Id. ¶ 14.]
Approximately thirty minutes after Caparida had called dispatch, at around
7:41 a.m., Officers Frederick Welch (“Officer Welch” or “Welch”) and Nathanael Gandeza
(“Officer Gandeza” or “Gandeza”) arrived on the property. [Caparida Decl. ¶ 25; Welch Decl.,
ECF No. 56-1 ¶ 21; Gandeza Decl., ECF No. 56-2 ¶ 14.] Dispatch had informed the officers that
Naki was on the property “acting crazy.” [Welch Decl. ¶ 9; Gandeza Decl. ¶ 9.] Caparida spoke
to the officers, explaining the incident with Naki and informing them Naki “had left the property
headed east.” [Caparida Decl. ¶ 26; see also Gandeza Decl. ¶ 15; Welch Decl. ¶¶ 23–25.] After
obtaining Caparida’s statement, Officers Welch and Gandeza left the property to locate and arrest
Naki for violation of an order for protection. [Caparida Decl. ¶ 28; Gandeza Decl. ¶ 16; Welch
Decl. ¶¶ 26–27.]
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C. 	Prior Police Contacts with Naki
Officer Welch--in his capacity as a police officer--has had prior contacts with
Naki. These contacts included incidents where Mother had reported to police “Naki was acting
violently or erratically.” [Welch Decl. ¶ 13.] Though, Officer Welch has never had to draw his
weapon on Naki. [Id. ¶ 14.] Officer Welch also knew Naki from them both having attended
church services at Caparida’s church. [Id. ¶ 11.]
Officer Gandeza--in his capacity as a police officer--also knew Naki from prior
contacts. [Gandeza Decl. ¶ 10.] Officer Gandeza had served Naki with the restraining order
Mother had obtained against him. [Id. ¶ 12.] Based on Officer Gandeza’s experience, Naki was
known to be “very combative and prone to yelling.” [Id. ¶ 11.]
D. 	The Shooting2
After Officers Welch and Gandeza had left Mother’s property on April 30, 2023,
they located Naki’s vehicle on the shoulder of the roadway approximately thirty yards from
Mother’s property. [Gandeza Decl. ¶ 17; Welch Decl. ¶ 28.] Officer Welch parked his police
vehicle on the shoulder about two car lengths away from Naki’s vehicle, while Officer Gandeza
parked his police vehicle partially in the roadway, behind Officer Welch’s. [Gandeza Decl.
¶¶ 18–19; Welch Decl. ¶¶ 29–30.]
Upon exiting their vehicles, Officers Welch and Gandeza encountered Naki who
was walking toward them while holding in his right hand what the officers immediately
2 The facts in this section are largely deduced from the footage captured by the officers’
respective body-worn cameras, which are attached as Exhibits F and G to “Defendants County of
Maui, Frederick Welch, and Nathanael Gandeza’s Concise Statement of Facts in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment” [ECF No. 56]. Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the events as
depicted by the officers’ body-worn cameras, nor do they dispute the admissibility and
authenticity of such evidence.
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recognized to be a large machete. [Gandeza Decl. ¶¶ 20–22; Exh. G, Gandeza Body-Worn
Camera (“Gandeza BWC”) 07:50:213; Welch Decl. ¶¶ 31–32; Exh. F, Welch Body-Worn Camera
(“Welch BWC”) 07:50:21.] The machete, which measured approximately 23 inches in length,4
was tucked under Naki’s left arm, with several inches of the blade visible over Naki’s left
shoulder. [Welch BWC 07:50:23; Gandeza Decl. ¶ 22.] The officers immediately drew their
firearms and pointed them at Naki. This encounter between Naki and the officers continued for
approximately three minutes.
Officer Gandeza, in due course, notified dispatch that Naki had a machete and
issued a directive “to clear the air.” [Gandeza Decl. ¶ 26; Gandeza BWC 07:50:46.]
Officer Gandeza positioned himself to the side, behind Officer Welch who was standing near his
police vehicle, and issued repeated commands to Naki to put the machete down, at one point
warning Naki to “put the fuckin shit down or you gonna get fuckin shot.” [Gandeza Decl. ¶ 27;
Gandeza BWC 07:50:23–28.] Similarly, for about five seconds, Officer Welch repeatedly yelled
to Naki to “put it down!” [Welch BWC 07:50:23–28.] In response, Naki said, “I not harming
you.” [Welch BWC 07:50:29; Gandeza 07:50:30.] Officer Welch again instructed Naki to “put it
down,” and Naki again said, “I not harming you.” [Welch BWC 07:50:30–31; Gandeza BWC
07:50:30–31.] When Officer Welch then directed Naki to “put it down now,” Naki responded,
“nah.” [Welch BWC 07:50:31–32; Gandeza BWC 07:50:31–32.] Officer Welch repeated “put it
down,” to which Naki again said, “I not harming you,” prompting Officer Welch to, once again,
3 The referenced time is approximate, plus or minus five seconds, based on the information
displayed in the top right corner of the cited footage.
4 The officers’ declarations do not specifically identify the length of the machete, only describing
it to be “large.” [Welch Decl. ¶ 31; Gandeza Decl. ¶ 21.] However, Plaintiffs do not dispute
Defendants’ description of the machete as measuring approximately 23 inches long, [see ECF
No. 61 at PageID.574 ¶ 25,] and this description appears to be substantiated by the officers’
body-worn cameras.
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instruct Naki to “put it down.” [Welch BWC 07:50:33–35.] At the same time, Officer Gandeza
twice yelled at Naki to “put the fuckin machete down or you gonna get shot!” [Gandeza BWC
07:50:34–36.]
After the initial exchange, Naki walked away from the officers--toward his car--as
Officer Welch followed him. [Id. 07:50:36–43; Welch BWC 07:50:36–42.] Officer Welch
deployed the taser as Officer Gandeza continued to instruct Naki to put down the machete. [Id.]
However, the taser was not successful in gaining Naki’s compliance. [Id.] Officer Gandeza then
repeated his commands twice to Naki to “put down the fuckin machete,” but Naki did not
comply. [Gandeza BWC 07:50:40–43.] Officer Welch also instructed Naki to “put it down now,”
to which Naki responded, “you harm me, I nevah harm you.” [Welch BWC 07:50:43–44;
Gandeza BWC 07:50:43–44.] Both officers continued to give multiple commands to Naki to put
down the machete, with Officer Gandeza at one point warning Naki to “put it fuckin down or I’ll
shoot you” and Officer Welch yelling, “I’m telling you put it fuckin down” and “Nathaniel, put it
down!” [Welch BWC 07:50:49–59; Gandeza BWC 07:50:49–59.] Naki, still holding the
machete, responded by raising his voice at Officer Welch and saying that what he did was wrong,
presumably referring to when Officer Welch had deployed his taser earlier in the encounter.
[Welch BWC 07:51:00; Gandeza BWC 07:51:00.] Again, Officers Welch and Gandeza issued
multiple commands to Naki to put down the machete, to which Naki responded “no.” [Welch
BWC 07:51:02–07; Gandeza BWC 07:51:04–07.] Officer Welch repeated his commands to
Naki--about three more times--to put down the machete, while Officer Gandeza yelled, “put
down the fuckin machete!” [Welch BWC 07:51:07–12; Gandeza BWC 07:51:09–12.]
In apparent attempts to provoke Officer Welch, Naki urged him to shoot, to which
Officer Welch responded, “I don’t wanna shoot.” [Welch BWC 07:51:13–15; Gandeza BWC
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07:51:13.] In the meantime, Officer Gandeza again ordered Naki to “put down the machete.”
[Gandeza BWC 07:51:14.] Defiantly, Naki began moving toward Officer Welch, prompting both
officers to yell “don’t” and “back the fuck up!” [Welch BWC 07:51:15–17; Gandeza BWC
07:51:16–17.] Naki responded, “I nevah do nothing wrong,” as Officer Welch repeated “don’t.”
[Welch BWC 07:51:17–19.] Naki again told Officer Welch, presumably in relation to the earlier
taser deployment, that what he did was wrong, repeating this as Officer Welch again told Naki
“don’t,” and Officer Gandeza yelled, “back the fuck up!” [Welch BWC 07:51:19–21; Gandeza
BWC 07:51:19–20.] Officer Welch subsequently told Naki who was advancing toward him,
“don’t do it,” and Naki responded, “I not doing anything.” [Welch BWC 07:51:21–23.]
Officer Welch again instructed Naki to “put it down now,” to which Naki repeated, “I not doing
anything,” with Officer Welch then expressing, “Thaniel, I don’t wanna kill you today!” [Id.
07:51:23–26.] Simultaneously, Officer Gandeza directed Naki to “back the fuck up.” [Gandeza
BWC 07:51:23.]
Officer Welch proceeded to issue more commands to Naki, repeatedly instructing
him to put down the machete, while Naki urged Officer Welch in a provoking manner to “go
ahead.” [Id. 07:51:26–28; Welch BWC 07:51:27–33.] Fearing that Naki was too close in
proximity to Officer Welch, Officer Gandeza told Welch to “back up little bit” while also
instructing Naki to “stay right there, stay the fuck right there.” [Gandeza BWC 07:51:30–34;
Gandeza Decl. ¶ 39.] Naki moved backward, only to again advance forward while pointing at
Officer Welch and yelling, “brah you wrong!” [Welch BWC 07:51:34–40.] Officer Welch again
instructed Naki to put down the machete and told Naki he was wrong. [Id. 07:51:38–40.]
Meanwhile, Officer Gandeza shouted to Naki to “drop the fuckin machete!” [Gandeza BWC
07:51:36.] Naki did not comply and advanced toward Officer Welch, again saying “you wrong”;
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this prompted both officers to yell “back up!” [Id. 07:51:38–43; Welch BWC 07:51:41–43.]
Apparently challenging Officer Welch, Naki then said, “come on.” [Welch BWC 07:51:44.]
Officer Welch thereafter issued additional commands to Naki to put down the machete, at one
point backing up slightly at the request of Officer Gandeza. [Id. 07:51:45–54; Gandeza BWC
07:51:46–53.] This was the second time Officer Welch had retreated after Officer Gandeza had
asked him to do so.
In attempts to plead with Naki, Officer Welch stated, “come on bah, put it down.”
[Welch BWC 07:51:55–56; Gandeza BWC 07:51:54.] Naki and Officer Welch then argued,
during which argument Naki yelled at Officer Welch that what he “just did was wrong” and
Officer Welch responding that what Naki did was wrong, that Naki had been told many times to
not “go ova dea,” but that Naki kept “going ova dea.” [Welch BWC 07:51:57–07:52:07; Gandeza
BWC 07:51:57–07:52:07.] Naki denied “going ova dea,” to which Officer Welch replied that
Naki “did go ova dea” and that Naki argued with people at the property. [Welch BWC
07:52:07–09; Gandeza BWC 07:52:07–09.] Again moving forward, Naki sneered, asking
Officer Welch if he was scared. [Welch BWC 07:52:11; Gandeza BWC 07:52:11.] Officer Welch
repeated that Naki was “not supposed to go ova dea,” causing Naki to yell, “that’s my land!”
[Welch BWC 07:52:12–14; Gandeza BWC 07:52:12.]
Officer Gandeza attempted to reason with Naki. He lowered his gun and said in a
calm voice, “hey, hey, just drop the machete bro, listen to me, drop the machete.” [Gandeza
BWC 07:52:13–18.] At the same time, Officer Welch instructed Naki to put down the machete,
at one point saying, “please.” [Welch BWC 07:52:15–18.] Continuing in his efforts to gain
Naki’s compliance, Officer Gandeza then said, “you ain’t gotta get to this point,” repeating this
statement a second time. [Gandeza BWC 07:52:19–23.] Officer Welch again told Naki to “put it
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down bah,” but Naki refused, responding, “nah, nah, nah.” [Welch BWC 07:52:18–21.] Naki
then said, “I back off, you guys back off,” eventually moving backward, while Officer Welch
told Naki, “no, no, drop the machete.” [Id. 07:52:21–26; Gandeza BWC 07:52:24–25.]
Officer Gandeza then said, “drop the machete bro,” as Officer Welch repeated the same
commands to Naki two more times, but Naki again did not comply, moving forward and sharply
telling the officers to drop their “guns right now.” [Welch BWC 07:52:27–31; Gandeza BWC
07:52:26–31.] When Officer Welch responded “no, you drop your machete,” Naki defiantly
asked “why,” to which Officer Welch replied, “we in charge.” [Welch BWC 07:52:31–33;
Gandeza BWC 07:52:31–34.] Officers Welch and Gandeza repeated their commands to Naki to
put down the machete, but Naki refused and, at one point, stated, “you guys wen shoot already.”
[Welch BWC 07:52:34–38; Gandeza BWC 07:52:34–35.] Officer Gandeza again implored Naki
to drop the machete, but he did not comply. [Gandeza BWC 07:52:37.]
Advancing toward Officer Welch, Naki twice yelled at the officers to “get the
fuck outta my life right now” and then a third time, “get outta my life right now!” [Id.
07:52:39–43; Welch BWC 07:52:39–43.] Officer Welch shouted at Naki to put the machete
down and, repeatedly, to stop, while Officer Gandeza yelled twice, “back the fuck up or we gon’
shoot you!” [Welch BWC 07:52:44–47; Gandeza BWC 07:52:44–48.] Naki responded, “I not
swinging,” and when Officer Welch then instructed him to “put it down,” Naki repeated, “I not
swinging,” prompting Officer Welch to again yell, “put it down!” [Welch BWC 07:52:48–50;
Gandeza BWC 07:52:49–51.]
Naki turned around to walk toward his car, after which Officer Welch, from a
slight distance behind, followed him and asked, “Thaniel, where you going bah?” [Welch BWC
07:52:51–54; Gandeza BWC 07:52:53–54.] Naki turned around to face Officer Welch and began
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advancing while saying “oh, oh” and telling the officers to “back the fuck up.” [Welch BWC
07:52:55–58; Gandeza BWC 07:52:55–56.] As Naki was advancing, both officers instructed him
to “back up.” [Welch BWC 07:52:58–59; Gandeza BWC 07:52:56.]
In a challenging manner, Naki began encouraging Officer Welch to shoot,
repeating this multiple times while continuing to advance toward Officer Welch. [Welch BWC
07:52:59–07:53:03; Gandeza BWC 07:52:59–07:53:03.] As Naki moved toward the officers,
Officer Welch instructed Naki several times to “back up.” [Welch BWC 07:52:59–07:53:03.]
Continuing his forward movement, Naki kept repeating, “go ahead, shoot.” [Id.] At one point,
Naki walked backward but then advanced forward again while encouraging Officer Welch to
shoot. Officer Welch yelled to Naki to stop as Officer Gandeza ordered Naki to “back the fuck
up!” [Welch BWC 07:53:04–08; Gandeza BWC 07:53:04–07.] Naki then said twice, “I not
swinging,” to which Officer Gandeza responded, “it doesn’t matter, you get one machete.”
[Welch BWC 07:53:08–10; Gandeza BWC 07:53:08–10.] Naki subsequently yelled to
Officer Gandeza, “you back the fuck up!” [Welch BWC 07:53:10; Gandeza BWC 07:53:11.]
Officer Welch issued repeated commands to Naki to put down the machete, but Naki refused and
continued to move forward while also challenging Officer Welch, saying things like “come on
shoot” and repeatedly saying “come on.” [Welch BWC 07:53:12–17; Gandeza BWC
07:53:11–16.]
Once Naki was within three to five feet of Officer Welch and still advancing with
the machete in hand in direct defiance of the officers’ orders to back up and to drop the machete,
both officers fired their guns at Naki. [Welch BWC 07:53:17–18; Welch Decl. ¶¶ 53–54;
Gandeza BWC 07:53:16–19; Gandeza Decl. ¶¶ 46–48.] Naki fell forward but then propped
himself upward in a kneeling position while still holding the machete and saying in a seemingly
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provoking manner, “huh? Huh?” [Welch BWC 07:53:19–21; Gandeza BWC 07:53:21.]
Officer Welch moved backward, with his gun still aimed at Naki, and yelled commands like
“stop bah,” “put it down,” and “drop it”; Officer Gandeza likewise yelled at Naki to “drop the
fuckin machete,” giving a similar command a second time. [Welch BWC 07:53:21–26; Gandeza
BWC 07:53:22–24.] Naki then fell forward again, after which Officer Welch repeatedly said
“no” and “kick the machete away.” [Welch BWC 07:53:27–45; Gandeza BWC 07:53:33.] When
Naki apparently stopped making movements or gestures toward the officers, Officer Gandeza
walked over to Naki and removed the machete from underneath him. [Welch BWC 07:53:45;
Gandeza BWC 07:53:43.] Both officers then checked on Naki and began administering
life-saving measures.
Approximately three minutes had passed between the initial encounter and the
shooting. During and immediately after this incident, people began to gather where the officers
had been interacting with Naki. [Gandeza Decl. ¶ 43; see also Gandeza BWC 07:54:32 (officer
telling a male driver to back up); Welch BWC 08:02:33 (officer interacting with a female driver
of a truck who had driven up), 08:04:29 (camera showing three cars on the side of the road),
08:05:20 (officer speaking to a man who had approached, with the officer’s camera showing a
number of people congregating on the road), 08:06:22 (officer turning himself to apparently
interact with yet another man who had approached).]
II. 	RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nearly five months after the tragic shooting, on September 14, 2023, Plaintiffs5
filed a Complaint in this Court against the County of Maui (“County”) and “Doe Police
Officers,” among others, alleging that the defendants violated Naki’s rights under the United
5 “Plaintiffs” are comprised of Naki’s estate, his parents, and his siblings. [ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 2–5.]
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States Constitution, the Hawai‘i Constitution, and the laws of the State of Hawai‘i. [ECF No. 1.]
Then, on October 13, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). [ECF No. 9.]
After the Court dismissed the FAC with partial leave to amend pursuant to a motion brought by
the County, on March 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against the
County and Officers Welch and Gandeza (collectively, “Defendants”). [ECF Nos. 11, 16, 18.]
The parties subsequently stipulated to dismiss with prejudice Count I of the SAC only as to the
County. [ECF No. 21.] Hence, the remaining causes of action alleged in the SAC are as follows:
(1) Count I: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Officers Welch and Gandeza, asserting violations
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) Count II:
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants; (3) Count III: wrongful death
against Defendants; (4) Count IV: negligent infliction of emotional distress, pain, and suffering
against Defendants; (5) Count V: malicious, willful, and wanton conduct against Officers Welch
and Gandeza; and (6) Count VI: negligence, vicarious liability, and respondeat superior against
Defendants. [ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 29–56.]
On August 22, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
Section 1983 claims, arguing that the officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable and that, even
if it was not, they are entitled to qualified immunity. [ECF No. 55 at PageID.342–51.]
Defendants add that the officers’ conduct did not “shock the conscience” and that, should
Plaintiffs’ federal claims be eliminated, this Court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims. [Id. at PageID.352–53.] Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’
motion on September 24, 2025. [ECF No. 59.] In support of their opposition, Plaintiffs submitted
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the report of their expert witness, John D. McCarthy (“McCarthy”),6 who opined that
Officers Welch and Gandeza’s use of deadly force against Naki was not justified, concluding that
Naki posed no immediate threat to the officers or others and that the “officers’ actions were
inconsistent with accepted standards of police practice, training and policy concerning the use of
force.” [Exh. 1, ECF No. 60 at PageID.508.] McCarthy reasoned that the officers’ actions were
not justified under the Hawaii Revised Statutes; the officers “could have retreated a reasonable
distance” and maintained efforts to gain Naki’s compliance; Naki never raised the machete
toward the officers or threatened to use it; and the crime for which Naki was arrestable on the
date of the incident “did not involve the use or threatened use of deadly force.” [Id. at
PageID.511–13.] Defendants replied on October 1, 2025. [ECF No. 62.] And a hearing on
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was held on October 29, 2025. [ECF No. 65.]
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), “The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A principal purpose of the summary judgment rule “is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). The
“threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved
only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
6 Prior to retirement, McCarthy was in law enforcement for more than forty-five years, with four
of those years served in the role of deputy police chief of the Honolulu Police Department.
[Exh. 1, ECF No. 60 at PageID.517.] Since his retirement, McCarthy has “consulted in” at least
“ten police practices cases” within various contexts. [Id.]
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The moving party has the initial burden of “informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323
(internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant has met this burden, the opposing party
must come forward with “any significant probative evidence tending to support (his legal
theory)” to defeat summary judgment. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d
270, 282 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)),
reh’g denied (9th Cir. 1980). “[A] nonmoving party must ‘go beyond the pleadings and, by [his]
own affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,”
designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508
F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). “[T]he mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48.
The court must review the record as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149–50 (2000));
Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320
F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003)). It does not weigh the evidence but only determines whether there
is a genuine issue for trial. Marable, 511 F.3d at 929 (citing Abdul–Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, this Court views the facts in this case in the light
depicted by the officers’ body-worn cameras. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007)
(holding that the Eleventh Circuit should not have relied on the respondent’s version of events,
which was “so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him,”
and that the Court of Appeals “should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the
videotape”); Hernandez v. Town of Gilbert, 989 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 2021) (“While we view
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party at the summary judgment stage, we
are not required to accept a non-movant’s version of events when it is clearly contradict[ed] by a
video in the record.” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In their Motion, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ claims of Fourth Amendment excessive force and Fourteenth Amendment deprivation
of a familial relationship. [ECF No. 55-1 at PageID.342–53.] They also contend that the Court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under state law. [Id. at
PageID.353.] This Court analyzes each contention sequentially.
A. 	Fourth Amendment
Defendants maintain Officers Welch and Gandeza are entitled to qualified
immunity from Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. Qualified
immunity shields public officials from civil damages “unless ‘(1) they violated a federal statutory
or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was “clearly established at the
time.”’” Napouk v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 123 F.4th 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018)).
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1. 	The officers did not violate a federal statutory or constitutional right.
Under the first prong of the qualified immunity test, the Court must determine
whether Officers Welch and Gandeza’s use of deadly force on Naki violated the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. See Hyer v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu,
118 F.4th 1044, 1060 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). To determine whether the force used to
effect a seizure was reasonable, the Court must examine “whether it would be objectively
reasonable for the officer[s] to believe that the amount of force employed was required by the
situation [they] confronted.” Napouk, 123 F.4th at 915 (quoting Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350
F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citation omitted). This evaluation must
account “for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97.
The “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force case “requires a careful
balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Napouk, 123 F.4th at 915
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The strength of the government’s interest is based on a
totality of the circumstances, to include the following factors articulated in Graham: (1) “the
severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others,” and (3) whether the suspect “is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted). Of these Graham factors, the
“most important” is the immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect. Lal v. California, 746 F.3d
1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011)). But the
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Graham factors are not exclusive, and other factors--like the availability of less intrusive means
of force and whether the suspect was obviously emotionally disturbed--are relevant to the totality
of the circumstances. Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted).
a. 	Immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect
This Court addresses first the “most important” factor: whether Naki posed an
immediate threat to the safety of Officers Welch and Gandeza or others.
Where a suspect disregards officer commands and advances toward officers while
holding an object perceived to be a weapon, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”)
has concluded that such officers are objectively reasonable to view the suspect as an immediate
threat. In Napouk, two officers responded to reports of a person (“decedent”) walking around a
residential area with a “machete” or “slim jim,” acting suspiciously and peering into cars and
houses. 123 F.4th at 912. When they arrived, officers interacted with the decedent who appeared
to be holding a machete. Id. at 913. One officer drew his gun and immediately told the decedent
to drop the long object that was in his hand. Id. This officer repeated his command, but the
decedent did not comply. Id. The second officer also drew his gun, moved toward the decedent,
and told the decedent to put the long object on the ground. Id. The decedent stood still for a few
seconds, holding the object at his side. Id. One of the two responding officers reported that the
decedent was not following commands and that they were going to have to shoot him. Id. The
decedent then walked toward where one of the officers was standing as both officers continued to
repeat commands to drop the long object. Id. The decedent failed to follow these commands and
slowly advanced in the officers’ direction, causing them to retreat several times. Id. at 913–14. At
one point, one officer warned the decedent that if he took one more step toward them, “I will
shoot you.” Id. at 913. At another point, the other officer told the decedent, “I don’t want to shoot
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you today.” Id. at 914. The decedent came within nine feet of the officers, at which point they
shot him multiple times. Id. After the shooting, it was discovered that the object was a plastic toy
shaped to look like a blade. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity from the excessive force claim, reasoning that the officers’ use of deadly force was
objectively reasonable because, inter alia, the decedent posed an immediate threat to them when
they fired. Id. at 914–19; see also Blanford v. Sacramento Cnty., 406 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that it was objectively reasonable for officers to view a suspect holding a sword
as an immediate threat when he attempted to enter a house or yard and failed to comply with
warnings or commands to put down the weapon).
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Napouk, which underscores circumstances very
similar to the ones present here, reinforces the principle that the “reasonableness” of a police
officer’s “use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”
123 F.4th at 915 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). From this perspective, Officers Welch and
Gandeza had cause to believe that Naki posed an immediate danger to them and to others in the
area on April 30, 2023. See Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1116. Naki was on a public roadway armed
with a 23-inch-long machete, he advanced in the officers’ direction with the machete in hand,
and he failed to heed the officers’ repeated commands to stop or back up and to drop the
machete. When the officers fired their guns at Naki, he was within approximately three to five
feet of Officer Welch, had ignored the officers’ repeated commands, and had moved toward them
several times, causing them to retreat more than once as the encounter continued. These facts,
objectively and reasonably, led the officers to conclude that the situation could not be resolved
by talking and that Naki posed an immediate risk of harm to Officer Welch. See Blanford, 406
F.3d at 1116.
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Plaintiffs argue that Naki did not pose an immediate threat because a 23-inch-long
machete is not a deadly weapon per se, and he was not using it as such. In support of this
proposition, they cite to Glenn, 673 F.3d 864, and Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir.
2001). But those cases are distinguishable. In Glenn, officers responded to reports of a suicidal
man holding a pocketknife. 673 F.3d at 873. When they arrived, the officers stood several feet
away from the man, and no bystanders were close enough to the man to be harmed by him. Id. at
874. Although the man did not respond to the officers’ orders to put the knife down, the man
remained in the same position and made no attempts to move until the officers shot him. Id. at
873–74. In Deorle, the suspect was unarmed; he committed no serious crime; he was given no
warning of the imminent use of a significant degree of force; he posed no risk of flight; he
complied with officer commands; and he presented “no objectively reasonable threat to the
safety of the” responding officer or others. 272 F.3d at 1285.
Neither of the cases Plaintiffs cite stand for the proposition that a suspect armed
with a machete poses an immediate threat only when that suspect uses the machete as a deadly
weapon. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected a similar argument. The Fourth
Amendment does not always require “officers to delay their fire until a suspect turns his weapon
on them.” George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2013). If the suspect “is armed—or
reasonably suspected of being armed—a furtive movement, harrowing gesture, or serious verbal
threat might create an immediate threat.” Id. Instead, the caselaw requires courts to engage in a
context-specific analysis, evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there
are objective factors to justify a concern for the safety of the officers or others. Id. at 837–39
(citations omitted); Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872–73 (citing Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1115–19); Bryan v.
MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
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Here, the undisputed facts show that Naki repeatedly disobeyed officer commands
to stop or back up and to drop the machete. By telling Naki that they would shoot him if he did
not put down the machete, Officers Welch and Gandeza suggested “their reasonable perception
that they saw further deliberate movement toward them with the [machete] as a threat.” See
Napouk, 123 F.4th at 918. Rather than comply with the officers’ repeated commands, Naki
continued to hold the machete and deliberately advance in the officers’ direction. See id.
Naki’s verbal communication to the officers that he was not harming them or
swinging the machete at them does not make the officers’ perception of threat any less
reasonable. The objective circumstances and the threat posed by a suspect’s conduct control the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (“[T]he
‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether
the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them . . . .” (citations omitted)). Here, when the officers fired upon Naki, he was
advancing toward them while armed with a weapon. Focusing on what a reasonable officer on
the scene would do under the known circumstances, Naki’s physical conduct created an
objectively reasonable perception of threat regardless of his accompanying verbal assurances.
In short, Officers Welch and Gandeza were justified in their belief that Naki posed
an immediate threat when he advanced toward them with a weapon. The first Graham factor
accordingly weighs in favor of a finding of reasonableness.
b. 	Severity of the crime at issue
The Court next addresses the severity of the crime at issue. Plaintiffs argue that
the crime for which Naki was arrestable and why Officers Welch and Gandeza had pursued him
was a misdemeanor violation of an order for protection (“VOP”). Although a VOP is in fact a
misdemeanor under Hawai‘i law, see Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 586-11(a), Plaintiffs’
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argument fails to account for the fact that this crime involves allegations of domestic violence,
see HRS §§ 586-3(a) (“There shall exist an action known as a petition for an order for protection
in cases of domestic abuse.”), 586-1 (defining “[d]omestic abuse”--in relevant part--as
“[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the threat of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault, extreme psychological abuse, coercive control, or malicious property damage between
family or household members; or” any act constituting abuse of family or household members
under HRS § 709-906). And the Ninth Circuit “take[s] very seriously the danger that domestic
disputes pose to law enforcement officers.” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 450. That is, “[d]omestic
violence situations are ‘particularly dangerous’ because ‘more officers are killed or injured on
domestic violence calls than on any other type of call.’” George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 839
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mattos, 661 F.3d at 450). But even if the “domestic dispute” was over by
the time the officers encountered Naki, at the moment the officers fired their guns, Naki could
have raised the machete instantly and struck Officer Welch with it.
The Ninth Circuit has “used the severity of the crime at issue as a proxy for the
danger a suspect poses at the time force is applied.” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1136
(9th Cir. 2019) (citing Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017)). Here,
Naki may have committed, at minimum, a number of felonious crimes as the event unfolded,
including Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree under HRS § 707-716,7 Attempted Assault
7 “A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree if the person
commits terroristic threatening: . . . With the use of a dangerous instrument . . . .” HRS
§ 707-716(1)(e).
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Against a Law Enforcement Officer in the First Degree under HRS §§ 705-5008 and 707-712.5,9
or Attempted Assault in the Second Degree under HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-71110. These crimes
are sufficiently serious and dangerous.
Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ contention that the crime at issue was a violent
felony. [ECF No. 59.] In support, Plaintiffs rely on McCarthy’s report, which includes his
opinion that Naki “took no action or word that would constitute a felony offense under Hawaii
law.” [Id. at PageID.475 (citation omitted).] At the outset, this opinion is wholly refuted by the
Court’s finding in the previous paragraph that Naki may have committed multiple serious and
dangerous felonies. But beyond that, McCarthy’s isolated opinion, along with many others in his
report,11 constitutes a legal conclusion that is an improper topic for expert opinions. The Ninth
Circuit has repeatedly affirmed that an expert witness cannot render an opinion as to a legal
8 “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if the person: (a) Intentionally engages in
conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as the person
believes them to be; or (b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as
the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to
culminate in the person’s commission of the crime.” HRS § 705-500(1).
9 “A person commits the offense of assault against a law enforcement officer in the first degree if
the person: (a) Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a law enforcement officer who
is engaged in the performance of duty . . . .” HRS § 707-712.5(1)(a).
10 “A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if the person: (a) Intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes substantial bodily injury to another; . . . [or] (d) Intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a dangerous instrument . . . .” HRS
§ 707-711(1)(a), (d).
11 Other opinions within McCarthy’s report are as follows: (1) the officers’ use of deadly force
was not justified under HRS § 703-304(5)(b) because they “could have retreated a reasonable
distance and maintain[ed] their efforts to gain [Naki’s] compliance . . . through de-escalation
methods”; (2) the officers’ use of deadly force was not justified under HRS § 703-307(3)(d)(i)
because “the crime for which Mr. Naki committed did not involve the use or threatened use of
deadly force”; and (3) the officers’ use of deadly force was not justified under HRS
§ 703-307(3)(d)(ii) because “the officers could have employed alternative methods such as
retreating and continued verbal commands to delay the arrest and successfully arrest him.” [ECF
No. 60 at PageID.511–12, 512–13.]
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conclusion. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 337 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing
Hooper v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 688 F.3d 1037, 1052 (9th Cir. 2012)); Nationwide Transp.
Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Hangarter v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004)); United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d
964, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Aguilar v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Union Local No. 10,
966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 426–27 (2007) (concluding that summary judgment was appropriate because there was
no dispute over an issue of material fact, and the expert testimony on a legal determination could
not create such a dispute). Therefore, the Court rejects McCarthy’s opinions on the law as
improper legal conclusions that cannot preclude summary judgment.
The second Graham factor weighs in favor of a finding that the officers’ use of
deadly force in this case was reasonable.
c. 	Whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight
“The final Graham factor asks whether the suspect is ‘actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Napouk, 123 F.4th at 919 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at
396). As discussed previously, Naki repeatedly failed to heed the officers’ commands to drop the
machete and to back up, and he moved toward the officers with the machete in hand. Also, at two
separate points during the altercation with the officers, Naki walked away from them, toward his
car, in what appeared to be an attempt to leave the scene. [See Welch BWC 07:50:36, 07:52:51;
Gandeza BWC 07:50:36, 07:52:53.]
Acknowledging that Naki failed to “comply with all of the officers’ commands,”
Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that he did not resist arrest or attempt to flee, as he obeyed some of
their orders and the officers did not inform Naki--in accordance with the Hawai‘i statute on
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arrests (HRS § 803-612)--that they were there to arrest him. [ECF No. 59 at PageID.475–76.]
This Court is unpersuaded. In Napouk, the Ninth Circuit upheld the officers’ use of force even
though they did not explicitly inform the suspect he was under arrest, focusing on the suspect’s
actions of actively resisting the officers’ orders to stop moving toward them and to drop the
bladed weapon, and deliberately approaching them with that weapon. 123 F.4th at 919–20.
Additionally, even assuming there is a violation of a state statute here, such violation does not
independently render an officer’s otherwise justified use of deadly force unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment. To reiterate, claims of excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.
In this case, Officers Welch and Gandeza repeatedly warned Naki that further
noncompliance with their orders to stop or back up and to drop the machete would require them
to use force. Still, Naki did not comply. He “actively resisted the officers’ orders, satisfying
Graham’s final factor.”13 Napouk, 123 F.4th at 920.
d. 	Whether there were less intrusive alternatives and whether the suspect was
obviously emotionally disturbed
Plaintiffs argue that other factors like the availability of less intrusive alternatives
and Naki’s mental state suggest the officers’ use of deadly force violated Naki’s constitutional
rights. [ECF No. 59 at PageID.477–78.] Although relevant to the totality of the circumstances,
12 HRS § 803-6 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “At or before the time of making an arrest,
the person shall declare that the person is an officer of justice, if such is the case. If the person
has a warrant the person should show it; or if the person makes the arrest without warrant in any
of the cases in which it is authorized by law, the person should give the party arrested clearly to
understand for what cause the person undertakes to make the arrest, and shall require the party
arrested to submit and be taken to the police station or judge. This done, the arrest is complete.”
HRS § 803-6(a).
13 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Deorle is inapposite, as the circumstances in that case are unlike here for
the same reasons discussed supra Section IV.A.1.a.
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Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872 (citations omitted), such factors “do not overcome the Graham factors to
prove a constitutional violation where all three Graham factors favor the officers’ use of force,”
Napouk, 123 F.4th at 920. But even if they could, each of these additional factors weigh in favor
of the officers in this case. See Napouk, 123 F.4th at 920.
First, although officers are required to consider “if there were ‘clear, reasonable
and less intrusive alternatives’ to the force employed,” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 876 (quoting Bryan v.
MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 831 (9th Cir. 2010)), they “need not avail themselves of the least
intrusive means of responding to an exigent situation; they need only act within that range of
conduct [the Ninth Circuit] identif[ies] as reasonable,” id. (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912,
915 (9th Cir. 1994)). Here, the officers made efforts to use alternative means. They tried to
engage with Naki for approximately three minutes, even when Naki approached within close
proximity of Officer Welch; they retreated when Naki deliberately advanced toward them; and
Officer Welch used a taser--which was ultimately not successful in subduing Naki. Additionally,
the officers tried to deescalate by saying things like “come on bah, put it down” [Welch BWC
07:51:55; Gandeza BWC 07:51:54]; “hey hey, just drop the machete bro, listen to me, drop the
machete” [Gandeza BWC 07:52:13]; “please” [Welch BWC 07:52:17]; “you ain’t gotta get to
this point” [id. 07:52:21; Gandeza BWC 07:52:19]; and again, “drop the machete bro”
[Gandeza BWC 07:52:26]. Only when Naki advanced toward the officers for--at least--the tenth
time with what they had immediately recognized was a large machete, came within three to five
feet of Officer Welch, and failed to follow commands to stop or back up and to drop the machete
did the officers use deadly force.
Relatedly, Plaintiffs contend there were less intrusive options available to
Officers Welch and Gandeza, but they instead escalated the encounter. [ECF No. 59 at
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PageID.477.] In support of their argument, Plaintiffs offer the statements of McCarthy, who
opined that the officers had ample room to retreat, delay arrest, or use de-escalation tactics. This
argument fails to notice several facts: the officers did in fact use de-escalation tactics as
described supra; the situation was already intense when officers encountered Naki because he
was armed with a long-bladed weapon; and the officers retreated more than once throughout the
encounter, with Officer Welch ultimately standing near his police vehicle when he and
Officer Gandeza finally employed deadly force. That the officers did not retreat another time
does not shift their use of deadly force from reasonable to unreasonable conduct. Moreover,
Plaintiffs’ argument overlooks the well-settled principle “that officers need not employ the least
intrusive means available so long as they act within a range of reasonable conduct.” Glenn, 673
F.3d at 878 (citation omitted).
Secondly, whether the officers knew Naki was mentally unstable is a relevant
consideration, id. at 875 (citation omitted), but it “does not negate the serious threat he” posed to
the officers on the day in question, Napouk, 123 F.4th at 921. The governmental interest in using
deadly force against a suspect who is emotionally disturbed is diminished “only ‘where such an
individual is neither a threat to himself nor to anyone else.’” Napouk, 123 F.4th at 920 (quoting
Bryan, 630 F.3d at 829 (emphasis added)). Here, on the other hand, Officers Welch and Gandeza
were confronted by Naki who was armed with a large machete and not only moving forward and
backward in an unpredictable way, but also then abruptly advancing toward the officers. “If
anything, [Naki’s] mental state and erratic behavior made [him] more of a threat to the officers
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because he clearly was not behaving rationally or in a predictable manner when he repeatedly
approached them with a bladed weapon.”14 Napouk, 123 F.4th at 921.
Like the Graham factors, the additional factors of less lethal means and Naki’s
mental state weigh in favor of a finding of reasonableness.
e. 	Conclusion as to factors
In short, the undisputed facts of this case show that Naki did not “simply
possess[] what [the officers] believed was a bladed weapon, or [stand] in one place, or merely
fail[] to comply with their commands to drop the weapon.” Napouk, 123 F.4th at 922. Rather, he
deliberately advanced toward Officer Welch with a machete and repeatedly ignored the officers’
commands to drop it and to stop or back up. Taken together, these undisputed facts lead this
Court to conclude that the officers’ use of deadly force was necessary and that, as a consequence,
there is no constitutional violation.
2. 	The officers did not violate clearly established law.
Even if this Court were to conclude that there is a dispute of material fact as to
whether the officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable, the officers would still be entitled to
qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law finding otherwise. “A right is
clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5
(2021) (per curiam) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)). In the Fourth
Amendment context, “specificity is especially important,” where “it is sometimes difficult for an
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the
14 McCarthy’s opinion that “the officers failed to leverage” information gained from their prior
contacts with Naki [ECF No. 60 at PageID.514] is similarly unpersuasive for the same reasons,
in addition to the fact that Naki was known to be combative and had acted violently or erratically
on prior occasions.
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factual situation the officer confronts.” Id. at 6 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12). Hence, the
burden is on the plaintiffs to identify a case that put the defendants on notice that their specific
conduct was unlawful. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs have not done so.
As an initial matter, the Court has already determined that Naki posed an
immediate threat to the safety of Officers Welch and Gandeza for the reasons discussed supra
Section IV.A.1.a. Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that “it was clearly established
that ‘a suspect’s previous violent conduct does not justify non-trivial force where the suspect
poses no immediate safety threat.’” [ECF No. 59 at PageID.482 (citing Andrews v. City of
Henderson, 35 F.4th 710, 719 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added)).] The Court similarly rejects
Plaintiffs’ assertion that summary judgment in this case is precluded pursuant to Hyer v. City &
County of Honolulu, 118 F.4th 1044 (9th Cir. 2024). Unlike in Hyer, where the officers forced
the confrontation with the suspect who was barricaded in his room, and there was conflicting
evidence in the form of eyewitness accounts and internal inconsistencies with the officers’
statements and deposition testimony, 118 F.4th at 1052–54, 1062–63, there is footage in this case
from the officers’ body-worn cameras conclusively establishing that Naki posed an immediate
threat to the officers as he intentionally advanced toward them on a public roadway while armed
with a machete.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024
(9th Cir. 2018), for the proposition that the law was “clearly established that officers must
exercise greater restraint when they believe a suspect is mentally ill” is unavailing. [ECF No. 59
at PageID.482.] Whether the suspect has displayed signs of mental illness is but one factor in the
reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment, Vos, 892 F.3d at 1034 n.9, and Naki’s
mental state did not diminish the governmental interest in using deadly force, see supra
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Section IV.A.1.d. Moreover, Vos is distinguishable as to the strength of the government’s interest
in that the officers in that case were not responding to the report of a crime; they established a
defensive position behind their vehicles upon arrival; they outnumbered the suspect eight to one;
the suspect was within twenty feet of the officers when he was shot; the officers did not believe
the suspect had a gun; and only eight seconds had passed between the suspect’s emergence and
the shooting. Vos, 892 F.3d at 1031–33. By contrast, Officers Welch and Gandeza responded to
the report of a crime essentially founded on allegations of domestic abuse; they had no defensive
cover; they were the sole officers on scene; they saw Naki holding a machete; Naki was within
three to five feet of Officer Welch when he was shot; and approximately three minutes had
passed between the initial encounter and the shooting.15 Equally important, although the Ninth
Circuit in Vos held that summary judgment was improper on the reasonableness of the officers’
use of force, it ultimately affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the
officers on the Section 1983 claims, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity because they did not violate clearly established law. 892 F.3d at 1034–36.
Plaintiffs have not identified any existing precedent that places the conclusion that
Officers Welch and Gandeza “acted unreasonably in these circumstances ‘beyond debate.’”16 Id.
15 As stated previously, the officers also repeatedly instructed Naki to drop the machete, using
alternative means of force throughout the encounter before being compelled to finally employ
deadly force.
16 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, Blanford and Napouk support, rather than undermine, this
Court’s conclusion that Officers Welch and Gandeza did not violate clearly established law. The
Ninth Circuit’s decisions in those cases hinged on circumstances nearly identical to the ones
present here, including that the suspect was armed with a weapon and that the suspect failed to
obey officer commands. See Blanford v. Sacramento Cnty., 406 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that the deputies were justified in their belief that the suspect posed a serious danger
to themselves and others “because he failed to heed warnings or commands and was armed with
an edged weapon that he refused to put down”); Napouk, 123 F.4th at 916 (“As the officers
reasonably perceived it, [the suspect] was holding a long, bladed weapon, walking toward one of
them and failing to follow commands to stop or to drop the weapon.”).
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at 1035 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 14). As such, the officers are entitled to qualified
immunity.
B. 	Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs argue that a reasonable jury could find that the officers’ conduct violated
Naki’s parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right against deprivation of familial relationship. [ECF
No. 59 at PageID.484–85.] The Ninth Circuit has held that parents have a due process right to
companionship of their adult decedent child. Napouk v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 123 F.4th
906, 923 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 678–79 (9th Cir. 2023)).
Even assuming--for purposes of this Order--that Naki’s parents could assert a substantive due
process claim based on his death, “‘only official conduct that “shocks the conscience” is
cognizable as a due process violation.’” Sinclair, 61 F.4th at 680 (quoting Porter v. Osborn, 546
F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008)).
In determining whether an officer’s use of deadly force “shocks the conscience,”
the court must first inquire “whether the circumstances are such that actual deliberation [by the
officer] is practical.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Porter, 546
F.3d at 1137 (alteration in original)). “Where actual deliberation is practical, then an officer’s
‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the conscience.” Id. (quoting Porter, 546 F.3d at
1137). But “where a law enforcement officer makes a snap judgment because of an escalating
situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a purpose to
harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id. (citing Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140).
Here, the encounter between Naki and the officers was fast-paced and short in
duration such that “the officers had to react quickly” to an “evolving and escalating” situation,
prompting them to make “‘repeated split-second decisions.’” Porter, 546 F.3d at 1139–40
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(quoting Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008)). Therefore, the “shocks the
conscience” standard is met in this case by showing that the officers acted with a purpose to
harm for reasons unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. Contrary to Plaintiffs’
argument, there is no such evidence in the record. Ergo, the officers are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim.
C. 	State Claims
With the loss of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the question becomes whether
this Court should still consider Plaintiffs’ remaining claims--which are asserted under state law.
“When federal claims are dismissed before trial, the question whether pendent state claims
should still be entertained is within the discretion of the district court.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe,
Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Schultz v. Sundberg,
759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”). The Ninth Circuit
has “held that the proper exercise of discretion is to dismiss the pendent state claims as well.”
Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, 911 F.2d at 247 (citing Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d
646, 651 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Here, the Court has determined that summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal
claims is warranted. Accordingly, it declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
state claims.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 55, is GRANTED as to Count I. As to the pendent state claims, Counts II–VI, they are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.17
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, February 10, 2026.
17 The pendent state claims are being dismissed without prejudice to allow Plaintiffs an
opportunity to file such claims in state court, the forum “better suited to address these issues of
state law.” See Reed v. Iranon, 940 F. Supp. 1523, 1531 (D. Haw. 1996).
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