Spriestersbach v. State of Hawaii

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JOSHUA SPRIESTERSBACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII, 	CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU, OFFICER
ABRAHAM K. BRUHN, 	DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, 	OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER, NIETZSCHE LYNN
TOLAN, MICHELLE MURAOKA, LESLIE
MALOIAN, JACQUELINE ESSER, JASON
BAKER, MERLINDA GARMA, SETH
PATEK, DR. JOHN COMPTON, DR.
MELISSA VARGO, DR. SHARON TISZA,
HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL, DR.
ALLISON GARRETT, 	JOHN/JANE DOES
1-20,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 21-00456 LEK-RT
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S
MOTIONS FILED ON NOVEMBER 1, 2024, [DKT. NOS. 257, 258]
On November 1, 2023, Defendant City and County of
Honolulu (“the City”) filed its Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss
with Prejudice Newly Added Federal Failure to Discipline, Train,
and Supervise and Final Policy-Maker Claims (“New Claims
Motion”) and its Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 250) (“Original Claims Motion”). [Dkt. no. 257, 258.] On
December 29, 2023, Plaintiff Joshua Spriestersbach
(“Spriestersbach”) filed his opposition to the New Claims Motion
(“New Claims Opposition”) and his opposition to the Original
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Claims Motion (“Original Claims Opposition”). [Dkt. nos. 298,
300.] Also on December 29, 2023, Defendants Office of the Public
Defender (“OPD”), Nietzsche Lynn Tolan, Michele Muraoka, Lesley
Maloian, Jason Baker, and Seth Patek (collectively “PD
Defendants”) filed a statement of no position as to the City’s
motions. [Dkt. no. 296.] On January 12, 2024, the City filed its
reply in support of the Original Claims Motion and its reply in
support of the New Claims Motion. [Dkt. nos. 305, 306.]
These matters came on for hearing on February 12,
2024. 1 On March 15, 2024, an entering order was issued informing
the parties of this Court’s rulings on the New Claims Motion and
the Original Claims Motion (“3/15/24 EO Ruling”). [Dkt.
no. 352.] The instant Order supersedes the 3/15/24 EO Ruling.
The New Claims Motion and the Original Claims Motion
(collectively “the Motions”) are hereby granted in part and
denied in part for the reasons set forth below.
1 The City’s motions were heard with two other motions,
which have been ruled upon in separate orders. See Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Allison Garrett,
M.D.’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Filed
October 18, 2023 (ECF 250), filed 3/15/24 (dkt. no. 350) (“Order
on Dr. Garrett’s Motion”), available at 2024 WL 1142198; Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part the PD Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff Joshua Spriestersbach’s First Amended
Complaint Filed on October 18, 2023, filed 3/15/24 (dkt.
no. 351) (“Order on the PD Defendants’ Motion”), available at
2024 WL 1142830.
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BACKGROUND
Spriestersbach filed his original Complaint on
November 21, 2021. [Dkt. no. 1.] The Motions address his
October 18, 2023 First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”).
[Dkt. no. 250.] This Court previously issued an order addressing
Spriestersbach’s claims against the City in the original
Complaint. See Order: Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendant City and County of Honolulu’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings; Granting Defendant Dr. Sharon Tisza’s Motion to
Dismiss Complaint; and Granting Defendants Dr. John Compton and
Dr. Melissa Vargo’s Substantive Joinder in Defendant Dr. Sharon
Tisza’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed 8/18/22 (dkt.
no. 151) (“8/18/22 Order”). 2
The case arises from Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017
arrest and prosecution for crimes committed by Thomas R.
Castleberry and Spriestersbach’s subsequent detention and civil
commitment related to that arrest until January 17, 2020. See
Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 4. Relevant to the instant Motion,
the claims in the Amended Complaint are: 3
2 The 8/18/22 Order is also available at 622 F. Supp. 3d
948.
3 Doe Defendants 1-5 are unknown police officers with the
Honolulu Police Department (“HPD”). See Amended Complaint at
¶ 12. The claims that are not alleged against the City and/or
Doe Defendants 1-5 are not relevant to the claims against the
City and will not be addressed in this Order.
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-a Title 42 United States Code Section 1983 claim against the
City and Defendant Allison Garrett, M.D. (“Dr. Garrett”),
alleging violations of Spriestersbach’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(“Count I”);
-a Section 1983 claim against the City and Dr. Garrett alleging
violations of Spriestersbach’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment (“Count II”);
-a disability discrimination claim against the City and OPD,
based upon violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), Title 42 United States Code Section 12101,
et seq. (“Count III”);
-a Section 1983 claim against the City and Doe Defendants 1-5
alleging abuse of process, in violation of Spriestersbach’s
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count IV”);
-a malicious prosecution claim against Doe Defendants 1-5
(“Count V”);
-an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim
against Defendants Nietzsche Lynn Tolan, Michele Muraoka,
Lesley Maloian, Jason Baker, and Seth Patek (collectively
“Individual PD Defendants”), the City, and Dr. Garrett
(“Count XI”); and
-a negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claim
against the City, the Individual PD Defendants, and
Dr. Garrett (“Count XII”).
The core factual allegations supporting
Spriestersbach’s claims against the City in the Amended
Complaint are the same as those in the original Complaint. They
are summarized in the 8/18/22 Order and will not be repeated
here. See 8/18/22 Order, 622 F. Supp. 3d at 952-54. The instant
Order will address the new factual allegations that
Spriestersbach added in the Amended Complaint to address the
defects identified in the 8/18/22 Order.
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The original Complaint alleged that Spriestersbach was
arrested by HPD officers on two prior occasions before his
May 11, 2017 arrest – an October 14, 2011 arrest and a
January 17, 2015 arrest. See id. at 952-53. The Amended
Complaint adds allegations about a July 26, 2010 arrest.
The HPD report regarding the July 26, 2010 arrest
states that, on that date, Spriestersbach was observed “‘in
Honolulu Harbor waters near the Navatek ship.’” [Amended
Complaint at ¶ 40.] Because Spriestersbach identified himself as
William Castleberry, he was arrested on the outstanding bench
warrant issued on July 24, 2009 for Thomas R. Castleberry
(“Castleberry Warrant”). [Id. at ¶¶ 36, 41.] Spriestersbach
alleges:
46. 	The officers who made the arrest knew –
and it would have been obvious to any reasonable
person – that [Spriestersbach] was a person
suffering from a mental health disability based
on his bizarre conduct and presence in the water
near the abandoned ship and his inability to
reasonably explain this conduct at the scene.
This would make it difficult for others to find
[Spriestersbach] credible or for [Spriestersbach]
to vigorously advocate for himself to ensure he
was not falsely arrested. [Spriestersbach]
suffered from this disability and disability
would have been apparent when interacting or
communicating with him.
47. 	The H.P.D. officers who made this
arrest were fully aware that because of his
disability [Spriestersbach] was at a significant
risk of being wrongfully detained and held, as he
ultimately was, if they did not correct the case
reporting records falsely identifying him as
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Thomas R. Castleberry. The H.P.D. arresting
officers and the H.P.D. officer in charge of the
receiving desk could have accommodated
[Spriestersbach] by correcting the information
that incorrectly merging his identity with Thomas
R. Castleberry in the databases, or further
flagging those records to indicate that
[Spriestersbach] was not Thomas R. Castleberry.
The need for such accommodation was obvious.
Nevertheless, the officers, acting consistent
with City policy, practice, and procedure,
ignored the substantial risk to [Spriestersbach]
and did not provide the accommodation.
48. 	Likewise, the City was fully aware that
persons with disabilities such as
[Spriestersbach]’s have a history of providing
identities that are not their own and then
becoming falsely associated with the names of
other suspects, because of their disability. The
City should have provided reasonable
accommodations to [Spriestersbach] by addressing
or making available highly pertinent mental
health information; here, for example, that
Plaintiff was schizophrenic, bipolar and
dysfunctional, and referred to himself as
Castleberry. Further the City should have further
accommodated by ensuring that the personal
information on file for this person with a mental
disability was in fact accurate. The need for the
City and its employees to provide such an
accommodation was obvious, though they did not
provide it, notwithstanding the substantial risks
involved for [Spriestersbach] and persons like
him.
[Id. at pgs. 12-13.]
“[T]he H.P.D. Desk Lieutenant or officer in charge of
the receiving desk . . . directed that [Spriestersbach’s]
identity be confirmed with fingerprints.” [Id. at ¶ 42.] The
fingerprint analysis confirmed Spriestersbach’s identity, and he
was released. The fact that the fingerprint analysis proved his
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identity as Joshua Spriestersbach is noted on the arrest report,
but the report also erroneously combined Spriestersbach’s
personal identifying information with Thomas Castleberry’s
information. The erroneous information was loaded into HPD’s
case reporting system and then from HPD’s system to state and
federal crime data reporting systems. [Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.]
Spriestersbach alleges
[o]n information and belief Defendant Does 1-5
H.P.D. officers had a duty to correct the police
department records and acting with malice, with
reckless disregard of the law or of
[Spriestersbach]’s legal rights, and with
deliberate indifference to [Spriestersbach]’s
constitutional rights, failed to correct their
records. They did so knowing that failing to
correct their records would expose
[Spriestersbach] to being misidentification [sic]
and additional arrests.
[Id. at ¶ 45.]
The Amended Complaint also contains new factual
allegations regarding an April 14, 2011 missing person report
that one of his sisters made with the City. [Id. at ¶ 49.] She
indicated that Spriestersbach had a mental disability, gave some
information about his diagnoses and medications, and said he
would refer to himself as “‘Sergeant Castleberry.’” [Id.] She
identified a photograph of Spriestersbach from an HPD database,
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and the photograph was used to make a missing persons flyer. 4 On
April 19, 2011, Spriestersbach was found in the Fort Street Mall
and Hotel Street area. [Id. at ¶ 50.]
As to the October 14, 2011 arrest described in the
original Complaint, the Amended Complaint added the allegation
that, although Spriestersbach gave the HPD officers the last
name Castleberry and refused to give a first name, when the
officer asked him for his birth date and his social security
number, Spriestersbach complied. [Id. at ¶ 52.] Further,
Spriestersbach added that the incident report for the
October 14, 2011 arrest combined Spriestersbach’s personal
identifying information with Thomas Castleberry’s, and the
erroneous information was uploaded to the HPD reporting system,
and then to state and federal criminal data reporting systems.
[Id. at ¶ 57.] Spriestersbach alleges the error must have been
discovered because, following the October 14, 2011 arrest, he
was not brought before a court on the Castleberry Warrant. [Id.
at ¶¶ 113-14.] Further, Spriestersbach alleges Doe
Defendants 1-5 “acted with malice[ and] reckless disregard of
the law or of [Spriestersbach]’s legal rights” when they failed
to correct the HPD records, and when they failed to correct the
4 The flyer appears to have been created by Crimestoppers.
See Amended Complaint at ¶ 103.
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records, “[t]hey did so knowing that would expose
[Spriestersbach] to misidentification and additional arrests.”
[Id. at ¶ 58.] Spriestersbach adds allegations substantively
similar to paragraphs 46-48 regarding the October 14, 2011
arrest. See id. at ¶¶ 59-61.
As to the January 17, 2015 arrest described in the
original Complaint, the Amended Complaint added the allegation
that, because the HPD databases still comingled Spriestersbach’s
personal identifying information with Thomas Castleberry’s,
their information continued to be improperly merged. [Id. at
¶ 65.] Spriestersbach added allegations substantively similar to
paragraphs 46-48 regarding the January 17, 2015 arrest. See id.
at ¶¶ 69-71. Spriestersbach also added an allegation about Doe
Defendants 1-5 and the January 17, 2015 arrest that is similar
to paragraph 58. See id. at ¶ 72. In addition, Spriestersbach
alleges the erroneous identification was discovered, and the
arrest report had a note: “‘POSSIBLE WARRANT UNDER CASTLEBERRY,
THOMAS, A#1077743. CHECKS VIA ID (DAISY) PER ID PRINTS UNDER
A#10777743 CASTLEBERRY, THOMAS DO NOT MATCH Spriestersbach.’”
[Id. at ¶ 122 (emphasis in Amended Complaint).]
As to the May 11, 2017 arrest, Spriestersbach adds the
allegation that HPD Officer Abraham Bruhn (“Bruhn”) and his
partner believed Spriestersbach was Thomas Castleberry because
they were relying on a digital notebook. [Id. at ¶ 74.] The
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digital notebook was a database of wanted persons, and it was a
long-standing City practice for HPD officers to study the
photographs and information in the digital notebook and to rely
on it when making arrests. [Id. at ¶ 83.] Spriestersbach
alleges, “[o]n information and belief, the information listed in
the digital notebook was derived from the City case reporting
system.” [Id. at ¶ 88.]
According to Spriestersbach, “[t]he practice of using
this digital notebook and relying on it to make arrests was so
widespread as to have the force of law.” [Id.] On May 11, 2017,
there was an entry in the digital notebook for Thomas
Castleberry that indicated an open warrant and that included
Thomas Castleberry’s personal information, but the entry had a
photograph of Spriestersbach. Bruhn and his partner arrested
Spriestersbach on the Castleberry Warrant in reliance on the
digital notebook. [Id. at ¶¶ 85-87.] Spriestersbach alleges this
type of error in the City case reporting system occurred
numerous times, and the errors remained in the system because
the system was not corrected. Further, the error comingling
Spriestersbach’s and Castleberry’s information was known to the
City. Spriestersbach argues this type of error was particularly
harmful to persons with mental disability because of their
impaired ability to advocate for themselves. [Id. at ¶ 89.]
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Spriestersbach emphasizes that, on May 11, 2017, he was only
arrested based upon the Castleberry Warrant. [Id. at ¶ 90.]
Spriestersbach argues that his behavior on May 11,
2017 should have made it apparent to Bruhn and Bruhn’s partner
that he was a person with a mental disability, and therefore
others would not believe his statements and he would be unable
to advocate for himself. Because of this, Bruhn and his partner
should have done a record search, which would have revealed the
2010 harbor incident and the 2011 missing person report by
Spriestersbach’s sister. [Id. at ¶ 76.] Spriestersbach alleges:
77. 	H.P.D. officer Bruhn researched
[Spriestersbach] on the City’s Case Reporting
System, the City’s Digital Notebook, the
Crimestopper information he possessed and the
State of Hawai`i Criminal Justice Information
System database. H.P.D. officer Bruhn discovered
that these records listed Thomas R. Castleberry
as an alias for Joshua Spriestersbach. H.P.D.
officer Bruhn also discovered conflicting social
security numbers, conflicting state ID numbers,
conflicting dates of birth, and other personal
data that did not match Thomas R. Castleberry,
who he intended to arrest, with Joshua
Spriestersbach, who he did in fact arrest.
Further, H.P.D. officer Bruhn discovered or
should have discovered the records that indicated
that [Spriestersbach] suffered from a mental
disability and required medication.
. . . .
80. 	H.P.D. officer Bruhn knew that the
facts he gathered did not confirm that
[Spriestersbach] was the person named in the
warrant. H.P.D. officer Bruhn knew that many of
the facts he gathered contradicted any conclusion
that [Spriestersbach] was the person named in the
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warrant. Nonetheless, by proceeding with the
arrest H.P.D. officer Bruhn acted with malice and
with the knowledge of the risk that his actions
would lead to and detention of [Spriestersbach]
on the warrant without probable cause. In so
doing, H.P.D. officer Bruhn also acted with
malice toward [Spriestersbach], deliberate
indifference and with reckless disregard of
[Spriestersbach]’s legal rights.
81. 	H.P.D. officer Bruhn was fully aware
that because of his disability, [Spriestersbach]
may have been wrongfully associated with the
warrant and that pursuant to City policy, the
merger of his identity with Thomas R Castleberry
would not have been corrected, and that this was
particularly likely given his disability. Officer
Bruhn should have accommodated [Spriestersbach]
by verifying whether this misidentification had
happened. The need for such an accommodation was
obvious. Nevertheless, Officer Bruhn ignored the
substantial risk to [Spriestersbach] and did not
verify the information, causing him to be
arrested and detained.
[Id. at pgs. 21-22.] Spriestersbach emphasizes that, on May 11,
2017, he was only arrested on the Castleberry Warrant. In other
words, but for the comingling of Spriestersbach’s and Thomas
Castleberry’s information in the City’s digital notebook,
Spriestersbach would not have been arrested. [Id. at ¶ 90.]
H.P.D. Policy 7.01 VIII F states that, “[a]n
arrested person frequently provides false
information about his or her identity (e.g., an
alias or another person’s name) . . .” The policy
also indicates what steps must be taken “to
correct misidentifications when they are
discovered.” Thus, the City and the its [sic]
individual H.P.D. officers including H.P.D.
officer Bruhn were on notice that
misidentifications of arrested persons did take
place. On information and belief, these problems
were deemed corrected when the falsely arrested
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person was released. The City policy and related
training for correcting misidentifications,
however, does not include any instruction to
employees of the H.P.D. to correct errors they
discover in the databases or City digital
notebook which causes the same misidentification
to recur, resulting in persons being arrested
several times based on misidentifications.
[Id. at ¶ 91.] Spriestersbach alleges that the City had notice
that the digital notebook contained errors in the personal
information and/or photographs of some of the persons depicted
therein. The City was also on notice that there was no system in
place to identify and correct such errors. Spriestersbach
alleges the City does not discipline or retrain employees who
enter erroneous personal identifying information in case
reporting systems or who fail to correct such errors.
Spriestersbach alleges the failure to identify and correct
errors in the digital notebook and the failure to discipline and
retrain employees who made or failed to correct such errors
constitute deliberate indifference to persons like
Spriestersbach who may be arrested because of erroneous
information in the digital notebook. [Id. at ¶¶ 92-93.]
Spriestersbach also argues the City had notice of the comingling
of his information with Thomas Castleberry’s information because
the comingling was apparent on the face of the arrest reports,
and therefore it should have been obvious that, if
Spriestersbach interacted with HPD officers in the future, he
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could be arrested again because of these errors. By allowing the
erroneous information to remain, the City was deliberately
indifferent that Spriestersbach and other persons in similar
situations would be misidentified and falsely arrested. [Id. at
¶¶ 116-17.] Further, there were other case reports regarding
Spriestersbach’s interactions with HPD – from 2009 to 2012,
2015, and 2017 - that improperly had Thomas Castleberry’s
personal information. Pursuant to HPD’s longstanding practice
and custom, these case reports with the erroneous information
were uploaded state and national databases and to the HPD
digital notebook. [Id. at ¶¶ 118-19.]
Spriestersbach also adds additional allegations
regarding the events after his May 11, 2017 arrest. When
Spriestersbach was transported to the HPD Central Station after
the arrest, Bruhn reported to the HPD officer who was in charge
of the receiving desk (“Receiving Officer-in-Charge”). [Id. at
¶¶ 94-95.] Pursuant to HPD policy 7.01 VIII.A.3, the Receiving
Officer-in-Charge was required to “‘review the circumstances of
each arrest before any person is booked in order to determine
whether there exist sufficient grounds or facts to justify the
arrest.’” [Id. at ¶ 97.] In addition, Section VIII.A.8 of that
policy states “‘[n]o booking shall be made for an arrest by
warrant without first establishing the identity of the detainee
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as the person named and accused in the warrant.’” [Id. at
¶ 104.]
Spriestersbach alleges the arrest report for the
May 11, 2017 arrest lists his name as the defendant, with his
state ID number, birth date, social security number, and other
personal information, but it also lists Thomas R. Castleberry as
an alias and includes Thomas Castleberry’s social security
number. [Id. at ¶¶ 99-100.] According to Spriestersbach, Bruhn
informed the Receiving Officer-in-Charge that a search relating
to the Castleberry Warrant revealed conflicting names, social
security numbers, photographs, and other personal facts. Bruhn
also informed the Receiving Officer-in-Charge that the digital
notebook’s photograph for Thomas Castleberry did not match the
Crimestoppers flyer for Spriestersbach. [Id. at ¶¶ 102-03.]
Spriestersbach points out that HPD policy 7.01 VIII.C.1 requires
that “‘all arrestees for whom an H.P.D. Arrest Report has been
generated shall be fingerprinted and photographed.’” [Id. at
¶ 105 (brackets omitted).] Spriestersbach points out that the
May 11, 2017 arrest report states his arrest was “‘verified by
prints.’” [Id. at ¶ 106.]
Spriestersbach alleges the Receiving Officer-in-Charge
approved his May 11, 2017 arrest, even though Spriestersbach’s
fingerprints and mugshots should have confirmed that he was not
Thomas Castleberry. Further, in doing approving the arrest, the
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Receiving Officer-in-Charge acted with deliberate indifference
to Spriestersbach’s rights and was reckless when the officer
failed to confirm Spriestersbach’s identity. [Id. at ¶¶ 107-08.]
The Receiving Officer-in-Charge allowed Bruhn to hand-write
“‘AKA Spriestersbach, Joshua C.” on the Castleberry Warrant, 5
even though they did not verify that Spriestersbach was Thomas
Castleberry’s alias, nor that Spriestersbach was the person
named in the warrant. [Id. at ¶ 110.] Spriestersbach alleges
“[p]ermitting officers to write alias names on warrants was
consistent with the way the H.P.D. officer in charge of the
receiving desk and other City supervisors exercised supervision
over H.P.D. officers.” [Id. at ¶ 140.] According to
Spriestersbach, all of the actions associated with his booking
and the approval of his arrest were “done maliciously, with
reckless disregard to [his] legal rights, with deliberate
indifference and are all actions by the city that caused the
misidentification of [Spriestersbach], his arrest and his
prolonged incarceration and commitment.” [Id. at ¶ 112.]
Further, the City, acting through the Receiving Officer-in-
Charge, was deliberately indifferent to Spriestersbach’s rights
5 Spriestersbach alleges that, on May 11, 2017, the
Castleberry Warrant was considered an electronic warrant. When
Bruhn printed out the warrant from the warrant database, the
printed warrant was then treated as the original warrant. Bruhn
made his handwritten note on the original warrant. [Amended
Complaint at ¶ 133.]
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when it allowed Bruhn to make the handwritten note on the
Castleberry Warrant because the Receiving Officer-in-Charge did
not confirm that Spriestersbach was the person named on the
warrant. [Id. at ¶ 140.]
Spriestersbach alleges:
The H.P.D. receiving officer in charge binds the
City as a policymaker with respect to decisions
on individual arrests, because final authority
has been delegated to the H.P.D. officer in
charge of the receiving desk to determine whether
sufficient grounds justify arrests. Decisions by
the H.P.D. officer in charge of the receiving
desk are in effect decisions of the City with
respect to these individual arrests.
Id. at ¶ 98; see also id. at ¶ 109 (similar). Spriestersbach
therefore alleges the Receiving Officer-in-Charge’s approval of
his May 11, 2017 arrest and the officer’s decisions regarding
the protocols used during the approval process are binding on
the City. [Id. at ¶ 111.]
Spriestersbach also argues HPD Policy 7.01 VIII.F
requires that, when misidentifications are discovered, the
“‘Records and Identification commander shall also ensure that
the Department of the Prosecuting Attorney is notified of the
correct identity of the arrested person.’” [Id. at ¶ 123.]
Spriestersbach contends various HPD officers - including the
officer serving as the Receiving Officers-in-Charge at the time
of each of Spriestersbach’s arrests - and the HPD Records and
Identification Division discovered Spriestersbach’s
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misidentification in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2017, but they
did not follow Policy 7.01 VIII.F. According to Spriestersbach,
HPD had a longstanding policy of not correcting records. [Id. at
¶¶ 123-24.] This resulted in “repeated arrests without probable
cause of persons including Joshua Spriestersbach.” [Id. at
¶ 124.]
Spriestersbach points out that the Castleberry Warrant
is still active. Further, even after this case was filed, the
HPD case reporting system continued to improperly comingle
Spriestersbach’s personal information with Thomas Castleberry’s
and the errors continued to be uploaded to state and national
reporting systems. [Id. at ¶¶ 125-26.] According to
Spriestersbach, the HPD digital notebook was not corrected until
2022, i.e., after he filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction. [Id. at ¶ 127.] Spriestersbach argues “City
policymakers and employees acted with malice, reckless
disregard, and deliberate indifference to [his] rights . . . by
not correcting their records and databases.” [Id. at ¶ 128.]
Spriestersbach emphasizes that Bruhn was an HPD
officer since 2012, but Bruhn and the other officers who
encountered Spriestersbach and who discovered the erroneous
personal information in the case record system were not trained
to correct the errors. The failure to correct erroneous records
made it more likely that officers’ reliance on the records would
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lead to the misidentification of suspects, including
Spriestersbach. The City’s failure to train personnel regarding
the correction of errors was deliberately indifferent to
Spriestersbach’s rights and the rights of others. [Id. at
¶¶ 129-32.]
Spriestersbach states that, “[o]n occasions during his
service with H.P.D., officer Bruhn wrote the name of other
people on warrants, based on the long-standing H.P.D. custom and
practice of treating people identified through an alias the same
as persons actually named in warrants.” [Id. at ¶ 135.]
Spriestersbach alleges this practice leads to misidentifications
and causes people to be falsely arrested on warrants issued for
another person. Similarly, the City’s failure to train and
supervise HPD officers, including the Receiving Officers-in-
Charge, to confirm that the person taken into custody is the
person named on the warrant was likely to result in
misidentification and wrongful arrest. Further, the City was
deliberately indifferent to the rights of persons, including
Spriestersbach, who had errors in their HPD records
incorporating the personal information of other persons. [Id. at
¶¶ 137-39.]
Spriestersbach alleges that, in his May 11, 2017
arrest, the Receiving Officer-in-Charge was authorized to act on
the City’s behalf, and the City approved Spriestersbach’s arrest
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even though it should have been obvious that Spriestersbach was
not the person named in the Castleberry Warrant. After the
Receiving Officer-in-Charge made the decision to approve the
arrest, there was no further review by the City before
Spriestersbach was required to appear in court, and therefore
the decision by the Receiving Officer-in-Charge is binding upon
the City. Further, the May 11, 2017 arrest was pursuant to the
City’s practice or custom of relying on HPD records, including
the digital notebook and arrest records, even though the City
was aware that errors in the personal information contained in
those systems were not corrected. [Id. at ¶¶ 166-68.]
Spriestersbach alleges the “reliance on personal identifiers and
photos known to be wrong was the moving force behind and caused
individuals including [Spriestersbach] to be arrested falsely
for crimes the individuals did not commit,” and the Receiving
Officer-in-Charge’s decision to approve his May 11, 2017 arrest
was the moving force behind the violation of Spriestersbach’s
constitutional rights. [Id. at ¶¶ 167-68.] Spriestersbach
alleges “there were many other similar victims,” including one
“mentally ill man” who was arrested shortly after Spriestersbach
filed this action. [Id. at ¶ 167.]
Count I of the Amended Complaint now includes a
summary of the new factual allegations about the Receiving
Officer-in-Charge and the City’s custom and practice of relying
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on record systems that contained erroneous personal information
that was not corrected. See id. at ¶¶ 172-74. Spriestersbach
also added the allegation that the City’s customs, policies, and
practices caused his misidentification and arrest on the
Castleberry Warrant and that the violations of his rights and
the injuries he suffered were the proximate result of the
defendants’ actions and omissions. [Id. at ¶ 178.]
Count III of the Amended Complaint now includes a
summary of the allegations regarding Doe Defendants 1-5, Bruhn,
and the Receiving Officer-in-Charge for the May 11, 2017 arrest
and the fact that they all knew or should have known that
Spriestersbach was a person with a mental disability when they
arrested him in 2011, 2015, and 2017, and they failed to
accommodate him by verifying his identity. See id. at ¶¶ 192-94.
Count III also alleges the City has direct liability because it
knew that HPD officers would frequently interact with disabled
persons who would have difficulty advocating for themselves to
prevent a false arrest. In spite of this knowledge, the City
allowed HPD officers to leave known errors in the record systems
uncorrected and unaddressed. The City also failed to require
that such persons be accommodated by requiring that their
identity be confirmed prior to arrest. Spriestersbach argues the
City knew that its inactions would result in the wrongful arrest
of persons with mental disabilities. [Id. at ¶ 195.]
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Count IV of the Amended Complaint now includes
allegations about Bruhn and the Receiving Officer-in-Charge on
the date of the May 11, 2017 arrest, alleging that they acted
with malice, reckless disregard for Spriestersbach’s rights, and
an ulterior purpose. Their actions resulted in Spriestersbach
being arrested without probable cause and being deprived of his
liberty. The prosecution that ensued from the May 11, 2017
arrest ultimately resulted in Spriestersbach’s favor. [Id. at
¶¶ 204-06.]
Counts XI and XII of the Amended Complaint now include
allegations that the City is liable under respondeat superior
for the actions of Bruhn, the Receiving Officer-in-Charge, and
Doe Defendants 1-5. Spriestersbach summarizes the allegations
regarding the conduct of Bruhn and the Receiving Officer-in-
Charge related to the May 11, 2017 arrest, and Spriestersbach
argues they knew their actions would cause Spriestersbach severe
emotional distress. [Id. at ¶¶ 245-46, 252-53.]
In the New Claims Motion, the City argues
Spriestersbach’s “newly added federal claims in the First
Amended Compliant – Pembaur/Praprotnik final policy maker and
failure to discipline, train, and supervise claims” (“the New
Claims”) should be dismissed. [New Claims Motion at 2 & n.1
(citing Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality
opinion); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).] The
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City contends the New Claims should be stricken because
Spriestersbach violated the orders of this Court and the
magistrate judge. In the alternative, the City argues the New
Claims should be dismissed because they fail to state plausible
claims for relief. [Id.]
In the Original Claims Motion, the City seeks the
dismissal with prejudice of all claims against it in the Amended
Complaint. [Original Claims Motion at 2.] The City contends
Spriestersbach failed to cure the deficiencies in his claims
that this Court identified in the 8/18/22 Order. [Original
Claims Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 1.]
DISCUSSION
I. 	New Claims Motion
A. 	Request to Strike
This Court turns first to the City’s request that the
New Claims be stricken. In the 8/18/22 Order, this Court granted
Spriestersbach leave to amend his claims against the City to
cure the defects identified in the order. See 8/18/22 Order, 622
F. Supp. 3d at 971. The 8/18/22 Order did not grant
Spriestersbach leave to add new claims or new theories of
liability against the City.
Although it was not entirely clear in the original
Complaint, reading the Complaint as a whole, the claims against
the City in Counts I and II were based in part on a failure to
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train and supervise theory. See Complaint at ¶ 62 (“At all times
relevant to this action, the City has failed to train and
supervise Officer Defendant Braun, Defendant H.P.D. Officers
Does 1-5, and other officers to determine exactly who they are
arresting and to make sure accurate information is in their
records, particularly when the officers are interacting with
mentally ill and/or houseless members of the community. These
failures to train and supervise were the moving force behind
[Spriestersbach’s] improper arrest and detention.”). 6 Although
failure to discipline was not alleged in the original Complaint,
the addition of failure to discipline allegations was an
amendment of the failure to train and supervise theory that was
alleged in Counts I and II of the original Complaint. Therefore,
the addition of failure to discipline allegations and the
expansion of the allegations regarding the failure to train and
supervise did not violate the 8/18/22 Order. The City’s New
Claims Motion is denied to the extent that the City requests
that the portions of Counts I and II based on the alleged
failure to discipline, train, and supervise be stricken. 7
6 Spriestersbach’s claim against the City in Count IV of the
original Complaint was not based upon a failure to train or
supervise theory. See Complaint at ¶¶ 87-90.
7 This Court does not construe Spriestersbach’s abuse of
process claim against the City in Count IV of the Amended
Complaint as based upon a failure to train, supervise, or
discipline theory. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 201-07.
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As to Spriestersbach’s allegations regarding a final
policymaker as to individual arrests, this Court agrees with the
City that Counts I and II of the original Complaint were not
based on similar allegations. See generally Complaint at ¶¶ 64-
77; compare, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶ 98 (“The H.P.D.
receiving officer in charge binds the City as a policymaker with
respect to decisions on individual arrests, because final
authority has been delegated to the H.P.D. officer in charge of
the receiving desk to determine whether sufficient grounds
justify arrests.”). The addition of the final policymaker
allegations in the Amended Complaint constitutes the assertion
of a new theory of liability, in violation of the 8/18/22 Order.
Although this Court could strike the portions of Counts I and II
based on a final policymaker theory, this Court declines to do
so for the sake of a complete analysis of Spriestersbach’s
claims. Thus, to the extent that the New Claims Motion asks this
Court to strike the portions of Counts I and II based on final
policymaker allegations, the motion is denied.
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
This Court next turns to Spriestersbach’s alternative
argument that the New Claims should be dismissed because they
fail to state plausible claims for relief. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
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accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
First, the New Claims Motion’s request to dismiss the
portions of Counts I and II based on alleged failures to train
and supervise is denied because this Court will address the
sufficiency of those portions of Counts I and II together with
the other claims at issue in the Original Claims Motion.
1. 	Failure to Discipline
As to the new portions of Counts I and II based on the
City’s alleged failure to discipline, this Court notes that the
Ninth Circuit has stated:
We have recognized that a § 1983 plaintiff
may prove the second type of Monell liability,[ 8 ]
deliberate indifference, through evidence of a
“failure to investigate and discipline employees
in the face of widespread constitutional
violations.” Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652
F.3d 1225, 1234 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, it is
sufficient under our case law to prove a “custom”
of encouraging excessive force to provide
evidence that personnel have been permitted to
use force with impunity. Id. at 1233 (“We have
8 See 8/18/22 Order, 622 F. Supp. 3d at 959, for a
description of the legal principles applicable to a Section 1983
claim against a municipality based on Monell v. Department of
Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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long recognized that a custom or practice can be
inferred from widespread practices or evidence of
repeated constitutional violations for which the
errant municipal officers were not discharged or
reprimanded.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); Larez [v. City of Los
Angeles], 946 F.2d [630,] 647 [(9th Cir. 1991)]
(“[T]here was evidence of a departmental policy
or custom of resorting to the use of excessive
force. The jury properly could find such policy
or custom from the failure of Gates to take any
remedial steps after the violations.”); McRorie
v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“McRorie alleges that guards seriously injured
him and twenty-eight other prisoners during the
shakedown and that Sergeant Dunn was acting under
orders of his superiors. If proved, these acts
reflect a [policy or custom].”); see also
Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010,
1027–28 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that a
plaintiff could present “a failure-to-discipline
Monell theory” based on evidence “that the City
had a policy or custom of failing to investigate
and discipline officers who had allegedly
committed prior instances of excessive force”).
Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 803 (9th Cir.
2018) (some alterations in Rodriguez) (emphasis added).
In Rodriguez, the jury returned verdicts against the
County of Los Angeles and nineteen Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (“LASD”) officers, and denied the defendants’ motion
for judgment as a matter of law and their motion for a new
trial. Id. at 790. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that there
was substantial evidence establishing a “failure to investigate
and discipline employees in the face of widespread
constitutional violations.” Id. at 803. That evidence included:
a report by a citizens’ commission report regarding problems
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with excessive force at the facility where the incidents at
issue in the case occurred; the testimony of one of the
defendant officer’s supervisors that, according to his
investigation, the defendant condoned subordinates’ use of
excessive force; evidence that LASD did not follow policies
regarding the tracking of incidents involving the use of force
against prisoners; and evidence that supervisors observed
practices involving the use of excessive force but did nothing
about them. Id. at 789-90, 803. Although Rodriguez did not
address a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
case is instructive as to the type of facts that are ultimately
necessary establish municipal liability based on a failure to
discipline.
Spriestersbach alleges the City did not discipline
employees who failed to identify and correct personal
identifying information after it was entered into the applicable
case reporting system. [Amended Complaint at ¶ 92.] He also
alleges the City failed to discipline Braun, Doe Defendants 1-5,
the Receiving Officer-in-Charge, and others “to make sure they
determine exactly who they are arresting and to make sure
accurate information is entered in the in the City records,
particularly when the officers are interacting with mentally ill
and/or houseless members of the community.” [Id. at ¶ 169.]
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Spriestersbach alleges “[n]umerous case reporting
records from interactions between [Spriestersbach] and the
police in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2017 all reveal
personal identifiers related to [Spriestersbach] improperly
merged with personal identifiers related to Thomas R.
Castleberry.” [Id. at ¶ 118.] He also generally alleges, “[o]n
information and belief, the City case reporting system included
numerous instances where personal identifiers and photos related
to one individual would be improperly entered under a different
individual.” [Id. at ¶ 89.] Spriestersbach asserts the errors
were not corrected, causing people to be wrongfully arrested for
crimes they did not commit. [Id.]
Spriestersbach, however, does not identify any
specific incidents when a person was wrongfully arrested because
identifying information for another individual was erroneously
included in the person’s records. Although this Court is
required to assume that the factual allegations in the Amended
Complaint are true, that assumption does not apply to
Spriestersbach’s allegation of “numerous instances” of wrongful
arrests based on erroneous personal identifiers because it is a
conclusory allegation of one of the elements of his failure to
discipline claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Although for the
purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept
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as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); id.
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
(citation omitted)).
Further, Spriestersbach does not allege that any City
supervisor was aware of and failed to act upon widespread
arrests of persons based upon erroneous identifying information.
The only allegation in the Amended Complaint regarding City
supervisors states: “Permitting officers to write alias names on
warrants was consistent with the way the H.P.D. officer in
charge of the receiving desk and other City supervisors
exercised supervision over H.P.D. officers.” [Amended Complaint
at ¶ 140.] Even assuming that this allegation is true, it is
insufficient to allow this Court to draw the reasonable
inference that City supervisors were aware of and failed act
upon widespread arrests of persons based upon erroneous
identifying information. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Spriestersbach alleges there were multiple incidents
where either his personal identifying information was comingled
with Thomas Castleberry’s or it became apparent that comingling
of their information had occurred in the past. See Amended
Complaint at ¶ 118. However, the unspecified incidents referred
to in paragraph 118, which occurred over an almost eight-year
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period, are insufficient to establish widespread constitutional
violations. See Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 44
F.4th 867, 884 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Plaintiffs cannot allege a
widespread practice or custom based on isolated or sporadic
incidents; liability must be founded upon practices of
sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct
has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”
(brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
This Court therefore concludes that Spriestersbach fails to
plead sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible Monell
claim based on failure to discipline. The portions of Counts I
and II based on the City’s alleged failure to discipline are
dismissed.
“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend
is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint
could not be saved by amendment.” Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
910 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation
marks omitted)). Spriestersbach had the opportunity to conduct
significant discovery before he filed the Amended Complaint.
Further, Spriestersbach has not indicated that he would be able
to add further allegations to support his failure to discipline
theory if he were granted leave to amend. This Court therefore
concludes it is clear that Spriestersbach cannot cure the defect
in these portions of Counts I and II by amendment. The dismissal
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of the portions of Counts I and II based upon the City’s alleged
failure to discipline is with prejudice.
2. 	Final Policymaker
Spriestersbach alleges the Receiving Officer-in-Charge
is a final policymaker for purposes of his Monell claims because
that officer has been delegated the power to change warrants
without court approval. [New Claims Opp. at 12-13.]
The Ninth Circuit has stated that:
[“T]he identification of those officials whose
decisions represent the official policy of the
local government unit is itself a legal question
to be resolved by the trial judge before the case
is submitted to the jury.” Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S. Ct. 2702,
105 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1989) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Christie v.
Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). “Once
those officials who have the power to make
official policy on a particular issue have been
identified, it is for the jury to determine
whether their decisions have caused the
deprivation of rights at issue . . . .” Jett, 491
U.S. at 737, 109 S. Ct. 2702.
Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis and
some alterations in Lytle). “Whether an official is a
policymaker for Monell purposes is a question governed by state
law.” Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2013) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 124, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988)).
Spriestersbach does not identify any state law that
renders the Receiving Officer-in-Charge a final policymaker for
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either HPD or the City. See, e.g., Puana v. Kealoha, CIV.
NO. 16-00659 LEK-WRP, 2023 WL 413127, at *3-4 (D. Hawai`i
Jan. 25, 2023) (concluding that the HPD Chief of Police
“possessed final policymaking authority for the actions that
lead to the presumed deprivation of [the plaintiff]’s
constitutional rights,” based upon Hawai`i Revised Statutes
Section 52D-3, and Sections 6-1601, 6-1603, 6-1604, 6-1606 of
the Revised Charter of the City and County of Honolulu 1973
(Amended 2017 Edition)). Spriestersbach appears to acknowledge
that he cannot do so and relies solely upon a delegated power
theory. See New Claims Opp. at 13.
A municipal employee may act as a de facto
policymaker under § 1983 without explicit
authority under state law, but we are ordinarily
“not justified in assuming that municipal
policymaking authority lies somewhere else than
where the applicable law purports to put it.”
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
126, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988).
Depending on the circumstances, however, we may
also look to the way a local government entity
operates in practice. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109
S. Ct. 2702 (trial judge must identify official
policymakers based on “state and local positive
law, as well as custom or usage having the force
of law”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
While “[a]uthority to make municipal policy may
be granted directly by a legislative enactment,”
it may also be “delegated by an official who
possesses such authority.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d
452 (1986).
Lytle, 382 F.3d at 982–83 (alteration in Lytle).
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Spriestersbach does not allege who delegated final
policymaking authority to the Receiving Officer-in-Charge nor
how that authority was delegated. Spriestersbach only pleads the
conclusory allegation that the Receiving Officer-in-Charge is “a
policymaker with respect to decisions on individual arrests,
because final authority has been delegated to” that officer. See
Amended Complaint at ¶ 98. Nor would Spriestersbach be able to
plead additional factual allegations to establish that every HPD
officer who serves as the Receiving Officer-in-Charge at any
given time has been delegated final policymaking authority. Cf.
Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]his
court has refused to hold that the Los Angeles chief of police
had delegated final policymaking authority to rank-and-file
police officers.” (some citations omitted) (citing Trevino v.
Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The police officers
who shot Bahena were not ‘officials with final policy-making
authority’ and they were not ordered to shoot by the police
chief, the City Council or anyone else possessing final policy-
making authority.”))). This Court therefore concludes that
Spriestersbach has failed to plead a plausible Monell claim
based on a final policymaker theory and dismisses the portions
of Counts I, II, and IV based on that theory of liability.
Because this Court also concludes that Spriestersbach cannot
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save those portions of Counts I, II and IV by amendment, the
dismissal is with prejudice.
II. 	Original Claims Motion
A. 	Time-Bar Argument
The City acknowledges that this Court ruled on its
time-bar argument in the 8/18/22 Order. See Original Claims
Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 22. However, the City argues “the new
allegations in the [Amended Complaint] reinforce the fact that
[Spriestersbach] is relying on time-barred actions in 2011 and
2015 as the basis for liability, and not simply for
‘background.’” [Id.] This Court rejects this argument and
reiterates that it construes the factual allegations regarding
events in 2011 and 2015 as background for Spriestersbach’s
claims, which arise from his arrest on May 11, 2017 and his
subsequent detention. See 8/18/22 Oder, 622 F. Supp. 3d at 954-
55 n.5.
The City also raises additional arguments in which the
City attempts to establish that this Court erred in rejecting
the City’s time-bar challenge to the claims in the original
Complaint. [Original Claims Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 24-25.]
These arguments are rejected as an untimely attempt to seek
reconsideration of the 8/18/22 Order. See Local Rule LR60.1
(stating a motion for reconsideration alleging “[m]anifest error
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of law or fact” “must be filed and served within fourteen (14)
days after the court’s order is issued”).
The City’s Original Claims Motion is therefore denied
as to the City’s time-bar arguments.
B. 	Count I (Fourth Amendment Violation –
Wrongful Arrest and Detention) and Count II
(Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process Violation)
In the 8/18/22 Order, this Court noted that
Spriestersbach’s claim against the City in Count I of the
original Complaint was based upon the City’s alleged inaction
and failure to implement adequate policies. 662 F. Supp. 3d at
959. Judgment on the pleadings was granted in favor of the City
as to that claim because the Complaint did not “allege a policy
that is ‘so facially deficient that any reasonable policymaker
would recognize the need to take action,’” nor did it contain
sufficient allegations of “‘a pattern of prior, similar
violations of federally protected rights, of which the relevant
policymakers had actual or constructive notice.’” Id. at 960
(emphasis in 8/18/22 Order) (quoting Park v. City & Cnty. of
Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1141, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020)). Judgment
on the pleadings was granted in favor of the City as to Count II
based on the same analysis as Count I. Id.
In light of this Court’s ruling that that the
Receiving Officer-in-Charge is not a final policymaker for
purposes of Spriestersbach’s Monell claims, Spriestersbach’s
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Section 1983 claims in the Amended Complaint are based upon the
City’s alleged inaction and failure to implement adequate
policies. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 174-75, 178. Thus,
Spriestersbach’s Section 1983 claims against the City in the
Amended Complaint will be analyzed under the same standards as
the Section 1983 claims against the City in the original
Complaint.
1. 	Digital Notebook
Spriestersbach alleges that, on May 11, 2017, Bruhn
and his partner initiated contact with him because, based on the
digital notebook, they believed Spriestersbach was the person
they were seeking to arrest on the Castleberry Warrant. [Id. at
¶ 74.] On May 11, 2017, the entry in the digital notebook for
Thomas Castleberry had Thomas Castleberry’s personal
information, but Spriestersbach’s photograph. [Id. at ¶ 85.]
Spriestersbach alleges that, pursuant to the longstanding custom
and practice regarding the digital notebook, the previous
“improper association of [Spriestersbach] with Thomas R.
Castleberry was carried over to the City digital notebook and
not corrected even after errors were identified.” See id. at
¶ 119.
On May 11, 2017, Spriestersbach gave the officers his
name, birth date, and social security number. [Id. at ¶ 75.]
Bruhn researched Spriestersbach’s name in various databases,
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including the digital notebook, [id. at ¶ 77,] and Bruhn and his
partner arrested Spriestersbach on the Castleberry Warrant in
reliance on the digital notebook, [id. at ¶ 87]. Spriestersbach
alleges HPD officers had a longstanding custom and practice of
studying the photos and information in the digital notebook and
relying on that information when they made arrests. [Id. at
¶ 83.] For example, Bruhn and his partner would “stud[y] the
digital notebook and . . . print[] pages of suspects so that
they could compare the photo from the digital notebook to the
potential suspects they encountered while on patrol.” [Id. at
¶ 84.]
Spriestersbach alleges the information in the digital
notebook comes from the City’s case reporting system, and the
City’s case reporting system has numerous instances of personal
identifying information entered for the wrong person. [Id. at
¶ 89.] Spriestersbach also alleges that, under City policy, a
mistaken identification arrest caused by erroneous information
in the reporting system is considered to have been corrected
when the arrestee is released. City policies do not require HPD
employees to correct the erroneous information in the digital
notebook, nor are they trained to do so. Id. at ¶ 91; see also
id. at ¶ 130. Spriestersbach alleges:
On information and belief, the City was on notice
that errors regarding the personal information
and/or photos of wanted persons would be posted
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in the digital notebook and that there was no
system in place to identify and correct those
errors. This failure to identify and correct
errors in the digital notebook was deliberately
indifferent to the rights of [Spriestersbach] and
other persons whose information was posted in the
digital notebook as it exposed them to repeated
arrests based on misidentification.
[Id. at ¶ 93.]
Accepting the factual allegations of the Amended
Complaint as true, Spriestersbach has sufficiently alleged
deliberate indifference by the City because the custom and
practice of failing to correct known instances of personal
identifying information being incorrectly associated with the
wrong person in the digital notebook is “so facially deficient
that any reasonable policymaker would recognize the need to take
action.” See Park, 952 F.3d at 1141. Further, Spriestersbach has
sufficiently alleged that the custom and practice caused the
deprivation of his constitutional rights. See id. This Court
therefore concludes that Spriestersbach has pled plausible
Monell claims in Counts I and II based upon the customs,
practices, and policies related to the use of the digital
notebook, particularly the failure to correct known errors in
the digital notebook. This includes Spriestersbach’s allegations
that the City failed to provide adequate training and
supervision regarding the use of the digital notebook,
particularly the failure to correct known errors in the digital
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notebook. The City’s Original Claims Motion is denied to the
extent that it seeks dismissal of the portions of Counts I and
II based upon the customs, practices, and policies related to
the use of the digital notebook.
2. 	Other Allegations
To the extent that Spriestersbach’s claims against the
City in Counts I and II are premised upon City customs,
practices, and policies other than those related to the use of
the digital notebook, including other instances of allegedly
deficient training and supervision, those portions of Counts I
and II are insufficiently pled and are therefore dismissed.
Further, the dismissal is with prejudice because, based on the
procedural history of this case, this Court concludes that it is
not possible for Spriestersbach to cure the defects in those
claims by amendment. The City’s Original Claims Motion is
granted as to the portions of Counts I and II asserting claims
against the City premised upon City customs, practices, and
policies other than those related to the use of the digital
notebook.
C. 	Count IV – Section 1983 Abuse of Process Claim
In the 8/18/22 Order, this Court noted that it was
unclear whether a Section 1983 abuse of process claim is
established by the same elements as the Hawai`i law abuse of
process claim or whether it is essentially a malicious
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prosecution claim with the additional requirement of conduct
that shocks the conscience. 622 F. Supp. 3d at 961. This Court
dismissed the Section 1983 abuse of process claim in the
original Complaint because it did not include
sufficient factual allegations to support
[Spriestersbach’s] abuse of process claim against
the City because Count IV only makes the
conclusory allegation that the City “continued to
commit multiple willful actions for the improper
purpose of prosecuting [him] for a crime he did
not commit, as more fully alleged above.” See
Complaint at ¶ 89.
Id.
Compared to the original Complaint, the Amended
Complaint includes additional allegations about the Receiving
Officer-in-Charge’s ulterior purpose, malice, and reckless
disregard. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 204-06. However, because
this Court has ruled that the Receiving Officer-in-Charge is not
a final policymaker for purposes of a Monell claim against the
City, Spriestersbach’s additional factual allegations in
Count IV are insufficient to state a plausible abuse of process
claim against the City. That portion of Count IV is therefore
dismissed, and the dismissal is with prejudice because, based on
the procedural history of this case, this Court concludes that
it is not possible for Spriestersbach to cure the defects in his
abuse of process claim against the City by amendment. The City’s
Original Claims Motion is granted as to Count IV.
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D. 	Count III – ADA Claim
In the 8/18/22 Order, this Court concluded the
original Complaint sufficiently alleged that he is a qualified
person with a disability for purposes of the ADA and that,
because of his disability, he was either denied the benefits of
the City’s police services or subjected to discrimination by a
City agency. 622 F. Supp. 3d at 962-63. However, judgment on the
pleadings was granted in favor of the City as to
Spriestersbach’s ADA claim because the Complaint did not
sufficiently allege that the HPD officers who arrested him on
May 11, 2017 knew or should have known about his disability. Id.
at 963-64.
In the Amended Complaint, Spriestersbach added the
allegation that:
As set forth above, including in paragraphs 62-
80, [Doe Defendants] 1-5 knew – and it would have
been obvious to any reasonable person – that
[Spriestersbach] was a person suffering from a
mental disability which would make it difficult
for others to find him credible or for
[Spriestersbach] to vigorously advocate for
himself to ensure he was not falsely arrested.
The fact that [Spriestersbach] often failed to
respond to questions, that he was terse when he
did talk, that his responses often did not make
sense given the context, that he was houseless,
and that a search of the records would reveal his
episode in the harbor from 2010 and the missing
person report listing his mental illness in 2011
demonstrate that [Spriestersbach] suffered from
this disability and the illness would have been
apparent when these Defendants interacted or
communicating with [Spriestersbach].
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[Amended Complaint at ¶ 192.] Paragraphs 62 to 72 of the Amended
Complaint describe Spriestersbach’s arrest on January 15, 2015,
when Spriestersbach refused to provide his name to the HPD
officer “at least seven times” and, according to the officer,
Spriestersbach “stated he would only provide his ‘signature and
number.’” [Id. at ¶ 63.] Spriestersbach alleges “[t]he H.P.D.
officers who made the arrest knew – and it would have been
obvious to any reasonable person – that [Spriestersbach] was a
person suffering from a mental disability. His unusual responses
to the H.P.D. officer when arrested helped put the officers on
notice.” [Id. at ¶ 69.] Even assuming that the HPD officers who
arrested Spriestersbach on January 15, 2015 knew or should have
known about Spriestersbach’s disability, the allegations
regarding Spriestersbach’s January 15, 2015 arrest are merely
background, and his claims arise only from his May 11, 2017
arrest and the events that followed. See supra Discussion
Section II.A.
In contrast to the January 15, 2015 arrest, there are
no allegations that Spriestersbach failed to respond to
questions prior to the May 11, 2017 arrest or that, when he did
respond, his answers did not make sense. On May 11, 2017,
Spriestersbach “was houseless and waiting for food with many
others outside of Safe Haven.” [Amended Complaint at ¶ 73.] He
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was sleeping and was awoken by Bruhn and his partner.
Spriestersbach provided his name, birth date, and social
security number. [Id. at ¶¶ 74-75.] He alleges he “was reclusive
and withdrawn and his responses to the H.P.D. officer’s
inquiries were sparse.” [Id. at ¶ 76.] The allegations regarding
Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017 arrest are insufficient to allow
this Court to draw the reasonable inference that Bruhn and his
partner knew or should have known about his disability.
Spriestersbach also appears to base his ADA claim upon
the alleged failure to correct known errors in HPD databases,
including the digital notebook. See id. at ¶¶ 193-94.
Spriestersbach does not adequately allege that the failure to
correct known errors was because of his disability. See Payan v.
Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 737 (9th Cir.
2021). Thus, to the extent that Spriestersbach’s claim against
the City in Count III is based upon the alleged failure to
correct known errors in the relevant City databases,
Spriestersbach fails to state a plausible ADA claim.
Spriestersbach also alleges the City is directly
liable because it failed to provide him with reasonable
accommodations. [Amended Complaint at ¶ 195.]
Defendant City was fully aware that its H.P.D.
officers would frequently interact with and
arrest persons who would have difficulties
appearing credible, or be unable to advocate for
themselves to ensure that they are not falsely
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arrested, like [Spriestersbach]. Defendant City
knew some of these people would be falsely
identified or connected to true suspects and
arrested, and that such people would not be as
able to advocate for their freedom and to clarify
any such mistakes as others. However, Defendant
City allowed its H.P.D. officers to not correct
such database systems or otherwise flag that the
person is not the true target of a warrant so as
to the reduce the known risk and likelihood that
such persons are detained and held. Likewise, the
City knows that persons with these disabilities
could be accommodated by verifying whether they
are in fact the subject of warrants, particularly
when the data for such warrants is inconsistent
with those of the person arrested.
[Id.] Spriestersbach argues that the City should have
accommodated his disability by confirming his identifying
information, but, as discussed above, Spriestersbach has not
sufficiently alleged that the arresting officers on May 11, 2017
knew or should have known about Spriestersbach’s disability.
Because they did not have reason to know of Spriestersbach’s
disability, they did not have a duty to provide an accommodation
for his disability. Further, to the extent that Spriestersbach
argues the City is liable because it did not require City
personnel to correct errors in City databases, Spriestersbach
does not adequately allege that the City failed to make such
corrections because of Spriestersbach’s disability.
Spriestersbach has failed to allege a plausible ADA
claim against the City. His claim against the City in Count III
must be dismissed, and the dismissal is with prejudice because
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this Court concludes that, under the circumstances of this case,
it is not possible for Spriestersbach to cure the defects in his
ADA claim against the City by amendment. The City’s Original
Claims Motion is granted as to Count III.
E. 	Count XI (IIED) and Count XII (NIED)
As with the original Complaint, Spriestersbach’s IIED
and NIED claims against the City are based on the respondeat
superior doctrine. See 8/18/22 Order, 622 F. Supp. 3d at 964
(citing Complaint at ¶¶ 126-33); Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 245,
252. Thus, the standards described in the 8/18/22 Order are also
applicable to Spriestersbach’s IIED and NIED claims in the
Amended Complaint.
Spriestersbach’s IIED claim and NIED claim in the
original Complaint were based upon Bruhn’s and other HPD
officers’ involvement in Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017 arrest.
This Court concluded that Spriestersbach sufficiently alleged
that they were acting within the scope of their authority, but
he failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to support his
position that they acted maliciously when they misidentified and
arrested him as Thomas Castleberry. 8/18/22 Order, 622 F. Supp.
3d at 964-65.
Spriestersbach’s IIED claim and NIED claim in the
Amended Complaint are based primarily upon the actions of Bruhn
and the Receiving Officer-in-Charge. See Amended Complaint at
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¶¶ 246, 253. Reading the Amended Complaint as a whole,
Spriestersbach sufficiently alleges they were acting within the
scope of their respective authority during the events relevant
to this case. See Vargas v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, CIV.
NO. 19-00116 LEK-WRP, 2020 WL 3547941, at *18-19 (D. Hawai`i
June 30, 2020); see also, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 74-79,
94-97. As to malice, Spriestersbach alleges
H.P.D. officer Bruhn and the officer in charge of
the receiving desk acted with malice when they
arrested and detained [Spriestersbach] when his
fingerprints did not match those of Thomas R.
Castleberry; when his photo did not match Thomas
R. Castleberry’s; when his personal identifiers
did not match those of Thomas R. Castleberry; and
when they chose to simply change the name on the
warrant rather than defer the arrest and confirm
that [Spriestersbach] was not Thomas R.
Castleberry. These city employees knew that their
actions would cause severe emotional distress to
[Spriestersbach].
Amended Complaint at ¶ 246; see also id. at ¶ 253 (similar).
Further, paragraph 80, quoted supra, contains allegations that
Bruhn acted with malice.
Spriestersbach alleges the Receiving Officer-in-Charge
approved Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017 arrest on the Castleberry
Warrant, [id. at ¶ 107,] in spite of the following
circumstances:
102. H.P.D. officer Bruhn disclosed to the
H.P.D. officer in charge of the receiving desk
the fact that H.P.D. officer Bruhn’s record
searches relating to Thomas R. Castleberry’s
warrant produced two conflicting social security
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numbers, two conflicting names, conflicting
personal facts, and photographs that did not
match.
103. On information and belief, H.P.D.
officer Bruhn also spoke with the H.P.D. officer
in charge of the receiving desk about the fact
that the photo of Thomas R. Castleberry in the
digital notebook did not match the photo in the
flyer created by Crimestoppers.
[Id. at pg. 27.] Further, the arrest report states that
Spriestersbach’s arrest was verified through fingerprints. [Id.
at ¶ 106.] However, that apparently was false because, after
Spriestersbach’s July 26, 2010 arrest on the Castleberry
Warrant, fingerprint testing confirmed that Spriestersbach was
not Thomas Castleberry, and Spriestersbach was released without
charges. See id. at ¶¶ 41-43. Similarly, after his January 17,
2015 arrest, HPD officers confirmed that Spriestersbach’s
fingerprints did not match Thomas Castleberry’s, and
Spriestersbach was not arrested on the Castleberry Warrant. See
id. at ¶¶ 62-68. It can be reasonably inferred that, on May 11,
2017, Spriestersbach’s fingerprints were either not taken or
were not analyzed because, if they had been, the analysis would
have confirmed that Spriestersbach was not Thomas Castleberry.
Spriestersbach also alleges the Receiving Officer-in-Charge
allowed Bruhn to write “AKA Spriestersbach, Joshua C.” on the
Castleberry Warrant, even though they did not verify that
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Spriestersbach was the person named in the Castleberry Warrant.
[Id. at ¶ 110.]
This Court concludes that the Amended Complaint’s
allegations are sufficient to allege that Bruhn and the
Receiving Officer-in-Charge were motivated by malice when they
engaged in the actions and omissions described in the Amended
Complaint. See Vargas, 2020 WL 3547941, at *18. Therefore,
Spriestersbach has sufficiently alleged a basis for the City’s
respondeat superior liability for his IIED and NIED claims. This
Court must therefore determine whether the Amended Complaint
pleads allegations that, if proven, would establish the elements
of Spriestersbach’s IIED and NIED claims.
1. 	Count XI - IIED
The Hawai`i Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he tort of IIED consists of four elements:
“1) that the act allegedly causing the harm was
intentional or reckless, 2) that the act was
outrageous, and 3) that the act caused 4) extreme
emotional distress to another.” Hac [v. Univ. of
Hawai`i], 102 Hawai`i [102,] 106–07, 73 P.3d
[46,] 60–61 [(2003)]. “The term ‘outrageous’ has
been construed to mean without just cause or
excuse and beyond all bounds of decency.” Enoka
v. AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co., Inc., 109 Hawai`i 537,
559 128 P.3d 850, 872 (2006) (citations and some
internal quotation marks omitted). “The question
whether the actions of the alleged tortfeasor are
unreasonable or outrageous is for the court in
the first instance, although where reasonable
people may differ on that question it should be
left to the jury.” Takaki v. Allied Machinery
Corp., 87 Hawai`i 57, 68, 951 P.2d 507, 518 (App.
1998) (quotations and quotation marks omitted).
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Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai`i 403, 429, 198 P.3d 666,
692 (2008) (footnote omitted).
Based on the factual allegations discussed above,
Spriestersbach has adequately alleged that Bruhn’s actions and
the Receiving Officer-in-Charge’s actions were intentional or
reckless. Spriestersbach alleges that because of their actions,
he “suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress.”
See Amended Complaint at ¶ 248. Further, this Court finds that
reasonable people could differ as to the question of whether
Bruhn’s actions and the Receiving Officer-in-Charge’s actions
were outrageous. See Young, 119 Hawai`i at 429, 198 P.3d at 692.
This Court therefore concludes that Spriestersbach has stated a
plausible IIED claim against the City based upon Bruhn’s and the
Receiving Officer-in-Charge’s actions and omissions related to
Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017 arrest. The City’s Original Claims
Motion is therefore denied as to Count XI.
2. 	Count XII - NIED
This district court has stated the elements of an NIED
claim are:
(1) 	that the defendant engaged in negligent
conduct;
(2) 	that the plaintiff suffered serious
emotional distress; and,
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(3) 	that such negligent conduct by the
defendant was a legal cause of the serious
emotional distress.
Kauhako v. State of Hawaii Bd. Of [sic] Ed., Civ.
No. 13-00567 DKW-BMK, 2015 WL 5312359, *11 (D.
Haw. Sept. 9, 2015).
An NIED claim is merely a negligence claim
alleging a wholly psychic injury. Duty and breach
of duty are essential elements of an NIED claim
and are analyzed utilizing ordinary negligence
principles. Kahoohanohano v. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 178 P.3d 538, 582 (Haw. 2008).
Ricks v. Matayoshi, CIV. NO. 16-00044 HG-KSC, 2017 WL 1025170,
at *11 (D. Hawai`i Mar. 16, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Ricks v. Dep’t
of Educ., 752 F. App’x 518 (9th Cir. 2019). Further, under
Hawai`i law, as part of the plaintiff’s requirement to prove
actual injury, he must prove “that someone was physically
injured by the defendant’s conduct, be it the plaintiff himself
or herself or someone else.” Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dep’t
of Educ., 100 Hawai`i 34, 69–70, 58 P.3d 545, 580–81 (2002)
(citation omitted).
Based on the factual allegations discussed above,
Spriestersbach has adequately alleged that Bruhn’s and the
Receiving Officer-in-Charge’s actions and omissions were at
least negligent. Spriestersbach alleges that because of their
actions, he “suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional
distress.” See Amended Complaint at ¶ 254. Although Count XII
does not expressly allege a physical injury caused by their
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conduct, Spriestersbach alleges he suffered physical injury
because of his unlawful imprisonment while in Defendant
Department of Public Safety’s (“DPS”) custody and while he was
in Defendant Hawai`i State Hospital’s (“HSH”) custody. See id.
at ¶¶ 214, 222. It can be reasonably inferred from the factual
allegations of the Amended Complaint that Bruhn’s conduct the
Receiving Officer-in-Charge’s conduct were legal causes of
Spriestersbach’s physical injury because, but for their conduct,
Spriestersbach would not have been placed in DPS’s custody nor
would he have been subjected to the judicial proceedings that
placed him in HSH’s custody. This Court therefore concludes that
Spriestersbach has stated a plausible NIED claim against the
City based upon Bruhn’s and the Receiving Officer-in-Charge’s
actions and omissions related to Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017
arrest. The City’s Original Claims Motion is therefore denied as
to Count XII.
3. 	The Second Amended Complaint
The Order on Dr. Garrett’s Motion and the Order on the
PD Defendants’ Motion directed Spriestersbach to file his second
amended complaint by March 29, 2024. [Order on Dr. Garrett’s
Motion at 31; Order on the PD Defendants’ Motion at 33.] The
3/15/24 EO Ruling stated that Spriestersbach’s claims against
the City in Counts XI and XII were dismissed with prejudice and
that the forthcoming written order on the City’s Motions would
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not affect the deadline set in the Order on Dr. Garrett’s Motion
and the Order on the PD Defendants’ Motion. See 3/15/24 EO
Ruling at PageID.4233-34.
Spriestersbach filed his Second Amended Complaint on
March 29, 2024. [Dkt. no. 362.] Count XI of the Second Amended
Complaint includes an IIED claim against the City and Count XII
of the Second Amended Complaint includes an NIED claim against
the City. See id. at ¶¶ 334-45. On April 12, 2024, the City
filed its Answer to Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 362) (“City
Answer”). [Dkt. no. 378.] The City responded to the allegations
in Counts XI and XII of the Second Amended Complaint. See id. at
¶¶ 44-45. Thus, although the instant Order differs from the
3/15/24 Order as to the disposition of Counts XI and XII, it is
unnecessary to amend either Spriestersbach’s Second Amended
Complaint or the City Answer.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s Motion to Strike
and/or Dismiss with Prejudice Newly Added Federal Failure to
Discipline, Train, and Supervise and Final Policy-Maker Claims
and its Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 250),
both filed November 1, 2023, are HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. The City’s New Claims Motion is GRANTED insofar
as the following claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE: the
portions of Counts I and II asserting Section 1983 claims
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against the City based on the alleged failure to discipline; and
the portions of Counts I, II, and IV asserting Section 1983
claims against the City based on a final policymaker theory of
liability. The New Claims Motion is DENIED in all other
respects.
The City’s Original Claims Motion is GRANTED insofar
as the following claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE: the
portions of Counts I and II asserting Section 1983 claims
against the City based upon City customs, practices, and
policies other than those related to the use of the digital
notebook; Spriestersbach’s ADA claim against the City in
Count III; and Spriestersbach’s Section 1983 abuse of process
claim against the City in Count IV. The City’s Original Claims
Motion is DENIED as to: the City’s time-bar argument; the City’s
request to dismiss the portion of Counts I and II alleging
Section 1983 claims against the City based upon the customs,
practices, and policies related to the use of the digital
notebook; the City’s request to dismiss Spriestersbach’s IIED
claim against the City in Count XI; and the City’s request to
dismiss Spriestersbach’s NIED claim against the City in
Count XII.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 19, 2024.
JOSHUA SPRIESTERBACH VS. STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL.; CV 21-00456
LEK-RT; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S MOTIONS FILED ON NOVEMBER 1, 2024,
[DKT. NOS. 257, 258]
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