JOHNSON v. HERBERT et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
HERRON LEE JOHNSON, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-403-CDL-AGH
:
HERBERT, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
________________________________
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are the claims of pro se Plaintiff Herron Lee Johnson,
a prisoner currently confined in the Muscogee County Jail in Columbus, Georgia.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
(ECF Nos. 4, 8) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff is ORDERED submit an initial partial
filing fee in the amount of $33.94 and recast his Complaint on the Court’s standard
form. 	Plaintiff’s motion for a mental health advocate (ECF No. 6) is DENIED, and
it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order (ECF No. 5) be
DENIED.
MOTIONS TO PROCEED IFP
Plaintiff first seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of the Court’s filing
fee. 	A review of Plaintiff’s motions to proceed IFP demonstrates that Plaintiff is
presently unable to pay the cost of commencing this action. 	Plaintiff’s motions (ECF
Nos. 4, 8) are therefore GRANTED. 	However, a prisoner allowed to proceed IFP
must still pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee in installments based on funds
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 11

2
in the prisoner’s trust account. 	When a prisoner has funds in his account, he must
pay an initial partial filing fee of twenty percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the
prisoner’s account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 	A review of Plaintiff’s prison trust fund account
statement shows he had an average monthly balance of $62.94 and average monthly
deposits of $169.71. 	See Cert. Prisoner Acct. 1, ECF No. 8-2. 	Twenty percent of the
greater of these amounts, $169.71, is $33.94. 	Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED to
pay an initial partial filing fee of $33.94.
Following payment of the initial partial filing fee, money will be deducted from
Plaintiff’s account until the filing fee ($350.00) is paid in full as set forth in § 1915(b)
and explained below. 	It is accordingly DIRECTED that the CLERK forward a copy
of this ORDER to the business manager of the facility in which Plaintiff is
incarcerated so that withdrawals from his account may commence as payment
towards the filing fee. 	The district court’s filing fee is not refundable, regardless of
the outcome of the case, and must therefore be paid in full even if the Plaintiff’s
complaint (or any part thereof) is dismissed prior to service.
I. 	Directions to Plaintiff’s Custodian
It is ORDERED that the warden of the institution in which Plaintiff is
incarcerated, or the sheriff of any county in which he is held in custody, and any
successor custodians, each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this Court
twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s account
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 11

3
at said institution until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. 	In accordance
with provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Plaintiff’s custodian is
authorized to forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the Clerk of Court
each month until the filing fee is paid in full, provided the amount in the account
exceeds $10.00. 	It is further ORDERED that collection of monthly payments from
Plaintiff’s trust fund account shall continue until the entire $350.00 has been
collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit (or any part thereof) or
the granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full filing fee.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Obligations on Release
Plaintiff should keep in mind that his release from incarceration/detention
does not release him from his obligation to pay the installments incurred while he
was in custody. 	Plaintiff remains obligated to pay those installments justified by the
income in his prisoner trust account while he was detained. 	If Plaintiff fails to remit
such payments, the Court authorizes collection from Plaintiff of any balance due on
these payments by any means permitted by law. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint may be
dismissed if he is able to make payments but fails to do so or if he otherwise fails to
comply with the provisions of the PLRA.
Plaintiff has FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date shown on this Order to
pay a partial filing fee of $33.94. 	If circumstances have changed and Plaintiff cannot
pay the initial partial filing fee as ordered, Plaintiff should file a renewed motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, accompanied by an updated prison trust fund
account statement covering the most recent six months, explaining such change in
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 11

4
circumstances within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of the date of this Order.
While Plaintiff’s custodian is ordered to 	make subsequent payments on
Plaintiff’s behalf, Plaintiff should note that it is HIS RESPONSIBILITY to pay the
initial partial filing fee. 	Thus, Plaintiff must arrange with the appropriate official
to ensure that the initial partial filing fee is paid. 	Thereafter, Plaintiff’s custodian
shall remit monthly payments as set forth above.
ORDER TO RECAST COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case arises from his treatment at the Muscogee
County Jail. 	Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff contends that Defendant Herbert, a
sergeant at the jail, “subjected [Plaintiff] to phy[s]ical danger by removing [him] from
the segr[e]gated dorm of 3F reserved for alternative lifestyle individuals.” 	Id.
Plaintiff contends he was assaulted after Defendant Herbert moved him. 	Id.
Plaintiff also contends his “rights to due process have been repeatedly violated” at
the jail because he complained about three sexual assaults, but his complaints were
“dismissed as un[su]stained.” 	Id. He also suggests that Muscogee County Sheriff
Greg 	Countryman 	and 	the 	mayor 	of 	Columbus, 	Georgia, 	are 	responsible 	for
Defendant Herbert’s actions and the condition of the jail. 	See id.
In 	addition 	to 	the 	above-captioned 	action, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	another 	case
complaining about his treatment at Muscogee County Jail, Johnson v. Countryman,
4:25-cv-318-CDL-AGH (M.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2025) (“Johnson I”). 	In his Recast
Complaint in Johnson I, Plaintiff confirmed that he wished to pursue § 1983 claims
against Defendant Countryman regarding his treatment at the jail (ECF No. 7). 	In
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 11

5
Johnson I, Plaintiff alleges that (1) jail officials “prevent[] lawsuits [from] being filed
by means of ‘forma pauperis’ by ensuring filing fee is not paid,” and (2) jail officials
allow “mopping by food,” which contaminates the food fed to the inmates at the jail.
Recast Compl. 5, ECF No. 7. 	Plaintiff states that Defendant Countryman is liable
for these alleged constitutional violations because he is responsible for his employees’
actions. 	Id. 	Johnson I has now been consolidated into the above-captioned action
and administratively closed.
To ensure that each of Plaintiff’s claims from the consolidated cases is
preserved, Plaintiff is ORDERED to recast his Complaint on the Court’s standard
form for complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of the
date of this Order. 	The recast complaint must contain a caption that clearly
identifies, by name, each individual that Plaintiff has a claim against and wishes to
include as a Defendant in the present lawsuit. 	Plaintiff is to name only the
individuals associated with the claim or related claims that he is pursuing in this
action. 	Plaintiff must provide enough facts to plausibly demonstrate that each
defendant’s actions or omissions resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights.
When drafting his statement of claims on the Court’s form, it is recommended
that Plaintiff list numbered responses to the following questions (to the extent
possible) along with the name of each defendant:
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 11

6
(1) 	What did this defendant do (or not do) to violate your rights? 	In other
words: 	What 	was 	the 	extent 	of 	this 	defendant’s 	role 	in 	the
unconstitutional conduct other than being in a supervisory role? 	Was
the defendant personally involved in the constitutional violation? 	If
not, did his actions otherwise cause the unconstitutional action? 	How
do you know?1
(2) 	When and where did each action occur (to the extent memory allows)?
(3) 	How were you injured as a result of this defendant’s actions or decisions?
If you have been physically injured, explain the extent of your injuries
and any medical care requested or provided.
(4) 	How and when did this defendant learn of your injuries or otherwise
become aware of a substantial risk that you could suffer a serious injury?
(5) 	What did this defendant do (or not do) in response to this knowledge?
(6) 	What relief do you seek from this defendant?
Plaintiff should state his claims as simply as possible referring only to the
relevant allegations against the named defendants in this case; he should not attach
supporting documents to his recast complaint, use legal terminology, or cite any
specific statute or case law to state a claim, although the Court will presume that
1 Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates
on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. 	See, e.g., Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320,
1330 (11th Cir. 2023). 	If Plaintiff wishes to sue a supervisory official, he must instead allege specific
facts to show that the supervisor either personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations
or that a causal connection exists between his actions and a subordinate’s conduct. 	Id. 	This causal
connection can be established if
(1) “a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need
to correct the alleged deprivation and he fail[ed] to do so”; (2) “the supervisor’s
improper custom or policy le[d] to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or
(3) “facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them
from doing so.”
Hendrix v Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Douglas v.
Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 11

7
Plaintiff’s claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless otherwise specified. 	See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 	If, in his recast complaint, Plaintiff fails to link a named defendant
to a claim, the claim will be dismissed. 	Likewise, if Plaintiff makes no allegations in
the body of his recast complaint against a named defendant, that defendant will be
dismissed.
Plaintiff is cautioned that the opportunity to file a recast complaint is not an
invitation for him to include every imaginable claim that he may have against any
state 	official. 	Plaintiff 	will not be permitted to join 	claims 	against 	multiple
defendants in one action unless Plaintiff can establish a logical relationship between
the claims in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Plaintiff is also
cautioned to fully and truthfully respond to each question presented on the standard
form including but not limited to those questions regarding previous federal lawsuits
and whether he has pursued grievances and exhausted his administrative remedies,
or he risks dismissal of this case.
The recast complaint will take the place of the original Complaints
filed in this case and Johnson I. 	Plaintiff may include additional pages
with the Court’s standard form, but the recast complaint must be no longer
than ten (10) pages in its entirety. 	This ten-page limitation includes (and is not
in addition to) the pre-printed pages of the Court’s standard form. 	The Court will
not consider any allegations in any other document, or any allegations not
contained within those ten pages, to determine whether Plaintiff has stated
an actionable claim. 	Accordingly, any fact Plaintiff deems necessary to his
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 11

8
lawsuit should be clearly stated in his recast complaint, even if Plaintiff has
previously alleged it in another filing. 	The Clerk is DIRECTED to forward a copy
of the § 1983 form, marked with the case number of the above-captioned action, to
the Plaintiff that he should use to file his recast complaint.
REMAINING PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for a protective order (ECF No. 5) and a motion
to appoint a mental health advocate (ECF No. 6). 	In his motion for a protective
order, he seeks “an order of protection . . . to protect [him] from the actions of SGT
Herbert at the Muscogee County Jail.” 	Mot. Protective Order 1, ECF No. 5.
Plaintiff further contends that “SGT Herbert has taken actions in the past that have
placed [Plaintiff] directly into harm with a lack of regard for [his] safety.” 	Id. 	The
Court will liberally construe this motion as one seeking a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”). 	A TRO or a preliminary injunction is a drastic remedy used primarily to
preserve the status quo rather than grant most or all of the substantive relief sought
in the complaint. 	See, e.g., Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983);
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 429 (11th Cir. 1982).2 	Factors a movant
must show to be entitled to a TRO include: “(1) a substantial likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits; (2) the TRO is necessary to prevent irreparable injury; (3) the
threatened injury outweighs the harm the TRO would inflict on the non-movant; and
2 The standard for obtaining a TRO is the same as the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction.
See Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (11th Cir. 2001); Windsor v.
United States, 379 F. App’x 912, 916-17 (11th Cir. 2010).
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 8 of 11

9
(4) the TRO would serve the public interest.” 	Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th
Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff does not clearly address these factors in his motion, and at this
juncture the facts have not been sufficiently developed to conclude that there is a
substantial 	likelihood 	that 	Plaintiff 	will 	ultimately 	prevail 	on 	the 	merits.
Furthermore, the Defendants have not been served or had a meaningful opportunity
to respond to Plaintiff’s allegations. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). 	Defendants should be
afforded an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff’s allegations, and any claims for
injunctive relief can be addressed as this case proceeds. 	It is thus recommended that
Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order be denied at this time.
Plaintiff also requests a “mental health advocate to help with the prosecution
of [his] case.” 	ECF No. 6 at 1. 	This is not a service the Court can provide Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s motion is accordingly denied. 	Plaintiff may file a motion for appointed
counsel if he would like to have a lawyer appointed to help him prosecute his case.
He is advised, however, that “[a]ppointment of counsel in a civil case is not a
constitutional right,” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990), and it is
“warranted only in exceptional circumstances,” Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d
1059, 1063 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir.
1996)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) (ECF Nos. 4, 8) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff is ORDERED submit an initial
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 9 of 11

10
partial filing fee in the amount of $33.94 and recast his Complaint on the Court’s
standard form within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of the date of this Order. 	Plaintiff’s
motion 	for 	a 	mental 	health 	advocate 	(ECF 	No. 	6) 	is 	DENIED, 	and 	it 	is
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order (ECF No. 5) be
DENIED.
If Plaintiff does not timely and fully comply with this Order, this
action may be dismissed. 	Plaintiff is further DIRECTED to notify the Court
immediately in writing of any change in his mailing address. 	There shall be no
service of process in this case until further order of the Court.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
objections to this Recommendation with the Honorable Clay D. Land, United States
District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
this Recommendation. 	Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES.
See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. 	The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file
written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline
for filing written objections. 	Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of §
636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s order based on
factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. 	See 11th Cir.
R. 3-1.
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 10 of 11

11
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 2nd day of February, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 4:25-cv-00403-CDL-AGH Document 9 Filed 02/02/26 Page 11 of 11