CLAY v. BATTS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
BYRON DONNELLE CLAY, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: 	No. 3:25-cv-00167-TES-CHW
v. 	:
:
AMBER BATTS, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Pro se Plaintiff Byron Clay, an inmate in the Walton County Jail in Monroe, Georgia,
filed a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff was granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis with an initial partial filing fee of $37.97. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff has
paid that fee and his complaint is ripe for preliminary screening. Also pending is Plaintiff’s
Emergency Motion for Protective Transfer and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 3).
PRELIMINARY SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
I. 	Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) directs courts to conduct a preliminary
screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity,
official, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Courts must also screen complaints filed by a
plaintiff proceeding IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard
of review is the same. “Pro se filings are generally held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250,
1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it
“(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)
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seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v.
Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). On preliminary screening, the
Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (citations omitted). A claim can be dismissed
as malicious if it is knowingly duplicative or otherwise amounts to an abuse of the judicial
process. Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of
duplicative complaint “in light of [prisoner’s] history as a prolific serial filer”).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations
[in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). In other words, the complaint must allege enough
facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim.
Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission
deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the
United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state
law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy
these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the
complaint is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (11th
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Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of certain claims at preliminary screening because prisoner failed
to allege sufficient facts to show a violation of his rights), abrogated on other grounds by Wade
v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
II. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff’s claims arise from his incarceration at the Walton County Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 7).
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Amber Batts did not forward payments of partial filing fees in
his federal civil actions when requested to do so and that she was dishonest with him about the
status of fee payments in his cases. (Id. at 5–9). Plaintiff further complains that Defendant Cpl.
Minor denied him “access to the grievance process.” (Id. at 6, 13–14). Plaintiff seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief as well as damages and the costs of his lawsuit. (Id. at 10–11).
III. 	Plaintiff’s Claims
A. 	Claims against Walton County Jail and Walton County Sheriff Office
Plaintiff has named “Walton County Jail/ Walton County Sheriff office” as a Defendant.
(ECF No. 1 at 1, 3). However, federal courts have long recognized that sheriff’s departments,
county detention facilities, and police departments are not legal entities subject to suit or liability
under § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that “sheriff’s
departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit”);
Bunyon v. Burke Cnty., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1328 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (dismissing claim against
police department, reasoning that it was not a legal entity subject to suit); Shelby v. City of
Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N. D. Ga. 1984) (concluding that the City of Atlanta Police
Department is not a proper defendant because it is “merely the vehicle through which the City
government fulfills its policing function”). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the Walton County
Sheriff’s Office and Walton County Jail must be dismissed because they are not entities subject
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to suit in a § 1983 action.
B. 	Access to Courts Claim
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Batts’s “intentional or reckless failure to process
Plaintiff trust funds payment, to forward partial filing fee to the federal court, and their false
statements about what Court required obstructed Plaintiff ability to file and prosecute civil
litigation in the federal courts.” (ECF No. 1 at 5).
“Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment,
the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)). To state an access to courts claim, an inmate must
show that the defendant deterred his “efforts to proceed with a legal claim in a criminal appeal,
[post-conviction] matter, or civil rights action seeking to vindicate basic constitutional
rights.” Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998). However, an inmate’s
right to access the courts is only implicated where there is actual injury suffered “in the pursuit
of specific types of nonfrivolous cases: direct or collateral attacks on sentences and challenges to
conditions of confinement.” Id. The Supreme Court clarified the requirement of showing an
actual injury in order to state a claim of denial of access, stating that “[t]he requirement that an
inmate alleging [denial of access to the courts] must show actual injury derives ultimately from
the doctrine of standing, . . . . It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, . . . who have
suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see
also Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349–50)
(“The doctrine of standing requires that an inmate alleging a violation of the right of access to
the courts must show an actual injury . . . . Thus, the prison officials’ actions which allegedly
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infringed an inmate’s right of access to the courts must have frustrated or impeded the inmate’s
efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.”)). Lastly, “[t]he allegations about the underlying
cause of action must be specific enough to give fair notice to the defendants and must ‘be
described well enough to apply the nonfrivolous test and to show that the arguable nature of the
underlying claim is more than hope.’” Cunningham v. Dist. Att’y’s Off. for Escambia Cnty., 592
F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416).
Since July 21, 2025, Plaintiff has filed seven § 1983 complaints in this Court that all arise
from his incarceration at the Walton County Jail. See (ECF No. 1); Clay v. Stidham, 3:25-cv-
114-TES-AGH (filed July 21, 2025); Clay v. Gamble, 3:25-cv-121-TES-AGH (filed July 31,
2025); Clay v. Cooper, 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH (filed Aug. 8, 2025); Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-
TES-AGH (filed Aug. 14, 2025); Clay v. Pressly, 3:25-cv-144-TES-AGH (filed Sep. 8, 2025);
Clay v. Mendez, 3:25-cv-196-TES-AGH (filed Dec. 11, 2025). Plaintiff does not specifically list
any of these lawsuits or any other lawsuit in his statement of claim as being the underlying
lawsuit of his access to courts claim. See (ECF No. 1 at 7–8). However, when asked on the
Court’s standard form about exhaustion of administrative remedies, Plaintiff does allege that the
“partial filing fee . . . was not paid for cases 3:25-cv-171-TES-AGH in the amount of $41.67 and
3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH in the amount of $50.00.” (Id. at 13). Therefore, the Court concludes that
these two lawsuits, 3:25-cv-171-TES-AGH, Clay v. Gamble, and 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH, Clay
v. Cooper, are the civil actions that are the basis for Plaintiff’s access to courts claim.
First, Cooper is still pending, and Plaintiff has been provided additional time to pay his
partial initial filing fee. (ECF No. 6); (ECF No. 16). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegation that he has been
denied access to the courts in Cooper due to Defendant Batts’s failure to forward his partial
initial filing fee to this Court for that case is senseless. Moreover, Plaintiff is not even solely
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reliant upon jail personnel to pay his initial filing fees out of his inmate account. Indeed, partial
initial filing fees have been paid via money orders submitted to the Court by Plaintiff’s family
and/or fiancée in this civil action ($37.97 fee paid on Nov. 20, 2025) and in at least two other
civil actions. See Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-AGH (docket reflecting that $41.67 fee was
paid on October 7, 2025, via money order by family friend/fiancée); Clay v. Pressly, 3:25-cv-
144-TES-AGH (docket reflecting that $35.53 fee was paid on Oct. 14, 2025, via money order by
family friend/ fiancée). Therefore, Plaintiff can hardly claim that Defendant Batts’s failure to
forward payment of the partial initial filing fee in Cooper in September 2025 has adversely
affected that case or otherwise impeded upon his bringing that lawsuit before the Court.
Gamble, however, was initially dismissed without prejudice on October 17, 2025, for a
failure to pay a partial initial filing fee. (Gamble, ECF No. 11). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a
motion for reconsideration. (Gamble, ECF No. 18). This Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration and reopened Gamble to further review its dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to
obey the Court’s orders and to conduct preliminary screening of that civil action under the
PLRA. (Gamble, ECF No. 21). Upon such review, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint
without prejudice pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.1 (Id. at 9–20). Since Plaintiff failed to state a viable claim in Gamble, he does not
satisfy the actual injury requirement of an access to courts claim in his present complaint.
Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff must prove “that
he has a colorable underlying claim for which he seeks relief” in order to state an access to courts
claim); Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a prisoner must
allege that he had a legitimate claim that he was unable to pursue due to the prison official’s
1 The Court dismissed Gamble again for failure to obey the orders of the Court. (Gamble, ECF No. 21 at 2–9).
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interference in order to satisfy the actual injury requirement of an access to courts claim).
In sum, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Batts denied him access to courts in Gamble
and Cooper by failing to forward court-ordered filing fees to the district court. However, Plaintiff
has failed to show any actual injury; thus, his access to courts claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim.
C. 	Grievance Procedure Claims
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Minor did not handle his grievances appropriately and
that these actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1 at 8). However, inmates
do not have a constitutional right to participate in grievance procedures, to have those procedures
properly followed, or to any preferred outcome to a filed grievance. See, e.g., Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1177–78 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (affirming dismissal as
frivolous prisoner’s claims that he was denied use of the prison’s grievance procedure and
holding that an inmate has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in access to that
procedure); Dunn v. Martin, 178 F. App’x 876, 878 (11th Cir. 2006) (prison officials’ failure to
respond to prisoner’s letters and grievances and to follow prison regulations regarding grievance
responses did not implicate due process concerns). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff raises a §1983
claim against Defendant Minor or any other named defendant based on the handling of his
grievances or the grievance process, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief.
D. 	Deprivation of Property Claim
Plaintiff complains that Defendants impeded his access to the funds in his inmate trust
account thereby depriving him of his property and violating his due process rights. (ECF No. 1 at
5, 8). Plaintiff’s claim that he has been deprived of his property is construed as a procedural due
process claim contrary to the rights conferred under the Fourteenth Amendment. “A § 1983
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action alleging a procedural due process clause violation requires proof of three elements: a
deprivation of a [constitutionally protected] liberty or property interest; state action; and
constitutionally inadequate process.” Doe v. Fla. Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994)). As to the third element, it is
recognized that “[d]ue process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.”
Cryder, 24 F.3d at 177. As to the second element of a procedural due process claim, “the state’s
action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable [post-
deprivation] remedy.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Thus, even “an
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a
violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if a meaningful [post-deprivation] remedy for the loss is available.” Id.; see also
Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009).
“Georgia provides a civil cause of action for the wrongful conversion of personal
property.” Moore v. McLaughlin, 569 F. App’x 656, 658 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing
O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1). The Eleventh Circuit has “held that this cause of action constitutes a
suitable [post-deprivation] remedy for procedural due process violations.” Id. Because Georgia
law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy through O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1, Plaintiff fails to
state a § 1983 claim against Defendants for the mishandling of the money in his inmate trust
account. See McLaughlin, 569 F. App’x at 658 (concluding that the district court did not err in
dismissing a plaintiff’s procedural due process claim regarding prisoner’s stolen packages);
Mines v. Barber, 610 F. App’x 838, 840 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding district court’s dismissal of
prisoner’s claim that correctional officers were illegally confiscating the prisoner’s personal
property).
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice
pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and his
Emergency Motion for Protective Transfer and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED as moot.2
(ECF No. 3).
SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of January, 2026.
S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 Plaintiff’s complaint is at times an unintelligible word salad of legalese. See, e.g., (ECF No. 1 at 5–6). In one such
instance, Plaintiff states that he “realleges prior paragraphs under Georgia law” and asserts “state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.” (Id. at 5). District courts do not have original jurisdiction over state law claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367. This Court’s only jurisdiction over state law claims is through exercising supplemental
jurisdiction. Id. As outlined in this Order, none of Plaintiff’s federal claims survive screening. Since Plaintiff has
alleged no viable federal claim in the present civil action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).
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