Reynolds v. Unknown Names of Manufacturer or Responsible Individuals

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BRIAN EDWARD REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
-against-
UNKNOWN NAMES OF
MANUFACTURER OR RESPONSIBLE
INDIVIDUALS,
Defendant.
24-CV-6854 (KMW)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at a Federal Correctional Institution (“F.C.I.”) in
Jesup, Georgia, brings this action pro se regarding events allegedly occurring during his
incarceration in F.C.I. Otisville (“Otisville”) between 2019 and 2022. By Order dated November
4, 2024, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is,
without prepayment of fees.1 (ECF No. 6.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses
the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also
1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed
IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
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dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Although the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obligated to
construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret
them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted),
has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that
the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must
accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. at 678-79. After separating legal
conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts
make it plausible–not merely possible–that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who states that he does “not know” the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, alleges
that sometime between March 2019 and March 2020, while at Otisville, his “reflux medication”
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was changed from Ranitidine to Famotidine “without explanation.”2 (ECF No. 1 ¶ III.) He
further complains that he cannot “get the B.O.P. to screen [him] for possible traces or the
existence of cancer.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he continues to “suffer reflux” and “claim[s] the
defendants in this matter knowingly poisoned [him] without care and have left [him] in a panic
worrying if [he] will end up (or have now) with cancer.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that “the
defendants were aware of the potential dangers prior to increasing the ingredient in Ranitidine
and [he] may be susceptible to cancer at any time because of their deliberate indifference to [his]
life.” (Id.)
Plaintiff names as Defendants “Unknown Names of Manufacturer or Responsible
Individuals,” and seeks $1 million in damages for “constant and continued stress and anxiety,”
$10 million in punitive damages, and “immediate release from custody to properly monitor
health.” (Id. ¶ IV.)
DISCUSSION
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth in 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court has jurisdiction only
when a “federal question” is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when plaintiff and defendant are
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
“[A]ny party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Manway Constr. Co. v. Hous. Auth. of
Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If
the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the Complaint
unless noted otherwise.
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the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter
delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative[.]”).
A. 	Federal Question Jurisdiction
To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under
federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that
the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of
federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal
subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182,
1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s allegations could be read to assert claims against the government or
government officials in connection with the medical treatment he received at Otisville. For the
following reasons, however, the complaint does not provide sufficient facts to state any plausible
claims under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction.
1. 	The Federal Tort Claims Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing suits for monetary
damages against the federal government, including its agencies and employees acting in their
official capacities, except where sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); see
Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action
against a federal agency . . . is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . .
barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”).
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The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for
certain claims arising from the tortious conduct of federal officers or employees acting within the
scope of their office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680. “The proper defendant
in an FTCA claim is the United States, not individual federal employees or agencies.” Holliday
v. Augustine, No. 3:14-CV-855, 2015 WL 136545, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2015). Although
Plaintiff does not name any specific federal agencies or officers, he does complain about how he
cannot “get the B.O.P. to screen him” for cancer. (ECF No. 1 ¶ III.) Since Plaintiff complains
about the specific inaction of a federal agency, the Court construes Plaintiff’s claims as brought
against the United States of America.
A plaintiff must comply with the FTCA’s procedural requirements before a federal court
can entertain his claims. See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015).
Specifically, before bringing a claim for damages under the FTCA, a plaintiff must first exhaust
his administrative remedies by filing a claim for damages with the appropriate federal
government entity and receiving a final written determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Such
an administrative claim must be in writing, specify the amount of damages sought, and be filed
within two years of the claim’s accrual. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). A plaintiff may thereafter
challenge the Government’s final denial in a federal district court by filing an action within six
months after the date of the mailing of the notice of final denial by the federal entity. See 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a). If the appropriate federal entity makes no final written determination within
six months of the date of the plaintiff’s filing of the administrative claim, the plaintiff may then
bring an FTCA action in a federal district court. See id.
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To the extent that Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts a claim under the FTCA against the
United States, the claim cannot go forward because he has not alleged facts demonstrating that
he filed an administrative claim for damages with a federal governmental entity and received a
final written administrative determination before bringing this action. Additionally, Plaintiff has
not alleged facts indicating that it has been more than six months since he filed an administrative
claim. The Court therefore dismisses any claims Plaintiff may be asserting under the FTCA for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead an FTCA
claim against the United States in an amended complaint. In this amended complaint, Plaintiff
must allege that he has exhausted his administrative remedies.
2. 	Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
Plaintiff alleges that BOP officials “were aware of the potential dangers prior to
increasing the ingredient in Ranitidine and [he] may be susceptible to cancer at any time because
of their deliberate indifference to [his] life.” (ECF No.1 ¶ III.) The Court construes these
assertions as asserting claims arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675 (“[Bivens] is the
federal analog to suits brought against state officials under [Section 1983].”).
To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show
that: (1) the challenged action was attributable to an officer acting under color of federal law, and
(2) such conduct deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution.
See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389).
Bivens relief against federal officials in their individual capacities is available only where the
individuals were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Ziglar v. Abbasi,
582 U.S. 120 (2017); Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F3d 218, 233 (2d Cir. 2015); Perez v. Hawk, 302 F.
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Supp. 2d 9, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Because personal involvement by a federal official is
prerequisite to liability under Bivens, federal officials who are not personally involved in an
alleged constitutional deprivation may not be held vicariously liable under Bivens for the acts of
subordinates.”).
The Supreme Court has permitted a damages remedy against federal employees under
Bivens in only three contexts: (1) unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (2) employment discrimination under the Fifth Amendment, Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and (3) inadequate medical treatment of an inmate under the
Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Recently, “the Court has made clear
that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity,” Ziglar, 582 U.S. 120,
135 (2017), and a Bivens remedy is not available, “where there are ‘special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,’” Hernandez v. Mesa, 582 U.S. 548,
553 (2017) (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18).
Under Ziglar, unless a Bivens claim bears some resemblance to one of the three types of
Bivens claims previously recognized by the Supreme Court, a court must hold that the claim
constitutes a new Bivens context. Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140. More recently, the Supreme Court
held that even if a court finds that a case presents “parallel circumstances” with the three prior
cases recognizing a Bivens remedy, a court may not find a Bivens remedy unless it also decides
that there is no rational reason to think that Congress is better equipped to create such a remedy.
See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491-93 (2022) (holding in the context of a Fourth
Amendment claim under Bivens that “superficial similarities are not enough to support the
judicial creation of a cause of action”).
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Because, as discussed below, the Court is granting Plaintiff leave to replead his claims,
the Court declines to decide the issue of whether Plaintiff has an implied cause of action under
Bivens until after he files an amended complaint.
The Court evaluates a prisoner’s claims for deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment and not the Fourteenth Amendment. Rodriguez v. Gusman, No. 21-2841, 2023 WL
219203, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2023) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir.
1998)) (emphasis added)). To state a claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth
Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that correction officials were deliberately
indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-
05 (1976). There are two prongs that a prisoner must satisfy to make out a deliberate
indifference claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment: “an objective and
a subjective component.” Id. (emphasis added). To make out the objective component, a
prisoner must demonstrate that the “alleged deprivation [is] . . . in objective terms, sufficiently
serious.” Id. And to make out the subjective component, the prisoner must show that the
"defendant act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. More specifically, the
“defendant must have been actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm would
result.” Id. (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)).
A prisoner cannot sustain a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment where a
medical professional’s failure to provide adequate care is merely inadvertent or negligent. In
addition, a “mere disagreement over the proper treatment” is not actionable. See Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998); Hill, 657 F.3d at 123 (holding that medical officer
who prescribed Motrin rather than stronger pain medication to treat a broken wrist did not have
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the “culpable state of mind” to satisfy the subjective component of the deliberate indifference
standard).
The facts alleged in the complaint do not suggest that any Defendant showed deliberate
indifference. Plaintiff fails to allege that any Defendant knew or should have known of a
substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff’s allegations are that BOP officials
changed his reflux medication, “knowingly poisoned” him, and declined to screen him for
cancer. (ECF No.1 ¶ III.) He further states that he continues to “suffer reflux” and “panic” that
he will get cancer. (Id.) However, these allegations do not suggest that there was any excessive
risk to Plaintiff’s health posed by a BOP employee’s actions. First, the facts fail to demonstrate
that merely changing from one over-the-counter reflux medication to another is objectively a
“poisoning” or poses an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. Second, Plaintiff fails to even
suggest that any BOP employee had the requisite culpable state of mind when they changed his
medication. Plaintiff’s claim that an official declined to screen Plaintiff for cancer is similarly
inadequate, in that the complaint does not state facts showing that such a decision posed an
excessive risk to his health. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to satisfy either prong
of the deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff is challenging the adequacy of the treatment provided and asserts, in a
conclusory fashion, that it was deliberately indifferent. To the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations
can be construed as disagreement with decisions to change his medication and to deny his
requests for cancer testing, his allegations are insufficient to give rise to Eighth Amendment
claims. See, e.g., Connolly v. Dunlop, No. 23-CV-1659, 2024 WL 4893903, at *7 (N.D. Ohio,
Nov. 26, 2024) (holding that decision to treat plaintiff’s reflux with over-the-counter antacid
medication did not constitute deliberate indifference); Berry v. United States, No. 22-CV-6113,
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2022 WL 17486238, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2022) (holding that decision to cease monitoring
plaintiff’s kidney disease while taking a reflux medication that can allegedly damage the kidneys
“presents a disagreement with [the doctor’s] professional judgment that close monitoring . . . was
unnecessary”).
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead his claim—should he wish to do
so—that BOP officials violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical treatment.
3. 	Habeas Corpus Claims
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a petitioner may file a habeas corpus petition seeking
“injunctive relief from federally imposed conditions of confinement,” including claims regarding
medical attention. Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2008). In a Section 2241
petition challenging the execution of a sentence, “[t]he proper respondent . . . is ‘the person who
has custody over [the petitioner].’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 ,434 (2004) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2242) (alteration in original). When a petitioner is transferred from a facility, any
claims for injunctive relief against that facility become moot. See Braxton v. Tellez, No. 20-CV-
6352, 2021 WL 1648023, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2021) (quoting Hill v. Zenk, 115 F. App’x 97
(2d Cir. 2004)); Beagle v. Easter, No. 20-CV-1894, 2021 WL 1026885, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 17,
2021) (noting that it “is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an
action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.”) (quoting Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d
504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).
Plaintiff seeks–inter alia–immediate release from custody “to properly monitor health.”
(ECF No.1 ¶ III.) It would seem that Plaintiff is requesting release as a consequence of being
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unable to obtain a screening for cancer, rather than some more general complaint about his
detention. But Plaintiff’s requested relief is, at best, ambiguous.3
For instance, Plaintiff is no longer in the custody at Otisville, where his claims arose.
Based on the record, it appears Plaintiff filed this complaint while he was a prisoner in a facility
in Illinois. According to the BOP Find an Inmate tool, Plaintiff is presently in a facility in
Georgia.4 To the extent Plaintiff was seeking release as a means to get relief from specific
conditions in his Illinois facility, his claims are moot because he has been transferred from the
facility about which he was complaining. The Court, therefore, dismisses any such claims
without prejudice for Plaintiff to refile those claims—should he wish to do so—in the court that
encompasses the district of his current incarceration. The person who has custody over the
petitioner would be the warden of that facility.5
B. 	Diversity Jurisdiction
Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction to consider any state-law claims. To establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
3 Plaintiff should specify in any subsequent complaint exactly what relief he is seeking and why. For instance, does
Plaintiff now have the injunctive relief he sought, in that he is no longer held at the facilities in either Otisville or
Illinois, or does he seek release from custody altogether? If the latter, what is his basis for that relief? As the Court
is granting Plaintiff leave to refile his claims, he should make it a point to spell out the exact relief he is seeking and
the basis for seeking it.
4 See Find an Inmate, BOP.Gov, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (enter “Brian Edward Reynolds” under the
“Name” tab).
5 Where an incarcerated individual challenges the execution of his sentence in a Section 2241 petition, he first must
also exhaust the available administrative remedies before filing his pleading. Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
243 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001). Failure to exhaust is a procedural default that will be excused upon a showing of
cause and prejudice. See id. at 630, 633-34. A court may also excuse a litigant’s failure to exhaust when: “(1)
available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury may occur without
immediate judicial relief; (3) [an] administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) in certain instances a plaintiff has
raised a substantial constitutional question.” Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Cohen v. United States, 2023 WL 8188424, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y., 2023)
(directing plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege facts detailing the injunctive relief he sought in connection with
medical care and the exhaustion of his administrative remedies with respect to that relief).
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§ 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different
states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998).
Diversity must be complete; that is, “no plaintiff and no defendant [may be] citizens of
the same State.” (Id.) An inmate’s citizenship is in the state where he was domiciled pre-
incarceration. Any other individual is deemed a citizen of the State where he is currently
domiciled. 	A person’s domicile is defined as the place where the individual “has his true fixed
home . . . and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel.
Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). An individual “has but one domicile.” Id. When a plaintiff is incarcerated, there is a
rebuttable presumption that he retains his pre-incarceration domicile, rather than establishing a
new domicile based on the location of his current incarceration. See Blumatte v. Quinn, 521 F.
Supp. 2d 308, 312 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Fermin v. Moriarty, No. 96-CV-3022, 2003 WL
21787351 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is well-established that a prisoner does not acquire a new
domicile when he is incarcerated in a state different from his previous domicile. Instead, the
prisoner retains his pre[-]incarceration domicile [for diversity purposes]; although this
presumption is rebuttable in the Second Circuit[.]”)).
Because an agency of the United States is not a citizen of a state for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, it does not count as a citizen in a diversity case. Barnes v. Fort Hamilton Fam.
Homes, 524 F. Supp. 3d 40, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Melendez-Garcia v. Sanchez, 629 F.3d
25, 41 (1st Cir. 2010)); see also 13E Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3602, n.19
(3d ed. 2009) (collecting cases regarding federal agencies). The Bureau of Prisons is, thus, not a
state.
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Here, Plaintiff filed the complaint from a facility in Illinois and alleges that he was
incarcerated at Otisville when the underlying events occurred. However, he does not identify his
pre-incarceration domicile, the entity or entities he seeks to sue, the nature of those entities, or
any relevant addresses for them. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is
complete diversity among the parties.
Additionally, a plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim exceeds
the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a);
Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his injuries (1) are not known currently, but
(2) have caused him millions of dollars in damage. However, he must provide facts supporting a
claim that he suffered more than $75,000 in damages, which he does not do here.
The Court therefore lacks diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s claims and
dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts
generally grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its
defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill, 657 F.3d at 123-24; Lucente v. Int’l Bus.
Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that
district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least
once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav.
Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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In an abundance of caution, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants
Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to amend his complaint and provide more facts about his claims. First,
Plaintiff must name as the defendants in the caption,6 and in the statement of claim, those
individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does
not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe”
in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint.7 The naming of John Doe
defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this
action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe”
defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants
before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party
after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must
provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each
defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it.
Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the
Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That
information should include:
a) 	the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) 	a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do,
the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each
event occurred;
6 The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption.
7 For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2010, at
Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
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c) 	a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered;
d) 	any information Plaintiff has about each defendant’s state of mind; and
e) 	the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory
relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff’s amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his
federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff
is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the
original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint
must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards
set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court’s Pro Se Intake Unit
within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,”
and label the document with docket number 24-CV-6854 (KMW). An Amended Civil Rights
Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to
comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
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The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil
judgment is entered.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	November 20, 2025
/s/ Kimba M. Wood
New York, New York
KIMBA M. WOOD
United States District Judge
Case 9:26-cv-80314-EA Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/25/2025 Page 16 of 16