Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 25-cv-25271-JB
ISIDRO ACANDA CEBALLO,
Petitioner,
v.
CHARLES PARRA, in his official
capacity as Assistant Field Office
Director, Krome North Service
Processing Center, et al.,
Respondents.
__________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS 	CAUSE 	comes 	before 	the 	Court 	upon 	Petitioner 	Isidro 	Acanda
Cebeallo’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). ECF Nos. [1],
[5]. 	Respondents filed a Return opposing the Petition and Petitioner filed a Reply.
ECF Nos. [11], [15]. 	The parties also filed supporting records and, at the Court’s
request, Respondents filed a Supplemental Filing Concerning Petitioner’s Release.
ECF Nos. [11-1 thru 11-4], [17], [20], [21], [22]. Upon due consideration of the parties’
submissions, the pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable law, for the
reasons explained below, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Cuban citizen who has resided in the United States since
December 2022. ECF No. [1] at ¶¶ 43, 45, 47. Petitioner has no criminal history. Id.
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at ¶ 44; see also ECF No. 11-1 at 3. At the time of his initial encounter with Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”) on or about December 26, 2022, CBP designated
Petitioner for expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Petitioner’s
designation for expedited removal is reflected in three documents that CBP issued on
December 27, 2022. 	In particular, CBP issued a Record of Deportable/Inadmissible
Alien charging Petitioner under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I), with being an
“immigrant without an immigrant visa” and reflecting his “disposition” as “Expedited
Removal with Credible Fear.” 	ECF No. [11-1] at 1. 	Similarly, CBP attempted to
interview Petitioner and issued a “Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings under
Section 235(b)(1) of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act,” which is codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). 	ECF No. [17] at 4. 	Finally, CBP issued a Determination of
Inadmissibility “pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).” Id. at 2. 	Notably, though,
Petitioner’s 	Alien 	Booking 	Record 	states 	that 	he 	is 	to 	be 	held 	“for 	removal
proceedings” with no mention of expedited removal. ECF No. [21] at 3.
Although Petitioner was initially being processed under section 1225(b)(1),
which does provide for mandatory detention, CBP appears to have changed that
designation because it released Petitioner on December 27, 2022. 	ECF No. [1] at ¶
47. 	Indeed, Respondents provide no explanation why or under what authority
Petitioner was released, ECF No. [22] at 2, although there is no allegation that his
release was unauthorized or otherwise improper.
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On or about October 25, 2025, Petitioner was detained by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and taken into custody. 	ECF No. [11-4] at ¶ 13.
Petitioner is currently being held by ICE at the Krome Detention Center in Miami,
id. at ¶ 15, and appears not to have received a bond hearing.
Respondents’ documentation as to Petitioner’s current status reflects that the
statutory basis for Petitioner’s current detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which provides
for discretionary detention, not mandatory detention. 	Specifically, on October 25,
2025, DHS issued a Warrant for Arrest of Petitioner based, in part, upon section 236
of the INA, which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 	ECF No. [11-3] at 3. 	Also on that
date, DHS issued a Notice of Custody Determination “pursuant to the authority
contained in section 236 of the [INA].1 ECF No. [11-3] at 1–2. In addition, DHS issued
a 	Record 	of 	Deportable/Inadmissible 	Alien 	charging 	Petitioner 	under 	section
212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), with being an “alien
present without admission or parole.” ECF No. [11-2] at 1.
II. 	THIS ACTION
On November 12, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition in which he raises
four claims. ECF No. [1]. Counts I and II allege that Petitioner’s continued detention
without a bond hearing violates the INA and the applicable bond regulations because
Petitioner’s detention is governed by section 1226, which establishes a discretionary
detention framework. 	ECF No. [1] at ¶¶ 52–57. Counts III and IV allege that
1 On November 17, 2025, the same day that Respondents filed their Return opposing
the Petition, DHS “cancelled” the Notice of Custody Determination. ECF No. [11-3]
at 1.
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Petitioner’s continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violates
substantive and procedural due process. 	Id. at ¶¶ 59–75. 	Petitioner requests that
the Court require Respondents to release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226 to take place within seven
days. Id. at ¶ 4.
III. 	ANALYSIS
District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive
detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may
be issued to a petitioner who shows that he is being held in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	The Court’s jurisdiction
extends to challenges involving immigration detention. 	See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to expedited removal under
section 1225(b)(1), which permits his mandatory detention and deprives this Court of
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 	ECF No. [11] at 3–9. 	Section 1252(a)
provides 	that 	“[n]otwithstanding 	any 	other 	provision 	of 	law 	(statutory 	or
nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus
provision...no court shall have jurisdiction to review...any individual determination
or 	to 	entertain 	any 	other 	cause 	or 	claim 	arising 	from 	or 	relating 	to 	the
implementation or operation of an order of removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1) of
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this title[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).2 	Accordingly, the key question before the
Court—both as to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the merits of the parties’
dispute—is whether Petitioner’s detention is governed by section 1225(b)(1) or section
1226. 	For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s
detention is governed by section 1226(a) and, thus, section 1252(a) is inapplicable and
Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.
A. Relevant Statutory Framework
Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of applicants for
admission. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 et seq. 	Applicants for admission are defined as
noncitizens “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted” or those
“arriv[ing] in the United States.” Id. All applicants for admission “must be inspected
by immigration officers to ensure that they may be admitted into the country
consistent with U.S. immigration law.” 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287
(2018).3 	To that end, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).” Id.
2 	There 	are 	three 	limited 	circumstances 	under 	which 	judicial 	review 	of
determinations made under section 1225(b)(1) is permitted, namely “determinations
of—(A) whether the petitioner is an alien, (B) whether the petitioner was ordered
removed under [§ 1225(b)(1)], and (C) whether the petitioner can prove ...that the
petitioner is [a lawful permanent resident], has been admitted as a refugee...or has
been granted asylum[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). Neither party argues that any of these
circumstances are present here.
3 Indeed, Jennings began its analysis by emphasizing the temporal and categorical
distinction between the detention statutes. Section 1225 applies to noncitizens who
are “seeking admission into the country” at the border or a port of entry, whereas
section 1226 governs those “already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 285–89.
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at 289 (emphasis added). As relevant here, “[s]ection 1225(b)(1) applies to all aliens
initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of
valid documentation.” 	Id. 	Such noncitizens are generally subject to expedited
removal “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
Federal immigration law “also authorizes the Government to detain certain
aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings,
583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). 	“Whereas [section] 1225 governs removal
proceedings for ‘arriving aliens,’ [section] 1226(a) serves as a catchall.” Pizarro Reyes
v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025). As
the Supreme Court stated in Jennings, section 1226 “creates a default rule” that
“applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
The inclusion of a “catchall” provision in section 1226, particularly following the more
specific provision in section 1225, is “likely no coincidence, but rather a way for
Congress to capture noncitizens who fall outside of the specified categories.” Pizarro
Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; see also Barrera v. Tindall, No. 3:25-cv-541, 2025 WL
2690565, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (citation omitted).
Section 1226(a) provides that when a noncitizen has been “arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States,” the Attorney General may either continue to detain the individual or release
them on bond or conditional parole. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	The statute thus
“establishes a discretionary detention framework.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11571,
2025 WL 1869299, at *2 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). 	Importantly for purposes of the
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instant action, “[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a)
receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)); see also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-Civ-5937,
2025 WL 2371588, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (“To be sure, a noncitizen detained
under § 1226(a) is undoubtedly entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.”).
B. Petitioner’s 	Detention 	Is 	Governed 	By 	Section 	1226(a), 	Not
Section 1225(b)(1).
Respondents argue that Petitioner was originally placed in expedited removal
proceedings and, thus, he is lawfully detained without bond under section 1225(b)(1).
ECF No. [11] at 7—10. 	This argument misses the mark because Petitioner was
released in December 2022 and his current detention, as reflected in DHS’s own
documentation, is based upon section 1226.
Respondents’ argument that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention is
based on documentation related to his initial detention. 	Respondents are unable to
explain why or under what authority Petitioner was released in December 2022. This
is critical because Petitioner could not have been released if Respondents were
proceeding 	under 	expedited 	removal 	proceedings 	which 	requires 	mandatory
detention. It is true that the Attorney General may “for urgent humanitarian reasons
or significant public benefit” temporarily parole noncitizens subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(1). 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 	However, Respondents deny
that Petitioner was granted humanitarian parole or released for “significant public
benefit.” 	ECF No. [22] at 2—3. 	As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]hat express
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exception to detention [set forth in § 1182(d)(5)(A)] implies that there are no other
circumstances under which aliens detained under § 1225(b) may be released.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300 (emphasis original).
In addition, the documentation pursuant to which Petitioner is currently
detained affirmatively shows that Petitioner is being held pursuant to section
1226(a). 	The Warrant for Arrest and Notice of Custody Determination, both dated
October 25, 2025, state that they are issued “pursuant to . . . section 236 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act,” which is codified at section 1226. ECF No. [11-3]
at 1—3. 	Further, the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, also issued on
October 25, 2025, states that Petitioner is charged with being an “alien present
without admission or parole” under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). ECF No. [11-2] at 1. This evidence is significant for at least
two reasons.
First, it demonstrates that DHS did not classify Petitioner as an “arriving
alien” but, rather, as a noncitizen “present in the United States without admission or
parole.” This classification places him squarely within section 1226. See e.g., Pizarro
Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8 (emphasizing ICE’s selection of “present” rather than
“arriving” on a Notice to Appear as evidence that section 1226 applied); see also Perez
v. Berg, No. 25-cv-494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. July 24, 2025) (“The Court
notes that the government itself charged Petitioner as an alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or paroled rather than an arriving alien.”)
(quotations omitted). 	Indeed, by its own terms, section 1225(b)(1) applies to a
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noncitizen “who is arriving in the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), and DHS
did not classify Petitioner as such when it detained him in October 2025. 	Second,
section 	1225(b)(1) 	applies 	to 	“arriving” 	noncitizens 	who 	are 	determined 	to 	be
“inadmissible under section . . . [8 U.S.C.] 1182(a)(7).” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
The Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien issued in October 2025 does not charge
Petitioner under section 1182(a)(7) but, rather, under section 1182(a)(6).
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by 	section
1226(a)and, therefore, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge. As such, Petitioner’s mandatory detention without conducting a
dangerousness and risk of flight determination rests on an incorrect statutory
interpretation and contravenes the INA. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to relief
as to Count I.
Given this ruling, the Court declines to reach the merits of Petitioner’s
remaining claims, and dismisses them without prejudice. See, e.g., Puga, 2025 WL
2938369, at *6 (declining to reach the merits of the petitioner’s due process claim
because it granted the requested relief in another count, but allowing the due process
claim to be reasserted if the respondents do not comply with the court’s order to
provide a bond hearing or release); Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *8.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED 	AND 	ADJUDGED 	as
follows:
1. 	Petitioner Isidro Acanda Cebeallo’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
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Corpus, ECF No. [1], is GRANTED IN PART. Respondents shall afford Petitioner
an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or otherwise
release Petitioner.
2. 	Counts II, III, and IV of the Petition are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
3. 	The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 4th day of
December, 2025.
________________________________________
JACQUELINE BECERRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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