Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-20717-SMITH/STRAUSS
DAVID BRUCE STEAGALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Unopposed Petition for Attorney
Fees [DE 22] (the “Motion”). 	On August 22, 2025, the Court entered the Order Granting
Defendant’s Unopposed Amended Motion to Remand [DE 21], reversing and remanding the
decision of the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	[DE 21] ¶ 2. 	In the
Motion, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $9,094.33 and a recovery of
the filing fee in the amount of $405.00. [DE 22] at 1.
“Under [the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”)], a party is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees if: (1) the party prevailed in a non-tort suit involving the United States; (2) the
Government’s position was not substantially justified; (3) the party timely files an application for
attorney fees; (4) the party had a net worth of less than $2 million when the complaint was filed;
and (5) no special circumstances would make the award of fees unjust.” Ochoa v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 19-80802-CIV, 2020 WL 4208042, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 2020) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)); Delaney v. Berryhill, No. 17-81332-CIV, 2018 WL 7820219, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14,
2018)).
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Plaintiff has satisfied the foregoing requirements. First, Plaintiff is a prevailing party. A
plaintiff in a social security appeal prevails if the court orders a sentence-four remand. See Shalala
v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993). The Court expressly remanded the case under sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See [DE 21] ¶ 2. I conclude that Plaintiff satisfies this element.
Second, Plaintiff asserts in the Motion that the Government’s position was not substantially
justified. [DE 22] ¶ 4; see Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160 (1990) (“A fee application
must contain an allegation ‘that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B))). Given that the Motion is unopposed and that this case was
remanded under sentence four, I conclude that Plaintiff has shown a lack of substantial
justification.
Third, the Motion was timely filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (stating that prevailing
party must move for attorney’s fees within thirty days of final judgment); id. § 2412(d)(2)(G)
(defining a final judgment as “a judgment that is final and not appealable”); Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(B) (stating that judgment against the United States, its agencies, or its officers sued in their
official capacities can be appealed “within 60 days after entry of judgment”); Johnson v. Kijakazi,
No. 22-81926-CIV, 2023 WL 4972924, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2023) (“An EAJA request is
timely if made within 30 days of the final judgment, which, if no appeal is taken, is 90 days from
the judgment’s entry”); Newsome v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 775, 778, 780 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When a
remand was pursuant to sentence four, the 30-day filing period for applications for EAJA fees
begins after the final judgment (affirming, modifying, or reversing) is entered by the district court
and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable.” (citation modified)).
Fourth, I conclude that the net-worth requirement is satisfied based on the representation
made in the Motion regarding Plaintiff’s net worth at the time this action was filed. 	It states,
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“Plaintiff’s net worth at the time this proceeding was filed was less than two million dollars.”
[DE 22] ¶ 5.
Fifth, I find that no special circumstances make an award of fees unjust, particularly given
that the Motion is unopposed.
Because Plaintiff satisfied these EAJA requirements, I conclude that Plaintiff is entitled to
an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
As for the amount of fees, the EAJA provides that “fees awarded under this subsection
shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,
except that . . . (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court
determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability
of 	qualified 	attorneys 	for 	the 	proceedings 	involved, 	justifies 	a 	higher 	fee.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(A).
The fees sought here are reasonable. 	Plaintiff’s attorneys request compensation at an
hourly attorney rate of $251.84 for work performed in 2024 and an hourly attorney rate of $256.74
for work performed in 2025. These requested hourly rates are within the range of market rates for
South Florida attorneys who represent plaintiffs in similar actions. Cf. Higgs v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 24-61687-CIV, 2025 WL 2264216, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2025) (finding $255.03 to
be reasonable in sentence-four remand case), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
2264257 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025). 	Furthermore, courts consider the application of the cost-of-
living adjustment “next to automatic.” See Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1035 n.9 (11th Cir.
1992). Therefore, I conclude that the requested hourly rates are warranted. Similarly, the number
of hours is reasonable based on my knowledge and experience. For Sarah H. Bohr, the Motion
seeks fees 0.95 hours in 2024 and 13.00 hours in 2025. [DE 22] ¶ 6. For Heather Freeman, the
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Motion seeks fees 0.50 hours in 2024 and 21.00 hours in 2025. Id. Applying a lodestar method,
$9,094.33 represents a reasonable fee in this case. 	I therefore recommend that the Court award
the requested fee. I further conclude that Plaintiff is entitled to recover the filing fee of $405.
As a final matter, attorney’s fees awarded under the EAJA are payable to the plaintiff. See
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010). The payment is thus subject to a government offset to
satisfy any pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United States. Id. In this case, Plaintiff’s
Motion requests that the amounts sought be paid to Plaintiff’s attorneys if it is determined by the
Commissioner on remand that Plaintiff does not owe a debt to the United States that is subject to
an offset. [DE 22] ¶ 7. I conclude that this request is appropriate and recommend that the Court
grant it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion [DE 22] be
GRANTED. 	The Court should award Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $9,094.33 and
costs in the amount of $405.00. Provided that Plaintiff does not owe a debt to the United States
that is subject to offset, the Court should order the foregoing amounts to be paid to Plaintiff’s
attorneys.
The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable
Rodney Smith, United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties
from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar
the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this
Report except for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
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Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989);
11th Cir. R. 3-1.
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 9th day of February 2026.
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