USA v. Olvera et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 24-cr-20289-BLOOM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
BLAS BARRIOS,
Defendant.
_________________________/
OMNIBUS ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Government’s Notice of Intent to Use Evidence
of Prior Convictions (“Notice”), ECF No. [264], the Government’s Motion in Limine, ECF No.
[274], Defendant’s Motion for James Hearing, ECF No. [281], and Defendant’s Motion in Limine,
ECF No. [282]. Defendant filed Objections to the Government’s Notice, ECF No. [294], and a
Response to the Government’s Motion in Limine. ECF No. [295]. The Government filed a
Response to Defendant’s Motion in Limine, ECF No. [298], and Motion for James Hearing, ECF
No. [300]. The Court has considered the Motions and the Notice, the supporting and opposing
submissions, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the
Motions are granted in part and denied in part. Defendant’s Objections to the Notice are sustained
in part and overruled in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On July 9, 2024, Defendant Blas Barrios and seven other Co-Defendants were charged in
a 26-Count Indictment with “conspiring to distribute controlled substances and various crimes
related to the possession and distribution of firearms and narcotics.” ECF No. [300] at 1 (citing
ECF No. [15]). Defendant is proceeding to trial based on a Superseding Indictment that charges
him with “conspiring to distribute narcotics, distributing narcotics, dealing in firearms without a
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license, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon with three prior convictions for a serious
drug offense and/or violent felony.” Id. (citing ECF No. [291]).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motions in Limine
A party can file a motion in limine to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence from future
proceedings. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). “In fairness to the parties and their
ability to put on their case, a court should exclude evidence in limine only when it is clearly
inadmissible on all potential grounds.” United States. v. Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345
(S.D. Fla. 2010). The movant has the burden of proving that the evidence is inadmissible. Id.
“Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that
questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In
re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06-md-1769, 6:07-cv-15733, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). Likewise, “[i]n light of the preliminary or preemptive nature of motions in
limine, ‘any party may seek reconsideration at trial in light of the evidence actually presented and
shall make contemporaneous objections when evidence is elicited.’” Holder v. Anderson, No.
3:16-cv-1307, 2018 WL 4956757, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2018) (quoting Miller ex rel. Miller
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:01-cv-545FTM-29DNF, 2004 WL 4054843, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 22,
2004)); see In re Seroquel, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (“The court will entertain objections on
individual proffers as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within the scope of a denied
motion in limine.”) (citing United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989)).
“In general, a district court may deny a motion in limine when it ‘lacks the necessary
specificity with respect to the evidence to be excluded.’” Vaughn v. Carnival Corp., 571 F. Supp.
3d 1318, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (quoting Bowden ex rel. Bowden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
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CIV. A. 99-D-880-E, 2001 WL 617521, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2001)). “Motions in limine
should be limited to specific pieces of evidence and not serve as reinforcement regarding the
various rules governing trial.” Powers v. Target Corp., No. 19-cv-60922, 2020 WL 1986968, at
*7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020) (quoting Holder v. Anderson, No. 3:16-cv-1307, 2018 WL 4956757,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2018)).
B. 404(b) Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) prohibits the introduction of evidence of another
“crime, wrong, or act . . . 	to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such
evidence may be admissible, however, “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2). If the Government seeks to introduce 404(b) evidence in a criminal case, the
prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to
offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it;
(B) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the prosecutor intends
to offer the evidence and the reasoning that supports the purpose; and
(C) do so in writing before trial — or in any form during trial if the court, for good
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3).
“To be admissible, the Rule 404(b) evidence (1) must be relevant to an issue other than the
defendant’s character, (2) there must be sufficient proof to allow a jury to find that the defendant
committed the extrinsic act, and (3) the evidence must possess probative value that is not
substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice, and the evidence must meet the other
requirements of Rule 403.” United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v.
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Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d
898 (5th Cir. 1978)). “A defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material issue which
imposes a substantial burden on the government to prove intent, which it may prove by qualifying
Rule 404(b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an issue.”
United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 238 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Edouard,
485 F.3d 1324, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007)).
“Rule 404(b) is a ‘rule of inclusion,’ and Rule 404(b) evidence ‘should not lightly be
excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.’” United States v. Harding, 104 F.4th 1291,
1300 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Rehaif v.
United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. James Hearing
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), an out-of-court statement is not hearsay
if it is “offered against an opposing party” and was “made by the party’s co-conspirator during and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The Government may introduce
statements under this rule if it proves “by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a conspiracy
existed, (2) the conspiracy included the declarant and the defendant . . . , and (3) the statement was
made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Wenxia Man,
891 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2018). The Eleventh Circuit applies a “liberal standard in
determining whether a statement was in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1181 (11th Cir. 2011)). “[T]he contents of the statement do not alone
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suffice to establish a conspiracy in which the declarant and the defendant participated[.]” United
States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003).
In United States v. James, the former Fifth Circuit stated that “[t]he district court should,
whenever reasonably practicable, require the showing of a conspiracy and of the connection of the
defendant with it before admitting declarations of a co-conspirator. If it determines it is not
reasonably practical to require the showing to be made before admitting the evidence, the court
may admit the statement subject to being connected up.” 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979)
overruled on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). Since James, the
Eleventh Circuit has clarified that “[a] separate James hearing prior to the presentation of the
government’s case-in-chief, however, is not required.” United States v. Sanchez, 722 F.2d 1501,
1507 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Defendant filed a Motion for Pretrial James Hearing, requesting that a pretrial hearing “be
held for the purpose of determining the admissibility of any extrajudicial statements of alleged co-
conspirators[.]” ECF No. [281] at 1. Defendant argues that “[m]ost of the evidence that the
Government intends to present involving the Defendant directly relates to several transactions
between the Defendant and a confidential informant for the sale of cocaine base. If there are only
two members of a conspiracy, neither may be a government agent or informant.” Id. ¶ 5 (citing
United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2006)). Because there is a “lack of evidentiary
basis in the record supporting the existence of a conspiracy,” Defendant contends “it is unclear
how the Government can try this case without a pre-trial James hearing.” Id. ¶ 7. Specifically,
Defendant states he “will be severely prejudiced at trial . . . because he has no notice of what
alleged co-conspirator statements the Government will seek to introduce, aside from the statements
referenced in the Government’s motion in limine, and whether those statements are admissible.”
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Id. ¶ 8. The Government responds that a James hearing would “unnecessarily consume judicial
resources—in the form of [a] mini-trial involving the Government’s most critical witnesses—when
the Court will be well-equipped to render its evidentiary rulings at trial.” ECF No. [300] at 5. The
Government also notes that it shared its proposed trial exhibits with the defense on November 10,
2025, filed an exhibit list on November 24, 2025, the parties reviewed recorded calls, recorded
purchases, and their accompanying transcripts following the status conference on November 25,
2025, and conferred on the defense’s objections. Id. at 3. Additionally, the Government provides
specific details regarding the alleged conspiracy. It alleges Defendant “belongs to a gang called
the Latin Kings” and that his “co-conspirators include four fellow Latin Kings[,]” facts which the
Government knows “because a confidential informant (the “CI”)—a former member of the Latin
Kings—assisted law enforcement in this investigation.” Id. at 2. It details the alleged length of the
conspiracy, the names of the co-conspirators, the actions taken by the CI, and describes specific
recorded calls in which the CI communicated with Defendant. Id. at 2-3.
Defendant argues that allowing the Government “to ‘connect up’ any statements that it
seeks to introduce at trial and determine admissibility of those statements at the close of the
[Government’s] case-in-chief would be wholly inadequate to remedy the prejudice that will befall
the Defendant[.]” ECF No. [281] at 7. However, the Government correctly points out that the
Eleventh Circuit has “expressly approved of that practice.” ECF No. [300] at 5; see United States
v. Allison, United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1534 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the district
court concludes that a James hearing is not reasonably practical, it can admit the statements subject
to the government later connecting them up”) (quoting United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842,
850 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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Indeed, the Court agrees with the Government that a James hearing would be “duplicative
of the trial itself and would . . . ‘waste[] the judicial resources James was designed to conserve.’”
United States v. Marquardt, 695 F.2d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v.
Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 464 (11th Cir.1982)). Accordingly, the Court is “well within its discretion
in refusing to hold a James hearing.” Id. Because “holding a James hearing most assuredly would
yield a lengthy mini-trial, unnecessarily consuming judicial resources and requiring unnecessary
duplication of effort[,]” the Motion is denied. Order Denying Motion for James Hearing, United
States v. Carner, No. 22-cr-80022, ECF No. [457] (Nov. 21, 2022).
B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine
Defendant seeks to exclude two categories of evidence: (1) testimony and evidence
regarding gang membership and the Latin Kings organization; and (2) evidence that Defendant
acted as an enforcer or engaged in any alleged acts of violence or threatened violence. ECF No.
[282] at 2-3. Defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing.1
As an initial matter, Defendant acknowledges that the Court previously granted the
Government’s motion in limine and allowed the Government to “introduce evidence that
Defendant, the CI, and co-defendants are members of the Latin Kings Gang.” ECF No. [220] at 6-
7. Defendant attempts to draw a “distinction . . . between mentioning membership in the
organization and making the Latin Kings organization the focus of the [trial].” ECF No. [282] ¶ 3.
The Government argues that Defendant “offers no basis for the Court to overturn its prior ruling.”
ECF No. [298] at 1-2.
1 Defendant offered no explanation as to why an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve his Motion
in Limine. Because Defendant’s Motion largely relitigates issues that were decided in the Court’s prior
Order on Motion in Limine, ECF No. [220], and the Court can resolve the remaining issues on the
briefings, Defendant’s request for a hearing is denied.
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Although Defendant argues “[t]he indictment does not allege any RICO counts[,]” ECF
No. [282] at 2, it is unclear what bearing that has on the instant Motion, given that the Court
previously permitted the introduction of evidence of membership in the Latin Kings gang without
any reference to a RICO Count. However, the Superseding Indictment includes a Count for
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. ECF No. [291]
at 2. And, as the Court previously stated, “[t]he Government argues that Defendant ‘used his
membership to accomplish the conspiracy’s goals’ and that his gang membership provides context
to Defendant’s ‘motive, relationships, . . . conversations and transactions evincing an agreement.’
ECF No. [209] at 16. Therefore, the probative value of this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice[.]” ECF No. [220] at 7. Defendant has offered no reason for the Court to depart from its
prior ruling. Therefore, the Motion is denied.
Regarding evidence that Defendant acted as an enforcer or engaged in any alleged acts of
violence or threatened violence, Defendant argues that “[i]nformation regarding acts of violence
committed by others is not relevant to any acts of the Defendant and would be unfairly prejudicial.”
ECF No. [282] ¶ 4. Additionally, Defendant contends that testimony “outside of the time periods
alleged in the Indictment, the Defendant acted as an ‘enforcer’ within the organization,” which
included “the potential use of violence” offers no probative value as to the conduct alleged in the
Indictment and is unduly prejudicial because “Defendant in this case is accused of selling cocaine
base and firearms to the confidential informant from inside his home. There are no threats of
violence.” Id. ¶ 5.
The Government responds that Defendant’s “role as the gang’s enforcer, and at least two
alleged acts concerning violence involving the Defendant—not to mention repeated discussions of
firearms—are direct evidence of the drug conspiracy with which he is charged and his dealing in
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firearms.” ECF No. [298] at 1. Additionally, “discussions of violence are inextricably interwoven
with the evidence of the drugs and firearm sales with which the Defendant is charged.” Id.
Specifically, the Government argues that Defendant “used his membership [in the Latin Kings] to
accomplish the conspiracy’s goals, including punishing a fellow King who dealt with individuals
he was not supposed to and fighting with another King who would not share a cocaine supplier.
All these facts explain the Defendant’s relationship, in particular his role as Enforcer, with his co-
conspirators and the CI.” Id. at 10.
The Court has already held that Defendant’s membership in the Latin Kings is admissible.
See ECF No. [220] at 6-7. The Court also agrees with the Government that Defendant’s role as
enforcer “and the actions he took as a gang member” which included “issuing a violation to Mourin
and fighting with Prince . . . not only demonstrate [Defendant’s] participation in the drug
conspiracy, but also evince his relationship to his co-conspirators and the CI.” ECF No. [298] at
11. As the Government correctly argues, such evidence demonstrates that “Defendant agreed with
other gang members to distribute drugs, agreed on the rules to distribute drugs, and when another
Latin King violated those rules, [Defendant] ensured he suffered consequences.” Id. Because the
potential prejudicial effect of this evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value, the
Motion is denied.
To the extent Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of violence committed by others, he
appears to be referencing a shooting involving other Latin Kings which occurred on May 17, 2024
(“Shooting”). ECF Nos. [282] ¶ 4; [298] at 5. The Government also references “a different
instance,” in which “another Latin King ‘got hit,’ which the Defendant and the CI discussed during
a controlled purchase.” ECF No. [298] at 5. The Government states it “d[oes] not intend to present
evidence of the Shooting except to rebut any claims or arguments that the Latin Kings are a non-
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violent gang. References to the Shooting have been redacted from the government’s trial exhibits.”
Id. at 5 n.2. To the extent the Government introduces evidence of the Shooting to rebut arguments
that the Latin Kings are non-violent, the Motion is denied because the evidence would be relevant
and the potential prejudicial effect of this evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative
value. To the extent the Government introduces evidence that, during a controlled purchase,
Defendant and the CI discussed another instance in which a Latin King “got hit,” such evidence is
inextricably intertwined because it “forms an integral and natural part of an account” of the drug
conspiracy and “is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.” Id. at 9 (quoting
United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998)). Because the potential prejudicial
effect of this evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value, the Motion is denied.
C. Government’s Motion in Limine
On March 17, 2024, Defendant was arrested by the State of Florida and, as a condition of
his bond, he was placed on house arrest with GPS ankle monitoring. ECF No. [274] at 2. The
Government seeks to introduce (1) GPS evidence obtained through Defendant’s ankle monitor and
(2) evidence that Defendant was “on GPS ankle monitoring and house arrest during the
investigation, including the Defendant’s own words and testimony by an investigating agent and
the CI.” Id. at 3. The Government argues this is “direct evidence of the Defendant’s guilt” because
“his location during the controlled purchases . . . is essential to proving the Defendant committed
the cocaine base and firearm sales he is charged with.” Id.
Defendant responds that this evidence is “needlessly cumulative” and is only being offered
for the impermissible purpose of proving that Defendant “is a bad guy who was on GPS monitoring
during the time period alleged in the indictment. There is no reason, other than contact with the
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criminal justice system, why [Defendant] would be under supervision by the Miami Dade
Corrections and Rehabilitation Department.” ECF No. [295] at 2-3.
The Government states that it will need to introduce the GPS evidence which “reflect[s] a
summary of the Defendant’s movements each day as well as each time the GPS ankle monitor
pinged the Defendant’s location” because the records show that Defendant “was at the same
address where the controlled purchases occurred and where the Defendant was arrested . . . during
the time of each controlled purchase from the Defendant in this matter.” ECF No. [274] at 2.
Although each of the CI’s controlled purchases “were audio/video recorded and witnessed live,
via recording, by law enforcement” and the “CI and the Defendant discussed these purchases over
phone calls, which were recorded[,] . . . the hidden camera used to record the video does not clearly
capture the Defendant’s face throughout the controlled purchases.” Id. In Response, Defendant
notes that “[b]y the Government’s own admission – they have audio/video recording, controlled
phone calls, and multiple witnesses who are able to testify that [Defendant] was at his residence at
the time periods relevant to the acts alleged in the indictment. They do not need to introduce the
highly prejudicial evidence that the Defendant was on an ankle monitor for pending criminal
cases.” ECF No. [295] at 3. Defendant argues that “the Government seeks to portray the Defendant
as a repeat criminal, that it is more likely than not that he committed the crimes charged because
he is a repeat criminal, and the jury should convict him regardless of the strength of the evidence
in their current prosecution.” Id. at 4.
As the Government points out, the prejudicial effect of introducing evidence that Defendant
was wearing an ankle monitor is limited because Defendant is charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Therefore, “[a]t minimum, the government’s case will require evidence
the Defendant is a convicted felon and knew he was a convicted felon.” ECF No. [274] at 5.
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Furthermore, although Defendant is correct that the Government has other evidence that Defendant
participated in the controlled purchases, because the recording of the transaction “does not clearly
capture the Defendant’s face throughout the controlled purchases[,]” GPS records showing that
Defendant was at the location of the controlled purchases when they took place is probative and
not needlessly cumulative. Id. at 2.
Defendant also argues that all but one of the cases the Government cites in support of the
introduction of ankle monitor evidence “allowed the testimony in relation to convictions[,]”
whereas, in the instant case, “Defendant was on pre-trial supervision for criminal cases that have
not resulted in a conviction.” ECF No. [295] at 3. Therefore, Defendant argues, the Government
is seeking to introduce “evidence of criminal cases in which the Defendant continues to be
presumed innocen[t].” Id. As an initial matter, for purposes of the motion in limine, the
Government is not seeking to introduce evidence of the alleged crime for which Defendant was
placed on house arrest with GPS monitoring. It is seeking to introduce the fact that Defendant was
wearing an ankle monitor, Defendant was on house arrest during the investigation, and records
from the GPS monitoring, showing Defendant’s location. ECF No. [274] at 3. Although Defendant
is correct that “[t]here is no reason, other than contact with the criminal justice system, why
[Defendant] would be under supervision by the Miami Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation
Department[,]” the analysis of whether the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the GPS
monitoring’s probative value is not affected by the fact that “Defendant continues to be presumed
innocen[t].” Id. at 2-3. Regardless of whether Defendant was ultimately convicted of the alleged
crime which resulted in his GPS monitoring, it would be equally improper for the monitoring to
be introduced as evidence that he has a propensity for committing crimes. Therefore, the fact that
Defendant is presumed innocent of the alleged crime has no bearing on the instant analysis.
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Because the prejudicial effect of the GPS evidence does not substantially outweigh the probative
value, the Motion is granted. See United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770, 776 (11th Cir. 1998)
(district court did not abuse discretion in permitting testimony of defendant’s probation officer
where “testimony was neither the only, nor even the primary, source of the jury’s information
concerning [defendant’s] prior contact with the criminal justice system. Rather, the jury was
otherwise aware of [defendant’s] criminal history because the government introduced evidence of
five previous bank robberies committed by [defendant].”); United States v. Hemphill, 642 F. App’x
448, 450, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s admission of evidence pertaining to
defendant’s ankle monitor “including that he was wearing it at the time of both drug sales and that
its data showed he was at home” where no other “evidence of defendant’s underlying previous
criminal conduct was adduced at trial” and defendant was wearing ankle monitor as part of pretrial
supervision).
D. 404(b) Evidence
On November 17, 2025, the Government filed a Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of
Defendant’s Prior Convictions. ECF No. [264]. The Government seeks to introduce four of
Defendant’s five2 prior convictions:
i. 	1998 conviction for armed robbery following a plea of nolo contendere, see
State of Florida v. Blas Frank Barrios, Case No. F98-001803B (11th Fla.
Cir. Ct., Dec. 19, 2001) (sentence modified from 364 days’ imprisonment
to three years’ imprisonment following revocation of probation), attached
as Exhibit 1 (“Armed Robbery Conviction”);
ii. 	2010 conviction for possessing with the intent to sell, manufacture, or
deliver cocaine and marijuana following a guilty plea, see State of Florida
v. Blas F. Barrios, Case No. F10-002333 (11th Fla. Cir. Ct., June 30, 2010)
2 The Government states that it will only introduce the Fraud Conviction if Defendant testifies, in which
case, the Government will introduce all of Defendant’s convictions for impeachment purposes. ECF No.
[264] at 2 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 609).
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(sentenced to 366 days of imprisonment), attached as Exhibit 2 (“Drug
Distribution Conviction”);
iii. 	2013 conviction for strongarm robbery with aggravated battery pursuant to
a guilty plea, see State of Florida v. Blas Frank Barrios, Case No. F11-
16888 (11th Fla. Cir. Ct., Nov. 18, 2015) (sentence modified from 50
months’ imprisonment to 5 years’ imprisonment following revocation of
probation), attached as Exhibit 3 (“Robbery and Battery Conviction”);
iv. 	2020 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, specifically
methamphetamine following a guilty plea, see State of Florida v. Blas
Frank Barrios, Case No. F20-014221 (11th Fla. Cir. Ct., Dec. 18, 2020)
(sentenced to two days’ imprisonment), attached as Exhibit 4 (“Drug
Possession Conviction”)
v. 	2009 conviction for uttering a forged instrument and grand theft, among
other offenses, following a plea of guilty, see State of Florida v. Blas Frank
Barrios, Case No. F07-026745B (11th Fla. Cir. Ct., Mar. 23, 2009)
(sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment), attached as Exhibit 5 (“Fraud
Conviction”).
ECF No. [264] at 2-3.
The Government argues (1) the Armed Robbery Conviction, Drug Distribution Conviction,
and Robbery and Battery Conviction are necessary to prove Defendant was a convicted felon and
knew he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearms in this case; (2) because
Defendant has not moved to bifurcate the trial, the Government must, in its case-in-chief, prove
the predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); (3) even if Defendant stipulated to his felon status
and knowledge, the Drug Distribution Conviction and Drug Possession Conviction are necessary
to proving that Defendant “knew the unlawful purpose of the narcotics conspiracy, willfully joined
in it, knew he possessed either cocaine base, cocaine, or a federally scheduled controlled substance,
and he intended to distribute it”; (4) the Drug Convictions are relevant to counter any entrapment
defense; (5) the certified convictions constitute sufficient evidence to allow the jury to determine
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Defendant committed the other acts3; and (6) the probative value of the evidence far outweighs the
potential for unfair prejudice. Id. In his Objections, Defendant argues (1) the evidence the
Government seeks to introduce is irrelevant and is only being offered as evidence of Defendant’s
propensity to commit those acts; (2) the prior Drug Convictions do not pass the Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 balancing test; and (3) evidence related to Defendant’s other convictions is irrelevant
because the Court has already granted a motion to bifurcate the trial and Defendant plans to
stipulate to his status as a convicted felon and his knowledge of that status. ECF No. [294].
As Defendant notes, since the Government filed its Notice, the Court has granted
Defendant’s motion to bifurcate the trial. ECF No. [272]. Therefore, the Government’s argument
that, in its case-in-chief, it must prove the predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is now
moot. See ECF No. [264] at 6 (noting that the Government must prove, in its case-in-chief, that
the Armed Robbery, Drug Distribution, and Robbery and Battery Convictions occurred “on
occasions separate from one another” because Defendant had not yet moved to bifurcate the trial).
Regarding the Government’s argument that it must introduce the Armed Robbery, Drug
Distribution, Drug Possession, and Robbery and Battery Convictions to prove “Defendant was a
convicted felon, knew he was a convicted felon, and that he did not possess the charged firearm
by any mistake or accident[,]” ECF No. [264] at 5, Defendant represents that he “plans to stipulate
to his status as a convicted felon and his knowledge of that status.” ECF No. [294] at 4. Therefore,
the Government’s argument is moot, except to the extent that the stipulation does not address the
Government’s argument that these Convictions prove Defendant “did not possess the charged
firearm by any mistake or accident.” ECF No. [264] at 5. However, of Defendant’s prior
3 Defendant does not dispute that the certified convictions constitute sufficient evidence to allow the jury
to determine Defendant committed the other acts.
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convictions, only the 1998 Armed Robbery Conviction appears to have involved a firearm. ECF
No. [264] at 2-3. Therefore, the Government’s argument that the prior convictions are necessary
to prove Defendant’s knowing possession of a firearm only applies to the Armed Robbery
Conviction.4 See Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(b).
The Eleventh Circuit has “previously recognized the ‘logical connection between a
convicted felon’s knowing possession of a firearm at one time and his knowledge that a firearm is
present at a subsequent time.’” United States v. Reid, No. 23-10619, 2025 WL 2399780, at *5
(11th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2003)).
However, the Government has not argued that, pursuant to Defendant’s Armed Robbery
Conviction, Defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing a firearm. The Information
charging Defendant with Armed Robbery alleged that Defendant “did unlawfully, by force,
violence, assault or putting in fear, take certain property . . . and in the course of committing said
robbery, carried a . . . firearm, to [sic] in violation of s. 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat.” ECF No. [264-1]
at 1. Because the Government has not argued that Defendant’s Armed Robbery Conviction
necessarily entailed the knowing possession of a firearm, the Armed Robbery Conviction has no
relevance as to whether Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in the instant case. Therefore,
Defendant’s Objection as to the Armed Robbery Conviction is sustained.
Regarding the Government’s argument that the Drug Distribution Conviction and Drug
Possession Conviction are necessary to prove that Defendant “knew the unlawful purpose of the
narcotics conspiracy, willfully joined in it, knew he possessed either cocaine base, cocaine, or a
federally scheduled controlled substance, and he intended to distribute it,” ECF No. [264] at 6,
4 Because the Government has not offered any alternative, permissible purpose for introducing the Robbery and
Battery Conviction in its case-in-chief, Defendant’s Objection is sustained as to that Conviction.
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Defendant concedes there is “controlling caselaw that . . . ‘[e]vidence of prior drug dealings is
highly probative of intent to distribute a controlled substance.’ United States v. Barron-Soto, 820
F.3d 409, 417 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir.
1990)); see United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1057 (11th Cir. 1987).” ECF No. [294] at 4.
Therefore, Defendant argues “[t]he convictions are old and are not alleged to involve the same
individuals. They are not indicative of [Defendant’s] actions in 2024. And a conviction for simple
possession does not provide probative value as to whether someone was involved in the
distribution of a controlled substance.” Id.
As the Government argues, the Drug Distribution Conviction is highly probative because
it “specifically concerns cocaine—one of the substances charged in Count I and the very substance
cooked to make cocaine base,” making the Conviction “even more relevant to proving the
Defendant’s knowledge and lack of mistake or accident.” ECF No. [264] at 7. As the Eleventh
Circuit has previously stated “a not guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case . . . makes intent a material
issue and opens the door to admission of prior drug-related offenses as highly probative, and not
overly prejudicial, evidence of a defendant’s intent.” United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1225
(11th Cir. 2013). Although the fact that the Drug Distribution Conviction is fifteen years old may
lessen the Conviction’s probative value, prior drug-related offenses may still be highly probative
“even where the prior conviction is many years old.” Id. Because the Government intends to
introduce the Drug Distribution Conviction for a proper purpose and the prejudicial effect does
not substantially outweigh its probative value, Defendant’s Objection is overruled. See United
States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s admission of
fifteen-year-old drug dealings “despite their differing nature [from the charge] and remoteness in
time”); United States v. James, 147 F. App’x 76, 81 (11th Cir. 2005) (fifteen-year-old drug
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conviction was not “so temporally remote that its prejudice substantially outweighed its probative
value”); United States v. Manning, 800 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming district
court’s admission of drug convictions that were thirteen-years-old at the time of the charged
offense, noting “prior convictions were not identical to the charged offense, [but] differences in
the amount or type of drugs do not substantially prejudice a defendant).
Defendant also argues that “a conviction for simple possession does not provide probative
value as to whether someone was involved in the distribution of a controlled substance.” ECF No.
[294] at 4. However, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that its “precedent regards virtually any
prior drug offense as probative of the intent to engage in a drug conspiracy.” United States v.
Aguirre-Orozco, 340 F. App’x 626, 638 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Matthews, 431
F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005)). Because the Government intends to introduce the Drug
Possession Conviction for a proper purpose and the prejudicial effect does not substantially
outweigh its probative value, Defendant’s Objection is overruled.
Defendant Objects to the Government’s Notice that it intends to introduce the Fraud
Conviction for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 if Defendant testifies.
ECF No. [294] at 5. Rule 609(b) states that, where more than ten years have elapsed since the
witness was convicted, evidence of the conviction is admissible only if written notice is given to
the adverse party and the conviction’s “probative value, supported by specific facts and
circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Defendant
was convicted “for uttering a forged instrument and grand theft, among other offenses,” in 2009,
therefore, more than ten years have elapsed since the Fraud Conviction. See ECF No. [264] at 3.
Defendant argues that the Government “has not alleged any specific facts and circumstances in
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that 2009 case that support a finding that its probative value [substantially] outweighs its
prejudicial effect.” ECF No. [294] at 5. The Court agrees and Defendant’s Objection is sustained.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	The Government’s Motion in Limine, ECF No. [274], is GRANTED;
2. 	Defendant’s Motion for James Hearing, ECF No. [281], is DENIED;
3. 	Defendant’s Motion in Limine, ECF No. [282], is DENIED;
4. 	Defendant’s Objections to the Government’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence
of Defendant’s Prior Convictions, ECF No. [294], are SUSTAINED IN PART
and OVERRULED IN PART.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 29, 2025.
________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
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