SMITH v. COMERFORD

Page 1 of 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
CORNELL SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-55-MW-MJF
RICKY DIXON,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
This prisoner civil-rights case is before this court on Plaintiff
Cornell 	Smith’s 	motion 	for 	a 	temporary 	restraining 	order 	and
preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) and
(b). Doc. 33. Defendant Ricky Dixon opposes the motion. Doc. 38. For the
reasons set forth below, the District Court should deny Smith’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Smith is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections
(“FDC”) housed at the Franklin Correctional Institution. Smith initiated
this civil action on February 5, 2025, by filing a civil-rights complaint.
Doc. 1. Smith’s amended complaint, filed on June 30, 2025, is the
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 1 of 8

Page 2 of 8
operative complaint. Doc. 13. Smith is suing Secretary Dixon in his
official capacity.
Smith asserts that he is a Muslim. Smith’s amended complaint
alleges that it is an “Islamic tenet . . . for all able Muslims to grow a beard
unrestricted, with the exception of trimming their mustache.” Doc. 13 at
7. On October 11, 2024, a prison official required Smith to shave his beard
pursuant to the FDC’s grooming policy. The FDC’s grooming policy
provides that “[a]ll inmates shall elect either to be clean shaven or to
grow and maintain a half-inch beard. Such a beard shall include all the
hair that grows naturally on the face and front of the neck, excluding
eyebrows and eyelashes.” Fla. Admin. Code. r. 33-602.101(4).
Smith alleges that he filed grievances seeking a religious exemption
from the grooming policy, but prison officials denied those grievances.
Doc. 13 at 7–8. Smith claims that the FDC’s refusal to exempt Smith from
the FDC’s grooming policy violates Smith’s rights under the First and
Fourteenth 	Amendments, 	as 	well 	as 	the 	Religious 	Land 	Use 	and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Doc. 13 at 8. In his amended
complaint, Smith seeks a declaratory judgment and an injunction that
prevents prison officials from applying the grooming rule to him. Id. at 9.
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 2 of 8

Page 3 of 8
S MITH’S M OTION FOR P RELIMINARY I NJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Smith filed his motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order on December 9, 2025. Doc. 33. That was more than nine
months after Smith filed his initial complaint, and six months after he
filed his amended complaint. In support of his motion, Smith cites two
cases 	in 	which 	courts 	granted 	Muslim 	inmates 	injunctions 	that
prevented 	the 	FDC 	from 	enforcing 	its 	grooming 	policy 	against 	the
plaintiff. Id. at 1, 3 (citing Sims v. Inch, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1272 (N.D. Fla.
2019) and Shabazz v. Dixon, 2023 WL 5206111 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2023));
see also Denson v. Dixon, 2023 WL 5200482 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2023).1
Secretary Dixon opposes Smith’s motion. Doc. 38. Dixon argues that
Smith 	fails 	to 	establish 	the 	two 	most 	critical 	factors 	for obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief: a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, and irreparable injury. Dixon also argues that the proposed
injunction would be adverse to the public’s interest. Doc. 38.
T HE STANDARD FOR P RELIMINARY I NJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The four prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of
1 Shabazz and Denson are the same cases and involve the same Plaintiff,
Abdul Hakeen Jahmal Naseer Shabazz aka Owen D. Denson, Jr.
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 3 of 8

Page 4 of 8
irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury
to the movant outweighs whatever harm the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party; and (4) granting the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest. A movant’s failure to “show any of the four
factors is fatal” to his motion for injunctive relief. Am. Civ. Liberties
Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198
(11th Cir. 2009).
“A 	preliminary 	injunction 	is 	an 	extraordinary 	remedy 	never
awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24
(2008); Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020). “The chief
function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the 	merits 	of 	the 	controversy 	can 	be 	fully 	and 	fairly 	adjudicated.”
Robinson 	v. 	Att’y 	Gen., 	957 	F.3d 	1171, 	1178-79 	(11th 	Cir. 	2020).
“Mandatory preliminary relief,” as Smith seeks here, “goes well beyond
simply maintaining the status quo[,] is particularly disfavored, and
should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving
party.” Powers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 691 F. App’x 581, 583 (11th
Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
The irreparable-injury factor “‘is the sine qua non of injunctive
relief.’” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 4 of 8

Page 5 of 8
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen Contractors v. City of
Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990)). In Wreal, LLC v.
Amazon.com. Inc., 840 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2016), the Eleventh Circuit
explained:
A delay in seeking a preliminary injunction of even only
a 	few 	months—though 	not 	necessarily 	fatal—militates
against 	a 	finding 	of 	irreparable 	harm. 	A 	preliminary
injunction requires showing “imminent” irreparable harm.
Indeed, the very idea of a preliminary injunction is premised
on the need for speedy and urgent action to protect a plaintiff's
rights before a case can be resolved on its merits. For this
reason, our sister circuits and district courts within this
Circuit and elsewhere have found that a party’s failure to act
with speed or urgency in moving for a preliminary injunction
necessarily undermines a finding of irreparable harm.
Id. at 1248 (citations omitted). “[T]wo time periods are relevant in
determining whether a plaintiff acts promptly in seeking [injunctive]
relief: (1) a plaintiff cannot delay in filing a complaint after discovering a
potential infringer, and (2) a plaintiff must move quickly in filing a
motion for a preliminary injunction once a complaint has been filed. If
either 	is 	unreasonably 	delayed, 	a 	finding 	of 	irreparable 	harm 	is
significantly 	weakened.” 	Bethune-Cookman, 	Univ., 	Inc. 	v. 	Dr. 	Mary
McLeod Bethune Nat'l Alumni Ass'n, Inc., 2022 WL 18107602, at *2
(M.D. 	Fla. 	Nov. 	22, 	2022) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation
omitted).
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 5 of 8

Page 6 of 8
D ISCUSSION
Smith fails to satisfy the irreparable-injury requirement. Smith
alleges 	that 	he 	“faces 	imminent, 	ongoing 	harm 	that 	cannot 	be
compensated 	with 	money 	damages. 	Without 	immediate 	judicial
intervention, Plaintiff will continue to be violated.” Doc. 33 at 3. In
response, Dixon argues that Smith’s three-year delay in 	filing this
lawsuit 	and 	seeking 	injunctive 	relief 	undercuts 	Smith’s 	claim 	of
irreparable injury. Doc. 38 at 9–10.
On February 2, 2022, Smith registered with the FDC his faith as
“Muslim.” Doc. 38-1, Ex. A. In 2022, as now, the FDC’s grooming policy
limited 	inmates’ 	beards 	to 	one-half 	inch. 	Fla. 	Admin. 	Code 	r. 	33-
602.101(4) (2018). Consistent with the FDC’s grooming policy, Smith was
not—and has not been—permitted to grow an unrestricted beard for a
number of years, at least since February 2022.
Smith, however, did not file this lawsuit until February of 2025,
and 	Smith 	did 	not 	file 	a 	motion 	for 	a 	temporary 	restraining
order/preliminary injunction until December of 2025. This means that
Smith has waited three years to seek judicial relief. And Smith has not
provided a satisfactory reason for such a lengthy delay. Smith does not
explain why he faced harm in February 2025 with regard to the FDC’s
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 6 of 8

Page 7 of 8
grooming policy, but not before. As a result of the lengthy delay, Smith
has 	failed 	to 	establish 	that 	he 	will 	suffer 	irreparable 	injury 	if 	a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is not granted.
When confronted with similar challenges to the FDC’s grooming
policy, other judges have denied preliminary injunctions because of a
prisoner’s delay in seeking relief. See Yoseph v. Dixon, No. 1:24-cv-137-
AW-ZCB, 2024 WL 5046301 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2024), aff’d sub nom.
Yoseph v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2025 WL 2366445, at *5–6 (11th Cir.
Aug. 14, 2025) (denying Muslim prisoner’s request for a preliminary
injunction against FDC’s beard grooming policy because prisoner could
not show irreparable injury when he waited years to seek judicial relief);
Abdul v. Inch, No. 4:21-cv-153-MW-MJF, 2024 WL 3436636 (N.D. Fla.
June 17, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3432015
(N.D. Fla. 	July 16, 	2024) (same); 	Smith v. 	Dixon, No. 4:22-cv-373-
WS/MAF, 2024 WL 5717479 at *2–3, 4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2024) (same)
McWilliams v. Dixon, No. 24-80055-CIV, 2024 WL 2194664, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 22, 2024) (same). The Eleventh Circuit reached the same result
in analogous cases. See Yoseph, 2025 WL 2366445, at *5–6; Powers, 691
F. App’x at 583–84 (affirming denial of preliminary injunction because
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 7 of 8

Page 8 of 8
the inmate waited three years to challenge prison’s failure to provide
religiously-compliant meals, and thus could not show irreparable injury).
Because the failure to establish even one of the four requirements
dooms a request for a preliminary injunction, Smith’s motion must be
denied because he failed to show that he will suffer irreparable injury.
C ONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, Doc. 33.
At Panama City, Florida, this 3rd day of March 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Case 5:25-cv-00055-MW-MJF Document 47 Filed 03/03/26 Page 8 of 8