GAY v. KAYLA SCOTT et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
JOHN S. GAY,
D.O.C. # 882614,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:25cv053-AW-MAF
CENTURION OF FLORIDA, LLC,
KAYLA SCOTT, RN,
and JOHN HRICZ, RN,
Defendants.
____________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case was removed to this Court from state court on February 5,
2025. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff ultimately filed a third amended complaint
[hereinafter “complaint”], ECF No. 24, on May 6, 2025. Defendant
Centurion filed a motion to dismiss, ECF No. 33, on May 23, 2025. The pro
se Plaintiff was advised of his obligation to respond to that motion, ECF No.
34, and after being granted several extensions of time, see ECF Nos. 36
and 38, Plaintiff’s response was filed on July 9, 2025. ECF No. 41. The
motion is ready for a ruling.
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Allegations of the Complaint, ECF No. 24
On November 13, 2022, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Columbia
Correctional Institution Annex. ECF No. 24 at 5. An officer doing rounds
noticed that “something was amiss” with Plaintiff as he was not sitting up,
and “immediately called medical emergency.” 	Id. 	After 30 minutes, and no
response to that call, the officer called for medical again. 	Id. 	When there
still was no response, the officer enlisted the help of other inmates to assist
Plaintiff to medical. 	Id.
Two nurses, identified as Defendants Scott and Hricz, “turned Plaintiff
away stating that Plaintiff was not having a stroke.” 	Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff
claimed the two nurses refused to assist him, even though he declared a
medical emergency 7 times over a 2-day period. 	Id. at 6. His complaint
suggests that the Defendants failed “to even physically examine” him and
“thereby discover Plaintiff’s condition was critical.” 	Id. at 9.
Eventually ARPN McQueen intervened and Plaintiff was transferred
to the hospital by ambulance. 	Id. at 6. At the hospital, it was determined
that Plaintiff suffered two strokes. 	Id. at 7.
As it pertains to Defendant Centurion, Plaintiff alleged that “Centurion
adopted the policy/custom in place that ultimately caused [Defendants]
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Kaylee Scott and John Hricz to act deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical need.” 	Id. at 8. Plaintiff contends the policy at issue
“governs ‘Medical Emergencies’ and states that a medical emergency is
anything but a stroke.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff says, “Apparently, an inmate must be
bleeding profusely, have a broken or protruding bone, stab wounds, or not
be breathing in order to declare and qualify what ails him or her as an
medical emergency.” 	Id. at 8-9.
Plaintiff claims the Defendant nurses violated his Eighth Amendment
right to receive medical care. 	Id. at 10. Defendant Centurion has
contracted with the Department of Corrections to provide medical services,
and Plaintiff claims that Centurion and its employees “failed to meet even
the bare minimum of Plaintiff’s needs thereby violating Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment.” 	Id.
at 11-12.
Count I of the complaint is brought against Centurion. 	Id. at 13. 1
Plaintiff claims that “Centurion and/or its agents or employees used and
adopted policy/custom to deny Plaintiff treatment.” 	Id. at 14. He further
1 Count II of the complaint is brought against Defendant Scott, and Count III is
brought against Defendant Hricz. ECF No. 24 at 16-18. Those claims are not
addressed in this Report and Recommendation.
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stated that “Centurion and/or its agents were deliberately indifferent to [his]
serious medical needs.” 	Id.
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 33
Centurion argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
because Plaintiff’s claims “fail to allege any specific policy or procedure
violative of any Constitution[al] right, and otherwise fail to properly allege
sufficient facts to state a cause of action.” ECF No. 33 at 1. Centurion
further argues that the complaint is “a mix-up of often conclusory facts
raised against multiple defendants without specificity, clarity, or cohesion.”
Id. at 5.
Standard of Review
The motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 33 at 1. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the Court must determine whether a complaint alleges “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but Plaintiff must
provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127
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S. Ct. at 1964-65. Furthermore, the facts of a well-pleaded complaint must
be accepted as true and the case should proceed even if it appears “that
actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely.’” 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (citations
omitted).
The pleading standard is not heightened, but flexible, in line with Rule
8’s command to simply give fair notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s
claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534
U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) (“Rule 8(a)’s
simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
exceptions.”). Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
those drafted by an attorney. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th
Cir. 1986) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S. Ct. 594,
596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972)). Nevertheless, a complaint must provide
sufficient notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that a
“largely groundless claim” does not proceed through discovery and “take
up the time of a number of other people . . . .” Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2005)
(quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558). 	In other words, a motion to dismiss
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considers the legal sufficiency of a complaint, but does not determine
whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,
534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) (citing to
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90
(1974)).
Analysis
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires
that prisoners be provided treatment for their serious medical needs.
Failing to provide treatment because a defendant is “deliberately
indifferent” to a prisoner’s plight results in cruel and unusual punishment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). To
allege an Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of medical care, a Plaintiff
must allege: “an objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient
response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need,
and an actual inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor v.
Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1077 (2001);
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).
As alleged by Plaintiff, Centurion is a private entity that contracted
with the D.O.C. to provide medical services. “Although Centurion is not a
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governmental entity, ‘[w]here a function which is traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state . . . is performed by a private entity, state action is
present’ for purposes of § 1983.” Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769
F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoted in Tipton v. Centurion, No.
3:23-CV-1215-MMH-PDB, 2023 WL 7131849, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30,
2023), appeal dismissed, No. 24-10316-C, 2024 WL 3559736 (11th Cir.
May 29, 2024)). When a private entity such as Centurion “‘contracts ... to
provide medical services to inmates, it performs a function traditionally
within the exclusive prerogative of the state’ and ‘becomes the functional
equivalent of the municipality’ under section 1983.” Ramirez v. Centurion
Med. Servs. of Fla., No. 4:22-CV-323-MW/MJF, 2023 WL 3394116, at *3
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No.
4:22cv323-MW/MJF, 2023 WL 3391443 (N.D. Fla. May 11, 2023) (citing to
Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); Ireland v.
Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1289 (11th Cir. 2022).
Even though Centurion is subject to liability under § 1983, it “may not
be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty.,
Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Craig v.
Floyd Cty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); Buckner v. Toro,
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116 F.3d 450 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a private health care provider
who contracts to provide health care services to prisoners, like a
municipality, may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of
respondeat superior)); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611
(1978). Here, Plaintiff has attempted to assert a claim against Centurion
based on the actions or omissions of its agents and medical staff.
However, that claim is insufficient because the doctrine of respondeat
superior is not applicable. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th
Cir. 2003) (“It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are
not liable under 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on
the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). That aspect of
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed.
To the degree Count I attempts to hold Centurion liable for its own
custom or policy, that is a legitimate basis to sue Centurion. However,
Centurion may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “only under certain
circumstances.” Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth.,
344 F.3d 1263, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2003) (cited in Hand, 2023 WL 119426,
at *6). Those circumstances exist when the entity, in this case Centurion,
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is alleged to have “caused the violation of [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”
Est. of Hand by & through Hand v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 21-11542, 2023
WL 119426, at *6 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2023) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “In sum, § 1983 liability
against Centurion must be conditioned on the existence of an official policy
or custom that constitutes deliberate indifference.” Hand, 2023 WL
119426, at *6 (citing to Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 453 (11th Cir. 1997)
(stating “the Monell policy or custom requirement applies in suits against
private entities performing functions traditionally within the exclusive
prerogative of the state, such as the provision of medical care to inmates”).
“To establish liability, ‘a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional
rights were violated; (2) that the [entity] had a custom or policy that
constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that
the policy or custom caused the violation.’” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d
1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388 (1989)) (quoted in Hand, 2023 WL 119426, at *6). Here, Plaintiff
presented only a conclusory assertion that “Centurion adopted the
policy/custom in place that ultimately caused [the Defendant nurses] to act
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need.” ECF No. 24 at
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8. He claimed the “policy/custom in place governs ‘medical emergencies,’
and states that a medical emergency is anything but a stroke.” 	Id.
However, Plaintiff did not point to a specific written policy or provide facts
which demonstrate that Centurion had a custom of denying emergency
medical care to inmates who are suspected of having a stroke. “In order
for a plaintiff to demonstrate a policy or custom, it is generally necessary to
show a persistent and wide-spread practice.” Hand, 2023 WL 119426, at
*6. Plaintiff has not done so.
Further, Plaintiff has also not demonstrated that the custom or policy
caused the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to medical care.
Plaintiff did not allege that he was denied medical treatment because he
was found to be having a stroke and the nurses told him that his condition
was not a medical emergency. Rather, Plaintiff alleged that he was denied
medical care because the Defendant nurses said “Plaintiff was not having a
stroke.” ECF No. 24 at 6. Plaintiff alleged that at one point, Defendant
Scott claimed “Plaintiff was faking a stroke in order to transfer.” 	Id.; see
also ECF No. 41 at 4. Under those allegations, a policy which pertains to
treating strokes as non-emergencies would be inapplicable because,
according to Plaintiff, the nurses did not think he was having a stroke.
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Plaintiff does not contend that the nurses treated his stroke as a non-
emergency, but instead, contends that those nurses erroneously concluded
he was not having a stroke.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is correct - Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that Centurion had a policy or custom which “was the
‘moving force’ behind the alleged constitutional deprivation.” ECF No. 33
at 10. Instead, Plaintiff referenced “only a generalized, conclusory, and
illogical violative purported policy of Centurion (i.e., that a ‘medical
emergency is anything but a stroke”). 	Id. at 13.
Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss also demonstrates that
no policy of Centurion led to the violation of his rights. Plaintiff reiterated
that Defendants Scott and Hricz said, “You’re not having a stroke, this is
not a medical emergency.” ECF No. 41 at15-16. Thus, both the third
amended complaint and Plaintiff’s response reveal the he was denied
medical care because the nurses did not believe he was having a stroke.
That is a vastly different situation than claiming Centurion does not
acknowledge a stroke as a medical emergency.
Plaintiff’s claim against Centurion should be dismissed. Plaintiff has
not sufficiently alleged that a policy or custom of Centurion led to the denial
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of medical care. Centurion’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 40, should be
granted.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that
Defendant Centurion’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 33, be GRANTED, and
this case be REMANDED for further proceedings.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on December 15, 2025.
S/ 	Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other
parties. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). 	Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	If a
party 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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