SHEAN v. HARRIS et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
DORA RENEE SHEAN,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:24cv529-MW-MAF
SHEVAUN HARRIS, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________/
SECOND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In June 2025, a Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 43, was
entered, recommending that the pro se Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the “domestic
relations” exception to federal court jurisdiction. In addition, it was
concluded that Plaintiff’s claims were primarily based on events which were
time barred. ECF No. 43. The recommendation was accepted in part, but
rejected in part. ECF No. 53. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend if she
could, “in good faith, allege facts to support her argument that the statute of
limitations is tolled for any of her claims . . . .” ECF No. 53 at 5. Her
deadline to file an amended complaint was “on or before July 28 2025.” 	Id.
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Plaintiff belatedly filed a motion for an extension of time, ECF No. 56,
which was granted, ECF No. 57, and her amended complaint, ECF No. 58,
was filed on August 6, 2025. Thereafter, two motions to dismiss were filed,
ECF Nos. 59 and 60, and other Defendants filed a notice of joinder, ECF
No. 61, adopting the arguments raised in the second motion to dismiss,
ECF No. 60.
Plaintiff was directed to file her opposition to those motions by
September 22, 2025. ECF No. 62. Plaintiff did file “opposition,” ECF No.
63, although she failed to clearly indicate which of the two motions her
opposition addressed. Plaintiff submitted numerous arguments, but did not
provide any citation to the corresponding motion to dismiss. It will be
assumed that Plaintiff’s opposition is in response to both motions to
dismiss.
In November 2025, two additional Defendants (Daena and Robert
Legacy) filed a separate motion to dismiss. ECF No. 66. Plaintiff was
given until December 15, 2025, to file a response in opposition to that
motion. ECF No. 67. As of this date, Plaintiff has not filed a response and
the third motion to dismiss, ECF No. 66, is deemed to be unopposed.
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Allegations of the First Amendment Complaint, ECF No. 581
Plaintiff’s amended complaint 2 is once again brought against a
multitude of Defendants - 22 in all. ECF No. 58 at 1. Plaintiff seeks to
bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3729-3733. 	Id. at 2-3. Her § 1983 claims are based on alleged violations
of Plaintiff’s First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendment rights. 	Id.
at 2-3. In particular, Plaintiff asserts her “constitutional rights to free
speech, freedom of petition, freedom from unlawful search and seizure,
rights to fair trials and due process, rights to trial by jury, rights to not be
retaliated against with cruel and unusual punishments.” 	Id. at 2.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint [hereinafter “complaint”] explains that
Plaintiff is the biological maternal grandmother of four children who were
“removed and adopted” by Defendants Andrea and James Douglas. 	Id. at
5. The children were removed from Plaintiff’s biological daughter, Brianna,
1 Only relevant factual allegations have been included, and only allegations which
pertain to named Defendants in this case. Plaintiff included numerous irrelevant facts
and events which are not related to named Defendants, see ECF No. 58 at 11-12, 16-
17, are 26-27, but those are omitted in this Report and Recommendation.
2 As an initial observation, Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with the Rules of
this Court. Her complaint, ECF No. 58, is 56 pages long. The Local Rules of this Court
state that a “petition, motion, or complaint, together with any memorandum, must
not exceed 25 pages, unless the Court authorizes it.” N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 5.7(B). Plaintiff
was not authorized to exceed the page limitation.
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in August of 2016. 	Id. at 8. It appears that Defendant Porter (an
investigator employed by the Department of Children and Families [“DCF”])
“dropped all four children off” with the Legacy Defendants on August 17,
2016, to serve as foster parents, although Plaintiff claims the “two oldest
children were never biologically related to the Legacys.” 	Id. at 9.
As background information, Plaintiff alleges that there were initial
discussions with the Legacy Defendants for Plaintiff to take the two older
children and the Legacy Defendants would keep the younger two children.
ECF No. 58 at 9. However, when Plaintiff advised that DCF wanted to
keep all four “children together as an intact family,” the Legacy Defendants
kept all four children and stopped communicating with Plaintiff. 	Id. at 9-10.
At some point thereafter, Defendant Porter “transferred the case to
Children’s Home Society employee Jennifer Smith.” 	Id. at 10. Defendant
Smith informed Plaintiff that the children would remain “with the Legacys’
[sic] as she was the grandmother . . . .” 	Id. at 11. 3 Plaintiff’s questioning of
that decision resulted in Plaintiff being informed that she could have
3 It appears that Plaintiff is the maternal biological grandmother of all four
children. The Legacy Defendants are, presumably, paternal biological grandparents of
two of the children. See ECF No. 58 at 5, 11.
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unsupervised visits with the children, and Plaintiff responding that she
“would be filing complaints and a dispute.” 	Id.
Plaintiff indicates she filed complaints, and Defendant “Smith refused
to inform” her about the next scheduled court date. ECF No. 58 at 11.
However, after filing a complaint “with the then acting CEO of Children’s
Home Society, [Defendant] Smith was forced to give Plaintiff information on
the next court hearing.” 	Id.
Plaintiff attended the hearing, but complains that when she
“respectfully stood up and raised [her] hand to correct the perjured
documents and testimony by Defendants Smith and Barclay,” Defendant
Clark - the presiding state court judge - denied her the ability to do so. 	Id.
at 11-12. The Legacy Defendants complained to the court that Plaintiff was
sending gifts to the grandchildren at their home. 	Id. at 12. Plaintiff was
then inexplicitly “forced” by Defendants Garcia, Jordan, Smith and Burke 4
to send gifts to DCF and the agency would then deliver the gifts to the
Legacy house. 	Id.
4 Defendant Ana Maria Garcia is a state court Judge. ECF No. 58 at 6.
Defendant Jessica Jordan “was an attorney for plaintiff’s daughter,” and Defendant
Jennifer Smith was an employee with Children’s Home Society. Id. Defendant Daniel
Burke “was an attorney for the state of Florida.” Id. at 7.
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Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Suzanne Beam, an employee of
either DCF or Children’s Home Society, informed Plaintiff that she and her
husband must undergo “drug testing prior to each visit” with the children.
ECF No. 58 at 7, 14. Plaintiff contends she has “never done drugs, let
alone had a problem with drugs or any substance.” 	Id. at 14. She claims
that requirement was “a violation of search and seizure, retaliatory, and
intentional cruel and unusual punishments.” 	Id.
Allegedly, the Legacy Defendants “began to use undue influence and
threats to keep the grandchildren from seeing” Plaintiff. 	Id. at 12. Plaintiff
claimed that the “eldest female grandchild was being induced with toys and
special privileges to stop visits with Plaintiff.” 	Id. at 14. 5 Those facts
necessarily occurred prior to June 2017 when the eldest grandson told
Plaintiff that his eldest “sister would no longer be coming on visits . . . .” 	Id.
at 14-15. By November 2017, only the youngest two grandchildren would
visit with Plaintiff. 	Id. at 18. Plaintiff alleges that the eldest grandson
stopped coming to visits also due to “undue influence” from the Legacy
Defendants. 	Id.
5 Plaintiff said that after the instruction to take a drug test before visits, she had
only one “last visit . . . with all four of her grandchildren,” but the dates of those incidents
are not alleged. ECF No. 58 at 14.
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In December 2017, during a telephone hearing with DCF, Children’s
Home Society and their counsel, Plaintiff, her spouse, and their attorney,
Defendant state court judge Garcia granted a request to terminate visitation
with the children. ECF No. 58 at 18. At some point thereafter, Plaintiff
obtained a “private adoption study” which approved her home for adoption.
Id. at 19-20. Plaintiff filed a motion to intervene in the dependency case.
Id. at 19, 21. After a hearing, the motion was denied by Defendant Garcia,
in part because of “a 2009 misdemeanor domestic violence incident 6 and
the ‘bonding’ with the Legacy’s.” Id. at 21, 22. Plaintiff, through counsel,
“appealed the denial of intervention.” 	Id. at 23.
After Hurricane Michael caused extensive damage to Bay County,
Florida, and destroyed the home of the Legacy’s, Defendant Garcia
allowed the Legacy Defendants to “take the children to Alabama and then
eventually to Texas.” 	Id. at 24. Plaintiff alleges that neither she nor her
daughter Brianna (the mother of the four children) “were told the children
moved out of state,” despite that fact that Brianna still “retained her
6 Plaintiff said that her husband’s domestic violence incident was nolle prossed.
ECF No. 58 at 22.
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parental rights.” 	Id. 	According to Plaintiff, she and her daughter learned
“about a year later” that the children had moved out of state. 	Id. at 24. 7
In April 2019, a “trial” was held for the termination of Brianna’s
parental rights. ECF No. 58 at 24. Brianna was represented by counsel,
Defendant Christopher Scott, and Plaintiff complains that Scott refused to
allow Plaintiff and her spouse to testify as a witness. 	Id. at 25. Defendant
Scott terminated Brianna’s parental “rights in July of 2019; however,
[P]laintiff and her daughter did not find out until January of 2020.” 	Id. at 28.
Plaintiff contends that at the time of the termination, she had a pending
petition to adopt 8 her grandchildren which was “waiting” a decision
concerning the termination. 	Id. at 29.
At some point in “late 2020,” Plaintiff “accidentally” learned that the
grandchildren had been adopted. ECF No. 58 at 29. Around that same
time period, Defendants Andrea and James Douglas returned gifts to
7 That allegation is not entirely clear or consistent with other facts alleged.
Plaintiff indicates that at the time they learned the children had moved out of state,
Brianna still had her parental rights and it was about a year after Hurricane Michael.
ECF No. 58 at 24. Hurricane Michael hit Florida in October 2018, and Plaintiff
elsewhere said that Brianna’s termination of rights occurred in July of 2019, although
they did not find out about the order until January 2020. ECF No. 28. That time line of
events is not clear, nor is the date when Plaintiff learn about the termination decision.
8 Plaintiff does not allege when or where she filed the petition for adoption, nor
does she state whether or not she was represented by counsel.
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Plaintiff which had been sent to the grandchildren. 	Id. at 29. Plaintiff
alleges that returning the unopened gifts without explanation was “cruel
and deliberate.” 	Id. 	She further claims the Douglas Defendants “no longer
allowed Plaintiff to send” gifts to the children. 	Id., n.43.
Despite that knowledge, Plaintiff and her husband drove to Texas in
January 2021 in an attempt to deliver gifts to the grandchildren. 	Id. 	Prior
to going to the “Legacy’s home” in Texas, Plaintiff requested a police
escort. 	Id. at 29-30. Through that contact, Plaintiff contends she learned
that the children were no longer with the Legacy’s, that they “gave the
children back,” and Mr. Legacy was no longer residing at the residence
with Mrs. Legacy. 	Id. at 30. 9
In February or March of 2024, DCF allegedly contacted Plaintiff when
the “Douglas Defendants could no longer handle the eldest grandson and
returned him back to ‘DCF.’” Id. at 31. DCF asked if Plaintiff was
“interested in adopting her grandson,” to which Plaintiff “said definitely.” 	Id.
at 32. Yet after dangling “the carrot” in front of her, DCF at some point,
9 At another point in the complaint, Plaintiff claimed that because of health and
financial concerns, the Legacy Defendants surrendered the children “back to DCF . . .
less than three years after removal and placement.” Id. at 8-9. Accepting Plaintiff’s
statement that the children were removed from her daughter Brianna in August 2016,
this event would have occurred by August of 2019. Id. at 8.
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“intentionally, and purposefully yank[ed] the carrot away.” ECF No. 58 at
32.
Claim Raised in the Amended Complaint
Counts 1-4, 7-8, and 10 are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff also asserts state law claims. ECF No. 58 at 32-48.
Although Plaintiff states that Count 1 is brought “Against All
Defendants,” id. at 32, she then identifies this as a First Amendment claim
which is brought against Defendants Clark, Kennedy, Smith, Garcia,
Legacy, Scott, Jordan, Burke, Adeoti, Cuff, Porter, and Flemming for
retaliation. 	Id. at 33.
Count 2 is a Fourth Amendment claim for illegal search and seizure,
brought against 9 Defendants - Garcia, Beam, Kennedy, Smith, Burke,
Adeoti, Harris, Jordan, and Scott for requiring her “to undergo evasive and
embarrassing drug testing . . . .” 	Id. at 34-35. Improperly alleged within
Count 2 is Plaintiff’s claim that the Douglas Defendants violated her equal
protection rights (which is not a Fourth Amendment claim) because they
allowed the Legacy Defendants to continue having a relationship with the
children “after they gave the children back to ‘DCF’ . . . .” 	Id. at 36.
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Count 3 is a claim for “Failure to Intervene in Violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” 	Id. at 37. It is asserted against all Defendants, and claims
the Defendants “had a duty to intervene.” Without further explanation,
Plaintiff contends that “[a]ll Defendants are guilty of bystander liability.” 	Id.
at 37.
Count 4 is against all Defendants for conspiring “to alienate the
Plaintiff from her biological children.” 	Id. at 37-38. She contends all of the
Defendants conspired to the illegal search and seizure of her body, to
retaliate, and deny Plaintiff’s “right to access the courts . . . .” 	Id. at 39.
Count 5, also asserted against all Defendants, is a state law claim for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 	Id. at 39-40. She claims the
Defendants tried to “break the bond” between she and her grandchildren
through “deplorable actions . . . .” 	Id. at 40. As a result, Plaintiff says she
“has suffered for over eight years and will continue to suffer her entire life.”
Id.
Count 6 is a state law claim for “alienation of affections,” also against
all Defendants. 	Id. at 41. It is duplicative of Count 5.
Count 7 is another § 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment. 	Id. at 42. It is redundant to Count 1 of the complaint.
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Count 8 is an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants. 	Id. at
42. Plaintiff contends Defendants’ actions were “wanton, reckless, callous,
and malicious” and caused her “to suffer” in the past and in the future. 	Id.
at 43.
Count 9 is an equal protection claim10 against all Defendants. 	Id. at
43. She appears to assert that she “had to spend excessive amounts of
money on a private lawyer,” while the Legacy Defendants “got everything
from ‘DCF’ and Children’s Home Society.” 	Id. at 44. Plaintiff further
complains again that efforts were made to “break the children’s bond” with
her and her family. 	Id.
Count 10 is a § 1983 claim for “Monell Liability against all
Defendants.” 	Id. at 44. She contends that both DCF and Children’s Home
Society “are policy makers.” 	Id. at 45.
Count 11 is a state law loss of consortium claim against all
Defendants. 	Id. at 45-46. Again, that claim is based on Plaintiff’s
contention that Defendants tried to break the biological bond between
Plaintiff and her grandchildren. 	Id.
10 Plaintiff does not allege that this claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Count 12 is for “undue enrichment” and is against all defendants. 	Id.
at 47. Plaintiff asserts that she had sufficient income to raise her
grandchildren, but the Legacy Defendants “required state and federal
taxpayer assistance.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff makes a conclusory assertion that “[a]ll
defendants, and this means all, benefited [sic] in some way, shape or form,
by these federal and state taxpayer dollars.” 	Id. 	She asserts that
Defendants intended “to intentionally defraud in direct violation of the False
Claims Act.” 	Id.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks “general damages” and punitive damages.
Id. at 48. She also seeks a 30% relator fee for the False Claims Act
violation. 	Id. at 49.
Standard of Review
The first two motions to dismiss were filed pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),(6), among other arguments. ECF Nos. 59, 60.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must determine whether a
complaint alleges “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not
required, but Plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and
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a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. Furthermore, the facts of
a well-pleaded complaint must be accepted as true and the case should
proceed even if it appears “that actual proof of those facts is improbable,
and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.
Ct. at 1965 (citations omitted).
The pleading standard is not heightened, but flexible, in line with Rule
8’s command to simply give fair notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s
claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534
U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) (“Rule 8(a)’s
simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
exceptions.”). Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
those drafted by an attorney. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th
Cir. 1986) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S. Ct. 594,
596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972)). Nevertheless, a complaint must provide
sufficient notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that a
“largely groundless claim” does not proceed through discovery and “take
up the time of a number of other people . . . .” Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2005)
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(quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558). 	In other words, a motion to dismiss
considers the legal sufficiency of a complaint, but does not determine
whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,
534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) (citing to
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90
(1974)).
A. 	Shotgun Pleading
Defendants have argued that Plaintiff’s amended complaint is an
impermissible shotgun pleading. ECF No. 60 at 21-22. Shotgun pleadings
have been condemned by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals time and
time again. 	See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d
1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that a complaint must present a claim
succinctly such that a defendant can discern the basis for the plaintiff’s
claim and “frame a responsive pleading”) (citation omitted). The Eleventh
Circuit has explained the four categories of shotgun pleadings as follows:
The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint. The next most common
type, at least as far as our published opinions on the subject
reflect, is a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of
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re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of
being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third
type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not
separating into a different count each cause of action or claim
for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of
asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which
acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is
brought against. The unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another,
and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate
notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which
each claim rests.
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23.
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s amended complaint “meets
the criteria for the first, second, and fourth type of shotgun pleadings.” ECF
No. 60 at 22. The Court agrees.
In presenting each of Plaintiff’s 12 claims, Plaintiff “incorporates and
re-alleges by reference all of the proceeding paragraphs in this complaint.”
ECF No. 57 at 32, 34, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47. That is, Plaintiff
incorporated all 76 numbered paragraphs into each claim, and each
successive included all prior counts of the complaint. That is, by definition,
the first type of shotgun pleading.
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Additionally, the amended complaint is filled with conclusory
assertions disguised as facts, and a litany of immaterial facts which are not
obviously connected to any specific cause of action or a particular
Defendant. Plaintiff’s statement of her claims does not relate back to any
specific factual allegation, and merely “incorporating” all facts alleged from
the prior multitude of facts asserted is insufficient. The 22 named
Defendants do not have adequate notice of the basis for the multiple claims
asserted against them. This is a shotgun pleading. Because Plaintiff has
already been provided opportunities to amend - and Plaintiff refused to do
so initially, see ECF No. 9 - it is recommended that this case be dismissed.
B. 	Statute of Limitations
All three motions to dismiss raise the statute of limitations as a
defense to Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 59 at 9-10; ECF No. 60 at 9-12; ECF
No. 66 at 1. That defense provides another sufficient reason to dismiss
this case.
The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action in federal court is
governed by the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.
McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (“All constitutional
claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of
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limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983
action has been brought”) (citing to Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76,
105 S. Ct. 1938, 1946-47, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985)); see also Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S. Ct. 573, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1989))).
Florida observes a four year personal injury statute of limitations. 	See
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999);
Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); McGroarty v.
Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Specifically, a plaintiff
must commence a § 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years of the
allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.”).
Plaintiff complains of events which span from August 2016 through
the early part of 2024. ECF No. 57. However, the only allegations which
are alleged which conceivably support Plaintiff’s claims against the
Defendants occurred between 2016 and 2019. There were no facts
alleged which identify wrongful actions of the Defendants after 2019. 	Id.
Indeed, the only events alleged which occurred after 2019 were:
January 2020 - Plaintiff learned of the termination order
Late 2020 - Plaintiff found out the children were adopted
Late 2020 - gifts to the grandchildren were returned
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January 2021 - Defendant Daena Legacy yelled at Plaintiff
2024 - DCF asked Plaintiff of her interest in adopting a grandson
ECF No. 58 at 28-32. None of those alleged events are unlawful or
unconstitutional.
The reality is, Plaintiff’s amended complaint seeks relief concerning
events which occurred more than four years before this case was filed.
This case was initiated on December 26, 2024. ECF No. 1. Thus, all of
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff attempts to save her claims with the contention that she
detected a “conspiracy” in May of 2025. ECF No. 63 at 7. However, the
amended complaint is devoid of any facts which support Plaintiff’s
conspiracy theory.
While a conspiracy claim could be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Kearson v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 763 F.2d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1985)
(noting that § 1983 is the statute “which provides remedies for conspiracies
to interfere with certain civil rights”), Plaintiff did not allege facts to support
that claim. 	See Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2010) (stating that a “plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy
to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted
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in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right”). A conspiracy
claim requires a plaintiff to “show that the parties reached an
understanding.” Bailey v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cty., Fla., 956
F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The complaint must inform the defendants ‘of the nature of the
conspiracy which is alleged. It is not enough to simply aver in the complaint
that a conspiracy existed.’” Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th
Cir. 1984) (quoted in Wilk v. St. Lucie Cnty. Fla. Sheriff Off., 740 F. App’x
658, 663 (11th Cir. 2018)). The “conclusory, vague, and general
allegations of conspiracy . . . justify dismissal of a complaint.” Kearson,
763 F.2d at 407. Here, Plaintiff did not allege facts to show “the parties
had a ‘meeting of the minds’ or reached an understanding to violate the
plaintiff’s rights . . . .” Bailey., 956 F.2d at 1122 (quoted in Spadaro v. City
of Miramar, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2012)). There are no
allegations of communications or agreements made between the
Defendants. There are also no allegations which explain how Plaintiff
belatedly learned of the conspiracy in May 2025. The essential facts raised
in the amended complaint, ECF No. 58, are the same as the facts
presented against the Defendants in the initial complaint, ECF No. 1, filed
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in December 2024. 11 Thus, Plaintiff’s unexplained argument of belatedly
learning of a conspiracy does not save her claims from the statute of
limitations.
Furthermore, the fact alleged in 2020 - that the Douglas Defendants
sought to adopt the four grandchildren - is not a constitutional violation, nor
is the failure to comply with a Florida Rule of Procedure. 	See ECF No. 63
at 7-8. It is well established that § 1983 “does not create a remedy for
every wrong committed under the color of state law, but only for those that
deprive a plaintiff of a federal right.” Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272,
1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoted in March v. Dep't of Children and Families,
No. 2:03cv162, 2006 WL 2644917 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2006)). Put another
way, a violation of state law is insufficient to support a federal civil rights
claim. Dean v. Escambia Cnty., No. 3:05cv29/LAC/MD, 2005 WL 927387
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2005) (holding that “[a]n alleged violation of a state
statute does not give rise to a corresponding § 1983 violation, unless the
11 The initial complaint included 77 numbered paragraphs, spanning 27 pages,
raising 12 separate claims, based on the same facts alleged in the amended complaint.
The amended complaint also includes 77 numbered paragraphs, spanning 32 pages,
but also raising 12 claims. ECF No. 58. The primary difference between the two
complaints is Plaintiff’s reference in Count 12 of the False Claims Act. Id. at 48.
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right encompassed in the state statute is guaranteed under the United
States Constitution”).
In addition, Plaintiff’s argument that she did not fully realize or
understand the Defendants’ actions until May of 2025 is immaterial. ECF
No. 63 at 14. Plaintiff claims she was unaware of the adoption of the
children until recently, but that fact has no bearing on the claims that she
brings against the 22 named Defendants. That is because this case does
not challenge an adoption order; 12 rather, it challenges the actions of
persons prior to the adoption. It challenges events in 2016, 2017, 2018,
and 2019, and Plaintiff did not include factual allegations which show or
explain that she was not aware of those events until recently. All of the
facts which are relevant to Plaintiff’s 12-count amended complaint occurred
prior to December 2020. Because this case was filed on December 26,
2024, ECF No. 1, the claims are bared by the statute of limitations.
C. 	Fails to state a claim
Even though the claims are barred by the statute of limitations, each
of Plaintiff’s claims should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim, or
12 Plaintiff’s prior objections clearly state that “she is not seeking a directive from
this court to overturn any adoption” and acknowledges that “this court does not have the
authority or jurisdiction to do that.” ECF No. 49 at 2.
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as frivolous. Count 1 is a First Amendment claim, allegedly for retaliation.
However, that claim is unsupported by facts which show that Plaintiff
suffered an adverse action for engaging in constitutionally protected
speech. Plaintiff did not allege facts which show that any specific
Defendant took a particular action because of Plaintiff’s exercise of her
First Amendment rights. A conclusory allegation is insufficient to support a
retaliation claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.’”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff does not include facts which show
that a specific Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s particular First
Amendment activities and then, took adverse action against her because of
that action. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim as presented in Count 1 should be
dismissed. Likewise, Count 7 should also be dismissed because it is
redundant to Count 1's retaliation claim.
Count 2 is the Fourth Amendment claim for an “illegal search and
seizure.” It’s based on the allegation that Plaintiff was forced to take a drug
test prior to visits with the grandchildren. However, no facts were alleged
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to show which Defendant imposed that requirement. The claim is
insufficient.
Count 3 is for failing to intervene in the violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights. It was asserted against all Defendants, but Plaintiff
failed to allege facts which show that any particular Defendant was in a
position to “intervene.” Furthermore, without an allegation as to which
Defendant imposed the drug testing requirement, it is far from clear that a
Defendant could lawfully intervene. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged
facts which support her claim than any Defendant had a “duty” to intervene.
This claim is insufficient and should be dismissed.
In Count 4, Plaintiff contends all Defendants conspired “to alienate”
her from her “biological children.” 	Id. at 37-38. Even assuming that
Plaintiff intended to say that persons attempted alienate her grandchildren
from her, there were no facts presented to support a conspiracy claim as
explained in greater detail above.
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim as presented in Count 8 also fails
to state a claim. The Eighth Amendment is applicable to persons who have
been convicted of crimes and are incarcerated. Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty.,
774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that the Eighth Amendment
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“applies only to confinement that occurs subsequent to and as a
consequence of a person’s lawful conviction of a crime”). Because Plaintiff
is not, and was not, incarcerated at the time of these events, she fails to
state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Count 9 is an equal protection claim that is unsupported by facts
which show that any named Defendant treated Plaintiff differently than
other persons. Moreover, the basis for the claim is frivolous. Plaintiff
complained that she “had to spend excessive amounts of money on a
private lawyer,” while the Legacy Defendants “got everything from ‘DCF’
and Children’s Home Society.” 	Id. at 44. Plaintiff is not similarly situated to
the Legacy Defendants because they were court appointed as foster
parents for the grandchildren. Plaintiff did not have such an appointment.
The equal protection claim should be dismissed.
Count 10 is also a frivolous claim in which Plaintiff seeks to impose
“Monell Liability against all Defendants.” 	Id. at 44. In Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611
(1978), the Supreme Court held that a civil rights plaintiff could sue a
municipal entity if the plaintiff could “show that their injury was caused by a
municipal policy or custom.” Los Angeles Cnty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562
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U.S. 29, 30–31, 131 S. Ct. 447, 449, 178 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2010) (explaining
Monell). However, Plaintiff is not suing a municipality because of a policy
or custom. Plaintiff has not alleged that a policy or custom was involved in
this case. The claim is frivolous and should be dismissed.
That leaves Plaintiff’s state law claims as presented in Counts 5, 6,
and 11. All of those claims were conclusory and unsupported by facts as
to each and every Defendant named.
Moreover, Counts 5 and 6 were duplicative claims for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 13 Such a claim requires allegations which
show: “1) extreme and outrageous conduct; 2) an intent to cause, or
reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional distress; 3)
severe emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff and 4) that the conduct
complained of caused the plaintiff's severe emotional distress.” Broberg v.
13 To the degree Count 6 was intended to separately present a claim for
alienation of affection, Defendants have correctly shown that there is no such cause of
action under Florida law. ECF No. 59 at 17 (citing to § 771.01, Florida Statutes (2020);
Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). See also Hutzel v. Franklin,
No. 5:21-CV-40-RH/MJF, 2021 WL 3502483, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 19, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 5:21CV40-RH-MJF, 2021 WL 3491754 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 9,
2021) (stating “a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a claim for alienation
of affections because such a cause of action no longer exists under Florida law”);
Wardak v. Goolden, No. 1:19-CV-21121-RAR, 2020 WL 9718811, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May
22, 2020) (noting that § 771.01, known as the “heart balm statute,” has been
abolished).
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Carnival Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1317–18 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (citing to
Blair v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 212 F.Supp.3d 1264, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2016)
(citing Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 278
(Fla. 1985)). The first element requires allegations showing conduct that is
“so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.” Metropolitan Life, 467 So.2d at 278-79 (quoted in
Broberg, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 1317). Showing “outrageous conduct” is an
“extremely high standard,” and Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not
make that demonstration. Moreover, Plaintiff did not allege facts which
show that any named Defendant acted with an “intent” to cause Plaintiff
emotional distress. The loss of Plaintiff’s beloved grandchildren would
naturally result in emotional distress, but Plaintiff has not presented facts
which show that any Defendant intended that result or took actions which
were outrageous. Those state law claims should be dismissed for failure ot
state a claim.
Count 11 was for loss of consortium, asserted against all Defendants.
Id. at 45-46. Again, that claim is based on Plaintiff’s contention that
Defendants tried to break the biological bond between Plaintiff and her
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grandchildren. 	Id. 	First, Plaintiff did not present facts to support her
conclusory assertion that Defendants had such an intent. Second, as
pointed out by Defendants, such a claim must be based on a spousal
relationship or a parent-child relationship. 14 ECF No. 59 at 19-20 (citing to
Castro v. Linfante, 307 So. 3d 110, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)). Plaintiff has
pointed to no basis under Florida law to support a loss of consortium claim
for grandchildren. This claim should be dismissed.
Finally, Count 12 is titled as a claim for “undue enrichment;” it
appears that Plaintiff is contending that because the Legacy Defendants
“required state and federal taxpayer assistance,” they were unjustly
enriched in violation of state law. It also appears that Plaintiff uses this
same assertion to support her federal claim under the “False Claims Act.”
As correctly argued by Defendants, see ECF No. 59 at 20, a cause of
action for unjust enrichment has the following elements: “(1) plaintiff has
conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge thereof; (2)
14 Florida statute 768.0415 provides: “A person who, through negligence, causes
significant permanent injury to the natural or adoptive parent of an unmarried dependent
resulting in a permanent total disability shall be liable to the dependent for damages,
including damages for permanent loss of services, comfort, companionship, and
society.” In addition, § 768.21(2),(3) provide for loss of consortium after a wrongful
death, but only for a “surviving spouse” or “minor children of the decedent.”
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defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit conferred; and (3) the
circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the defendant to
retain the benefit without first paying the value thereof to the plaintiff.” Duty
Free World, Inc. v. Miami Perfume Junction, Inc., 253 So. 3d 689, 693 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Agritrade, LP v. Quercia, 253 So. 3d 28, 33
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)) (quoted in AIM Recycling Fla., LLC v. Metals
USA, Inc., No. 18-60292-CIV, 2019 WL 1991946, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4,
2019)). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim is insufficient as a matter of
law because, first and foremost, “Plaintiff has not alleged that she
conferred any benefit upon any Defendant.” ECF No. 59 at 20. That is a
fatal flaw in Plaintiff’s state law claim, and the unjust enrichment claim must
be dismissed.
To the degree Plaintiff also brings this as a claim under the False
Claims Act, Defendants argues that this claim is insufficient. ECF No. 60 at
14-16. “At the pleading stage, a complaint alleging violations of the False
Claims Act must satisfy two requirements.” United States v. HPC
Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x 783, 789 (11th Cir. 2018). First, as required
by Rule 8(a), the complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” HPC Healthcare, 723 F.
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App’x at 789 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). As noted above, Plaintiff’s
amended complaint is a shotgun pleading and does not comply with Rule
8. “Second, the complaint must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading
requirement for claims alleging fraud.” 723 F. App’x at 789. “That is, it
must ‘state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake.’” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab.
Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding Rule 9(b)
applies to False Claims Act claims). “Under Rule 9(b), the plaintiff must
plead ‘facts as to time, place, and substance of the defendant's alleged
fraud,’ including ‘the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts,
when they occurred, and who engaged in them.’” Clausen, 290 F.3d at
1310 (quoted in HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x at 789). Plaintiff’s
amended complaint falls woefully short. There are no allegations which
reveal who engaged in fraud, what actions were fraudulent, or when the
alleged fraud occurred. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion of a False Claims
Act violation is insufficient, fails to state a claim, and should be dismissed.
Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim, in
addition to the statute of limitations issue, there is no need to review the
other defenses asserted. ECF Nos. 59-60, 66. Dismissal is appropriate.
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RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the
three pending motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 59-60 and 66, be GRANTED
and Plaintiff’s amended complaint, ECF No. 58, be DISMISSED with
prejudice as barred by the statute of limitations, because it is an
impermissible shotgun pleading, and because it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on January 26, 2026.
S/ 	Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other
parties. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). 	Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	If a
party 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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