GORAYA v. RYAN

4:23-cv-00278Flnd15 de jun. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
KULTAR SINGH GORAYA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 4:23-cv-278-MW-MJF
JAMES PATRICK RYAN,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In this § 1983 action, Plaintiff alleges that while Plaintiff was
incarcerated, 	Defendant—an 	orthopedic 	surgeon—“deliberately 	and
maliciously” replaced Plaintiff’s hip with an artificial hip that is too large,
and 	Defendant 	then 	failed 	to 	address 	Plaintiff’s 	chronic 	pain 	that
resulted from the oversize artificial hip. Defendant moves to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and based on the statute of limitations. Doc. 40.
Plaintiff opposes the motion. Doc. 46 & 48. Because Plaintiff states a
claim 	under 	the 	Eighth 	Amendment 	and 	because 	Plaintiff 	timely
asserted his claim, the District Court should deny Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, is the operative pleading. Doc. 28.
A. 	Defendant Diagnoses Plaintiff and Recommends Surgery
In 2018, while incarcerated at the Florida State Prison, Plaintiff
experienced pain in his hips. Id. at 5. Defendant, an orthopedic surgeon,
diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from “avascular necrosis disease,” and
Defendant advised that Plaintiff’s hips required replacement. Id.
B. 	Defendant Replaces Plaintiff’s Right Hip
On January 10, 2020, before commencing surgery on Plaintiff’s
right hip, Defendant incorrectly informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff suffered
from 	arthritis. 	Id. 	at 	5. 	Plaintiff 	responded 	that 	he 	suffered 	from
avascular necrosis disease. Id.
Plaintiff angered Defendant because Plaintiff corrected Defendant
in the presence of the medical staff. Id. Defendant then, in “angry tones,”
told Plaintiff: “you will be finding out in the operation theater.” Id. at 5–
6. Defendant then performed total hip replacement surgery on Plaintiff’s
right 	hip. 	According 	to 	Plaintiff, 	Defendant 	“deliberately 	and
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maliciously” replaced Plaintiff’s right hip with an artificial hip that
Defendant knew was too large for Plaintiff. Doc. 28 at 6.
C. 	Plaintiff Reports Complications from the Hip Replacement
“[I]mmediately after” his surgery, Plaintiff experienced “constant
pain” and became unable to care for himself or “even complete basic daily
functions.” Id.
D. 	Plaintiff Reports his Pain to Defendant
One week after the right hip surgery—January 17, 2020—Plaintiff
informed Defendant that Plaintiff’s right leg had become longer than his
left leg. Id. Plaintiff also complained that he suffered “constant and
excruciating” pain. Id.
E. 	Plaintiff Again Reports his Pain to Defendant
Three weeks after the right hip surgery, Plaintiff again reported
that his right leg was longer than his left leg and he was suffering
constant and excruciating pain. Id. at 6–7. Defendant responded, “you
have to deal with the right hip pain.” Id. at 7.
F. 	Plaintiff’s Claim and Request for Relief
Plaintiff sues Defendant in his individual capacity. Plaintiff asserts
an 	Eighth-Amendment 	claim of deliberate 	indifference 	to 	a serious
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medical 	need: 	Defendant 	“deliberately 	and 	maliciously” 	replaced
Plaintiff’s 	hip 	with 	an 	artificial 	hip 	that 	was 	too 	large 	and 	then
Defendant refused to treat Plaintiff’s chronic pain that resulted from the
oversized artificial hip. Doc. 28 at 5–6, 10. Plaintiff seeks compensatory
and punitive damages. Id. at 11.
G. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues that the District Court should dismiss this civil
action because Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need and the statute of limitations bars
Plaintiff’s claim. Doc. 40.
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff States a Plausible Eighth-Amendment Claim
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to state an Eighth-
Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Doc. 40 at 9.
To state a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) the plaintiff had an objectively serious medical need;
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(2) the 	defendant 	was deliberately indifferent to the 	plaintiff’s
serious medical need;
(3) the plaintiff suffered an injury; and
(4) the defendant’s deliberate indifference caused the plaintiff’s
injury.
Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); see also Goebert v. Lee
County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
To state the second element of a deliberate indifference claim, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant “(1) had subjective knowledge of
a risk of serious harm, (2) disregarded that risk,” and (3) “acted with
subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Johnson v. Lewis,
83 F.4th 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2023); Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255 (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). To allege subjective recklessness, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant was “actually, subjectively aware that his
own conduct caused a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff.” Wade,
106 F.4th at 1262.
Plaintiff has alleged each of the elements, including the “deliberate
indifference” element. Doc. 28 at 5–7. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
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was 	“actually, 	subjectively 	aware 	that 	his 	own 	conduct 	caused 	a
substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262.
Indeed, 	Plaintiff explicitly 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	“deliberately 	and
maliciously” intended to cause Plaintiff harm. Doc. 28 at 6. An allegation
of intentional harm is more than sufficient to state the “deliberate
indifference” element.
Furthermore, Plaintiff offers a document—purportedly from the
Florida Department of Corrections Office of Health Services—which
appears to indicate that Plaintiff’s post-surgery right leg is two inches
longer than his left leg, which is a substantial disparity. Doc. 48 at 5.
Although 	submitted 	after 	the 	filing 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	fourth 	amended
complaint, 	Defendant 	did 	not 	object 	to 	the 	court 	considering 	this
document. Doc. 49. A district court may consider such documents when
addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. U.S. ex rel.
Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811 (11th Cir. 2015); Saunders v.
Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014); Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d
1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff, however, states a claim even
without the benefit of this document.
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Although Plaintiff’s claim may be difficult to prove and may be
improbable, the probability or improbability of Plaintiff establishing a
claim at trial is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. 187, 193 (2026); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). As the Supreme
Court recently noted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make it
“relatively easy for plaintiffs” to survive dismissal, “even for claims that
are likely to fail.” Berk, 607 U.S. at 194.
B. 	Plaintiff Filed his Claim Timely
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s claim is untimely because the
fourth amended complaint was filed nine months after the statute of
limitations expired. Doc. 40 at 19.
In § 1983 suits, district courts should apply the most analogous
statute of limitations under State law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). In Florida,
claims 	brought 	under 	§ 	1983 	are 	subject 	to 	a 	four-year 	statute 	of
limitations. Ellison v. Lester, 275 F. App’x 900, 901–02 (11th Cir. 2008);
Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Fla.
Stat. § 95.11(5)(g). That is, a plaintiff must initiate a § 1983 action within
four years of the date “the facts which would support a cause of action
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are apparent or should be apparent to a person with reasonably prudent
regard for his rights.” Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir.
2008)). Section 1983 claims, therefore, accrue when a plaintiff knows or
has reason to know that he has been injured, and is aware or should have
been aware who inflicted the injury. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388
(2007).
Plaintiff alleges that by January 17, 2020—one week after his
surgery—he was aware that Defendant intentionally replaced Plaintiff’s
hip with an oversize artificial hip. Thus, the law required Plaintiff to file
his claim on or before January 17, 2024.
On June 26, 2023, Plaintiff timely commenced this civil action. Doc.
1 at 14. In his original complaint, Plaintiff named “Dr. J. Ryan” as a
Defendant and asserted that Defendant violated the Eighth Amendment
“by 	neglecting 	Plaintiff’s 	medical 	needs 	and 	exercising 	deliberate
indifference in regard to Plaintiff’s pain and suffering.” Id. at 8. In
support of his claim, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant “erroneously added
length to Plaintiff’s right leg” during a right hip replacement surgery and
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refused 	to 	recommend 	corrective 	surgery 	to 	alleviate 	the 	pain 	and
suffering with Plaintiff’s condition. Id. at 5, 7.
Plaintiff’s original complaint and his first and second amended
complaints 	were 	all 	grossly 	deficient. 	The 	undersigned, 	therefore,
afforded Plaintiff opportunities to amend the complaint. Docs. 5, 7, 17,
22. One of the “purposes of an amended claim is to fill in facts missing
from the original complaint.” Dean v. United States, 278 F.3d 1218, 1222
(11th Cir. 2002).
On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed his fourth amended complaint,
which is the operative pleading. Doc. 28 at 16. As noted above, it contains
the same claim—an Eighth-Amendment “deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need” claim—against the same Defendant, based on the
same general facts that Plaintiff alleged in his initial complaint.
“Relation back is a legal fiction employed to salvage claims that
would otherwise be unjustly barred by a limitations provision.” Mungin
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 89 F.4th 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2024). The
standard for whether an amendment “relates back” to the date of a timely
filed original plead is found in Rule 15(c). If Rule 15(c) is satisfied, the
amended complaint is “itself timely even though it was filed outside an
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applicable statute of limitations.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560
U.S. 538, 541 (2010).
Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), an amended relates back to the original
pleading when the “amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set
out—in the original pleading.” That is, to relate back, the new claims
“must have arisen from the same set of facts as the timely filed claim, not
from separate conduct or a separate occurrence in both time and type.”
Davenport 	v. 	United 	States, 	217 	F.3d 	1341, 	1344 	(11th 	Cir. 	2000)
(quotation marks omitted). And “[w]hen the nature of the amended claim
supports specifically the original claim, the facts there alleged implicate
the original claim, even if the original claim contained insufficient facts
to support it.” Dean, 278 F.3d at 1222.
The relation back doctrine resolves any question as to whether
Plaintiff timely asserted his claim against Defendant. That is, Plaintiff’s
fourth amended complaint clearly relates back to the claim Plaintiff
asserted in his original complaint. Plaintiff’s claim, therefore, is not
barred by the statute of limitations.
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CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DENY Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
2. 	RETURN 	this 	case 	to 	the 	undersigned 	for 	further
proceedings.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 15th day of June 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. An objecting party must serve a copy
of the objections on all other parties. A party who fails
to 	object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and
recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to 	challenge 	on
appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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