LEE v. GRIMM et al

Page 1 of 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
ROBERT SINCLAIR LEE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
JACOB GRIMM, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Robert Sinclair Lee, a prisoner at Santa Rosa Correctional Institution
(“SRCI”), filed an amended civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
Defendants used excessive force while they were transporting Lee between cells at
SRCI. 	Doc. 11. 	Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. 	Doc. 78. 	After considering the motion, Lee’s response (Doc. 85),
Defendants’ reply (Doc. 89), the record, and the relevant law, the undersigned
recommends the Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 1 of 17

Page 2 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact.” 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). An issue of
fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law,
and it is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. 	Id. 	The Court must review the evidence, and all factual
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, “in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th
Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 	“If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences
arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.”
Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).
II. 	THE USE OF FORCE INCIDENT
Lee alleges that Defendants Coates, Gerencser, Grimm, Hartley, Perkins,
Trumble, White, and Young, correctional officers with the Florida Department of
Corrections, used excessive force or failed to intervene to stop the use of excessive
force against him. Specifically, as set forth in his Declaration (Doc. 90-1) and sworn
First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11), Lee alleges the following occurred on May 17,
2024, at SRCI:
At approximately 11:30 a.m., Defendant Hartley approached Lee’s cell at the
SRCI Annex and informed him that officers were going to move him to the Main
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 2 of 17

Page 3 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
Unit. Lee expressed his concern, including his fear of Main Unit staff and officers
due to a lawsuit he had filed against them and for which he received a “small
settlement.” Doc. 90-1 at 1. Lee asked Hartley to call the captain and mental health.
Captain White told Lee he was “going to the Main Unit by force” or he “could make
the right choice and go freely.”1 Id. at 2.
Defendants White, Hartley, and Grimm “came to administer chemical agents
with the hand-held use of force camera.” 	Id. 	Grimm gave Lee three minutes to
comply with the order to transfer cells. Lee told Grimm he would comply if he was
escorted on camera to the new location. 	White and Grimm instructed Hartley to
“place shackles, handcuffs, a black box and waist chains” on Lee. Id. at 3.
After entering the Main Unit compound, Defendants Young and Coates “both
joined in to escort” Lee. Id. When they got to E Dorm, Captain White stopped the
video recording, although Lee made him aware he “only agreed to go to the Main
Unit to avoid getting sprayed with gas and that [he] had not changed [his] objection
to being placed in a cell in the Main Unit with another inmate.” 	Id. 	Once in E-2,
Lee noticed Officers Trumble, Perkins, and Gerencser waiting for him at cell E-
2102. 	By that time, Lee “had an escort of four officers, and … saw three more
waiting.” Id.
1 Mental health specialist Garcia, who is not a defendant, also came to the cell and spoke with Lee.
Although Lee complained about his fear of going back to the Main Unit based on prior events
there, Garcia told him all she could do was document the problem. Doc. 11 at 9; 90-1 at 2.
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 3 of 17

Page 4 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
Lee knew someone was in the cell already and told Hartley, Young, and
Perkins that he refused to go into the cell. Hartley, Young, Trumble, and Gerencser
then “violently slammed [Lee’s] head into the wall, causing [him] extreme pain in
[his] head and neck, and to feel drunk-like and woozy.” Id. at 4. They then “rushed
[Lee] head first about five steps and slammed [him] face first on the floor, causing
[him] tremendous pain.” Id. Young then “deliberately slammed” his knee into Lee’s
neck “with excessive force,” causing him “tremendous pain.” 	Id. 	Lee thought he
was going to die. Young “palmed” Lee’s face “to the concrete with all his weight
pressed down on [him], which was extremely painful.” Id.
Defendants Grimm, Perkins, Coates, Trumble, Young, Gerencser, and Hartley
were all yelling for Lee to stop resisting, but he “was not resisting.” Id. Hartley hit
Lee twice in the face and head with his “heavy, brick-like, standard FDC issue
walkie-talkie with malicious intent to cause serious physical, mental and emotional
pain and suffering.” 	Id. 	The other seven Defendants failed to intervene when
Hartley hit Lee with the walkie-talkie, even though they were “all in a position to do
so and had time to do so at least by the second blow.” Id.
Defendants Perkins and Coates were twisting Lee’s ankles and “pulling on
[his] shackles, trying to break [his] ankles.” Id. at 5. The other six Defendants were
in a position to intervene but failed to do so. 	Young, Hartley, Trumble, and
Gerencser were “violently twisting” Lee’s body, “snatching on the waist chain, and
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 4 of 17

Page 5 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
bending [his] wrist against the handcuffs backwards, attempting to break [his]
wrist.” 	Id. 	Young, Hartley, and Gerencser “took turns” twisting Lee’s wrist. 	Id.
Hartley tried to break his wrist. 	Trumble assisted them, pulling on Lee’s arm.
Because he was in restraints, he was “incapacitated and could not move when [he]
was on the floor being attacked.” Id. at 8.
Hartley grabbed Lee by the neck and head while Gerencser, Young, Trumble,
and Perkins “dropped” Lee on his stomach. 	Id. at 5. 	They all ran out of the cell,
leaving Lee on the floor in pain. Captain White summoned the prison nurse on duty
“minutes later” to do a “visual body check” but she could not do so because Lee was
behind the steel door of the cell, and she could not see him.
Because of the Defendants’ actions, Lee “suffered extreme neck and back
pain, and scrapes on [his] arms, wrist, ankles and hip.” 	Id. 	He was “mentally
anguished and emotionally distressed due to this attack.” 	Id. at 6. As a result, Lee
saw the prison doctor three times. 	The first time, he was prescribed “600mg
Ibuprofen (keep on person) for 90 days, plus Tylenol,” for his neck pain; the second
time, he received a “125mg shot of SoluMedrol, a steroid for [his] neck pain”; and
the third time, an x-ray was ordered for his neck. 	Id. at 6-7. 	Lee also suffered
dizziness “for about 3 or 4 days” following the attack and “was extremely tired.” Id.
at 6. Lee continues to suffer pain from his “lower back all the way up to [his] neck,
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 5 of 17

Page 6 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
headaches, chronic severe neck pain, and pain in [his] arms.” Id. at 6. His right-side
collar bone and right shoulder “still hurt, discomfort which comes and goes.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	There is a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendants used
excessive force.
In Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, the “core judicial inquiry” is
“not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). 	In determining whether force was
applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, a court considers: (1) the need
for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted upon the prisoner; (4) the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials on the basis of facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made
to temper the severity of a forceful response. 	Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321
(1986). 	In addition, “an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take
reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force can
be held personally liable for his nonfeasance.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295,
1301 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 6 of 17

Page 7 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (rejecting view that arrestee must specify the
actions of each alleged participant in a collective beating).
Lee does not contest that the Defendants had the right to use force to place
him in cell E-2102 because he was non-compliant. He contends, however, that the
force 	used 	was 	excessive—more 	than 	necessary—once 	he 	ceased 	resisting.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that they are entitled to summary judgment
based on the video evidence. Specifically, they argue the video evidence shows Lee
continued to resist while force was being used and contradicts Lee’s contention that
Defendants “maliciously and sadistically” used force to cause him harm. Doc. 89 at
3. Thus, Defendants contend the Court cannot accept Lee’s version of events.
When video evidence “blatantly contradicts” the plaintiff’s version of events
in an excessive force case, the court should not adopt the plaintiff’s version when
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007). Here, however, none of the video evidence provided by the Defendants
clearly depicts the entire use of force incident.2 As discussed below, the handheld
video footage stops immediately before the use of force incident and does not start
again until almost two minutes after use of force began. And the footage from the
2 Defendant submitted five video exhibits, Exhibits A-E. Exhibits A, C and E are discussed herein.
Exhibit B, which is the footage from the fixed wing camera at the front door of Wing 2 of Echo
Dormitory, only shows Lee entering the dayroom area. Exhibit D, which is the fixed wing video
from the dayroom, shows only the backs of the Defendants during the use of force incident and is
too far away to show what any of the Defendants or Lee are doing with any clarity. Also, the fixed
wing videos do not include any audio.
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 7 of 17

Page 8 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
fixed wing cameras is either too grainy or too far away to discern what any of the
Defendants or Lee are doing.
Exhibit A, which is a handheld video, begins at 1:02 p.m. and runs for more
than 23 minutes.3 It starts with Defendant Grimm stating that the use of chemical
agents against Lee has been approved because Lee is refusing to submit to an
unclothed 	search 	and 	exit 	his 	cell 	for 	dorm 	reassignment. 	Lee, 	however,
subsequently agrees to cooperate, eliminating the need for officers to administer
chemical agents. 	The video nonetheless continues and captures Lee’s escort from
the Annex to the Main Unit’s E dormitory. During much of the escort, Lee can be
seen and heard combatively yelling at officers, including yelling profanities at them,
and telling them that he does not want to be moved to E dormitory or be in a cell
with someone else.
Once inside E dormitory, and as Lee and some of the Defendants head near
the E-2102 cell, Lee says “I’m not going in there,” (Exhibit A, at 23:14) and, at that
moment, Officer Vega turns the camera away from Lee and the escorting officers to
Defendant White (Id. at 23:19) who is reading a closing script. A few seconds later
(id. at 23:34), Lee can be heard screaming in the background, but the camera remains
3 The handheld video camera was operated by Officer Vega, who is not named as a defendant.
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 8 of 17

Page 9 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
focused on Defendant White, who turns off the camera.4 Id. at 23:35. 	Exhibit A,
therefore, does not capture the use of force incident.
Exhibit E is a continuation of the handheld video, but does not begin until
1:27 p.m., almost two minutes after the use of force incident began. 	This video
captures Lee lying in the threshold of E-2102 cell and yelling. 	However, because
Defendants are either standing over or laying on top of Lee, their interactions are not
clearly depicted in the video. About one minute and twenty-seven seconds after the
video begins, Lee is placed back in the cell and all use of force ceases. Exhibit E at
1:27.
Exhibit C, which is the control fixed wing video, captures the entire use of
force incident but does so from a distance. Thus, it is not clear from the video what
force Defendants are using. Moreover, while Lee is seen refusing to go into the cell
and pulling away from Defendants initially, it is not clear when or if Lee ceased
resisting.
Because none of the video evidence clearly depicts the entire use of force
incident, the undersigned cannot say that evidence blatantly contradicts Lee’s
version of events. See Logan v. Smith et al., 439 F. App’x 798, 800 (11th Cir. 2011)
4 Captain White and Officer Vega were reprimanded for failing to capture the entire use-of-force
incident on camera. 	See Doc. 78-8 at 12 (“Captain White was also spoken with about the
importance of ensuring all events are captured in their entirety and the appearance of impropriety
in the way the events unfolded.”); see also Doc. 84-3 at 2 (“COT Vega was not trained properly
on handheld camera usage [and] lost visual of the inmate Lee while inside of the cell.”).
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 9 of 17

Page 10 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
(“even where the entire series of events is recorded, video evidence is not obviously
contradictory if it fails … to provide an unobstructed view of the events”) (citing
Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010) (declining to
wholly discredit plaintiff’s version of the events where video evidence lacked sound
and was periodically obstructed)). 	In other words, the video footage provided by
Defendants does not “so utterly discredit[]” Lee’s version of events “that no
reasonable jury could have believed him.” 	See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. 	Thus,
accepting Lee’s sworn allegations as true,5 the undersigned finds there are genuine
disputes of material fact as to whether Defendants used more force than necessary
to restrain Lee and move him into his new cell. 	See Wromas v. Mursch, No.
3:20CV02698/MCR/ZCB, 2023 WL 11937244, at *5 n.5 (N.D. Fla. June 28, 2023)
(recommending denial of motion for summary judgment on excessive force claim
because “the video evidence does not wholly corroborate either party’s version of
events surrounding the uses of force”).
Also, because questions of material fact exist regarding whether excessive
force was used, those same questions of fact preclude the entry of summary
judgment on Lee’s failure to intervene claims. All Defendants were present at the
5 It is well settled that at the summary judgment stage, the Court cannot make credibility
determinations and must instead review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See e.g., Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (“It is not
the court’s role to weigh conflicting evidence or to make credibility determinations [at summary
judgment]; the non-movant’s evidence is to be accepted for purposes of summary judgment.”).
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 10 of 17

Page 11 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
time force was used, and Lee’s declaration indicates the Defendants had the
opportunity to intervene. Thus, if a jury concludes that any of the Defendants used
excessive force, then the others could be liable for failing to intervene. 	See Alston
v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2020) (“‘An officer who is present at
the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another
officer’s use of excessive force’ can be liable for failing to intervene, so long as he
‘was in a position to intervene yet failed to do so.’”) (quoting Hadley v. Gutierrez,
526 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2008)).
B. 	Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants argue judgment should be entered in their favor because they are
entitled to qualified immunity. 	Qualified immunity shields government officials
performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would be aware. 	Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 69 F. 4th
1277, 1300 (11th Cir. 2023). However, generally, “a defense of qualified immunity
is not available in cases alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, because the use of force ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm’
is clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 11 of 17

Page 12 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
decisions in Hudson and Whitley.”6 Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301 (internal citations
omitted).
As explained above, the undersigned finds there is a genuine dispute of
material fact regarding whether Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by
using excessive force and failing to intervene. And, because “a reasonable jury could
find [Defendants] violated [Plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights, [Defendants] are
not entitled to qualified immunity.” Bowden v. Stokely, 576 F. App’x 951, 955 (11th
Cir. 2014). 	Thus, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on
qualified immunity.
C. 	Lee is not barred from seeking damages.
1. 	Compensatory Damages
Defendants argue Lee is not entitled to compensatory damages because he
“fails to state a physical injury which is greater than de minimis.” 	Doc. 78 at 22.
Specifically, 	Defendants 	argue 	(1) 	a 	“review 	of 	[Lee’s] 	medical 	records
demonstrates that he did not have any injuries on May 17, 2024” (Doc. 78 at 26), (2)
Lee’s examination immediately after the use of force did not show “observable
6 Defendants argue Skrtich is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Citing Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002), they claim prison officials who violate the Eighth Amendment by using
excessive force may nonetheless be shielded from liability if their actions did not violate clearly
established law. 	Doc. 89 at 4-5. 	However, Hope does not support that argument because it
involved a deliberate indifference claim related to an inmate’s conditions of confinement. 	536
U.S. at 737-38 (“In making this determination in the context of prison conditions, we must
ascertain whether the officials involved acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to the inmates’ health
or safety.”).
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 12 of 17

Page 13 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
injuries,” and his subsequent medical assessments on May 23, June 6, and June 12
revealed only “mild sternocleidomastoid muscular pain from muscle strain” and
“possible torticollis” (Doc. 78 at 26-7), and (3) an aggravation of a pre-existing
injury is not more than de minimis.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a prisoner must prove he suffered a more than
de minimis physical injury to recover compensatory damages. 	Thompson v. Smith,
805 F. App’x 893, 900-01 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 	To surpass the de
minimis threshold, an injury must generally be “an observable or diagnosable
medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care professional.” 	Thompson
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555, 557 n.3 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Tex. 1997)). Here, the undersigned finds a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Lee suffered a more than de
minimis injury from the Defendants’ use of force.
When there is a conflict between medical records and a prisoner’s affidavit,
the conflict cannot be resolved automatically in favor of the medical records. 	See
Reid v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 486 F. App’x 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2012) (“While
it is true that [the inmate’s] medical records do not support the version of the facts
he presents in his affidavit, all this means is that there is conflict in the evidence,
which we must resolve at the summary judgment stage in [the inmate’s] favor.”).
Lee has consistently cited the May 17 incident as the source of his neck pain. 	See
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 13 of 17

Page 14 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
Doc. 78-10 at 54 (May 20, 2024, Sick Call Request); id. at 49 (June 3, 2024, Sick
Call Request); id. at 38 (June 12, 2024, Sick Call Request); Doc. 84-1 (November
13, 2024, Sick Call Request). And Lee declares that his “chronic severe neck pain”
is ongoing, which takes his injury beyond a mere aggravation of a preexisting
condition. 	Doc. 90-1 at 6. 	Thus, while temporary neck pain alone would not
generally constitute more than a de minimis injury, the evidence indicating Lee
continues to experience medically-treated neck issues caused by the May 17 incident
for over a year after the incident is sufficient to cross the more than de minimis
threshold and survive summary judgment. 	See Flanning v. Baker, 2016 WL
4703868, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2016), report and recommendation adopted,
2016 WL 4703862 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2016) (“Because a genuine dispute of material
fact exists concerning whether plaintiff’s injuries were 	de minimis, summary
judgment is not appropriate on the issue of compensatory … damages.”).
2. 	Punitive Damages
Defendants argue the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) bars Lee’s
request for punitive damages. The PLRA states:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions
shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not
grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct
the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 14 of 17

Page 15 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
Punitive damages are included within the definition of “prospective relief”
used in the statute. See Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002),
abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395.
Defendants 	claim 	punitive 	damages 	categorically 	cannot 	satisfy 	the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) because: (1) “‘correction’ of a violation
[of a federal right] accomplished through compensatory damages and punitive
damages are, by their nature, never corrective”; (2) punitive damages cannot be
“narrowly drawn”; and (3) punitive damages are “never the ‘narrow[est]’ or ‘least
intrusive’ way of effectuating such a correction” of a violation of a federal right.
Doc. 78 at 32-33. However, Defendants cite no cases that hold § 3626 prohibits the
assessment of punitive damages in prison conditions cases. And the Eleventh Circuit
case they do cite, Johnson, indicates punitive damages are permitted in prison
conditions cases.7 Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1325 (finding § 3626’s “requirements mean
that a punitive damages award must be no larger than reasonably necessary to deter
7 The undersigned recognizes Defendants’ argument that the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson did not
consider whether § 3626 bars punitive damages, nor has the issue ever been squarely addressed by
the circuit court. See Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1364 n.5 (11th Cir. 2021) (“We decline the
government’s invitation to address the availability of punitive damages in prison condition cases
under 18 U.S.C. § 3626, as it falls outside the scope of the en banc briefing question posed to the
parties.”).
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 15 of 17

Page 16 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
the kind of violations of the federal right that occurred in the case” and “that such
awards should be imposed against no more defendants than necessary to serve that
deterrent function and that they are the least intrusive way of doing so”).
Thus, the current state of the law does not support the conclusion that § 3626
imposes a categorical prohibition on an award of punitive damages. 	See Hoever v.
Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding “that § 1997e(e) permits
claims for punitive damages without a physical injury requirement”); Benton v.
Rousseau, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1379-80 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2013) (finding
prisoner was entitled to $15,000 in punitive damages for violations of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights). Accordingly, Lee may pursue punitive damages in
this case.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 78) be DENIED.
2. 	This case be referred to the undersigned for further pretrial proceedings
on Lee’s Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure to intervene claims.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 29 th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 16 of 17

Page 17 of 17
Case No. 3:24cv321-TKW-HTC
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
Case 3:24-cv-00321-TKW-HTC Document 91 Filed 12/29/25 Page 17 of 17