HALES v. PRESTON et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
JEREMY B. HALES,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No.: 1:25cv58/RH/ZCB
RICHARD LUTHMANN, JR., et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Currently before the Court is Defendant Luthmann’s motion to
dismiss. 	(Doc. 198). 	Plaintiff has responded in opposition. 	(Doc. 202).
For the reasons below, the motion to dismiss should be granted.
I. 	Background1
Plaintiff Jeremy Hales operates an online business that generates
revenue by posting content on social media websites like YouTube,
Facebook, and TikTok. 	Plaintiff has over 730,000 subscribers for his
“What the Hale$” channel on YouTube and over 327,000 followers for his
“What the Hale$” page on Facebook.
1 The information below comes from the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s
third amended complaint. (Doc. 189). At this stage, those allegations are
accepted as true. 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
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Defendant Richard Luthmann also maintains an online presence
by, among other things, posting content on a blog. 	In early 2025,
Defendant Luthmann allegedly sent emails about Plaintiff to the Anti-
Defamation League and to people who post content on YouTube. Around
the same time, Defendant Luthmann also posted a video to a blog
allegedly depicting Plaintiff “as Adolf Hitler by adding a Hitler mustache
to Plaintiff’s photograph and engaging in oral sex with a journalist.”
(Doc. 189 at 7).
In 	the 	third 	amended 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	claims 	Defendant
Luthmann’s conduct violated Florida’s sexual cyberharassment statute
(count two). Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief against
Luthmann.
II. 	Discussion
Defendant 	Luthmann 	argues 	that 	dismissal 	is 	warranted 	for
several reasons.2 First, he argues that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. 	Second, 	he 	argues 	that 	service 	of 	process 	has 	been
2 Defendant Luthmann also raises arguments regarding joinder and
severance. 	Because the Court concludes dismissal is warranted, it is
unnecessary to address the joinder and severance arguments. 	If this
matter is not ultimately dismissed, then Defendant Luthmann will be
permitted to raise the joinder and severance issues by separate motion.
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insufficient. 	Third, he argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 	Because the order of operations
requires jurisdiction to be addressed before merits, the Court will first
address the subject matter jurisdiction argument. See Sinochem Int’l Co.
v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (stating the
general rule that a court “may not rule on the merits of a case without
first determining that it has jurisdiction”).
A.
According to Defendant Luthmann, the claim brought against him
in the third amended complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 	Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, dismissal is warranted if the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. 	Federal subject matter jurisdiction typically exists either
because the case presents a federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331) or the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction have been met (28 U.S.C. § 1332).
Plaintiff’s third amended complaint invokes the Court’s diversity
jurisdiction. 	(Doc. 189 at 2). 	Diversity jurisdiction exists when the
parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. 	28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 	It is undisputed that Defendant
Luthmann and Plaintiff are diverse (Plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio, and
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Defendant Luthmann is a citizen of Florida). But Defendant Luthmann
contends that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.
When a plaintiff has filed an action in federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction, “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls” for
amount in controversy purposes “if the claim is apparently made in good
faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less
than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.” 	Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1977) (cleaned up).
Here, the third amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff Hales
suffered $370,000 in damages from the alleged sexual cyberharassment
by Defendant Luthmann. 	(Doc. 189 at 14). 	According to the third
amended complaint, these damages stemmed from reputational harm,
harassment, and loss of business opportunities. 	(Id. at 13-15). 	Taking
as true the allegations about Plaintiff’s online subscriber base and his
associated online business ventures that were allegedly damaged by
Defendant Luthmann’s conduct, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged
in 	good 	faith 	damages 	that 	satisfy 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy
requirement. 	And it does not appear to a legal certainty that the claim
is really for less than the jurisdictional amount. 	Accordingly, the Court
has subject matter jurisdiction over this case based on diversity of
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citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	See Pete v. Cooper, 812 F. Supp. 3d
1251, 1256-58, 1269-70 (S.D. Fla. 2025) (stating that a complaint alleging
damages exceeding $75,000 from defendant’s “campaign of smear and
harassment through social media . . . using video, audio, and written
posts to cause reputational harm and emotional distress” including a
“deepfake pornographic video” of plaintiff was sufficient for diversity
jurisdiction).
B.
Next, the Court will address Defendant Luthmann’s argument that
dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service. 	The
Court rejects Defendant Luthmann’s argument for two reasons. 	First,
Defendant Luthmann has been evading service and has had actual notice
of this lawsuit for quite some time. (See, e.g., Doc. 158 at 5-14; Doc. 115).
Second, Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for substituted service.
It appears to the Court that Defendant Luthmann has treated
service like a game of cat and mouse. 	He has actively worked to evade
service, all the while being fully aware of the lawsuit and filing lots of
documents in the lawsuit. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s service
attempts on Defendant Luthmann are “sufficient to confer jurisdiction.”
See Lancaster v. Bottle Club, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-634, 2017 WL 4922855, at
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*2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2017) (finding service sufficient where plaintiffs
made multiple attempts to serve defendants who had notice of the
lawsuit but were foiled by defendant’s refusal to answer the door or
accept any service documents); see also Banco Latino, S.A.C.A. v. Gomez
Lopez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“Notice of a complaint
coupled 	with 	good 	faith 	attempted 	service 	is 	sufficient 	to 	confer
jurisdiction where a party is evading service of process.”). Indeed, at this
point “it seems futile to require Plaintiff[] to expend countless additional
resources 	in 	order 	to 	effect 	service 	upon” 	Defendant 	Luthmann.
Chamberlain v. Integraclick, Inc., No. 4:10cv477-SPM, 2011 WL 1456878,
at *4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2011) (finding the defendant was served where
there was actual notice, multiple attempts to serve, and acts to evade
service).
The Court also, and alternatively, finds that Defendant Luthmann
has been served under Florida’s substituted service procedure. Although
the general rule under Florida law is that a defendant must be personally
served, “the general rule has exceptions, such as substituted service on
the Secretary of State” under Fla. Stat. § 48.161. Rebalko v. Atallah, 413
So. 3d 170, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). 	Under § 48.161, a plaintiff may
complete substituted service by serving the Florida Secretary of State
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when an individual conceals his whereabouts. 	To complete substituted
service under § 48.161, a plaintiff must (1) serve the Secretary of State
with a copy of the summons and complaint; (2) pay the requisite fee to
the Secretary of State; (3) provide notice of service upon the Secretary of
State to the defendant by registered or certified mail;3 and (4) file an
affidavit of compliance that shows substituted service was proper and
that due diligence was exercised in attempting to complete personal
service before using substituted service. 	Fundamental Nutrition LLC v.
Emerge Nutraceuticals Inc., No. 5:23cv64, 2023 WL 6975984, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 23, 2023).
Here, the Court finds that the requirements of substituted service
have been satisfied. 	More specifically, the Court finds that Defendant
Luthmann has concealed his whereabouts and worked to actively evade
service. 	As detailed by Plaintiff, repeated attempts to locate and serve
Defendant Luthmann have been unsuccessful. (Docs. 150, 150-1, 150-2).
Defendant Luthmann is very much aware of the lawsuit, he is aware of
the attempts to serve him, and he has taken steps to avoid being served.
3 “Courts may dispense with the filing of a postal receipt if a substituted
service statute is invoked on the ground that the defendant is evading
service.” 	Wise v. Warner, 932 So. 2d 591, 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
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Second, the Court finds that Plaintiff has served the Florida Secretary of
State and otherwise complied with the procedural requirements for
substituted service. (See Docs. 150, 150-1).
The Court further finds that Plaintiff exercised due diligence in
attempting to locate and serve Defendant Luthmann, as evidenced by the
process server affidavits and related documents provided by Plaintiff.
(Doc. 150-2). 	In reaching that conclusion, the Court notes that the “test
is not whether it was in fact possible to effect personal service in a given
case, but whether the plaintiff reasonably employed knowledge at [his]
command, 	made 	diligent 	inquiry, 	and 	exerted 	an 	honest 	and
conscientious 	effort 	appropriate 	to 	the 	circumstances, 	to 	acquire
information necessary to enable [him] to effect personal service on the
defendant.” 	Verizon Trademark Servs., LLC v. Producers, Inc., No. 8:10-
cv-665, 2011 WL 3296812, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2011). 	Accordingly,
the Court concludes that Defendant Luthmann has been served by
substituted service under Fla. Stat. § 48.161.
Defendant Luthmann attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing
that substituted service is only available for nonresidents, and he is a
resident of Florida. 	The Court disagrees with Defendant Luthmann’s
argument. 	The statute provides that substituted service may be used
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when “an individual or a business entity is a nonresident or conceals his,
her, or its whereabouts . . . .” 	Fla. Stat. § 48.161(2) (emphasis added).
The word “‘or’ is generally construed in the disjunctive when used in a
statute or rule.” 	Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1986).
“The use of a disjunctive in a statute indicates alternatives and requires
that those alternatives be treated separately.” 	Ellinwood v. Bd. of
Architecture & Interior Design, 835 So. 2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA
2003). 	Applying that principle here, Fla. Stat. § 48.161(2) provides two
alternatives for when substituted service may be used—(1) the individual
or business entity is a nonresident; or (2) the individual or business entity
is concealing its whereabouts. 	So regardless of Defendant Luthmann’s
status as a Florida resident, he is subject to substituted service because
he has concealed his whereabouts and evaded service. 	See Smith v.
Leaman, 826 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (stating that § 48.161
“allows for substituted service of process on a Florida resident who is
concealing his whereabouts”). 	The Court, therefore, rejects Defendant
Luthmann’s argument that dismissal is warranted for lack of service.
C.
The Court will now turn to Defendant Luthmann’s argument that
dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
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To overcome a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff
must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the 	misconduct 	alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	At the motion to dismiss
stage, the complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true, but its
legal conclusions are not. 	Id.
In count two, the third amended complaint alleges that Defendant
Luthmann violated Florida’s sexual cyberharassment statute, Fla. Stat.
§ 784.049. 	Plaintiff claims Defendant Luthmann did this by publishing
on a blog a video that allegedly depicted Plaintiff engaged in a sex act.4
In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Luthmann argues that Plaintiff’s
allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Fla. Stat. § 784.049. As
explained below, Defendant Luthmann is correct.
4 The third amended complaint includes a link to the video, and the video
is discussed throughout the third amended complaint. (Doc. 189 at 7, 11).
Because Plaintiff “refers to [the video] in the complaint,” the video is
“central to the [cyberharassment] claim,” and the video’s “contents are
undisputed[,]” the Court will consider the video in connection with the
motion to dismiss. 	Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, 67 F.4th 1268,
1276 (11th Cir. 2023); see also Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App’x 696, 700
(11th Cir. 2020) (considering, at the motion to dismiss stage, video
footage that was referenced in the complaint).
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Section 784.049 “criminalizes sexual cyberharassment.” 	Conradis
v. Buonocore, No. 6:18-cv-1486, 2021 WL 4243720, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
17, 2021) (cleaned up). 	The statute was designed to address so-called
“revenge porn,” which occurs when a “person depicted in a sexually
explicit image taken with the person’s consent” has the image published
online without the person’s consent. 	See Fla. Stat. § 784.049(1)(a)-(b)
(discussing 	the 	legislature’s 	findings 	relating 	to 	the 	sexual
cyberharassment statute); see also Crapps v. State of Fla., 180 So. 3d
1125, 	1127 	(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2015) 	(explaining 	that 	the 	sexual
cyberharassment statute was enacted to provide a tool for addressing
“acts of so-called ‘revenge porn’”). 	In addition to criminal penalties, the
statute provides an “aggrieved person” with the right to bring a civil
action “against a person” who has violated the statute. 	Fla. Stat. §
784.049(5) (Oct. 1, 2022).5
5 The statute was amended, effective October 1, 2025. 	But Defendant
Luthmann’s video was published in January of 2025, so the Court looks
to the version of Fla. Stat. § 784.049 that was effective at that time, which
was the October 1, 2022, version. See S-Fer Int’l, Inc. v. Stonesheets, LLC,
No. 14-24662-CIV, 2016 WL 8808748, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2016)
(“Florida law provides that the applicable version of a statute is that
which was in effect when a cause of action accrues.”). To the extent that
any of the statutes that Fla. Stat. § 784.049 points to for definitional
purposes were subsequently amended, the Court applies those statutes
as they existed in January of 2025. And for what it is worth, none of the
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To state a violation of § 784.049, a plaintiff must plausibly allege
that:
1. 	Defendant 	published 	a 	sexually 	explicit 	image 	of
Plaintiff on an internet website;
2. 	The image contained or conveyed Plaintiff’s personal
identification information;
3. 	Defendant 	acted 	willfully 	and 	maliciously, 	for 	no
legitimate 	purpose, 	and 	with 	the 	intent 	of 	causing
substantial emotional distress to Plaintiff;
4. 	Plaintiff did not consent to the publication.
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2017-09, 238
So. 3d 192, 196 (Fla. 2018). 	Looking to the third amended complaint, it
plausibly alleges that Defendant Luthmann posted an image of Plaintiff
on an internet website, that the image conveyed Plaintiff’s name (which
qualifies as personal identification information under the statute, see Fla.
Stat. 784.049(2)(b)), that Defendant Luthmann acted with the requisite
mental state, and that Plaintiff did not consent to the publication. 	The
question 	is 	whether 	Plaintiff 	has 	plausibly 	alleged 	that 	the 	image
changes made to § 748.049 in 2025 would have changed the result in this
case.
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Defendant Luthmann posted was “sexually explicit.” 	To answer that
question, it is necessary to venture through a dense forest of defined
terms.
The venture starts with the phrase “sexually explicit image,” which
the statute defines as any photograph or video that depicts “nudity” or
depicts “any person engaging in sexual conduct.” 	In re Standard Jury
Instructions, 238 So. 3d at 196; Fla. Stat. § 784.049(2)(a), (d) (Oct. 1,
2022). Let’s take those terms one at a time—starting with what “nudity”
means in this context. 	According to the statute (i.e., § 748.049(d))
“nudity” has the same meaning here as it does in Fla. Stat. § 847.001.
And that statute defines “nudity” as:
the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area,
or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering; or the
showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple; or
the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid
state.
Fla. Stat. § 847.001(11) (Oct. 1, 2022).
Having established what “nudity” is for purposes of § 748.049(d), it
is necessary to decide if the third amended complaint plausibly alleges
that 	the 	video 	posted 	by 	Defendant 	Luthmann 	depicts 	“nudity” 	by
Plaintiff. 	It 	does 	not. 	Instead, 	the 	video 	shows 	Plaintiff’s 	face
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superimposed on somebody else’s body. 	The video only shows the body
from the shoulders up, and the body is clothed. Thus, the third amended
complaint does not plausibly allege that the video is “sexually explicit”
based on a depiction of “nudity” by Plaintiff.
An image can also be “sexually explicit” if it depicts a person
engaged in “sexual conduct.” 	According to the statute, “sexual conduct”
means the same thing in § 748.049(d) as it does in § 847.001(19). Here is
the definition from § 847.001(19):
actual 	or 	simulated 	sexual 	intercourse, 	deviate 	sexual
intercourse, 	sexual 	bestiality, 	masturbation, 	or
sadomasochistic abuse; actual or simulated lewd exhibition of
the genitals; actual physical contact with a person’s clothed or
unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if such person is
a female, breast with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of either party; or any act or conduct which constitutes
sexual battery or simulates that sexual battery is being or will
be committed.
Fla. Stat. § 847.001(19) (Oct. 1, 2022). As you just read, “sexual conduct”
includes “actual or simulated . . . deviate sexual intercourse.”6 But what
does that mean? 	To find out, we turn to Fla. Stat. § 847.001(5), which
6 Plaintiff has simply stated that the video depicts “sexual conduct” (Doc.
202 at 15), but he has not identified what particular portion of the
definition of “sexual conduct” he believes is implicated. The only portion
that the Court believes could arguably be implicated by the video is
“deviate sexual intercourse.” Thus, that is where the Court will focus its
discussion.
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says that “deviate sexual intercourse” is “sexual conduct between persons
not married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the
anus, the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vulva.” Fla. Stat. §
847.001(5) (Oct. 1, 2022). 	The statute not only covers the “actual”
depiction of these things, but also the “simulated” depiction of them. And
in this context, “simulated” means “the explicit depiction of conduct
described in subsection (19) which creates the appearance of such conduct
and which exhibits any uncovered portion of the breasts, genitals or
buttocks.” Fla. Stat. § 847.001(22) (Oct. 1, 2022).
Applying all that here, the third amended complaint does not
plausibly allege that the video posted by Defendant Luthmann depicted
a person engaged in “sexual conduct.” 	The video shows an image of
Plaintiff 	Hales’s 	face—with 	an 	added 	fake 	Hitler 	mustache—
superimposed on another person’s body. The video also shows an image
of a woman with her mouth open. The image of the woman then rotates
before moving to the bottom of the screen such that only a portion of the
woman’s hair is visible. 	The woman’s head then appears to go up and
down, as the image of Plaintiff Hales bears an expression of excitement
or shock. 	Although the video is intended to mockingly suggest that
Plaintiff Hales is receiving oral sex from the woman, the video does not
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show “contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis,
or the mouth and the vulva.” 	Fla. Stat. § 847.001(5) (Oct. 1, 2022).
Indeed, the video shows neither male nor female genitalia. 	The video,
therefore, does not depict “actual” “deviate sexual intercourse.”
The 	video 	also 	does 	not 	depict 	“simulated” 	“deviate 	sexual
intercourse.” As mentioned above, the statutory definition of “simulated”
requires two things: “[1] the explicit depiction of [sexual conduct] . . .
which creates the appearance of such conduct and [2] which exhibits any
uncovered portion of the breasts, genitals, or buttocks.” 	Fla. Stat. §
847.001(22) 	(Oct. 	1, 	2022) 	(emphasis 	added). 	The 	Court 	assumes
arguendo that the video creates “the appearance” of “contact between . .
. the mouth and the penis” as necessary to meet the first statutory
requirement for conduct to qualify as “simulated.” 	But the second
statutory requirement7 is clearly not satisfied because the video does not
7 The statute uses the word “and,” which is a conjunctive that “combines
items.” Hon. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation 	of 	Legal 	Texts 	116 	(2012). 	When 	a 	statute 	lists
requirements “connected by the conjunctive ‘and,’” it is necessary to meet
all the requirements. 	United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321,
326 (2021); see also Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Monroe
Cnty., 105 So. 3d 555, 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Of course, ‘and’ is a
conjunction to mean that both elements must be met.” (cleaned up)).
Although there are rare cases where “and” is not used in the conjunctive
sense, this case is not one of them. Reading the “and” in this statute as
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“exhibit[] any uncovered portion of the breasts, genitals, or buttocks.” Id.
The video, therefore, does not depict any “simulated” “sexual conduct” as
those terms are defined by Fla. Stat. §§ 847.001(19), (22).8
When all the above is put together, it leads to the conclusion that
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the video published by Defendant
Luthmann contained a “sexually explicit image” of Plaintiff. As a result,
Plaintiff 	has 	not 	stated 	a 	plausible 	claim 	under 	Florida’s 	sexual
cyberharassment statute, Fla. Stat. § 784.049. 	Although the video
Defendant Luthmann published is vulgar, offensive, and juvenile, it does
not 	constitute 	sexual 	cyberharassment 	under 	Florida 	law. 	Thus,
dismissal is warranted for failure to state a claim.9
anything other than a conjunctive would make little sense given the
statutory text and context.
8 This result is consistent with the idea that statutes prohibiting the
depiction of “simulated” sexual conduct are typically intended to address
situations where “[t]he portrayal” would “cause a reasonable viewer to
believe that the actors actually engaged in” the depicted conduct. United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (discussing simulated sexual
conduct in the context of child pornography laws). 	Here, the video—
containing superimposed faces and clearly satirical elements—would not
lead any reasonable viewer to believe that Plaintiff and the woman were
actually engaging in sexual conduct in the video.
9 	The dismissal should be with prejudice because Plaintiff has had
multiple chances to amend his complaint. 	See Eiber Radiology, Inc. v.
Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 673 F. App’x 925, 930 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We
have never required district courts to grant counseled plaintiffs more
than one opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, nor have we
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III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Defendant 	Luthmann’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	(Doc. 	198) 	be
GRANTED and count two of the third amended complaint (Doc. 189) be
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
2. 	This matter be recommitted to the undersigned for further
proceedings involving Defendant Preston.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 2nd day of September 2026.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to the Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.
Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the
Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	An objecting party must
serve a copy of the objections on all other parties. 	A party who fails to
object to the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained
concluded 	that 	dismissal 	with 	prejudice 	is 	inappropriate 	where 	a
counseled plaintiff has failed to cure a deficient pleading after having
been offered ample opportunity to do so.”). To the extent that Defendant
Luthmann (a pro se litigant) believes that he is entitled to attorney’s fees
under Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute (see Doc. 198 at 12-13), he is wrong.
See Lee v. Animal Aid, Inc., 388 So. 3d 25, 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (stating
that the appellant “as a pro se litigant on her Anti-SLAPP motion, was
not entitled to attorney’s fees”).
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in a report and recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal
the 	district 	court’s 	order 	based 	on 	unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal
conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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