Lincoln v. Delaware State Police

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
MARKICE LINCOLN,
Plaintiff,
V.
DELAWARE STATE POLICE,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 25-517-CFC
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This case arises out ofpro se Plaintiff Markice Lincoln's arrest by Delaware
State Police officers on December 28, 2022. Lincoln alleges in the Complaint that
officers of Defendant Delaware State Police searched, seized, and arrested him in
violation of the Fourth Amendment ofthe U.S. Constitution.' D.I. 1-4 at 3^.
Pending before me are Delaware State Police's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint(D.I. 6)and Lincoln's Motion for Extension of Time to Serve (D.I. 18).
'Lincoln also appears to allege violations of Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware
Constitution, but because neither party addresses those allegations in any
subsequent filings, and because there is no private right of action under Article I,
Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, Amoako v. Clayton Police Dep't, 2024 WL
3596419, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2024); see also Schueller v. Cordrey, 2017
WL 568344, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2017), I will construe the Complaint as
just alleging violations ofthe Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
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The Delaware State Police has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). D.I. 6 at 1.
Rule 12(b)(5) permits a defendant to assert by motion the defense of
insufficiency of service of process. Lincoln, in response, has moved for an
extension oftime to perfect service under Rule 4(m). D.I. 18.
Rule 4(c)(1) requires a plaintiff to serve the summons and complaint on the
defendant within the time allowed by Rule 4(m). Rule 4(j) provides that a state or
state agency may be served by either "delivering a copy of the summons and ofthe
complaint to [the state's] chief executive officer" or by "serving a copy of each in
the manner prescribed by that state's law ... on such a defendant." Delaware law
provides that:
No service of summons upon the State, or upon any
administrative office, agency, department, board or
commission of the state government, or upon any officer
of the state government concerning any matter arising in
connection with the exercise of his or her official powers
or duties, shall be complete until such service is made
upon the person of the Attorney General or upon the
person of the State Solicitor or upon the person of the
Chief Deputy Attorney General.
10 Del. C. § 3103(c). And Rule 4(m)provides that a plaintiff has ninety days after
the complaint is filed to serve the defendant. Failure to do so could result in
dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). "[I]f the plaintiff shows good cause for [his]
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failure," however,"the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate
period." Id.
Courts consider three factors in determining whether good cause exists:
(1) whether the plaintiff reasonably attempted to effect service;(2) whether the
defendant is prejudiced by the plaintiffs failure to timely effect service; and
(3) whether the plaintiff moved for an extension of time to effect service. United
States V. Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. 163, 166-67(D. Del. 1988); see also MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097(3d Cir. 1995)(citing
Nuttall approvingly).
Lincoln argues that good cause exists, see D.I. 18 at 1; D.I. 17 at 4, and I
agree. With respect to the first factor, it is undisputed that "Plaintiff served
Defendant with a summons and a complaint on January 14, 2025." See D.I. 6 at 2;
see also D.I. 1 at 1 ("The Complaint was served on Defendant on January 14,
2025."); D.I. 1-1 (Deputy Sheriffs sworn statement that he served a copy of the
summons and Complaint on Delaware State Police Troop 2). Such service
occurred within one month of when Lincoln filed the Complaint. See D.I. 1-2 at 2;
see also D.I. 1 at 1. Although Lincoln has failed thus far to perfect service by
serving the Attorney General, State Solicitor, or Chief Deputy Attorney General
pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3103(c), Lincoln's attempt to effect service by serving the
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named defendant, the Delaware State Police, was reasonable, especially
considering that Lincoln is proceeding pro se.
With respect to the second factor,"[the] defendant's actual knowledge ofthe
lawsuit... is crucial." Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. at 167 (citing Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I.
Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 517(3d Cir. 1988)). "This actual notice precludes any
finding of detrimental reliance by, or prejudice to, [the] defendant...
notwithstanding that service of process did not comport with every detail of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4." Id. And as I explained above, it is undisputed that the Delaware
State Police has long had actual notice of Lincoln's claims against it.
With respect to the third and final factor, Lincoln should have requested an
extension sooner because the Delaware State Police put Lincoln on notice of his
failure to perfect service as early as April 29, 2025, in its notice of removal. See
D.I. 1 at 1 ("Plaintiff failed to comply with 10 Del. C. § 3103(c)... ."). Lincoln,
however, has since moved for an extension. D.I. 18. Moreover, he is proceeding
pro se and appears to have experienced repeated delays in obtaining access to
filings on the docket. See, e.g., D.I. 3 (Letter to the Court explaining that he
received the notice of removal on June 23, 2025, nearly two months after it was
filed); D.I. 4(Notice of return of undeliverable mail sent to Lincoln dated July 3,
2025); D.I. 10 (Letter to the Court stating that the motion to dismiss was
"somehow returned so [he] was unaware of[the] motion until [the Court] sent
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[him] the order to respond by October 14th, 2025"). And failure to timely request
an extension "certainly is not by itself fatal" to the existence of good cause. See
Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. at 167 (citation omitted).
I thus conclude that Lincoln had good cause for not timely perfecting service
on the Delaware State Police. Accordingly, I will grant Lincoln's motion for an
extension to perfect service and deny without prejudice to renew Delaware State
Police's motion to dismiss insofar as it seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)
for insufficient process.
11.
The Delaware State Police has also moved to dismiss Lincoln's Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, arguing that it enjoys sovereign immunity and is not a "person" within the
meaning of42 U.S.C. § 1983. See D.I. 6 at 1. In response, Lincoln has filed a
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint(D.I. 20) and a Motion to Amend
the Complaint(D.I. 19)to name individual officers as defendants instead of the
Delaware State Police.
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that "[tjhe court should freely give leave [to amend
the complaint] when justice so requires." "The Third Circuit has adopted a liberal
policy favoring the amendment of pleadings to ensure that claims are decided on
the merits rather than on technicalities." S. Track & Pump, Inc. v. Terex Corp.,
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722 F. Supp. 2d 509, 520(D. Del. 2010)(citingDo/e v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d
484, 487(3d Cir. 1990)). Absent a showing of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive, undue prejudice, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment
previously allowed, or futility of the amendment, leave to amend under Rule 15
should generally be permitted. Id. at 520-21 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962)).
The Delaware State Police argues that "amendment would be futile as the
statute of limitations [for Lincoln's claims] expired on December 28, 2024."^
D.I. 21 at 5. I agree that the statute of limitations has expired because Lincoln
alleges that the unlawful arrest occurred in December 2022 and the statute of
limitations for Lincoln's claims is two years. See D.I. 1-4 at 2-3; Kach v. Hose,
589 F.3d 626,639(3d Cir. 2009)("[A] § 1983 claim is governed by the statute of
limitations that applies to personal injury tort claims in the state in which such a
claim arises."); 10 Del. C. § 8119("No action for the recovery of damages upon a
claim for alleged personal injuries shall be brought after the expiration of2 years
from the date upon which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained
.. . .").
^ The Delaware State Police makes another futility argument that I need not
address here. See D.I. 21 at 5.
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The analysis, however, does not end there. Rule 15(c) permits amendments,
including amendments that change the defendant, to relate back to the date the
original complaint was filed if certain conditions are met. To determine whether
amendment is futile, then, I must first determine whether Lincoln's proposed
amendment relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Rule 15(c)(1)(C), in turn, relies
on Rule 4(m), and the Third Circuit has held that "Rule 15(c)(l)(C)'s reference to
'the period provided by Rule 4(m)' is not limited to just the default 90 days since
Rule 4(m)also encompasses the mandatory good cause extension provision."
Moore v. Walton, 96 F.4th 616,624(3d Cir. 2024). I thus do not think it prudent
to rule on Lincoln's motions for leave to amend the Complaint—and the merits of
Delaware State Police's remaining arguments in its motion to dismiss—^until the
good cause extension expires. Accordingly, I will also deny without prejudice to
renew Delaware State Police's motion to dismiss insofar as it seeks dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
NOW THEREFORE, at Wilmington on this Twelfth Day of March in 2026,
it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Serve
(D.I. 18) is GRANTED and Plaintiff shall have until April 13, 2026 to perfect
service on Defendant. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to
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Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint(D.I. 6)is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
RENEW.
CHIEF JJ^GE
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