MALLGREN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANTHONY BRIAN MALLGREN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-01013 (UNA)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint
(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	The
Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses the
Complaint, and this matter, without prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of New York, sues the United States. See Compl. at 1. The Complaint
is difficult to follow, consisting of a laundry list of assorted grievances. See generally id. First,
Plaintiff broadly alleges that he “has faced widespread unresolved employment discrimination,
including by the federal government,” in various sectors. See id. at 1. Second, he alleges that he
is dissatisfied with the lack of response from the legislature when he has attempted to “engage” in
“government representation.” See id. at 2. Third, he addresses concerns with his landlord. See id.
Fourth, he challenges the grading systems instituted by State University of New York and City
University of New York. 	See id. 	at 3. 	Fifth, he states that “the United States Second Circuit
(including the district courts), are involved in the sponsorship of select parties rather than the
administration of justice,” and alleges that the federal courts are inaccessible to some. See id. at
3–4. Sixth, he discusses the mental health field and his feeling that the “government is seemingly
of the opinion that because they have a fear of death, that others are not allowed to die,” with
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respect to “medically assisted suicide.” 	See id. at 4. 	Finally, he covers a variety of other
miscellaneous topics, expressing his general concerns and ideas regarding “digital citizenship,”
corporations, the “finance industry,” distribution of wealth, the potential insolvency of the Social
Security Administration, “undeveloped land, and unutilized resources throughout the nation,” land
development, and “mismanagement” of “market resources.” See id. at 2–4. He demands equitable
relief. See id. at 5.
Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.
Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8
standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can
prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of
res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
Plaintiff’s allegations are neither clear nor direct, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), and the
paragraphs are not limited to a single set of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). When, as
here, a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely
stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal
comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. 	Jiggetts v. Dist. of Columbia, 319
F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 17-7021, 2017
WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). Put differently, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of
charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort
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Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category, failing to provide the Court or the
Defendant with adequate notice of a claim, and falling short of establishing the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“we do not require
heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”).
Accordingly, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. 	A separate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
DATE: June 1, 2026 	/s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
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