ADEYINIKA v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EMMANUEL ADEWALE ADEYINIKA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00539 (UNA)
)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 	)
OF TREASURY, 	)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has filed a Complaint, ECF No. 1, and his Application for Leave
to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application,
and for the reasons discussed below, dismisses this action without prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Oregon, attempts to bring this action as a “relator/Private Attorney
General.” 	See Compl. at 1. 	He alleges that the Oregon Department of Revenue (“ODR”) is
operating a “ghost-reporting enterprise among regional employers designed to falsify federal tax
credits[.]” See id. He seeks an injunction, correction of records, and restitution, and asks the Court
to order an investigation by the Department of Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. See id.
at 2.
Plaintiff, however, is not authorized to bring this action, as pleaded. As background,
whistleblowers are generally authorized to bring qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3732, “an anti-fraud statute that prohibits the knowing submission of false or
fraudulent claims to the federal government.” United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys.,
Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003). More specifically, the FCA authorizes a private individual,
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as a relator, “to bring [a qui tam] action in the Government’s name, and to recover a portion of the
proceeds of the action, subject to the requirements of the statute.” 	U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM
Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); 31 U.S.C. § 3730. But, in federal
court, a plaintiff generally “may [only] plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(individual “not a member of the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to
appear in [federal] court as counsel for others”) (citation and footnote omitted). And in a qui tam
action, the United States is “the real party in interest,” Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176, 2015
WL 512896, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015); therefore, a “pro se plaintiff may not file” on its behalf,
Jones v. Jindal, 409 Fed. App’x. 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see Gunn v. Credit Suisse Grp.
AG, 610 Fed. App’x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that “every circuit that has [addressed the
issue] is in agreement that a pro se litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the
Government.”) (citing cases).
Indeed, it is well established that “pro se parties may not pursue [qui tam] actions on behalf
of the United States.” Walker v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2015)
(quoting U.S. ex rel. Fisher v. Network Software Assocs., 377 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196–97 (D.D.C.
2005)); see Canen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 118 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that
“courts in this jurisdiction consistently have held that pro se plaintiffs . . . are not adequately able
to represent the interests of the United States”) (citing cases); U.S. ex rel. Szymczak v. Covenant
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 207 Fed. App’x 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] qui tam relator—even one
with a personal bone to pick with the defendant—sues on behalf of the government and not
himself. He therefore must comply with the general rule prohibiting nonlawyers from representing
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other litigants.”). 	In other words, Plaintiff has neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to
pursue the claims of the federal government, or anyone else, without counsel.
Furthermore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to compel an agency investigation. See Otero v.
U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also Jafree v.
Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). The Executive Branch has absolute discretion to decide
whether to conduct such an investigation and those decisions are not subject to judicial review.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); see Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d
1476, 1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute
or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an
agency’s absolute discretion.”).
For all of these reasons, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. 	A separate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
DATE: May 26, 2026 	/s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
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