ARNOLD v. MCCUMBER et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEANDRE ARNOLD, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 	25-04264 (UNA)
)
)
KEVIN F. MCCUMBER et al, 	)
Clerk of the U.S. House, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action brought pro se is before the Court on review of Plaintiff’s complaint and
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court grants the
application and dismisses the complaint.
I.
Plaintiff, a resident of McDonough, Georgia, sues Georgia’s U.S. Senators Jon Ossoff and
Raphael Warnock; U.S. House of Representatives Clerk Kevin F. McCumber and unnamed staff
members; U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia Theodore Hertzberg and unnamed
employees; the FBI’s Field Office in Atlanta, Georgia, and unnamed employees; the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee and unnamed staff members; the House Judiciary Committee; and the Office
of the U.S. Attorney General. 	In the 59-page, 245 paragraph Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants either engaged in or acted in furtherance of a criminal enterprise under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 	He seeks a declaratory judgment, see
Compl. ¶¶ 223-244, “the availability” of which “presupposes the existence of a judicially
remediable right.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
Case 1:25-cv-04264-UNA Document 3 Filed 04/09/26 Page 1 of 5

2
Plaintiff is “the founder of a civil rights advocacy group, the United Coalition Family.”
Compl. ¶ 3. In May and November of 2025, Plaintiff “alerted various Federal offices of an alleged
Criminal RICO Enterprise spanning across three (3) states, involving collectively over 50 state
and federal officials, four (4) nongovernmental organizations and one (1) private citizen.” Compl.
¶ 24. Plaintiff surmises that the “motives of this alleged criminal network were to stifle [his] civil
litigation . . . 	due to [his] potential legal success . . . in an official proceeding challenging the
constitutionality of Georgia’s Municipal court authority to adjudicate state traffic offenses.” Id. ¶
25; see Arnold on behalf of Arnold v. City of Hampton, No. 1:21-cv-4970-SEG, 2023 WL 3243913
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 2023) (district court granting “each of the motions to dismiss pending before
it” and denying as moot Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment in action “against a
variety of defendants connected with” Plaintiff’s “conviction for a traffic violation in the Hampton
Municipal Court, his ensuing probation, and some related public records requests and state court
litigation”). Plaintiff’s RICO claims include “but [are] not limited to, falsifying support records
and 	court 	summons, 	simulating 	custody 	proceedings, 	obstruction 	of 	mail, 	extortion 	and
intimidation of process servers.” Compl. ¶ 92.
Plaintiff faults the Attorney General for failing to investigate his “RICO criminal
complaint” asserting “multiple bona fide and prima facie meritorious claims,” id., and to appoint
a special prosecutor. See id. ¶¶ 45-51; 91-104. He alleges that the Atlanta FBI Office “refused
delivery,” id. ¶ 59, of his voluminous packages “containing his criminal material detailing” the
“criminal ‘racketeering’ conspiracy,” id., ¶ 56, and has an “alleged pattern, practice and policy of
returning mail sent by private citizens” for various reasons, id. ¶¶ 80-82 (emphasis in original);
see also generally id. ¶¶ 53-63.
Case 1:25-cv-04264-UNA Document 3 Filed 04/09/26 Page 2 of 5

3
As for the congressional defendants, Plaintiff faults the House for failing to receive and
consider a bill he “authored” that would allow “lower courts to review de novo prior child support
and child custody orders entered in under state processes that lacked a favorable presumption and
particularized hearings to determine parental absences.” Id. ¶ 134; see generally id ¶¶ 137-168.
II.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). 	The
United States, U.S. agencies, and U.S. employees performing official duties are immune from suit
save “clear congressional consent[.]”1 United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see
Albrecht v. Comm. on Employee Benefits of Fed. Reserve Employee Benefits Sys., 357 F.3d 62, 67
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (federal agencies and instrumentalities performing federal functions possess
sovereign immunity) (cleaned up); Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
1 	Although Plaintiff sues John and Jane Doe staffers in their individual capacities, Compl. ¶¶ 5, 8, 11, 12,
he has not plausibly alleged that any one of them acted beyond the scope of his or her employment or
statutory authority. See Compl. ¶¶ 142, 161-162, 168, 176, 183-184, 198 (allegations mentioning the “Doe”
defendants); cf. Navy, Marshall & Gordon, P.C. v. U.S. Intern. Development-Cooperation Agency, 557 F.
Supp. 484, 488-89 (D.D.C. 1983) (sovereign immunity does not “shield federal officers who act beyond
the scope of their authority, in derogation of established constitutional and statutory principles[.]”) (citing
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949) (other citations omitted));
Hunter v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 569 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Courts will exercise their
[inherent] power to review alleged ultra vires agency action [only] when an agency patently misconstrues
a statute, disregards a specific and unambiguous statutory directive, or violates a specific command of a
statute.”) (citing Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Additionally, Plaintiff does not
seek damages from the complaint, which is the only “appropriate relief” for claims against government
officials sued in their individual capacities. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 49 (2020); see Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing an implied
cause of action under the Constitution for monetary damages against federal employees sued in their
individual capacities).
Case 1:25-cv-04264-UNA Document 3 Filed 04/09/26 Page 3 of 5

4
(confirming immunity for government employees acting in their official capacity). 	In addition,
sovereign immunity generally “forecloses 	. . . claims against the House of Representatives and
Senate as institutions, and against members of both congressional houses acting in their official
capacities, since an official capacity suit is treated as a suit against a government entity.” Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. Schiff, 474 F. Supp. 3d 305, 310 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Rockefeller v. Bingaman,
234 F. App’x 852, 855 (10th Cir. 2007) (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Shade v. Congress, 2013 WL 5975978, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 15, 2013) (per curiam)
(affirming dismissal of claims against “the Congress and the U.S. House of Representatives based
on absolute immunity from claims stemming from “purely legislative activities”) (quoting U.S. v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972)). 	“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for [exercising] jurisdiction.”
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
III.
A waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and
[it cannot] be implied.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (cleaned up). Congress “has not
waived” the United States’ immunity “for claims brought under the RICO Act,” Klayman v.
Obama, 125 F. Supp. 3d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Norris v. Dep't of Def., No. 96-5326, 1997
WL 362495, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 1997) (per curiam) (other citation omitted)), and Plaintiff has
not established any other basis of federal court jurisdiction. 	To the extent he seeks a judgment
declaring a right to an investigation, it is established that the United States Attorney General has
absolute discretion in deciding whether to investigate claims for possible criminal or civil
prosecution. As a general rule applicable here, such decisions are not subject to judicial review.
Shoshone–Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Therefore, this case
Case 1:25-cv-04264-UNA Document 3 Filed 04/09/26 Page 4 of 5

5
will be dismissed by separate order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring dismissal “at any time”
the court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).
_________/s/_____________
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
Date: April 9, 2026 	United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-04264-UNA Document 3 Filed 04/09/26 Page 5 of 5